公司治理中的会计角色

近年来 ,上市公司的治理成为企业改革的又一个热点话题 ,其中 ,财务信息失真问题引起社会愈来愈多的关注 ,会计也成为人们非议的焦点。本文要厘清的是会计在公司治理中真正的角色和地位是什么 ,以便正确发挥会计在公司治理中的作用。本文认为 ,会计在公司治理中所扮演的角色为 :一方面 ,财务会计和审计作为一个信息系统 ,在减少信息的不对称方面起着重要的作用 ;另一方面 ,管理会计与内部审计为监督合约条款的实施 ,保障合约的有效运行也发挥着重要的作用。     

媒体的公司治理作用——共识与分歧

随着媒体在监督企业违规行为,保护中小投资者权益方面发挥日益重要的作用,媒体的公司治理作用逐渐成为主流财务学研究关注的焦点和重要内容。一方面,倡导者坚定的认为,作为法律外公司治理机制的重要环节,通过事前监督、事中深入调查和追踪报道,媒体能够有效提高企业在事后改正违规行为的概率;另一方面,反对者则坚持,由于受到政府和其他利益集团的影响,媒体很难做出客观、中立和公正的报道,由此产生的报道偏差可能削弱媒体的公司治理作用。更进一步,反对者指出,通过改变受众的信息分布,有偏报道甚至会危害整个社会资源的配置效率。本文将重点从媒体发挥公司治理作用的动机、机制、条件、效果以及"媒体报道偏差学派"对媒体公司治理作用的质疑人手,详细梳理近年来主流财务理论关于媒体公司治理作用的不同观点和最新研究成果,并在此基础上指出在我国制度背景下研究媒体公司治理作用的可能拓展方向。     

机构投资者的治理效应研究述评:盈余管理视角

本文在综合分析了国内外学者对公司治理、机构投资者和盈余管理三者关系的基础上,认为机构投资者在一定程度上参与了公司治理,其持股比例越高则在公司治理中发挥的作用越大,越有助于提高公司治理水平。在公司治理水平高的公司,盈余管理行为受到有效的监督;而公司治理水平低的公司则为盈余管理提供了环境和机会。     

关于公司财务治理问题的思考

本文认为公司财务治理在公司治理中居于核心地位。尽管存在三种主要模式的公司治理,但不论采用那种模式,只要财权得到有效配置,就能够在很大程度上保证公司治理是有效的。根据对财务信息生成和呈报的影响力,可以把公司财务治理中的利益主体分为两类,第一类是依赖公司内部财务治理保障其利益的主体,第二类是依赖公司外部财务治理保障其利益的主体。第一类利益主体往往利用其在公司内部财务中的优势侵犯第二类利益主体的利益,所以加强公司外部财务治理是必要的。本文还通过对安然公司财务治理问题的分析强调了这一观点。     

股权制衡的公司治理效应

对于股权制衡能否发挥公司治理效应,学术研究对于这一问题仍然存在很多争论.本文从股权制衡和公司治理的概念出发,分析了股权制衡和公司治理之间的关系.在此基础上,本文认为股权制衡发挥公司治理效应能够起到提高财务信息质量,抑制关联交易行为以及降低控制权私人受益的作用.最后,本文认为股权制衡和公司治理的研究深度和广度都有待提高.     

国有公司治理中的财务监督体制研究

随着我国经济发展,我国的企业制度不断得到完善,国有公司治理过程中的财务监督的作用日益凸显.在国有公司治理过程中,财务监督作为公司经济监督的重要部分发挥了不可忽视的作用,其通过一定的监督程序、方法从公司的财务情况进行监督,从而维护国有公司的经济利益.虽然我国国有公司已经重视财务监督体制的构建,但是在具体实施过程中仍存在很多问题,故而有必要对这些问题进行分析、研究,从而提出对策以促进国有公司治理中的财务体制的构建和完善.     

发挥内部审计职能,实现公司治理完善

公司治理是对公司管理层的风险管理和内部控制的再监督,内部审计在公司治理过程中发挥着重要的价值增值作用。本文针对内部审计在公司治理中发挥的作用途径浅谈几点自己的看法。     

媒体发挥公司治理作用的动机、途径及效果研究

公司治理是近年来的研究热点,而现有研究很少涉及到关于媒体在公司治理中的作用。随着媒体在监督企业违规行为,保护中小投资者权益方面发挥日益重要的作用,媒体的公司治理作用逐渐引起学术界的关注。本文研究了媒体发挥公司治理作用的动机、途径以及媒体在公司治理中起到的作用,并就如何更好地发挥媒体的公司治理作用提出了几点建议。     

媒体发挥公司治理作用的动机、途径及效果研究

公司治理是近年来的研究热点,而现有研究很少涉及到关于媒体在公司治理中的作用.随着媒体在监督企业违规行为,保护中小投资者权益方面发挥日益重要的作用,媒体的公司治理作用逐渐引起学术界的关注.本文研究了媒体发挥公司治理作用的动机、途径以及媒体在公司治理中起到的作用,并就如何更好地发挥媒体的公司治理作用提出了几点建议.     

浅谈内部审计在公司治理中的作用

在公司整体治理过程中,内部审计具有监督以及评价、咨询等职能,对公司治理具有一定的推动作用。随着目前国内市场环境的变化,企业的发展环境也发生了变化,整体发展风险不断增加。本文对公司发展中内部审计发挥的作用进行讨论,并制定有效的战略规划,希望能够为公司治理提供一定的借鉴。     

Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.     

The impact of corporate governance on Internet financial reporting

This study examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure transparency measured by the level of Internet financial reporting (IFR) behavior. We measure corporate governance by shareholder rights, ownership structure, board composition, and audit committee characteristics. We develop a disclosure index to measure the extent of each sample firm’s IFR by presentation format, information content, and corporate governance disclosures. Results indicate that firms with weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of blockholder ownership, a higher percentage of independent directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher percentage of audit committee members that are considered financial experts are more likely to engage in IFR. The findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm’s Internet disclosure behavior, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Additional exploratory analysis indicates that the association between corporate governance and IFR varies with firm size. Our results suggest that new regulatory guidance in corporate governance leads to improved disclosure transparency via IFR.     

Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

The effect of audit committee shareholding,financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures

In recent years, corporate failures and accounting irregularities have led to concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees in the financial reporting process. In response, corporate governance committees in different countries have made specific recommendations designed to enhance the role of the audit committee in executing its financial reporting oversight duties. We investigate in this study, the effect of some of these recommendations by empirically examining the relationship between selected audit committee characteristics and the level of disclosure in interim reports of a sample of 262 UK listed companies. Specifically, the audit committee characteristics examined are shareholding of audit committee members (as a proxy for audit committee independence), audit committee size and audit committee financial expertise. Employing both a weighted and unweighted index to measure interim disclosure, the results indicate a significant negative association between shareholding of audit committee members and interim disclosure. Our results provide evidence of a significant positive association between interim disclosure and audit committee financial expertise. We find no significant relationship between audit committee size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Overall, however, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics have an impact on its monitoring effectiveness of the financial reporting process. These results have important implications for corporate governance policy-makers who have a responsibility to prescribe appropriate corporate governance structures to ensure that shareholders are protected.     

Audit committees,corporate governance,and shareholder wealth: Evidence from Korea

This paper examines the effect of audit committee appointments on shareholder wealth in Korea after the Asian financial crisis. We find that stock prices generally increase with audit committee appointments. In contrast, chaebol (business group) affiliates and firms switching audit committee membership are associated with significantly lower stock returns, probably due to the management’s opportunistic behavior. However, the independence and financial literacy of the audit committee members appear to mitigate the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, our result confirms that the characteristics of the audit committee strengthen or weaken the existing corporate governance. We discuss the implications of our results obtained under Korea’s unique corporate governance structure.     

The impact of corporate governance on financial performance of Indian and GCC listed firms: An empirical investigation

Corporate governance plays a vital role in creating a corporate culture of consciousness, transparency, and openness. In this context, this paper provides a brief view about the background of corporate governance mechanisms in India and Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries, corporate legal system and monitoring policies laid down by Indian and GCC governments. Furthermore, it analyzes the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial performance of Indian and GCC listed firms. The study uses a sample that consists of 53 non-financial listed companies from India and 53 non-financial listed companies from GCC countries for the period 2009–2016. Results revealed that board accountability (BA) and audit committee (AC) have an insignificant impact on firms' performance measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, transparency and disclosure (TD) have an insignificant negative impact on firms' performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the country dummy results show that Indian firms are performing better than Gulf countries ones in terms of corporate governance practices and financial performance. The current study is considered as a battery for further research and studies particularly in India & GCC listed firms in the context of corporate governance and financial performance.     

Corporate governance,SFAS 157 and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and the cost of equity capital under different fair value valuation methods, and assesses the impact of corporate governance on this relationship for US financial firms. We find that firms’ cost of equity capital is negatively associated with more verifiable fair value assets and positively related to less verifiable fair value assets. Furthermore, the positive association between less verifiable fair value assets and the cost of equity capital is mitigated under better corporate governance. The differential impact between more and less verifiable assets becomes smaller for firms with stronger governance. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on fair value regulation by investigating the economic consequences of adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) and the importance of audit committee financial expertise on fair value reporting. We also provide evidence on the importance of board independence, internal control strength, auditor industry specialists, and audit committee financial experts in fair value reporting.     

Are Audit Committees Red Herrings?

The common expectation of committees established in the wake of the corporate debacles during 1980s in the English-speaking world is that the audit committee device will raise the standards of corporate accountability and governance by improving the quality of financial reporting. That expectation is based on the prevalent belief that by strengthening the independence of auditors and non-executive directors audit committee members will monitor the financial reporting process in an independent manner. Unless accounting practices are reformed so that financial statements can be authenticated by recourse to reliable commercial evidence, audit committees are red herrings. Such reforms are essential if audit committee members are to keep under vigilant appraisal matters pertaining to the financial governance of, and reporting by, firms: the raison d'être of their appointment.     

Audit Committee Regulation in Australia: How Far Have We Come?

This paper presents a synopsis of the major developments in corporate governance regulations and recommendations for Australian audit committees, categorised into three distinct periods of regulation from 1976 to 2004. Earlier Australian research on audit committee formation, composition and diligence is summarised and compared. The research is then extended by presenting the results of an empirical study of 188 of the top 300 ASX listed companies with a financial year end of 30 June 2004, the first year of the third period of regulation. The results indicate that compliance with corporate governance regulations and recommendations had improved substantially with respect to: audit committee formation; the number of audit committee members, non‐executive directors on the audit committee; financial expertise of audit committee members; and the frequency of audit committee meetings. However, the number of independent directors on audit committees was well below ASX best practice guidelines.