| 信用治理策略与污染防治:失信惩戒还是守信激励？ |
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| 引用本文： | 冯星宇,曾光辉.信用治理策略与污染防治:失信惩戒还是守信激励？[J].西部经济管理论坛,2022,33(5):57-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 冯星宇 曾光辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.西安交通大学管理学院 陕西西安 710049 |
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| 摘 要： | 当前，加快社会信用体系建设和加强生态环境保护是中国经济从高速增长向高质量发展的两大重要任务。以雾霾污染表征环境污染，基于30个省份2008—2018年的面板数据，通过GS3SLS模型和门槛效应模型识别失信惩戒和守信激励两类信用治理策略对雾霾污染的直接影响及传导机制。研究发现:第一、失信惩戒主要通过驱动产业结构升级、促进技术效率提升和抑制经济规模以治理雾霾污染。第二、守信激励缓解了研发投入对生产的“挤出效应”，从而提升生产效率，但生产规模扩张是造成雾霾污染的主要原因。第三、政府降低市场干预有助于释放守信红利从而推动雾霾治理，但对失信惩戒的治霾效果没有显著影响。第四、加大失信惩戒力度会产生“震慑效应”，使本地高污染产业发生转移，形成邻近地区“污染天堂”；加强守信激励会使邻近地区将污染产业转移至本地，加剧雾霾污染。最后，针对政府提出如下建议:加快形成信用奖惩区域一体化制度，建立污染企业联合警示和禁入机制；持续加大对环保失信企业的惩戒力度，充分发挥失信惩戒的“震慑效应”；持续深化“放管服”改革，充分发挥市场机制的资源配置作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 信用治理 污染防治 雾霾污染 失信惩戒 信激励守 |
| 收稿时间： | 2022-05-27 |
Credit Governance Strategy and Pollution Prevention: Punishment for Breach of Faith or Incentive for Keeping Faith? |
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| Authors: | Feng Xingyu Zeng Guanghui |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710049, China |
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| Abstract: | At present, accelerating the construction of the social credit system and strengthening the protection of the ecological environment are two important tasks for China’s economic development from high-speed growth to high-quality development. In this paper, haze pollution is used to characterize environmental pollution. Based on the panel data of 30 provinces from 2008 to 2018, the direct impact and transmission mechanism of two types of credit governance strategies (dishonest punishment and trustworthy incentive) on haze pollution are identified through gs3sls model and threshold effect model. The research findings are as follows: First, dishonesty punishment mainly controls haze pollution by driving the upgrading of industrial structure, promoting the improvement of technical efficiency and restraining economic scale. Second, Trustworthy incentive can alleviate the “crowding out effect” of R&D investment on production scale and improve production efficiency, but the expansion of production scale may be the main cause of haze pollution. Third, the government’s reduction of market intervention is helpful to release the bonus of trustworthiness and promote haze control, but has no significant impact on the haze control effect of punishment for trust-breaking. Fourth, strengthening the punishment of dishonesty will produce a “deterrent effect”, which will make local high pollution industries shift and form a “pollution paradise” in nearby areas; strengthening trustworthy incentives will enable nearby areas to transfer polluting industries to local areas, which will exacerbate haze pollution. The paper puts forward the following suggestions for the government: accelerate the formation of the regional integration system of credit rewards and penalties, and establish a joint warning and banning mechanism for polluting enterprises; continue to strengthen the punishment of environmental dishonest enterprises and give full play to its “deterrent effect”; continue to deepen the reform of “decentralization, management and service”, and give full play to the role of market mechanism in resource allocation. |
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