The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia |
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| Authors: | Insaf Békir Sana El Harbi Gilles Grolleau Naoufel Mzoughi Angela Sutan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Université de Sousse, Sousse, Tunisie;2. Supagro, UMR 1135 LAMETA, Montpellier, France;3. Burgundy School of Business—LESSAC, Dijon, France;4. INRA, UR 767 Ecodéveloppement, Avignon, France |
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| Abstract: | Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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