Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness

This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand‐collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk‐taking tendencies induced by political connections.     

Taxes and the Financial Structure of German Inward FDI

The paper analyses the financial structure of German inward FDI. Intra-company loans granted by the parent should be all the more strongly preferred over equity the lower the tax rate of the parent and the higher the tax rate of the German affiliate. We find that the corporate tax rate of the foreign parent has no significant impact on the financial structure of a German subsidiary. However, among subsidiaries that are directly held by a foreign investor those firms that on average are profitable react more strongly to changes in the German corporate tax rate than this is the case for less profitable firms. This gives support to the frequent concern that high German taxes are partly responsible for the high levels of intra-company loans. Taxation, however, does not fully explain the high levels of intra-company borrowing. Roughly 60 per cent of the cross-border intra-company loans turn out to be held by firms that are running losses. JEL no. F23, H25     

Bank dependence and financial constraints on investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan

This paper investigates whether firms are able to substitute bank loans for public debt when the latter become less available to firms. To do so, this paper utilizes the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on Japanese markets as a natural experiment. Because the Japanese banking sector remained functional while the corporate bond markets were paralyzed, the data from Japan during this period provide us with an ideal environment to examine this hypothesis. I specifically examined whether firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 were financially constrained, by comparing the changes in their capital investment expenditures and borrowing conditions with those of bank-dependent firms. The main empirical results indicate that (1) firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 did not reduce investment expenditures; (2) instead, they exhibited higher increments in bank loans; and (3) firms that maintained relatively close bank-firm relationships had greater access to bank loans with low borrowing costs. These findings demonstrate that Japanese firms were able to substitute bank loans for public debt during the crisis and imply that the Japanese banking sector worked efficiently to replace public debt markets during the crisis.     

The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China

In January 2002, China decided to centralize corporate income tax collection, shifting the collection authority from the local tax bureaus (LTBs) to the state tax bureaus (STBs), for all firms established after December 31, 2001. We exploit this exogenous shock to identify a new cause for corporate bribery, namely, the complicit role of local government authorities. We find that firms whose income taxes are still collected by LTBs after the reform bribe more than similar firms whose taxes are collected by STBs. Such effects are more pronounced for firms located in provinces where government intervention is more prevalent and where judicial system is less independent. Moreover, we find that firms whose taxes are collected by LTBs enjoy lower tax burdens and receive greater tax-related subsidies, especially when they bribe more. Overall, our results highlight the reciprocation between local government authorities and firms in determining corporate bribery.     

Political connections,corporate innovation and entrepreneurship: Evidence from the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES)

In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the mixed effects of political connections on corporate innovation. Using the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), we find political connections contribute to innovative activities for those firms with innovative entrepreneurs but impedes innovative activities for those without innovative entrepreneurs. After solving the endogeneity problems and correcting the sample selection bias, the baseline results do not change much. Moreover, we find political connections can help firms obtain economic benefits such as tax preference and government subsidies which, however, are utilized by firms to increase fixed asset investment. But such positive effect of political connections on fixed asset investment greatly reduces when the firm's entrepreneur has a strong spirit of innovation. These results provide a reasonable explanation for the change in the direction of the effect of political connections on corporate innovation. This paper succeeds in reconciling the mixed effects of political connections on corporate innovation by taking the entrepreneur's innovative spirit into account.     

商业信用:基于企业融资动机的实证研究

商业信用是企业从外部市场进行短期融资的重要组成部分。本文采用我国上市公司2000年至2004年的数据实证研究了商业信用作为企业外部融资方式的决定因素。实证结果发现企业获得的商业信用与企业规模、财务杠杆、销售增长率以及国有股比例呈显著正相关关系．而与短期银行借款比例以厦毛利润率呈显著负相关关系。这些发现表明，在我国目前所处的融资环境下。商业信用已经成为企业的重要融资手段。与银行信贷相比。商业信用具有一定的融资比较优势，作为提供商业信用的企业，对客户的经营状况等信息的了解更有效。     

Corporate Taxes and Financing Methods for Taxable Acquisitions*

We examine the influence of corporate taxes on U.S. firms' financing methods for taxable acquisitions of 100 percent of a target corporation's stock. We conduct tests of acquirer firms' use of debt or internal funds as the funding source for these acquisitions over the period 1987‐97. Our results provide the first empirical evidence that U.S. firms' use of debt to fund acquisitions significantly declines as foreign tax credit limitations reduce the marginal tax benefits received from borrowing. This finding is consistent with earlier speculation that U.S. foreign tax credit provisions could materially affect the capital costs of U.S. companies in debt‐financed acquisitions. We also find that these firms are generally high‐tax‐rate corporations whose financing choices are not significantly influenced by whether they acquire target‐firm tax loss carryovers. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature on the influence of taxes on the structure and financing of corporate acquisitions.     

How Aggressive Tax Planning Facilitates the Diversion of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Path Analysis

In measuring tunneling with intercorporate loans disclosed by Chinese listed companies, we analyze the underlying channels through which aggressive tax planning facilitates the diversion of corporate resources by firm insiders. Using path analysis, we document that the path from tax aggressiveness to related loans is mediated by both the additional cash flows from tax savings and the increased financial opacity from tax planning, and that additional cash flows plays a much more important role than opacity in helping controlling shareholders to divert corporate resources under the guise of tax aggressiveness. Beyond the two mediated paths, we also detect a residual, direct path from tax aggressiveness to related loans. After an exogenous shock from the government crackdown on diversionary related loans, we find the direct path is fully mediated by the two indirect paths, suggesting that tunneling via related loans only occurs at firms where insiders can mask tunneling under the cover of opacity or can justify related loans on grounds of abnormal cash flows from tax savings. Our evidence supports the notion that greater outside scrutiny increases the hurdle for, but does not entirely eradicate, diversion facilitated by tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our research lends some support to recent theory on the importance of taxes to corporate governance by demonstrating how the agency costs of tax planning allow certain shareholders to benefit from firm activities at the expense of others.     

Outside Blockholders' Monitoring of Management and Debt Financing

Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager‐shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder‐bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting‐based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.     

Determinants of Corporate Leverage: A Time-Series Analysis Using U.S. Tax Return Data*

Abstract. The study examines how the risk of exhausting corporate tax liabilities before deducting interest expense affects corporate leverage. It differs from prior studies in three ways: (1) it uses data compiled by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from corporate tax returns rather than accounting data; (2) it measures risk of tax exhaustion more accurately; and (3) it adopts a first-difference time-series approach, so that firms act as their own control between adjacent years. These methodological innovations reduce biases caused by measurement error and omitted variables that were present in prior research. The results suggest that, all else being equal, high risk of tax exhaustion reduces firms' use of leverage. As well, the study provides the first evidence that personal taxes significantly affect corporate leverage. The effects on leverage decisions of other variables are also tested and the results are consistent with predictions from prior theoretical work.     

Do local firms employ political activities to respond to political uncertainty?

Using hand-collected data in China from 2001 to 2019, we examine how political uncertainty affects corporate political activities, including corporate corruption and corporate charitable donations, and whether the anti-corruption campaign moderates the relationship between political uncertainty and corporate political activities. First, we find that when city government officials change, local firms significantly increase corporate charitable donations while reducing corporate corruption. Second, the anti-corruption campaign strengthens the effects of political uncertainty on corporate political activities. Third, our results also show that political uncertainty has stronger effects 1) when new government officials come from external appointments, and 2) when former government officials experience abnormal turnover. In addition, the effects of political uncertainty on corporate charitable donations are stronger in non-state-owned enterprises and firms belonging to regulated industries. Finally, political uncertainty increases firms’ government subsidies through corporate political activities. It’s clear that political activities have mediating effects.     

Preferential corporate income tax treatment: Valuation in the market portfolio

In the setting of the market portfolio, the impacts of preferential corporate income tax treatments through the valuational reduction for risk are opposite to and offset the impacts through the expected proceeds. This suggests that focusing on the absolute valuation of tax-favored firms results in the undermeasurement of implicit taxes on returns on investments in tax-favored firms and the relative valuation with reference to fully taxed (i.e., tax-disfavored) benchmark firms be used. In addition, corporate income taxes imposed on entities and capital income taxes imposed on investors have opposite valuational effects through the endogenously derived market-aggregate aversion to risk.     

On corporate philanthropy of private firms and trade credit financing in China

This paper examines the impact of corporate philanthropy on trade credit financing for listed private firms in China viewed from the heterogeneous perceptions of credit suppliers. A positive relationship is found between corporate philanthropy and trade credit financing, suggesting that in general firms donating more can obtain more trade credits. However, this relationship is significant only for those firms with positive free cash flows and no political connections. It is striking to find that such a relationship does not exist when firms have negative free cash flows or political connections. Moreover, the relationship between corporate philanthropy and trade credits is affected by the local social trust environment. A good social trust environment is amicable for firms to use corporate philanthropy in obtaining trade credits. The research findings have important policy implications. This paper makes valuable contributions to the current literature through highlighting the importance of supplier heterogeneous perceptions towards corporate philanthropy as well as the effect of the local trust environment on the effectiveness of philanthropy in trade credit financing of the Chinese listed private firms.     

Corporate In‐house Tax Departments*

In‐house human capital tax investment is a significant input to a firm's tax decisions. Yet, due to the lack of data on corporate in‐house tax departments, there is little empirical evidence on how tax departments are associated with tax planning and compliance outcomes. We expect the size of tax departments to be positively associated with the effectiveness of tax planning and compliance. Using hand‐collected data on the number of corporate tax employees in S&P 1500 firms over the 2009–2014 period, we find that firms with larger tax departments are associated with lower and less volatile cash effective tax rates. Furthermore, using tax employees' specialization, we identify tax departments' relative focus on planning or compliance and document a trade‐off between tax avoidance and tax risk. Specifically, tax departments with more of a tax planning focus have incrementally greater tax avoidance but higher tax risk, whereas tax departments with more of a tax compliance focus have incrementally lower tax risk but higher tax rates. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by looking inside the “black box” of corporate tax departments and shedding light on the importance of human capital tax investment for tax outcomes.     

Direct or indirect? The impact of political connections on export mode of Chinese private enterprises

The learning-by-exporting effect can vary by mode of export (direct or indirect via intermediaries), which raises the importance of understanding factors associated with how firms export. This paper investigates the effect of political connections, one form of informal institutions particularly important in China, on the choice of export mode by Chinese private enterprises. By using firm-level survey data and addressing endogeneity, we find that having political connections significantly increases the probability of direct exporting, while it has no effect on indirect exporting through trade intermediaries. We further test the underlying mechanisms behind these findings. The results show that corporate political connections can help alleviate financial constraints by promoting the (external) access to bank credits and by reducing the (internal) extra-tax burdens, which are disproportionately important for direct exporting relative to indirect exporting. In addition, we find limited evidence supporting the importance of contract enforcement and managerial efficiency as channels though which political connections affect the choice of export mode.     

The role of information sharing in trade credit distribution: evidence from Thailand

Prior research has shown that information sharing among lenders facilitates bank credit allocation and reduces default rates. We examine the role of information sharing in trade credit allocation using a sample of publicly traded firms in Thailand over the 1994–2005 period. Taking the establishment of a private credit bureau in 1999 as signalling improvement in information sharing among lenders, we obtain three main results in the improved information sharing period: (1) Thai firms have become less dependent on supplier credit; (2) financially constrained firms redistribute more funds via trade credit; and (3) the relationships between the use of trade credit and firm‐specific factors such as liquidity, free cash flow, tangible assets, interest cost ratio, and firm size weaken as information sharing improves. Our results are consistent with the view that better information sharing facilitates credit allocation. Hence, policies aiming at facilitating information exchange among financial intermediaries should be supported. We also find support for the view that bank credit substitutes for trade credit. This substitution lowers firms' cost of capital, given that trade credit is assumed to be more costly than bank loans.     

Innovation and Corporate Tax Planning: The Distinct Effects of Patents and R&D*

Using a large US sample, we find a significant and positive relation between patents and corporate tax planning, and the effect is incremental to the effect of R&D on tax planning. We employ a quasi‐natural experiment based on staggered industry‐level innovation shocks to identify the positive causal effect of patents on corporate tax planning. We also find that patents are not associated with tax planning for domestic firms, but their association with tax planning is concentrated in multinational firms, which have the ability to shift domestic income to low‐tax countries. Moreover, we find that the identified effect mainly exists in the post–check‐the‐box (CTB) rule period when shifting income among affiliates becomes more flexible and convenient. Finally, we use two income‐shifting models and find that patents, rather than R&D, facilitate tax planning through an income‐shifting channel. Overall, our results suggest that R&D and patents facilitate firms' tax planning in distinct ways: R&D facilitates tax planning as intended through tax credits and deductions, whereas patents are used by taxpayers to avoid taxes aggressively through income shifting.     

Do Chinese publicly listed companies adjust their capital structure toward a target level?

We study the determinants of capital structure for 650 Chinese publicly listed companies over the period from 1999 to 2004. We posit that a firm's decision on capital structure is inherently dynamic, and estimate the resulting dynamic capital structure model. The main findings of the paper are as follows: (i) Chinese firms adjust toward an equilibrium level of debt ratio in a given year at a very slow rate; (ii) firm size, tangibility and state shareholdings are positively associated with firm's leverage ratio, while profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth and volatility are negatively related to firm's leverage ratio; (iii) lagged profitability has a negligibly small and positive impact on firm's leverage ratio; (iv) for a firm experiencing a large reduction in its leverage ratio only about 11% of the discrepancy between its desired and actual leverage level is eliminated within a year (compared to more than 18% for full firm sample); (v) extending the basic model to allow for both the target level and the speed of adjustment to be endogenously determined, we find that Chinese firms tend to adjust faster if they are farther away from the equilibrium leverage level; and lastly (vi) extending the sample period to cover the earlier periods starting from 1993, when the Chinese stock markets were first developed, results in a slower speed of adjustment for firms in the below target sample.     

The determinants of capital structure: Evidence from China

This paper employs a new database containing the market and accounting data (from 1994 to 2003) from more than 1200 Chinese-listed companies to document their capital structure characteristics. As in other countries, leverage in Chinese firms increases with firm size and fixed assets, and decreases with profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunity, managerial shareholdings and correlates with industries. We also find that state ownership or institutional ownership has no significant impact on capital structure and Chinese companies consider tax effect in long-term debt financing. Different from those in other countries, Chinese firms tend to have much lower long-term debt.     

税收政策的变化影响公司资本结构吗？--基于两税合并的经验数据

本文基于我国两税合并的背景,运用区间分析、配对样本T检验、回归分析和倍数差分法等方法,实证检验所得税政策的变化是否对资本结构产生影响,进而验证修正的MM理论是否适应中国资本市场。研究结果表明：所得税税负水平与公司资本结构显著正相关;由于新税法的实行,所得税税率下降的内资公司相应的降低了公司财务杠杆;两税合并前后税率下降的样本公司比税率不变的样本公司的资本结构变动显著要大。综合而言,税收政策能够显著影响公司资本结构决策。