Economic growth,repression, and state expenditure in non-democratic regimes

This paper examines how economic growth affects government spending in non-democracies. A robust finding is that positive growth induces a significant increase in defence spending but a decrease in non-defence spending in dictatorships, with little effect in democracies. Government spending is slightly sensitive to negative growth across regimes. Higher growth rate in a country than its neighbours induces more spending than their average. Corruption causes a reduction in defence spending but an increase in non-defence spending. Primary education stimulates non-defence spending but reduces defence expenditure, secondary education causing the opposite effect. An under-developed country spends less than a developed country.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

The Spending Multiplier in the Medium Run

Most of the discussion about fiscal stimulus focuses on the multiplier of government spending on impact. In this paper we shift the focus to the multiplier at the end, i.e., to the period in which a deficit spending program terminates. We show that recent time‐series analyses and neoclassical as well new Keynesian business cycle models predict that the multiplier turns negative before spending expires. This means that aggregate output at the time of expiry of fiscal stimulus is lower than it could be without deficit spending. Here, we show why this phenomenon is a general outcome of mainstream business cycle theory and explain the underlying mechanism. Using phase diagram analysis, we prove that the aggregate capital stock at the time of expiry of fiscal stimulus is lower than it would be without a deficit spending program. This fact explains why aggregate output is below its laissez faire level as well.     

Fiscal policy, long‐run growth, and welfare in a stock‐flow model of public goods

Abstract.  We introduce public capital and public services as inputs in an endogenous growth model. We show that the growth rate depends on the apportionment of tax revenues between the accumulation of public capital and the provision of public services. When public spending is financed by proportional income taxes, the growth rate, the level of public spending as a proportion of GDP, the level of investment in public capital as a proportion of total public spending, and the level of private investment as a proportion of total private spending all are lower in the equilibrium outcome than in the optimal outcome. JEL classification: E62, O40     

Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Multisector Model: The Price Consequences of Government Spending

This paper investigates optimal fiscal policy in a static multisector model. A Ramsey type planner chooses tax rates on each good type as well as spending levels on each good type subject to an exogenous total expenditure constraint. It is shown that, like taxes, government spending policy has price effects and that these price effects have significant implications for optimal policy. These price effects imply a U shape to the government's objective function and this U shape results in boundary values for the choice of the spending allocation. In particular, it is shown that the optimal allocation of government spending tends to be concentrated on one good rather than spread among many goods.     

STOP US BEFORE WE SPEND AGAIN: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING

A distributive politics model establishes that the presence of exogenously enforceable spending limits reduces spending and that the effect of executive veto authority is contingent on whether spending is capped and whether the chief executive is a liberal or conservative. Surprisingly, when spending limits are in place, governments with conservative executives spend more than those with more liberal chief executives. Limits are welfare improving, as is the executive veto when it leads to the building of override coalitions. Using 32 years of US state budget data, this paper also establishes empirically that strict balanced budget rules constrain spending and also lead to less pronounced short-term responses to fluctuations in a state's economy. Party variables like divided government and party control of state legislatures tend to have little or no direct effect, with political institutions and economic indicators explaining much of the variation in state spending.     

What happens to social spending in IMF-supported programmes?

This article finds that education and health spending has risen during International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported programmes at a faster pace than in developing countries as a whole. The analysis is based on the most comprehensive dataset assembled thus far for this purpose, with data covering 1985 to 2009 for 140 countries. Controlling for other determinants of education and health spending, including macroeconomic conditions, the results confirm that IMF-supported programmes have a positive and significant effect on social spending in low-income countries. Over a 5-year period with IMF-supported programmes, spending for education increases by about ¾ percentage point of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and for health, by about 1 percentage point of GDP. IMF-supported programmes are also associated with increases in the share of government spending allocated to education and health.     

Is Post-Communist Health Spending Unusual?

What factors determine a country's spending on health? And what factors determine the share of spending financed by the public sector? Taking these factors into account, is post-communist health spending unusual? For the OECD economies, we find that per capita health spending is strongly related to per capita income, with an elasticity of about 1.5. The elasticity for developing economies is close to one. Spending is also positively related to the elderly dependency rate, but the relationship is weaker than a static comparison of spending by the elderly and non-elderly would suggest. Even though health spending as a share of GDP in the post-communist countries of eastern and central Europe is below the OECD average, there is evidence of above normal health spending in most countries when we control for income and demographics. For Hungary, the ‘excess’ spending reached over three percentage points of GDP in 1994. For the OECD sample, four development indicators account for half the variation in the public sector share of total health spending. Political variables help explain the remainder. If the post-communist countries converge to the market economy pattern, the share of public financing will fall, yet still remain well above half.     

Household debt and spending during the financial crisis: Evidence from Danish micro data

We use data for nearly 500,000 Danish households to study the relationship between household leverage prior to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the development in spending over the course of the crisis. We find a strong negative correlation between pre-crisis leverage and the change in spending during the crisis. This reflects that highly levered households spent a larger share of their income than their less-levered peers prior to the crisis, resulting in larger increases in debt in these years. Once we condition on the size of the pre-crisis change in debt, a high level of debt is no longer associated with a larger spending decline. Our results suggest that the larger decline in spending among high-leverage households is the result of a spending normalization pattern that is also found in other years, rather than a causal effect of high debt levels suppressing household spending during the crisis.     

Government Deficits,Output and Inflation In A Monetary Model Of The Balance Of Payments: The Case Of Haiti, 1970–83

A quarterly macro-econometric model of the Haitian economy is estimated over the period 1970–1983. The model is based on the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, but differs from the standard formulation in that it takes explicitly into account autonomous components in the balance of payments. Simulation results show that an increase in government spending has only a weak effect on real output but a rather powerful impact on the trade balance and the net external assets position of the banking system. [431]     

Government size,composition of public spending and economic growth in Brazil

The performance of the fiscal policy is largely affected by the relationship between government size, composition of public spending and economic growth. We use a theoretical framework to find optimal relations among these variables and confront them with a panel data for the Brazilian states. Private capital and government spending are substitute inputs in production as the Brazilian states require provision of public spending to fill gaps in the underdeveloped private sector. Public investment and current government expenditures are combined in fixed ratios in the overall government spending due to strong rigidity of the public budget. The optimal share of public investment is considerably lower than current expenditures, as occurs in developing countries characterized by low economic dynamism. Finally, the average tax burden from the data is below the estimated optimal level, meaning that there is space for increasing tax rate without harming economic growth for some Brazilian states.     

Highway Spending and Induced Vehicle Emissions: Evidence from the US states

This paper investigates the impact of state and local government highway spending on vehicle emissions. A theoretical framework is constructed to show the effect of government highway spending on passenger and freight vehicle emissions and decompose the effect into a rebound effect, an induced demand effect and an interaction effect. We then develop an empirical strategy and combine state-level data in the US to test the induced CO2 emissions by government highway spending. We find that there are positive and significant total effects of government highway spending on passenger and freight vehicle emissions. The magnitude of these effects, however, significantly differs from one another as the elasticity of freight vehicle emissions with respect to government highway spending is four times larger than that in the passenger sector. The difference can be plausibly explained by the rebound effect and the interaction effect. We argue that policies regarding government spending on highway projects, especially those relying on cost-benefit analysis, should account for the potential difference in induced environmental impacts between passenger and freight vehicles.     

Cointegration and Causal Relationship between Taxes and Spending for Kenya,Nigeria and South Africa

Causal relationships between taxes and spending are examined for three African countries using the GDP as a control variable, and dummy variables to address structural changes in Nigeria and South Africa. There is one cointegration equation between nominal fiscal variables in all three countries, one cointegration equation for Kenya and two cointegration equations for Nigeria and South Africa for the real fiscal variables and their respective dummy variables. Short-term results of the nominal variables show fiscal independence for all three countries. In real terms, taxes cause spending for Kenya and Nigeria and a weak fiscal synchronization for South Africa. There is long run fiscal synchronization in nominal terms for all three countries, and in real terms for both Nigeria and South Africa, while real taxes cause spending in Kenya. Long-run estimates show a unit increase in nominal (real) taxes translating into a less than proportionate increase in nominal (real) spending for Kenya and South Africa, and a more than proportionate increase in nominal (real) spending for Nigeria. Fiscal imbalance is not a threat in the budgetary process in Kenya and South Africa, but an issue of concern in Nigeria, where oil revenues are a major source of support for budget short falls.     

Balanced-budget rules and macroeconomic (in)stability

It has been shown that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, a one-sector real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots when income tax rates are determined by a balanced-budget rule with a pre-set level of government expenditures. This paper shows that indeterminacy disappears if the government finances endogenous public spending and transfers with fixed income tax rates. Under this type of balanced-budget formulation, the economy exhibits saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness, regardless of the source of government revenue and/or the existence of lump-sum transfers.     

Macroeconomic effects of government spending in China

Government spending plays an important role in determining economic performances in China. Its macroeconomic effects are analysed in this paper. We show that government spending in China Granger‐causes output, consumption and investment booms as well as inflation, and has a multiplier larger than 1. The large multiplier effects are found not only in aggregated time‐series data but also in panel data at the provincial level. We also provide a theoretical model and Monte Carlo analysis to rationalize our empirical findings. Our theoretical and Monte Carlo analyses support the large multiplier found in China but also suggest that government spending is not necessarily a free lunch in spite of the large multiplier effects.     

Faith-based charity and crowd-out during the great depression

Interest in religious organizations as providers of social services has increased dramatically in recent years. Churches in the U.S. were a crucial provider of social services through the early part of the twentieth century, but their role shrank dramatically with the expansion in government spending under the New Deal. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the New Deal crowded-out church charitable spending in the 1930s. We do so using a new nationwide data set of charitable spending for six large Christian denominations, matched to data on local New Deal spending. We instrument for New Deal spending using measures of the political strength of a state's congressional delegation, and confirm our findings using a different instrument based on institutional constraints on state relief spending. With both instruments we find that higher government spending leads to lower church charitable activity. Crowd-out was small as a share of total New Deal spending (3%), but large as a share of church spending: our estimates suggest that benevolent church spending fell by 30% in response to the New Deal, and that government relief spending can explain virtually all of the decline in charitable church activity observed between 1933 and 1939.     

The principle of political-economic assignment

This paper formulates a macroeconomic model of disposable income, unemployment, inflation, and the balance of payments; a theory of qualitative choice to explain government popularity in terms of these variables; and a satisficing formulation of political-economic policy. This approach to economic policy relies on the promotion of ideology and satisficing popularity and gives rise to an interdependent system of political-economic reaction functions for the tax rate and state spending. Using a theorem for the stability of “patched-up” systems, the principle of political-economic assignment is derived.     

Corruption and military spending

Anecdotal evidence relates corruption with high levels of military spending. This paper tests empirically whether such a relationship exists. The empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries during 1985–1998. The association between military spending and corruption is investigated by using cross-section and panel regression techniques. The results suggest that corruption is associated with higher military spending as a share of both GDP and total government spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government spending. The results can be interpreted as evidence that defense spending may be used as a component of an indicator of the quality of governance.     

On the size of government spending multipliers in Europe

This article compares the size of government spending multipliers in Europe by applying a panel structural vector autoregression analysis on 11 eurozone and 8 non-eurozone countries using quarterly data from 1991Q1 to 2012Q4. We find that (i) spending multipliers are smaller in eurozone compared to non-eurozone countries, (ii) across the euro area the impact of government spending on GDP has been higher before than after the introduction of the euro, (iii) spending multipliers are larger in the eurozone periphery than in the core countries and (iv) since the beginning of the recent financial crisis, spending multipliers have become larger both for eurozone and for non-eurozone countries. We relate these results to an emerging theoretical literature linking the size of fiscal multipliers to the monetary policy stance. We also discuss the implications of our findings for the effectiveness of fiscal policy in Europe.     

Asymmetric output growth effects of government spending: Cross-sectional and panel data evidence

Using a model that accommodates asymmetric adjustments of output growth to changes in growth of government spending, the effects of aggregate and disaggregate government spending variables on output growth are examined. Both cross-section and panel regression estimations are conducted. Robustness of results to joint-endogeneity of output and government spending, alternative conditioning variables, and cointegration is investigated. Aggregate government spending appears to have positive output growth effects particularly in periods of below-trend growth in this variable. The government sector's productivity appears to be higher than non-government sector's productivity when spending growth is below-trend growth and only for non-OECD countries; no differences in sectoral productivities are detected for OECD countries. Government consumption spending has no significant output growth effects, but government investment spending has positive output growth effects particularly when its growth falls below its trend-growth; this favorable effect turns negative when government investment spending growth exceeds its trend-growth. Results are robust across alternative model specifications and estimation methods.