Abstract:
At present, accelerating the construction of the social credit system and strengthening the protection of the ecological environment are two important tasks for China’s economic development from high-speed growth to high-quality development. In this paper, haze pollution is used to characterize environmental pollution. Based on the panel data of 30 provinces from 2008 to 2018, the direct impact and transmission mechanism of two types of credit governance strategies (dishonest punishment and trustworthy incentive) on haze pollution are identified through gs3sls model and threshold effect model. The research findings are as follows: First, dishonesty punishment mainly controls haze pollution by driving the upgrading of industrial structure, promoting the improvement of technical efficiency and restraining economic scale. Second, Trustworthy incentive can alleviate the “crowding out effect” of R&D investment on production scale and improve production efficiency, but the expansion of production scale may be the main cause of haze pollution. Third, the government’s reduction of market intervention is helpful to release the bonus of trustworthiness and promote haze control, but has no significant impact on the haze control effect of punishment for trust-breaking. Fourth, strengthening the punishment of dishonesty will produce a “deterrent effect”, which will make local high pollution industries shift and form a “pollution paradise” in nearby areas; strengthening trustworthy incentives will enable nearby areas to transfer polluting industries to local areas, which will exacerbate haze pollution. The paper puts forward the following suggestions for the government: accelerate the formation of the regional integration system of credit rewards and penalties, and establish a joint warning and banning mechanism for polluting enterprises; continue to strengthen the punishment of environmental dishonest enterprises and give full play to its “deterrent effect”; continue to deepen the reform of “decentralization, management and service”, and give full play to the role of market mechanism in resource allocation.