The problem of employees' network centrality and supervisors' error in performance appraisal: A multilevel theory |
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| Authors: | Lorenzo Bizzi |
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| Affiliation: | California State University, Fullerton |
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| Abstract: | This article reveals an unexplored paradox for HR managers: the centrality of an employee in the social network benefits performance but hampers performance appraisal because it affects supervisors' rating errors. Central employees can be erroneously rated high on performance even when they are not high performers because supervisors tend to overappraise their performance. A distinction is made between rating precision, which depends on supervisors' uncertainty regarding employees' performance, and rating accuracy, which depends on supervisors' bias in favor of employees. Employee centrality is posited to be beneficial to precision but deleterious to accuracy because it regulates the diffusion of positive information, status, and power, all of which distort supervisors' capacity and motivation to accurately appraise performance. It is then argued that rating errors caused by network centrality affect aggregate perceptions of justice in organizations. When employees are highly connected to each other in a dense network, organizations have a strong and positive justice climate. Yet when some employees are more central than others in a centralized network, organizations have a negative and weak justice climate. The article contributes to the literature because it identifies an unexplored dark side of network centrality and offers recommendations for HR managers to cope with its deleterious consequences and for scholars to study them. |
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| Keywords: | multilevel theory network centrality performance appraisal rating accuracy rating precision social networks |
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