Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Consumption Inequality in China: Theory and Evidence from the China Health and Nutrition Survey

We investigate consumption inequality in China both theoretically by constructing a theoretical model that delineates the transmission channels by which income shocks affect consumption and empirically through an Unequally Spaced Dynamic Panel Data model estimation. We find that China is experiencing consumption inequality with the full partial insurance of consumption against both permanent and transitory income shocks, although the impact of both types of shock are larger than the case of the United States. The results are due to precautionary savings motives of the Chinese. We further document how income becomes more dispersed in China and show how the family background of a child affects his outcome to a large extent. Policy implications based on our findings are proposed.     

Fiscal leadership and central bank design

Abstract.  This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.     

Mending the family tree a reconciliation of the linearization and levels schools of AGE modelling

This paper offers a critical comparison between the North American levels school of applied general equilibrium modelling, and the Norwegian/Australian school of linearizers. The paper develops both the levels and linearized representations of a neoclassical multiregion trade model. This is used as a vehicle for focusing attention on similarities and differences between the two schools. The main conclusions are: (i) that both the levels and linearized versions of non-linear AGE model offer a valid starting point for obtaining accurate solutions to the non-linear equilibrium problem; (ii) when update formulae are not employed, linearized representations are particularly prone to erroneous welfare conclusions; (iii) the levels representation offers a more natural starting point for expressing accounting conditions, whereas behavioural relationships are relatively more easily expressed in a linearized representation. Recent software developments now make both approaches to the representation and solution of non-linear AGE models convenient to implement. Thus the choice of which approach to use will depend on the special needs and preferences of the economist implementing the model. The two traditions of AGE modelling have a great deal in common and both would benefit from greater cooperation.     

Optimal monetary policy under rational expectations with a micro-based supply function

Combination monetary policies to stabilize both price and output in the face of IS, LM, and supply shocks are examined in a typical macromodel with the aggregate supply function expanded to include the real interest rate. The major results are that different combination policies are required for price and for output stability for both IS and supply disturbances, while the Poole result still holds for LM shocks. We also find a combination policy which stabilizes price and output given both IS and supply disturbances. Pure policies cannot, in this more general framework, be ranked except for LM disturbances.     

Complementarity between product and process innovation in a monopoly setting

In this article we study complementarity between market-enhancing product innovation and cost-reducing process innovation in a monopoly setting. First, we consider the possibility for a firm to alternatively invest only along one of the two directions and compare the incentives of process vs. product innovation. Then, we allow the firm to invest simultaneously in both activities, showing that both investment levels and profit are higher than in the case of individual investment. Thus, product and process innovations are complementary, and the firm always prefers the simultaneous adoption of both activities.     

Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment if and only if both tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks, so that there are two contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high efforts in both tasks can be implemented with smaller bonus payments.     

Foreign and domestic multinational presence in the UK

The determinants of multinational presence in Uk manufacturing industry in 1979 are analysed. It is argued that maultinational presence may result from strategic interaction as well as other firm and industry characteristics. The determinants of both foreign and Uk multinational presence are estimated using a dataset that enables both types of multinational to be indentified. Results show an important effect of both scale and concentration on multinational presence.     

Monetary policy through the ‘credit-cost channel’: Italy and Germany pre- and post-EMU

We present an empirical analysis of the ‘Credit-Cost Channel’ (CCC) of monetary policy transmission. This channel combines bank credit supply and interest rates on loans as a cost to firms. The thrust of the CCC is that it makes both aggregate demand and aggregate supply dependent on monetary policy. As a consequence (1) credit market conditions (e.g. risk spreads) are important sources and indicators of macroeconomic shocks, (2) the real effects of monetary policy are larger and persistent. We have applied the Cointegrated Vector Autoregression (CVAR) econometric methodology to Italy and Germany in the ‘hard’ EMS period and in the European Monetary Union (EMU) period. The short-run and long-run effects of the CCC are detectable for both countries in both periods. Simulation of the estimated model also confirms that inflation-targeting by way of inter-bank rate control stabilizes inflation through structural shifts of the stochastic equilibrium paths of both inflation and the output.     

Maximum‐revenue versus Optimum‐welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game*

In the Eaton and Grossman (1986 ) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximize tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximize tax revenue is not a Nash equilibrium unless the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently high. For a wide range of values for the degree of product substitutability, the game is a prisoner's dilemma where both countries are better off delegating to policymakers who maximize tax revenue but both will delegate to policymakers who maximize welfare in the Nash equilibrium.     

The economics of research,consulting, and teaching quality: theory and evidence from a technical university

We investigate the effect of both research and consulting on teaching quality in higher education, at the individual level. We propose a theoretical model in which academics allocate effort between the three activities, over a two period time horizon, under the assumption of positive spillovers from research to both consulting opportunities and teaching, and of life-cycle effects on incentives. Propositions from the model are tested against data from a mid-sized Italian engineering faculty. We find that teaching quality is negatively related to consulting and positively related to research experience. However, both relationships are not linear, due to the importance of several mediating factors, such as seniority and the role of scientific publications as a signal for attracting consulting opportunities.     

Estimating the Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture in Low-Income Countries: Household Level Evidence from the Nile Basin, Ethiopia

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the impact of climate change on agriculture in a typical developing country. The economic implications of climate change are estimated by using both a farm productivity and a Ricardian framework. Data are drawn from about 1,000 farms producing cereal crops in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia. The thin plate spline method of spatial interpolation was used to predict household specific rainfall and temperature values using meteorological station data collected for 30?years across the regions. We found that climate change adaptation has a significant impact on both farm productivity and farm net revenues. We complement the analysis by providing an estimation of the determinants of adaptation. Extension services (both formal and farmer to farmer), as well as access to credit and information on future climate changes are key drivers of adaptation.     

Taxes on capital in a specific factor model with international capital mobility

The efficiency and distributional effects of sundry capital taxes are analyzed in a simple two-sector specific factor model where capital is mobile both between the two sectors and between the home country and the rest of the world. Two cases are discussed: the small country case where factor and commodity prices are parametric; and the large country case. The optimal tax on capital export is illustrated when commodity prices are parametric. A simple approach to the case when both factor and commodity prices are variable is demonstrated.     

Off- and on-farm labour participation in Italian farm households

Most farms are family business, both in developed and developing countries. Labour allocation choices of farm household members are therefore relevant both for production choices in the farm and for rural labour markets. In particular, off-farm work and combination of on- and off-farm work (pluriactivity) are viewed as an efficient allocation of household labour resources. Moreover, labour choice of the children of the farm household is relevant for farm succession. In this article, we extend previous literature by estimating in an unified framework labour participation choices both for on- and off-farm work for operators, spouses and their eldest children in working age, using a five equation multivariate probit.     

Globalization,Inequality, and Local‐level Dynamics: Indonesia and the Philippines*

Subnational disparities and center–region relations are increasingly important issues in both the development economics literature and East Asian policy circles. Almost all developing countries in East Asia are actively decentralizing power and resources from the center. Analytically, there is growing interest in spatial economics, arising out of the fusion of economics and geography. This paper examines these issues with reference to Indonesia and the Philippines. Both countries are well suited to such a study: they are the two largest archipelagic nations in the world, they both feature great subnational diversity, and they have both adopted major decentralization programs, in similar circumstances. We conclude that, in aggregate, there have been no major changes in regional inequality in either country, although this conclusion is sensitive to the selection of economic indicators. In general, the regions that are the best connected to the global economy have grown more rapidly.     

Technology transfer with commitment

Summary. This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending on whether one or both firms commit. Under strategic incentive delegation, the possibility of technology transfer is minimal when both firms use the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are negligible. If both firms choose the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are significant then the possibility of technology transfer rises compared to a situation with no pre-commitment. In case of commitment to a capacity level before production, the possibility of technology transfer does not change when both firms simultaneously commit to their capacity levels. Different sets of results arise when only one firm can pre-commit. Received: February 10, 1997; revised version: December 16, 1999     

Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries

When trade policy is determined endogenously by lobbying, it matters whether countries are arranged into a customs union or a free trade area. This paper compares the two regimes when the member governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying and in their bargaining power within a customs union. In the model, a customs union never leads to lower tariffs for both countries, whereas it can lead to higher tariffs for both.     

Similitudes and Discrepancies in Post‐Keynesian and Marxist Theories of Investment: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation1

There has been a substantial amount of convergence between post‐Keynesian and Marxist economics, the writings of Kalecki being common ground for both traditions. Still, some differences remain. While authors in both traditions seem to agree to a large extent on short‐period issues, long‐period matters relating to the role of saving, the rate of profit, inflation, crowding out, excess money supply, are still contentious. All this seems to depend on the exact form taken by the investment function, more specifically the role of capacity utilization. Four different equations are set up to be tested, two of which correspond to two variants of the Marxist view, while the other two equations correspond to a naive and a sophisticated Kaleckian view, the latter being based on hysteresis. The equations are tested on three sets of annual Canadian data. Various statistical tests are applied to all four equations in an effort to rank them, notably information and encompassing tests. The Kaleckian equation with hysteresis generally comes out empirically with the preferred statistical properties, when manufacturing data on actual rates of capital accumulation are considered separately or when both realized and intended rates of investment for the total industrial sector are used.     

Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly

This paper examines the effects of signaling on environmental taxation in a two-period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technology is clean or dirty, while third parties (the rival firms and the regulator) have only a subjective perception about this fact. Consequently, there are both horizontal and vertical asymmetric information, and each firm can strategically manipulate both, the competitor's and the regulator's priors. In this context, we find that each firm wishes to be perceived as a technologically clean firm in period 2 whenever the regulator's ecological conscience is sufficiently high. We also show that taxes under symmetric information are always positive, but under asymmetric information and signaling they may be negative (subsidies) and lower or greater than in the symmetric information case, depending on the ecological conscience of the regulator and the probability of firms being dirty. Finally, taxes are below environmental marginal damage, both under symmetric and asymmetric information, and signaling reinforces such under-taxation.     

Selective Schools

This paper studies how schooling admission tests affect economic performance in an economy where individuals are endowed with both academic and non‐academic abilities and both abilities matter for labour productivity. We develop a simple model with schools run by the goverment, where individuals signal their abilities by taking an admission test and sort into low quality and high quality schools. When abilities are poorly correlated in the population, as documented in the literature, a standard test based only on academic abilities can be less efficient than a balanced test, which considers both ability types. We show that a sequential testing strategy, with schools testing academic abilities and firms testing non‐academic abilities on the sub‐sample of graduates of high quality schools, does not necessarily replicate the outcome of a balanced test.