Implications of Economic Interdependence for Endogenous Wage Indexation Decisions

This paper shows how economic interdependence affects the indexation decisions of atomistic wage setters in an environment in which monetary authorities do not observe stochastic disturbances before making their policy choices. If stochastic disturbances are common across countries, interdependence has no effect on equilibrium indexation choices in identical countries. However, if disturbances are country specific, numerical simulations show that interdependence is likely to reduce equilibrium indexation choices relative to a small open economy. We also show that indexation choices may be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but that strategic complementarity becomes more likely as the degree of interdependence rises.     

The incidence and intensity of wage indexation: an empirical analysis

Variables suggested by theoretical studies of indexation are considered with a view to examining their utility in the context of the decision to index (incidence) and the desired degree of indexation when escalator clauses are put into effect (intensity). The Tobit model, which can address both of these issues, suggests that most of the effects of explanatory variables on the regressand occur by modifying the incidence of indexation, not its intensity. However, the Tobit model is itself rejected in favour of separate Probit and Truncated Regression investigations of incidence and intensity, respectively. The results obtained indicate that the standard list of explanatory variables, which one thinks of in the context of the theoretical literature as dealing primarily with intensity, perform well in explaining incidence but very poorly in accounting for the non-limit observations. The latter are influenced by bargaining power proxies such as the unemployment rate and union density; a very clear trade-off between indexed and non-contingent wage adjustment can also be discerned. These results call for more theoretical attention to the distinction between indexation incidence and its intensity.     

Wage Indexation, Employment and Inflation

Price versus productivity-indexing is considered in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information and wage bargaining. In a perfectly price-indexed economy, the inflationary bias due to lack of credibility is eliminated. However, productivity-indexing is more appropriate to dampen macroeconomic fluctuations that are caused by real disturbances. We show that productivity-indexing alone guarantees both price and employment stability, provided the government's reputation is good enough and the union's bargaining power is not too strong. This reduces the degree of price indexation as the union becomes weaker and the government's reputation improves. Productivity-indexing is desirable with volatile productivity processes and weak unions.
JEL classification : E 24; E 52     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

The indexation of wages and bonds in Brazil

This paper analyses the dynamic relationship between the degrees of indexation of wages and public bonds in Brazil. A simple model is constructed to show that both degrees of indexation are determined simultaneously. We apply cointegration techniques and estimate error-correction representations to assess the temporal causality between them. Our results provide empirical support for the existence of simultaneity in the degrees of indexation in Brazil in the period 1980–93.     

Indexation of UNCTAD core commodity prices by buffer stocks or export quotas?: A comparison of the benefits for two developing economies

General equilibrium models are used to study the resource allocative and income implications for the Ivory Coast and Kenya of indexation of agricultural commodity prices. Two indexation methods are investigated, (i) buffer stock transactions, and (ii) export quota entitlements. The results suggest that there are efficiency losses associated with the buffer stock option which reduce the GDP gains below that indicated by the pure terms of trade gains. Efficiency gains associated with the export quota method however result in GDP increases above those indicated by the pure terms of trade gains.     

Macroeconomic Policy and the Current Account in an Open Economy with Partial Wage Indexation*

In Australia the practice of partially indexing wages has become an art form. While open economy macroeconomics has been extended by various authors to the indexed wage case, none highlights the distinctive effects of partial indexation. This paper examines short-and long-run consequences of partial indexation. The standard conclusions that partial indexation is conducive to growth and that fiscal policy with partial indexation is expansionary are seriously questioned     

Affordability and Some Welfare Aspects of Indexation*

A general equilibrium model with production and trade is used to analyze whether indexation schemes are affordable.     

On the role of network externalities in strategic delegation contracts with an industry-wide union

This article analyses the role of network externalities in managerial delegation contracts for differentiated products when the marginal product costs (the wage) are set by an industry-wide union. The results show that, in both Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, each owner offers a profit-oriented incentive scheme to his or her managers by penalizing sales maximization, irrespective of the strength of the network externalities. In the presence of weak network externalities and low product differentiation, firms can obtain higher profits in the equilibrium under Cournot-type quantity competition compared with that under Bertrand-type price competition. Furthermore, the wage chosen by the union is higher in the Cournot than in the Bertrand equilibrium. In the Cournot equilibrium, the wage increases with the strength of the network externalities. However, in the Bertrand equilibrium, there exists a threshold level of the degree of product differentiation.     

Wage indexation and the monetary policy regime

We estimate a New Keynesian wage Phillips curve for a panel of 24 OECD countries and allow the degree of wage indexation to past inflation to vary according to structural characteristics. We find that the degree of wage indexation is significantly lower for countries with an inflation target. However, this effect vanishes when we control for the degree of goods market competition. By contrast, more goods market competition is consistently associated with lower wage indexation. This robust finding puts into question whether embedding a constant degree of wage indexation in standard DSGE models is truly structural.     

Wage bargaining and shock sensitivity of a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of centralized bargaining over a nominal wage (indexation) rule on a small open economy with fixed exchange rates. It is shown that the relative bargaining power of the confederation of employers and the union, respectively, affects not only the level of the endogenous variables but also their reaction to exogenous disturbances. If the union's power exceeds a critical value, positive aggregate demand shocks increase unemployment since the actual nominal wage rises more than the market clearing one. Moreover, if the union's power is sufficiently close to its upper bound, the overreaction of wages becomes so large that positive aggregate demand shocks even lead to a decrease in output and employment, i.e., the multipliers become negative.     

On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents

This paper provides a thorough equilibrium analysis of a wage contract negotiation model where the union must choose between strike and holdout between offers and counter-offers. When the union and the firm have different discount factors, delay in reaching an agreement may Pareto dominate many immediate agreements. We derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs and characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles that support these extreme equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. In particular, our analysis clarifies open issues on the maximal wage in this model when the union has a higher discount factor than the firm. We would like to thank Wilko Bolt, Gerard van der Laan, Michiel Keyzer, and an associate editor and the referee for their comments and suggestions. Quan Wen is grateful to the Tinbergen Institute and the Vrije Universiteit for their hospitality and generosity. This project is supported by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant B45-271.     

Inertial inflation, indexation and price stickiness: evidence from Brazil

This paper evaluates the inertial inflation hypothesis for Brazil. The hypothesis posits that indexation created a feedback mechanism such that one-time supply shocks were fully transmitted into permanent changes in inflation. A theoretical model is used to show that this outcome is based on the assumption of perfect price flexibility. However, with price stickiness indexation does not produce inertial inflation. The degree of inertia is then compared for two periods: one without indexation (1945–1963), and one with indexation (1969–1985). Finally, vector-autoregressive representations are estimated for the latter period, allowing for price stickiness. The empirical results do not support the hypothesis.     

指数型基金跟踪误差的实证分析

指数型基金是指采用指数化方式构建投资组合的基金,它与标的指数的选择密切相关.指数基金的构建有三大要素:标的指数、样本证券、权重分配,其目的是与标的指数之间的跟踪误差尽量小.虽然流动性、噪音、处置效应等均会影响指数基金的跟踪误差,但是,在一个较高有效性的市场中,指数型基金与标的指数间的跟踪误差要比新兴市场的小,这主要是因为该市场的流动性较好,成份股的选择有较大的余地.而在中国这样一个"新兴 转轨"市场中,指数基金往往会因为标的指数成份股数量不同而产生很大的差异,标的指数成份股越多,相对应指数基金的跟踪误差就越大;复制型基金完全复制策略下的跟踪误差要比增强型指数基金非完全复制策略下的跟踪误差要小;大额申购与赎回对指数基金跟踪误差产生明显影响.因此,指数型基金投资组合的构建应坚持被动投资,力避主动投资.     

Regional debt in monetary unions: Is it inflationary?

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank?We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.     

The effects of indexation of wage contracts on macro-economic stability

The paper develops a simple analytical framework in which the shortrun affects of wage indexation on the dynamic stability of inflation can be analyzed. It consists of a unlonized labor market faced by a competitive demand. Without indexation, the wage contract is based upon the union's prediction of the price level during the period of the contract. With indexation, the same objective is achieved by contracting only once at some initial period, subject to the stipulation that the nominal wage is linked to the price level. The main result is that when the demand for money is sensitive to changes in the expected rate of inflation, nominal variables like prices and wages are more likely to yield an unstable dynamic response with wage indexation, thus endangering the monetary system.     

Partial inflation indexation and long-run inflation targeting in a growing economy: A comparison of Calvo and Rotemberg pricing models

The observed 2% long run inflation target in most developed industrial nations is in variance with the zero or negative optimal inflation rates predicted by prominent monetary theories. Using a calibrated simple New-Keynesian model with endogenous growth and nominal rigidity, we compare two price setting environments of Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982). In our growth model, the steady state welfare maximizing inflation takes into account the growth effect as well as the price distortionary effects of inflation. The long-run welfare maximizing trend inflation could be positive in economies with nominal rigidity in the form of partial inflation indexation and price stickiness. A higher degree of inflation indexation lowers the steady state price distortion in the Calvo model and steady state price adjustment cost in Rotemberg model and raises the long run optimal inflation. Since the productive inefficiency caused by partial inflation indexation is higher in Calvo economy compared to Rotemberg, the long run optimal trend inflation is higher in Rotemberg than in Calvo. In both models, a two percent long run inflation target is attainable for a reasonable degree of inflation indexation.     

On optimal wage indexation when shocks are real

This note studies the optimal degree of wage indexation in the presence of real shocks. Contrary to what is indicated in the literature, it is demonstrated that the optimal degree of indexation is not limited to (0;1) but may take any value in (-∞;∞).     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, L10