The impact of Greek labour market regulation on temporary employment – evidence from a survey in Thessaly,Greece

This paper uses an original data-set for 186 workplaces in Thessaly (central Greece), to study consequences of Greece's strict employment protection law (EPL) and national minimum wage for temporary employment. We find higher temporary work contract rates among workplaces that pay low wages close to the minimum. We also find that EPL ‘matters’, in particular, managers who prefer temporary contracts because temporary workers are less protected definitely employ more. Our findings thus support the view that a firm's HRM decisions regarding internal versus external allocation of tasks are influenced by labour regulation.     

Financial participation and recruitment and retention: causes and consequences

Using a sample of over 5000 establishments in Germany, we analyze the antecedents and effects of profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership (ESO) with respect to the ability of firms to meet their recruitment and retention objectives and to achieve employment growth. We draw on both economic and behavioral perspectives to argue that firms that adopt PS and ESO plans do so in order to attract and retain employees. Using logistic regression and a propensity score matching technique, we find that firms that face higher recruitment problems, and those that have greater employment growth objectives, are more likely to use ESO and PS. Unlike ESO, PS enhances firm-level employment growth. However, neither ESO nor PS help firms to fully resolve recruitment and retention problems.     

The Labour Market Effects of Increases in Social Insurance Premium: Evidence from Japan

Exploiting heterogeneous variations in labour cost increases due to Japan's 2003 social insurance premium reform as a natural experiment, we estimate the impacts of the increased social insurance premiums on employment, working hours and payroll costs. Using the difference‐in‐differences method with establishment fixed effects, we find that firms reduce the number of employees and increase average annual earnings from longer working hours in response to an exogenous increase in labour costs without productivity gains. Firms manage to pay for this increase in the average wage paid to the remaining workers by reducing the number of employees to keep total payroll costs unchanged. In contrast, since social insurance premiums are shared equally between employees and employers, firms pay the remaining half premiums that they are imposed with. Sub‐sample analyses show that firms adhering to a labour hoarding policy did fire many workers taking advantage of the 2003 reform. This may indicate that the reform provided a good excuse to cut employment in firms that had been forced to comply with a labour hoarding policy even in an over‐employment situation, which is more likely in sectors and countries where dismissals are rigorously regulated.     

Labour contract regulations and workers' wellbeing: International longitudinal evidence

All industrialized countries have employment protection legislation (EPL) for permanent workers and restrictions on the use of temporary employment (RTE). The (ambiguous) effects of these on the levels of employment and unemployment have been extensively studied, but nothing is known empirically about their wellbeing implications. Using longitudinal data from the European Community Household Panel, the author conducts the first study of the link between both EPL and RTE and workers' wellbeing. The results provide evidence that both permanent and temporary employees gain from reforms that ease restrictions on temporary employment but leave firing costs for permanent workers unchanged. This finding contrasts with common claims found in the political economy literature.     

The Structure of Sprawl: Identifying and Characterizing Employment Centers in Polycentric Metropolitan Areas

This paper applies a consistent framework to four comparably sized metropolitan areas to identify and characterize their employment centers. Employment centers are identified as places that exceed a threshold employment density and a threshold employment level. They are also characterized as specializing on the basis of location quotient analysis. We find clear evidence of specialization in every employment center in the four metropolitan areas studied. Our interpretation is that what we are observing is a systematic change in metropolitan structure rather than a random sprawling of firms. We also find some evidence that the size distribution of employment centers follows the rank-size rule. This suggests that there is structure not only in the distribution of economic activity among the employment centers but also in their size distribution. Because less than 50 percent of metropolitan employment is within employment centers, future research should focus on understanding the more diffuse employment patterns. The rank-size rule gives some guidance as to the expected size distribution of employment throughout the metropolitan area.     

Linking strategy and human resource practices: How employee and customer contracts are created

Organizations implement their business strategies through the human resource (HR) practices they use. These practices are major determinants of employees' psychological contracts. How employees interpret the terms of their employment impacts motivation, innovation, and customer service. This article describes four common types of psychological contracts in US firms and the HR practices that create them. It develops a framework for understanding how each contract shapes employee performance, retention, cooperation with fellow employees and customer responsiveness. It presents recommendations for more effectively managing the link between business strategy and the psychological contract of employees. © 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Temporary contracts and employee effort

Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide “stepping stones” into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons, workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: Their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60%. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of endogenous selection into temporary employment.     

Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.     

Termination and Coordination in Partnerships

It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A central organization problem in such partnerships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether contracts can be designed so that managers will maximize total profits. We characterize first best contracts for a variety of environments and show that efficiency imposes some restrictions on the ownership shares. In addition, we evaluate the performance of two termination contracts that are widely used in practice: the shotgun rule and price competition. We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency, they both perform well. We provide insight into when each rule is more efficient.     

The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents

While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general moral hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives. We show that envy creates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts if agents are risk-averse and there is no limited liability. Empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals that interact in markets. Flat-wage contracts are then more likely to be optimal in firms.     

Last in,first out?: Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden

In this paper we investigate whether a relaxation in seniority rules (the “last-in-first-out” principle) had any effect on firms' employment behaviour. Seniority rules exist in several countries, but consequences of seniority rules on firms' employment behaviour have not been examined previously. The “last-in-first-out” principle in Sweden was reformed in January 2001 such that employers with ten or fewer employees were allowed to exempt two workers from the seniority rule. Using an employer–employee unbalanced panel data for the period 1996–2005, we find that both hires and separations increased in small firms relative to large firms by 5%. This also implies that there were no effects on firms' net employment. Our results show that firms reacted to changes in the seniority rules, but we argue that the effects are not overwhelmingly large.     

Patterns of employment relationships: the association between compensation policy and contractual arrangements

Firms respond differently to labour market regulations and develop an employment relationship accordingly. We use linked employer–employee data to examine the relationship between compensation policies and contractual arrangements in large-sized firms in Portugal. In this country, the wages are regulated through minimum wage and collective agreement, while employment is protected by stringent employment legislation. The empirical analysis starts with a fuzzy clustering to identify typical compensation policies. Three major segments emerge from this analysis: Competitive, Internal Labour Markets and Incentive. The first segment comprises low-wage firms, which are highly responsive to market conditions. The other two reveal properties of internal labour markets, although the incentive-based firms reinforce the use of discretionary power to differentiate the workforce. Subsequently, we estimate a regression model to examine how the compensation policy interacts with contractual arrangement. Empirical evidence confirms the segmentation predictions, i.e. low, flexible wages and flexible contracts prevail in the same firms. Furthermore, vulnerable categories like young workers and female workers are over-represented in Competitive firms, while high-wages are associated with incentive devices benefiting white-collar employees. Apparently, firms foster inequality among segments of workers and often penalise or favour the same category of workers.     

审计意见与债务期限约束——来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据

中国上市家族企业存在债务期限过短的融资约束问题。标准(无保留)审计意见是否对企业债务期限融资约束产生影响呢?以2003年—2008年的上市家族企业为样本,对此问题展开实证研究发现,较之于被出具非标准审计意见的公司,被出具标准审计意见的公司所获得的银行借款期限较长;大型会计师事务所出具的标准审计意见更能缓解家族企业债务期限的约束。研究结论证实了信号传递理论。     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

Bargaining power in alliance governance negotiations: evidence from the biotechnology industry

Alliance partners negotiate how they will govern their alliance. This study shows bargaining power, not just efficiency considerations, influences the outcome of this negotiation. Whereas previous research on this phenomenon associates bargaining power with firm size, this study employs more nuanced measures of bargaining power applicable to biotechnology firms while controlling both absolute and relative firm size. We find small biotechnology firms with partners that are over five times larger can still have the bargaining power to get their interests met when the two parties have opposing governance interests.     

Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?

Using a Difference-in-Differences approach, we evaluate the effects of a 10 percentage point reduction in the payroll tax introduced in 2002 in northern Sweden. We find no employment effects among firms existing both before and after the reform, whereas the average wage bill per employee increases by about 0.25% per percentage point reduction in the tax rate. Extending the analysis to include entry and exit of firms, we find evidence of positive effects on the number of firms and a tendency to positive employment effects. Moreover, the wage incidence estimates become insignificant when we account for entry and exit of firms.     

The returns to formality and informality in urban Africa

This paper addresses the questions as to the size and causes of earnings differentials in two urban African labor markets, those of Ghana and Tanzania. We have panel data so we can ask how far time invariant unobservables, market ability for short, matters in the determination of earnings. We also have information on whether the individual is own self-employed, self-employed with employees, a private or public sector wage employee and the size of the enterprise in which wage employees work or which the self-employed owns. We find, mirroring work on developed economies, that unobserved individual market ability is by far the most important factor explaining the variance of earnings. With controls for such ability the gap between private wage employment and civil servants is about 50%. With controls for enterprise size we find that wage employees earn the same as the self-employed in both Ghana and Tanzania. Enterprise size matters. At most half of the OLS effect of size on earnings can be explained by unobservable ability. Workers in the largest firms are the high earners with wage rates which exceed those of civil servants. These results all assume exogenous movement. We find evidence that endogeneity bias may be serious and may be understating the extent of both the size effect and the private sector wage (negative) premium. The implications of our results for understanding the nature of formal and informal employment in Africa are discussed.     

Employment protection regulation,trade unions and tenure of employment: An analysis in 23 European countries

This article focuses on the relationship between employment protection regulation (EPL), trade unions and tenure of employment. A main hypothesis is that EPL strictness tends to prolong tenure, because rigorous rules imply that remaining with the same employer gives more job security. The role of unions can be expected to be similar. These assumptions are related to issues regarding dualisation in the labour market. Data used are the European Working Conditions Survey 2010—including 23 countries and more than 18,500 employees—combined with national‐level data on EPL, unemployment, union density and collective bargaining coverage. The analyses reveal that EPL strictness and bargaining coverage are associated with longer tenure. The same goes for having an employee representative in the workplace. The institutional variables work through interactions with individual‐level variables. For example, the impact of age, which is strongly linked to tenure, increases with stricter EPL and higher bargaining coverage.     

Effects of employment protection on worker and job flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian reform

This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust dismissal costs for businesses below 15 employees, while leaving dismissal costs unchanged for bigger businesses, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to large firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility, with a negligible impact on net employment. We also find some evidence suggesting that the reform reduced firms' entry rates and employment adjustments, but had no effect on exit rates.