Centralization,Fiscal Federalism,and Private School Attendance*

A CGE model is used to analyze the impact of public school financing on private school attendance. The common perception that public school finance centralization will necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not correct in such a model—even when that centralization involves an extreme equalization as in California. Furthermore, if centralization is less dramatic (as in most states), declines in private school attendance are even more pronounced. This weakens the speculation that low exit rates to private schools in centralizing states imply that general public school quality does not drop as a result of such centralization.     

The effects of generalized school choice on achievement and stratification: Evidence from Chile's voucher program

In 1981, Chile introduced nationwide school choice by providing vouchers to any student wishing to attend private school. As a result, more than 1000 private schools entered the market, and the private enrollment rate increased by 20 percentage points, with greater impacts in larger, more urban, and wealthier communities. We use this differential impact to measure the effects of unrestricted choice on educational outcomes. Using panel data for about 150 municipalities, we find no evidence that choice improved average educational outcomes as measured by test scores, repetition rates, and years of schooling. However, we find evidence that the voucher program led to increased sorting, as the “best” public school students left for the private sector.     

Competition between private and public schools: testing stratification and pricing predictions

When there are peer effects in education, private schools have an incentive to vary tuition to attract relatively able students. Epple and Romano [American Economic Review 88(1) (1998) 33] develop a general equilibrium model characterizing equilibrium pricing and student selection into schools when peer effects are present. The model predicts that competition will lead private schools to give tuition discounts to more able students, and that this will give rise to an equilibrium exhibiting stratification by income and ability between the public and private sectors and to a hierarchy of schools within the private sector. The model also yields a variety of comparative-static predictions. The predictions of the model are tested in this paper using a unique data set assembled by Figlio and Stone [Research in Labor Economics (1999) 115]. Tests of equilibrium predictions of the model reveal that: The propensity to attend private school increases with both income and ability, and, among private schools, the propensity to attend the highest-tuition schools rises with both income and ability. Within private schools, tuition declines with student ability, with a substantial number of even high-income households paying little or no tuition. The correlation between income and ability is greater in public than private schools. Tests of comparative static predictions of the model reveal that: Both income and ability become stronger predictors of private school attendance as public school expenditure falls. Income becomes increasingly important in determining placement in the private school hierarchy as public school expenditure falls. Discounts to ability in the lowest-quality private school decline as public school expenditure rises while discounts to ability in the highest-quality private school are little affected by changes in public school expenditure. Expenditure in private schools rises as expenditure in public schools increases. These empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.     

Examining Federal Impact Aid's Reimbursement for Local School Districts

In 1950, Congress created the Federal Impact Aid Program to compensate local school districts for lost tax revenue or increased burdens resulting from federal activities, including the placement of military bases within school districts. Currently, Impact Aid provides nearly $1 billion per year in subsidies to approximately 1400 local school districts that enroll over 1.2 million eligible children. This current study examines the adequacy of the funding in the Impact Aid program as an example of how the existing public finance literature provides the tools to help policy makers make informed decisions. (JEL H0 , H7 , 12 )     

The existence of non-elite private schools

We provide an explanation to the puzzle of the existence of paid-for private schools that offer lower quality education than some tuition-free public alternatives. We consider a model of a city composed of two communities: the urban area and the suburbs. The suburban public school provides higher quality education at an implicit price: the higher tax burden plus a housing rent premium. If that price is high enough and the urban public school has a sufficiently low quality, intermediate income households live in the urban area and use a private school. Intermediate quality private schools, then, exist to serve these households' demand. Lower and higher income households use different quality public schools. Therefore, perfect income stratification across public and private education does not characterize this equilibrium.     

SCHOOL CHOICE: SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS

We examine the attitudes of Ohio homeowners about school choice, which includes open enrollment programs, school vouchers, tuition tax credits, and charter schools. Previous studies examine more limited forms of choice and investigate fewer possible influences. Overall we report at least five new findings and five findings that contradict previous studies. We find the strongest predictors of opposition for school choice are people having graduate degrees and living in high‐performing public school districts. We find people living in blue collar areas and using private schools to be the strongest predictors of support. Males tend to oppose choice and African Americans support it. We find no role for income, the convenience of alternative schools, or the protection of house values in support for school choice. Overall we report at least five new findings and five findings that contradict previous studies. (JEL H44, I22)     

EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS AND CREAM SKIMMING*

Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most‐able students, and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that injects private‐school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming. Conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools' policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming. However, by adding restrictions like tuition constraints, such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification. This is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.     

Intra-school competition and student achievement

Within the economics of education literature, numerous studies have investigated the relationship between educational market competition and educational achievement. Educational market competition has been defined as either the availability of vouchers within a community or the number of schools or school districts within the relevant market structure. While these studies have shown that increases in inter-district competition result in increased student achievement, no studies, to our knowledge, have yet investigated the effect of intra-school competition on student achievement. Within this study, a measure of intra-school competition is developed and the findings indicate that increased intra-school competition leads to increased student achievement.     

Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting

Summary. This paper present the first fully closed general equilibrium model of hierarchical and local public goods economies with the following features: (i) multiple agent types who are endowed with both some amount of private good (income) and a house, who are mobile between houses and jurisdictions, and who vote in local and national elections; (ii) multiple communities that finance a local public good through property taxes which are set in accordance with absolute majority rule; and (iii) a national government that produces a national public good financed through an income tax whose level is determined through majority rule voting. In contrast to previous models, no overly restrictive assumptions on preferences and technologies are required to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of property taxation and voting. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium is proved without any of the major restrictions used in the past, and sufficient conditons for stratification of agents into communities based on their public good preferences and their wealth levels are found. This model lays the groundwork for a positive applied analysis of local public finance and intergovernmental relations. It furthermore builds the foundation for the first parameterized computable general equilibrium model of local public goods and fiscal federalism. Received: February 1, 1996; revised version August 9, 1996     

Entry into the Schooling Market: How is the Behaviour of Private Suppliers Influenced by Public Sector Decisions?

This research examines the location choice of private schools entering the California schooling market in 1979–80. We find that entrants are more likely to locate in public school districts with lower levels of per–pupil expenditure and higher fractions of public school students who reside in low–income households. In addition, we provide evidence of differences in the responsiveness of different types of private schools to the underlying conditions. Also, in comparing our results to those of previous research, we find that the determinants of the location choices of entrants appear to be the same as the determinants of the location pattern of incumbent private schools.     

School vouchers in practice: competition will not hurt you

Since the introduction of school vouchers in 1992, independent and public schools in Sweden operate on equal terms. We analyze the effects of competition on the public schools using data on the results of 28,000 ninth graders. Because the decision on which school to attend is a choice variable, sample selection models are used. To account for the potential endogeneity of the share of students attending independent schools, we use instrumental variable estimation. We also estimate panel data models on 288 Swedish municipalities. Our findings support the hypothesis that school results in public schools improve due to competition.     

PRIVATE EDUCATION IN INDIA: A NOVEL TEST OF CREAM SKIMMING

Students in private schools routinely outperform those in public schools both in the United States and around the world. But do private schools make students better or do they simply cream skim better students? In this article I take advantage of the remarkable fact that in many districts in India a majority of students attend private schools. As the private share of school enrollment increases, cream skimming becomes less plausible as the explanation for a higher rate of achievement in private schools. Evidence for cream skimming is found when the private share of schooling is low, in the range of 0–15%, and thus private schools have a large public pool from which to skim. But the private effect on achievement does not appear to diminish greatly even in districts where more than 70% of students are in private schools. Most importantly, mean scores taken over the entire population of students, private and public, increase with the share of private schooling. These findings support a significant productivity effect of private schools. (JEL I25, I2, L33)     

Competition Among Italian Junior‐Secondary Schools: A Variance‐Decomposition Empirical Analysis

The public economic theory emphasizes the potential role of competition in fostering the performance of educational systems. The rationale for pro‐competitive policies in education (i.e. vouchers, charter schools, tax deductions) is that schools can improve their quality responding to ‘pressures’ from nearby competitors. The objective of this paper is to analyze the potential relationship between (i) competition among schools and (ii) students’ achievement in Italy. While previous studies used OECD‐Pisa data for this purpose, here a new dataset about Italian schools has been employed: about 19,000 students in 150 schools constitute the sample. The reference framework is the idea that the presence of more schools in a certain area, and/or the proportion of students enrolled in private schools, should raise the performance of schools operating in that area through a ‘competition effect’. A multilevel strategy, which allows separating between‐areas variance in achievement scores, is employed. The findings support the view that competition has an impact, albeit little, on students’ achievement, and such competitive pressure is due to the number of schools, no matter if public or private.     

Non-public competition and public school performance: evidence from West Virginia

In this study, we investigate whether non-public school enrolment affects the performance of public school districts. If homeschooling and private schools act as competition, public school districts test scores should be positively associated with non-public enrolment. Using data on West Virginia county school districts, and controlling for endogeneity with an instrumental variables approach, we find that a one standard deviation increase in relative non-public enrolment in a county is associated with statistically significant improvements in public school district test scores. Our findings thus confirm that non-public enrolment and the competition it provides act to improve, rather than impede, public school performance.     

Access to transportation,residential segregation,and economic opportunity

The Housing Choice Voucher Program assists low-income families to afford decent housing and provide them with better economic opportunities. There is growing evidence that public transportation plays an important role in shaping the residential location choices of low-income households. However, transportation has not been a major focus of the research related to housing voucher programs. We develop a general equilibrium model of a city with multiple districts, decentralized employment, multiple commuting modes, and locally financed education. We compare housing vouchers with transportation vouchers with respect to poverty deconcentration, educational quality in each district, unskilled employment in the suburbs, and welfare.     

Private or public school advantage? Evidence from 40 countries using PISA 2012-Mathematics

It is known that in most countries, private school students outperform students in public schools in international assessments. However, the empirical literature recognizes that assessing the true effect of private school attendance requires addressing selection and sorting issues on both observabland unobservables. The existing empirical evidence on the private school effect mostly covers OECD and Latin American countries, with little evidence on other parts of the world. There is recent emerging country-specific evidence doubting the existence of a private school advantage. I use PISA 2012 data for Mathematics and two different methodologies to derive baseline and bias-corrected estimates of the private-dependent and independent school effect for 40 countries. A robust private school advantage is found only in a handful of countries. Public schools generally perform as well as private subsidized schools and outperform independent schools. Accounting for both peer effects and selection is necessary when evaluating school effectiveness, especially in the case of independent schools.     

Institutions,quality competition and public service provision: The case of public education

This paper contributes to the literature on integovernmental competition in two ways. First, the institutional setting within which public services are delivered is analyzed with respect to the impact on the quality of services provided. Previous studies have measured competition only in terms of governmental structure, ignoring the issue of service quality and the potential for differentiating local governmental jurisdictions along quality dimensions. Second, the outcome of competition is defined in terms of service quality. Previous studies generally have measured the outcome of competition by examining the fiscal effects of fragmentation and accountability through service costs or tax revenue impacts. School districts were used to empirically test quality competition. Student academic performance was modeled as a function of control variables and the degree of competition from neighboring school districts. Academic performance in public schools was positively associated with the performance of neighboring districts, although the effect was small. These findings, however, suggest that strategies to strengthen interjurisdictional competition may be useful in enhancing public service quality.     

A quantitative analysis of Turkish Private Education Reform

A recent education policy Turkish government is wishing to undertake is to shut down all private supplementary education centers (SECs) unless SECs manage to convert into a private school. With this policy, the government is willing to increase equality of opportunity among students. We show quantitatively that the policy, in fact, leads to a decrease in equality of opportunity since SECs are given the option to convert into private schools. We use a political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously set income, choose among a continuum of private schools differentiated by tuition and a public school. Households choosing the public school can privately supplement their child's education spending in any amount. Public school is free of charge, and its spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households. Income tax rate is determined by majority voting. Achievement of a child depends only on educational spending. We calibrate the model's parameters by matching certain targets from 2013 Turkish data. We then exogenously restrict the supplemental education spending to zero in a counterfactual experiment. We find that variance of achievement (or inequality of opportunity) increases by 23.51% and mean achievement decreases by 1.74%.     

Strategic quality choice and charter schools

Proponents of Charter schools argue that competition will improve the educational outcomes of both Charter and public students. A model of quality choice has been used to examine this claim. With capacity constraints, there is an equilibrium in which the Charter school offers a higher quality which the public school will not match. Competition from Charter schools may therefore have only modest effects on public school quality, if any.     

School finance reform and voluntary fiscal federalism

California has transferred the financing of its public schools from localities to the state. In response, many families have supplemented the tax revenue of their local public schools with voluntary contributions. This paper analyzes that phenomenon. We propose a model of partial cooperation among parents in making voluntary contributions to their public schools. Under reasonable conditions, the model predicts that contributions per pupil should decline with school size. We estimate this relationship using data on contributions to California schools. Our estimates reveal that contributions per pupil do decline with size; however, the rate of decline is surprisingly slow.