网络经济与市场结构变迁--新经济条件下垄断与竞争关系的检验分析

垄断和竞争的关系是市场结构的中心内容。作为一种新的经济形态,网络经济具有一些背离传统经济规律的经济特性,它导致在网络经济条件下的市场结构呈现出区别于传统经济的新特征,并促成其市场结构双重性的形成,进而带来垄断趋势的加强和竞争属性的变迁。因此,对其市场结构的探讨,有助于更好地理解在新的经济条件下垄断与竞争之间的关系。     

我国垄断行业收入与经济增长关系的实证研究——基于面板协整理论

基于1990—2008年我国垄断行业收入的面板数据,通过面板协整、Engle-Granger检验以及运用误差修正模型对我国垄断行业的收入水平与经济增长的长期关系进行分析。研究结果显示:与能源、交通相关的垄断行业的收入与经济增长之间存在长期稳定的协整关系;与能源相关的垄断行业的收入对经济增长具有正向影响,而与交通相关的垄断行业的收入对经济增长的影响不太显著;金融保险业和房地产业的收入与经济增长之间并不存在长期稳定的面板协整关系。     

A note on the effects of market power distribution in Cordella and Gabszewicz's Ricardian model

We argue that it is the distribution of market power among agents, rather than the use of market power itself, that may force Ricardian economies into autarky. By applying Baldwin (1948) monopoly equilibrium concepts to the general equilibrium with imperfect competition model analyzed by Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997), we show that the monopoly equilibrium outcome Pareto dominates the oligopoly one. As a consequence, economic efficiency is higher when market power is concentrated in one agent than when it is evenly distributed among few agents.     

Economic development by the creation of new sectors

The basic theme underlying this paper is qualitative change taking place during economic development. These changes in the composition of the economic system should become one of the most important variables in models of economic growth and development. Our knowledge of the relationship between economic development and qualitative change, however, is still very limited. This paper attempts to shed light on some important aspects of the role played by qualitative change in economic development, by laying the foundations of a model in which changes in the composition of the economic system are endogenously generated by the evolution of the system itself and, in turn, affect its future development. The model has a strong Schumpeterian flavour in that the first entrepreneur entering a market enjoys a temporary monopoly. This temporary monopoly is eroded by the entry of imitators, that gradually increases the intensity of competition. The saturation is reinforced as the demand for what was a new product comes to be satisfied. In this way the adjustment gap initially created by the innovation is eliminated transforming a niche into a mature market, which becomes one of the routines of the economic system. As soon as a sector becomes saturated there is an increasing inducement for incumbent firms to exit and to create a new niche, where once more they will have a temporary monopoly. To put it in another, slightly different, form, we can say that economic development is a process in which new activities emerge, old ones disappear, the weight of all economic activities and their patterns of interaction change.JEL Classification: O0, O12; O30Correspondence to: Pier Paolo Saviotti     

论正常垄断与非正常垄断

我国的垄断源自于计划经济,改革开放后有所改变,但行政垄断依然占主导地位。鉴于我国的国情,行政垄断组织的存在,有些是合理的,有些是不合理的。合理的行政垄断和经济垄断可称之为正常的垄断,不合理的行政垄断可称之为非正常的垄断。非正常的垄断会破坏资源的合理配置,损害社会经济福利。所以在我国反垄断应把矛头主要指向非正常的垄断。     

经济国有化与行政垄断制度的发展——基于制度变迁理论的经济史研究

文章在新制度经济学的理论框架下,对新中国的经济国有化和行政垄断制度的发展历程进行了经验研究。研究结果表明,行政垄断与国有经济存在很强的共生关系。当今中国的行政垄断是以法律法规形式存在的社会正式规则,它与国有经济、市场经济长期稳定共存,是转轨时期中国经济制度的一大特色。     

地区性行政垄断的经济增长效应

地区性行政垄断是指地方政府运用行政权力对市场竞争的限制和排斥,往往造成了要素价格扭曲,进而诱致地方保护和市场分割。本文基于一个经济增长模型,并将地区性行政垄断指数纳入该模型中,实证研究了地区性行政垄断对经济增长的影响以及这种影响在开放程度不同的地方会发生什么样的变化。结果表明,地区性行政垄断与经济增长呈倒U型关系,而且经济开放程度越高,地区性行政垄断越不利于经济增长。     

中国垄断性行业的准入壁垒及其经济绩效

中共“十八大”以来,如何理解市场准入的行政审批体制改革的重要意义成为当前理论界的热点。与以往的实证研究不同,文章使用主流经济学模型(动态的创新竞争模型)对行政审批制度进行模型化的尝试,并深入分析该制度的具体经济绩效及其作用机制。主要结论如下：1)垄断性行业的生命周期比竞争性行业长,因此,若不能破除垄断,那么在垄断性行业淘汰落后产能是相对有效的产业政策。2)垄断性行业会带来更高的价格,并使在位企业获得更多经济利润,因此价格和利润规制是政府管理垄断性行业的必要工具。3)由于行政性准入壁垒挤出了消费者剩余,行业监管部门应该从企业所获得的垄断租金中征收额外的福利税,构建起向消费者进行转移支付的政策体系。4)垄断性行业会抑制行业内部的技术进步,因此需要监管部门实施创新激励。     

Economic Integration,Monopoly Power and Productivity Growth without Scale Effects

This paper considers how monopoly power affects the relationship between economic integration and economic growth that is not biased by a scale effect. In a two‐country model of trade, productivity growth is generated by firm‐level investment in process innovation, and the location of economic activity is determined by relative market size, trade costs and imperfect knowledge diffusion. Equilibrium features the partial concentration of manufacturing and the full concentration of innovation in the larger country. Increased economic integration raises the concentration of manufacturing in the larger country, and when monopoly power is strong, leads to decreased product variety, accelerated productivity growth and greater national welfare. With weak monopoly power, however, it raises product variety and dampens productivity growth, but may benefit or hurt welfare.     

EFFECTS OF POLITICAL MONOPOLY ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Abstract.  This paper has two objectives. First, it presents a survey of the literature surrounding the relation between political monopoly and economic development. Second, it offers an analysis of how commoners' high degree of tolerance towards unfair inequality of income distribution between theirs and the monopolizing ruling elites leads to poor economic development. We assert that free migration between states causes monopoly rent to shrink because it poses a threat to the ruling elites due to fiscal competition between states. The shrinking in monopoly rent implies a higher level of division of labour, which results in a greater extent of the market and higher aggregate productivity.     

COMPETITION VS. FRANCHISE MONOPOLY IN CABLE TELEVISION

A modern defense of public utility regulation has arisen from the “transactions costs” literature. Traditional economic theorists called for government to establish regulated, franchise monopolies to guard against over-investment and wasteful duplication in natural monopoly (i.e., cost subadditive) markets. However, the new view is that monopoly licenses are issued to promote investment into markets where suppliers must sink considerable sums of specific…nonsalvageable…capital. Consumers, in this scenario, “delegate” their choice-making to political or bureaucratic agents, who administer day-to-day and year-to-year arrangements with a monopoly producer in a long-term exclusive-dealing arrangement. This may be a plausible explanation for the issuance of legal monopoly rights. But the troubling question regarding the public agency is: why should self-interested political agents create proconsumer regulatory contracts? They might instead be expected to maximize political clout by erecting monopolistic restrictions and directing excess returns to effective distributional coalitions. These competing explanations for the political issuance of monopoly franchises are contrasted in this paper through the use of legal and economic evidence in the cable television industry.     

自然垄断产业改革的理论分析

随着经济社会的发展，自然垄断产业的理论在不断变化，自然垄断产业也在不断的改革。从自然垄断理论产生与发展的理论角度讲，自然垄断产业健康发展的关键是引入竞争机制和放松政府管制，使其符合市场经济发展的规律。     

Monopoly Welfare Losses in the Long Run

Irrespective of the merit of any previous approaches to assess the deadweight loss due to monopoly they are all static in character and disregard the long term effects of monopoly power. Taking into account the long run consequences of monopoly power within the framework of the new growth theory yields startling new insights. In contrast to the Schumpeterian view that there is a tradeoff between static inefficiency and dynamic progressiveness monopoly power is shown to entail not only static welfare losses but also to exert an adverse influence on economic growth. Once this is granted the long run welfare loss due to monopoly can be shown to dwarf the static losses so far treated in the economics literature.     

The Cost Structure of Australian Telecommunications

Since 1991 Australian telecommunications has undergone substantial reform. To a large extent, the economic correctness of pro-competitive policy depends on the non-existence of natural monopoly technology. This paper provides estimates of the Australian telecommunications system cost structure, and tests for subadditivity from 1943 to 1991. Additivity of the cost function after 1945 rejects the natural monopoly hypothesis and supports recent government policy. Diminished natural monopoly characteristics suggest that co-ordination between firms through networking can achieve similar economies as internal co-ordination within a monopoly. This finding is important, given the trend towards network unbundling, and service provision through interconnection.     

管制范围的经济分析——基于自然垄断性维度的思考

经济学理论认为自然垄断性是政府管制的重要原因,从新制度经济学角度上看,规模经济和资产专用性才是自然垄断性的深层次原因。而现代经济学理论进一步发展了自然垄断性的概念,认为自然垄断性的决定因素是成本弱增性,从而改变了对自然垄断边界的认识,同时也带来了对管制范围和管制方式认识上的变化。     

利润破坏模型在国有垄断行业的应用

国有垄断的发展在一定程度上阻碍了经济的发展。本文利用让.梯若尔的公司金融理论建立了一个符合我国国有垄断行业的融资模型,利用该模型推导出我国垄断行业的确定的企业数量以使投资者(政府)取得最大的经济收益,并论述了我国几个主要国有垄断行业的企业数量状态。最后对减小垄断带来的影响提出了两种解决方案,一种是引进投资者增加竞争,另一种是将社会效益加入收益函数。     

天然气行业垄断行为的经济学分析

作为关系国计民生的天然气行业一直受政府的规制，实行国有垄断经营。应规避天然气行业的垄断弊端，对该行业进行天然气定价机制、打破行业垄断、建立合理管理体制，加强法制建设，以确保天然气行业健康、快速地发展。     

我国烟草商业市场结构与绩效的实证研究

烟草行业作为一种特殊的行业,自从1982年实行烟草专卖制度以来,为我国的经济发展做出了巨大贡献,成长为国民经济发展的支柱产业。作为烟草行业的一个重要分支——烟草商业,承担着烟草制品的经营和销售,对烟草制品最终实现经济价值具有举足轻重的作用。本文从实证的角度分析了烟草商业1999-2003年间的市场结构和市场绩效。     

A national-security argument for trade protection

This paper constructs a two-period model in which a domestic monopoly firm produces a good given an amount of import of the good. In the second period, the monopoly firm faces a capacity constraint with regard to its production level. The production level in the first period sets the maximum quantity for the second period. We investigate the effects of quotas on welfare to examine the economic rationale of the national-security argument for trade protection. Under decreasing marginal costs of a monopoly firm, tightening the import quota may increase the domestic consumer surplus and the social welfare.     

行政垄断:投资需求不足之痼疾

投资需求不足一直影响我国的经济增长。然而,由于行政垄断的普遍存在,抑制了投资需求的增长,成为抑制内需不足之痼疾。所以,目前急需对行政垄断加以控制,为国家解决投资需求不足问题排除障碍。