A Rent-Seeking Experiment for the Classroom

Abstract: Recent research has demonstrated that active learning techniques improve student comprehension and retention of abstract economic ideas such as rent seeking. Instructors can reinforce the concept of rent seeking with a classroom game, particularly one involving real money. The authors improve upon a game first introduced by Goeree and Holt (1999) and later expanded upon by Bischoff and Hofmann (2002). The authors present a version of the game in which students participate in an all-pay auction, risking their own money, and discover first hand the potential inefficiencies of rent seeking. The authors suggest extensions of the rent-seeking game, including discussions of social welfare effects, equity, campaign finance reform, tax simplification, and congressional reforms designed to limit the influence of rent seeking in the economy.     

Classroom Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma

This survey of intermediate microeconomic textbooks will be helpful to those in the throes of selecting a suitable text. The author identifies the major review criteria and examines nine widely used books, grouping them by type of approach.     

Calculating the Candy Price Index: A Classroom Inflation Experiment

In this classroom experiment, students develop a price index based on candy-purchasing decisions made by members of their class. They use their index to practice calculating inflation rates and to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the consumer price index (CPI). Instructors can use the experiment as an introduction to the topic of inflation and how it is measured. The exercise also provides a concrete example of the sources of bias in the CPI, promoting discussion of the measures the Bureau of Labor Statistics has taken to reduce bias. The experiment, including follow-up discussion, fits into a 50-minute class period. The authors and other professors have used the exercise in introductory and intermediate macroeconomics courses, in classes of 10 to 135 students.     

Your Place in Space: Classroom Experiment on Spatial Location Theory

The authors detail an urban economics experiment that is easily run in the classroom. The experiment has a flexible design that allows the instructor to explore how congestion, zoning, public transportation, and taxation levels determine the bid–rent function. Heterogeneous agents in the experiment compete for land use using a simple auction mechanism. Using the data that is collected, a bid–rent function is derived, and the experimental treatment is altered over the course of three sessions to uncover core concepts in urban economics. Moreover, this provides a tangible experience that can be used to help undergraduates relate to urban issues such as the steep rent gradient found around many larger colleges and universities.     

A Classroom Tariff-Setting Game

The author outlines a classroom tariff-setting game that allows students to explore the consequences of import tariffs imposed by large countries (countries able to influence world prices). Groups of students represent countries, which are organized into trading pairs. Each group's objective is to maximize welfare by choosing an appropriate ad valorem tariff that may be changed intermittently throughout the game. The game is built on a computable general-equilibrium model, which allows each nation's utility and terms of trade under alternative tariff regimes to be expressed quantitatively. The exercise encourages students to consider terms-of-trade improvements and efficiency losses resulting from large-country tariffs and provides a framework to discuss the Nash equilibrium of a tariff war. The game is a useful supplement to traditional teaching methods.     

垄断福利的法经济学分析

垄断福利是国有经济占控制地位的公用企业以及依法具有独占地位的经营者所在的垄断性行业长期以来一直存在的问题。其产生和存在有复杂的背景:行业自身的垄断性和行政权力的不合理干预;社会分配的不公平;相关社会主体成本效益观念的错位。由此,可以从以下几方面进行治理:引入竞争机制打破垄断,从源头上遏止"垄断福利";加强对垄断行业的监督与审计;规范社会分配制度,矫正相关社会主体的成本效益观念。     

Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest

Abstract: The authors' aim in this article was to show how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game is a version of the beauty contest game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets students react to other players' choices and converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. The authors perform this experiment with undergraduate students with no previous training in game theory. After four rounds, they observe a clear decreasing tendency in the average submitted number in all groups. Thus, the findings show that by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.     

Competitive Equilibrium and Classroom Pit Markets

Efforts to show the relevance of economic concepts early in a student's education can prevent the “economics is not very useful” attitude from setting in. The author extends the work of Holt to describe a pit-market experiment used to illustrate the concept of competitive equilibrium. In addition to detailed instructions as to how to set up and conduct a pit-market experiment, the author discusses features of the data and provides accompanying materials, including software for the display of the data.     

垄断行业改革任重道远

深化垄断行业改革是深化经济改革和国企改革的攻坚战,但这一改革至今仍进展缓慢。为了推进国企改革攻坚、垄断行业改革攻坚,首先要有顶层设计,同时要有自上而下的强力推动,否则无法排除既得利益群体的阻挠和干扰。     

电信行业的垄断与竞争问题研究

本文通过明确电信垄断与竞争的分析视角 ,解读电信行业垄断与竞争的利弊 ,说明电信行业是竞争性垄断行业。竞争性垄断是在一种竞争的市场环境里形成并通过市场竞争电信行业维持下去的垄断。在竞争性垄断市场格局下 ,电信行业的竞争是有效率竞争     

垄断、分工与市场

中国的国有企业一直面临着垄断的指责,但这种指责却是极其模糊和偏颇的。本文从时间与空间对垄断的概念进行界定,认为垄断是一种相对而非绝对的状态,其基础源于分工,是一个在与市场的相互作用下不断扩张的过程。笔者认为,从这种理论概念的澄清上可以看出,对于国有企业而言,绝大部分对于垄断的指责是偏颇的,也是不符合现实的。     

行政垄断、放松规制与产业绩效——基于原油开采业的实证分析

我国原油开采业是行政垄断而不是自然垄断,而行政垄断下原油开采业的市场绩效表明了其危害性.通过对我国原油开采业1998年的隐性放松规制进行界定,建立计量模型对这次放松规制的效果进行了实证分析,从理论和实践两方面证实了放松规制有利于我国原油开采业产业绩效的提升.     

垄断的经济学再思考

如果交易费用为零,那么垄断厂商就会实施完全价格歧视。不考虑收入分配效应,完全价格歧视实现了资源的最优配置。如果交易费用不为零,那么消费者剩余和利润是不可以简单相加的,更不可以二者之和是否达到了最大来判定真实经济是否是效率的。交易费用不为零,也不能得出垄断存在资源配置扭曲的结论。传统分析忽视了垄断的成因,忽略了那所谓的福利三角形,其实是避免价值消散和获得规模经济的必要的代价。传统分析还不恰当地以为政府既有能力又有动力管好垄断这样的问题。因而,其一般化的反垄断政策主张也错了。     

日本行政垄断规制改革及启示

日本是"政府主导性"市场经济国家,其政府对行政垄断行业的规制事无巨细.但在20世纪80年代后,日本为适应国内变化了的经济形势,对其规制进行了以"原则上实行经济自由化"为目标的规制改革,其改革采取了渐进式改革方式.日本对规制的改革对我国的国有企业改革和非国营经济进入行政垄断行业以及促进经济竞争、提高行政垄断行业的效率具有启示意义.     

自然垄断产业规制改革过程中的风险研究

我国在社会主义市场经济体制建立过程中,逐步开始了以引入竞争、提高效率为目标的自然垄断产业规制改革.但是,在规制改革过程中,要面临许多不确定的风险.国内外对自然垄断产业的规制经验、教训表明,能否有效地控制规制过程中引发的风险在很大程度上决定了规制改革的绩效,甚至影响到对规制改革本身的评价.引发规制风险的因素很多,但总的来看,主要集中在规制本身、市场、政府规制行为不规范这三个方面.分析了上述三方面所引发的规制风险产生的原因,并根据我国目前自然垄断产业规制现状提出了若干建议,以化解规制改革中面临的风险.     

关于行业工资差距与行业垄断的研究

首先利用理论模型分析了垄断行业与非垄断行业工资差异存的必然性,再利用Miner工资收入模型和Chow检验法,对我国的行业工资进行了实证分析,认为行业人力资本水平、行业劳动生产率和行业垄断程度差异是造成行业职工工资差距的影响因素,但行业垄断程度对垄断行业与非垄断行业的影响结果不同,而且行业属性的差异是造成垄断行业与非垄断行业工资差距的主要原因.     

由自然垄断的动态性谈中国电信业的政府规制

自然垄断作为一个特殊的行业,由于成本的劣加性等原因导致企业垄断定价,为了减少消费者福利损失,政府不得不对自然垄断行业进行规制。然而由于技术、需求等方面的变化,这种垄断性并不具有永久性,使得政府的规制政策也作相应的调整。自然垄断行业动态性说明中国电信业政府规制的变化过程。     

收费公路行业行政垄断及其社会成本测度

公路收费制度的实施,有效地缓解了公路建设资金紧张的矛盾。但由于垄断经营和相关制度的不完善,导致收费公路行业出现诸多弊端,产生了较大的社会成本。首先指出收费公路行业垄断的本质是行政垄断,而非自然垄断;在此基础上,分析了行政垄断社会成本的构成及其表现形式,同时结合相关理论,建立了行政垄断社会成本计量模型;并以此为依据,对收费公路行业行政垄断的社会成本进行了估算。通过估算发现,收费公路行业行政垄断成本远远高于其他行业。