| 分税制、转移支付与地方政府财政努力 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘小勇. 分税制、转移支付与地方政府财政努力[J]. 南方经济, 2012, 0(5): 38-53 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘小勇 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南理工大学经济与贸易学院,510006 |
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| 基金项目： | 华南理工大学985高校基金，教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金，国家自科基金青年项目，教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金，武汉市社会科学基金一般项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文实证检验了分税制和转移支付对地方政府财政努力的影响,通过引入空间效应,将总效应分解为直接效应和间接效应。我们发现,地方财政收入分成比例的提高会提高地方政府财政努力程度,财政转移支付依赖越高则地方政府财政努力程度越低,并且地方政府会依据过去的分成比例和财政转移支付来决定其财政努力水平。利用空间计量模型,我们还发现,地方政府之间存在横向模仿行为,横向政府间财政策略存在空间外溢性。
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| 关 键 词： | 财政努力 分成比例 模仿 |
Tax Share System, Transfer and Local Government Revenue Effort |
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| Xiaoyong Liu. Tax Share System, Transfer and Local Government Revenue Effort[J]. South China journal of Economy, 2012, 0(5): 38-53 |
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| Authors: | Xiaoyong Liu |
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| Affiliation: | Xiaoyong Liu |
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| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of fiscal revenue retention ratio and transfer on fiscal revenue effort of provincial governments and decomposes the total effect into direct and indirect effect by introducing spatial effect.we find that fiscal revenue retention ratio has positive effect on local governments’revenue effort,but central government’s transfer has negative effect.Local government would decide its revenue effort level according to previous revenue retention ratio and transfer.We also find there is mimicking effect among local governments.Local government will decides its effort level according to its neighbor. |
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| Keywords: | Fiscal Revenue effort Revenue Retention Ratio Mimicking |
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