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ENTRY REGULATIONS,WELFARE, AND DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE
Authors:Florin G Maican  Matilda Orth
Affiliation:1. KU Leuven, Belgium;2. University of Gothenburg, Sweden;3. Centre for Economic Policy Research;4. IFN, Belgium
Abstract:Welfare effects of entry regulations are theoretically ambiguous in differentiated product markets. We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store‐type differentiation and static price setting to evaluate how entry regulations affect long‐run profitability, market structure, and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry costs and fixed costs by store type. Counterfactual policy experiments show that welfare increases when competition is enhanced by lower entry costs. Protecting small stores by imposing licensing fees on large stores is not welfare enhancing.
Keywords:
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