The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights,and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements |
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| Authors: | Timo Goeschl Grischa Perino |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany;2. University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany |
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| Abstract: | The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of “green” technologies. Using a simple model, we highlight a conflict between international environmental agreements (IEAs) on emissions reductions and international systems of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on abatement technologies. When IPRs are strong and global, IEA signatories anticipate rent extraction by innovators. This hold‐up effect reduces abatement, potentially to levels below those of non‐signatories, and it reduces the number of signatories to self‐enforcing IEAs. We explore policy options that respect existing property rights, but avoid the strategic interaction between signatories to an IEA and innovators. |
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| Keywords: | Diffusion of innovations intellectual property rights international climate policy L12 O33 O34 Q54 Q55 |
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