Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination

In this paper, I compare two-part tariff competition to linear pricing in a vertically differentiated duopoly. Consumers have identical tastes for quality but differ in their preferences for quantity. The main finding is that quality differentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only if two-part tariffs are feasible. Furthermore, two-part tariff competition encourages entry, which in turn increases welfare. Nevertheless, two-part tariff competition decreases consumer surplus compared to linear pricing.     

Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation

This paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third-degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous. The results provide rich implications for antitrust policy.     

Product differentiation and dynamic price behavior in fish markets

The objective of this paper is to estimate the dynamics of aquaculture and fish prices as a response to price shocks. The vector autoregression approach will be used to explain the dynamics of the sea bream market in both cultured and wild fishing. The main result is that changes in public regulation or in production conditions could stimulate production responses which may take time to settle. Usually, the change is a matter of adjusting between equilibria over a period of time, with the pattern and speed of the adjustment, depending on the nature and degree of disequilibrium in the fishing system. Comments from reviewers have been incorporated into the paper and are gratefully acknowledged. Financial support was provided by Direcció General de Recerca, Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació project N^o SGR2001-160.     

Seasonality,price discrimination,and welfare

We discuss a potential limitation to a widely accepted result, namely that an output increase is a necessary condition for welfare to increase with price discrimination. We use a theoretical model to show that the existence of seasonal demand fluctuations may allow for a simultaneous reduction in average output and increase in average welfare. We also discuss a number of extensions of our basic model.     

Endogenous rationing,price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames

This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price–quantity pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price. Under price–quantity competition firms are able to ration their output below capacity. For a wide range of capacity pairs, the equilibrium path providing the smaller firm with its highest stationary perfect equilibrium payoff requires that it undercut its rival’s price and ration demand. Furthermore, for some capacities and discount factors supporting security level punishments, price shading and rationing arise everywhere on the set of stationary perfect equilibrium paths yielding (constrained) Pareto optimal payoffs. That is, price shading may not only be consistent with optimal collusion, it may be a requirement of optimal collusion.     

Third-degree price discrimination,quality choice,and welfare

Employing an endogenous quality choice model, we reconsider the effect on welfare of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. We prove that price discrimination always enhances welfare, mainly because the quality improvement owing to price discrimination increases consumer surplus. Moreover, we show that third-degree price discrimination benefits all parties, including consumers in the higher priced market if the preference differences between markets are sufficiently large.     

Imperfect price discrimination, market structure, and efficiency

Abstract.  We introduce a flexible third‐degree price discrimination framework by modeling the information firms possess about consumers' locations (preferences) on the Salop circle as a partition. Higher information quality is translated into a partition refinement. In the limit, we obtain the perfect price discrimination paradigm. We show that the free‐entry equilibrium number of firms exhibits a U‐shape as a function of the quality of information. This implies that imperfect price discrimination generates the most efficient free‐entry outcome. JEL classification: D43, L11, L43     

Switching costs, consumer heterogeneity and price discrimination

In a duopoly with price discrimination and switching costs, we analyse the evolution of market structure, when an incumbent and a new entrant compete, and a new class of users with lower willingness to pay appears in the market. We find that the market share of the new entrant depends on the degree of heterogeneity and the level of switching costs. In particular, if the degree of heterogeneity is intermediate, the evolution of market structure is similar for high and null switching costs. Since consumer surplus and social welfare are unambiguously lower under high switching costs, this result points at the risk of inferring the degree of market competitiveness from the convergence in market shares.     

Replacement cycles,income distribution and dynamic price discrimination

This article analyses how income distribution, Intellectual Property Rights and other regulatory policies such as minimum quality standards determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a monopolist periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good. Discrimination through quality and screening in this article takes place in a context where consumers buy several versions of the durable good during their lifetime, instead of a single version as in Inderst’s (2008) or Koh’s (2006). It also differs from Glass (2001) in that an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable generations with different frequencies. Our modelling is motivated by stylized facts from the last Brazilian POF (household budget survey).     

Regulating monopoly price discrimination

There is a substantial literature assessing the impact of entry restrictions created by state certificate-of-need (CON) programs on hospital and nursing home markets, but comparatively little research has focused on CON for home health agencies (HHAs). We assessed the impact of state CON programs for HHAs, and for potential substitute service providers, on quality ratings for HHAs. HHA quality ratings were obtained from the Home Health Compare database developed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the last quarter of 2010 through the last quarter of 2013. The HHA-level data were augmented with county-level area characteristics for each HHA in the CMS database. An ordered logit model was used to estimate the association between state CON restrictions and Low, Medium, and High quality categories, adjusted for HHA and area characteristics. The results indicated that HHAs in states with CON for HHAs were less likely to have High quality ratings, and more likely to have Medium quality ratings, compared to agencies in states without CON for home health. Additional research is needed to assess whether the apparent adverse impact of CON on HHA quality is related to diminished competition among HHAs in states with CON.     

Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment

Experimental Economics - We experimentally compare collusive behaviors in first-price sealed-bid auctions without and with a reserve price. Before the auction begins, a bidder may offer a bribe to...     

Input price discrimination and horizontal shareholding

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in...     

Intertemporal price discrimination and consumer demand

Under a particular class of utility functions, intertemporal price discrimination (IPD) is not feasible. That is, customers cannot be made to pay different prices for a durable good at different points in time. Other factors such as falling costs, and differing discount rates between buyers and sellers have been found to make intertemporal pricing schemes feasible, or even profitable. None of these factors, however, were fundamental demand differences which give rise to static price discriminations. In this paper we argue that IPD is indeed feasible and sometimes profitable, if only we allow for a nondurable good in the utility function. A simple additively separable utility is examined first, which is then extended to a nonseparable utility function which allows richer substitution/complementary relations between the durable and the nondurable goods. This may help us to better understand the similarities between static and intertemporal price discriminations.     

Product differentiation,prices, and market structure

We examine the effect of cost reductions and advertising on equilibrium prices and the equilibrium market shares. Our equilibrium has the following characteristics; the aggregate demand is the integral of individual demand over consumers, goods are differentiated in the sense of Novshek and Sonnenschein (1979), production functions are constant returns to scale.Cost reductions of a firm, which are due to R&D activity of the firm, lead to declines of equilibrium prices. Advertising of a firm, which is supposed to influence consumers' preferences in favor of the firm, cannot necessarily cause equilibrium prices to go up; one firm can raise its prices, but the other cannot. Contrary to our intuition, cost reductions cannot always enable a firm to capture a larger share.     

Product differentiation, competition, and international trade

In this paper the two workhorse theories of international trade under imperfect competition – Krugman's taste for variety model and Brander's strategic intra-industry trade model – are integrated into a single analytical framework. A quadratic utility function allows for a nesting of these two theories by postulating a consumer taste for variety over differentiated products, where the extent of product differentiation is linked to the intensity of strategic interaction among firms. The model yields intuitive predictions on the effects of the degree of product differentiation on the volume of trade and on the composition of the gains from trade under imperfect competition. JEL classification: F12
Différenciation de produits, concurrence et commerce international. Ce mémoire intègre deux théories connues du commerce international en régime de concurrence imparfaite – le modèle du goût pour la variété de Krugman et celui du commerce intra-industrie de Brander – en un seul cadre analytique. Une fonction d'utilité quadratique permet d'encadrer ces deux théories en postulant que le consommateur a un goût pour la variété dans une gamme de produits différenciés où le degré de différenciation est reliéà l'intensité de l'interaction stratégique entre les entreprises. Le modèle engendre des prévisions quant aux effets du degré de différenciation des produits sur le volume de commerce international et la composition des gains résultant de ce commerce en régime de concurrence imparfaite.     

Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment

We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We find that the degree of price collusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts are made than in periods without contracts, and than in the baseline treatments.     

Exchange rate pass-through,price discrimination,and US meat export prices

Exports are becoming increasingly important for US livestock and poultry producers. Consequently, meat industry participants are concerned about the potential impacts of variations in relative currency values. These effects are considered by quantifying the impacts of relative exchange rates on US beef, pork and poultry export prices. In addition, the impacts of GATT and NAFTA agreements on exchange rate pass-through are considered. The results indicate incomplete exchange rate pass-through occurs for several countries. Trade liberalization under GATT has positively influenced US beef and poultry export prices.     

Second degree price discrimination and natural monopoly

This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. The paper shows that a “no‐distortion‐at‐the‐top” result, which is standard in models with restricted entry, may also appear in a contestable market. Depending on cost and demand structures, first best efficiency can also be a sustainable equilibrium. However, due to the existence of a continuum of equilibria, first best efficiency is not guaranteed. Most notably, even a stable “distortion‐at‐the‐top” result is possible.