Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Career Concerns and Product Market Competition

This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second effect is privately valuable to firms, but is socially wasteful. As a result, equilibrium pay for talent can be inefficiently high and career concerns too strong. Explicit incentive contracts do not solve the problem, but equilibrium pay is reduced if managerial skills have firm‐specific components, or if firms are heterogeneous. In this second case, managers are efficiently assigned to firms, but equilibrium pay reflects the profitability of talent outside the efficient allocation. The effect of increased competition is ambiguous in general, and depends on the profit sensitivity to cost reductions. This ambiguity is illustrated in two examples of commonly used models of imperfect competition.     

Optimal promotions of competing firms in a frictional labour market with organizational hierarchies

We study optimal promotion decisions of hierarchical firms, with one junior and one senior managerial position, which interact in a search and matching labour market. Workers acquire experience over time while being employed in a junior position and the firm has to determine the experience level at which the worker receives a promotion which allows her to fill a senior position. Promoted workers move to the senior position in their current firm, if it is vacant, otherwise they search for senior positions on the market. The promotion cut-offs of the competing firms exhibit strategic complementarity, but we show that generically a unique stable symmetric general equilibrium exists. We find that stronger competition among firms leads to later (earlier) promotions if the initial number of firms is small (large) giving rise to an inverse U-shape relationship. In the presence of two skill groups, stronger competition among firms reduces the importance of skill differences, so the gap in wages and promotion times decreases with the number of firms. The model is compatible with empirical evidence that high-skill workers are promoted faster than the low-skilled and that internal promotions are more frequent than cross-firm moves to a higher hierarchical position.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners ‘penalize’ managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition,Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

This study examines the relevance of non‐executive outside directors with multiple directorships for corporate governance building on a large panel of European listed firms in the period 2003 to 2011. Focusing on executive turnover as an indicator for effective monitoring, the findings reveal that multiple directorships and product market competition are substitutes. Outsiders increase executive turnover in underperforming firms exclusively if competition in the industry is weak. In environments with effective competition, outsiders do not significantly influence the decision to replace underperforming managers. In fiercely competitive industries, the market pressure seems to effectively limit managerial discretion for opportunistic behavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small open city

This paper analyzes a duopoly location model with an asymmetric zoning that prohibits firms from locating to a specific interval in a small open linear city. It is shown that the maximum differentiation principle presented in d'Aspremont et al. [Econometrica 47 (1979) 1145] is still valid under area zoning regulation. Moreover, a zoning regulation can be seen as a policy instrument to limit firms' excess profits, and a proper regulation may even reduce the distortion in total transportation costs, therefore enhancing social welfare. Specifically, the optimal zoning is about 29.5 percent of the city with no amenity effect. Finally, all the land rents raised by zoning are eventually confiscated by the absentee landowner.     

Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution Program

In 1985, Demsetz and Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns would yield insignificant results. To test this hypothesis, we use the zaibatsu dissolution program from late-1940s Japan as a natural experiment: an exogenous shock to the equilibrium ownership structure. Through that program, the US-run occupation removed the more prominent shareholders from many of the most successful Japanese companies. By focusing on the way firms and investors responded to the mandated selloff, we accomplish two goals: (a) we avoid the endogeneity problem that has plagued much of the other research on the subject, and (b) we clarify the equilibrating dynamics by which competitive markets move firms toward their optimal ownership structure. With a sample of 637 Japanese firms for 1953 and 710 for 1958, we confirm the equilibrating mechanism behind the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis: between 1953 and 1958, the ex-zaibatsu firms did retructure their ownership patterns. As of 1953, the unlisted ex-zaibatsu and new firms still had not been able to negotiate the transactions necessary to approach their profit-maximizing ownership structures. Even the listed firms had not fully undone the effect of the occupation-induced changes on managerial practices. By 1958 the firms had done this, and the earlier correlation between profitability and ownership disappeared. By then, firm profitability showed no correlation with ownership, whether under linear, quadratic, or piecewise specifications. We further find no evidence that ex-zaibatsu firms sought to strengthen their ties to banks over 1953–1958.     

Bank monitoring,managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India

The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small‐sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies

This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether and under what conditions managed competition or segmentation of the market between regulated monopolies achieves better results. In the spatial duopoly model analyzed here, unhindered competition generally results in an inefficient allocation. When the regulator knows the technologies, optimal managed competition results in distortions of the quality choice, but an optimal regulated-monopolies regime achieves the first best outcome. When the regulator is uncertain about the technologies, neither of these methods yields the first-best outcome. The regulated-monopolies regime still tends to produce better quality choices, but managed competition tends to be more effective at extracting rents from the firms. The overall comparison depends on some finer details of the environment.     

Firm value,managerial confidence,and investments: The case of China

The purpose of this article is to test empirically the impact of Chinese managerial confidence on firm value through investment decisions. We use a simultaneous equation model, which treats firm value, investments, and managerial confidence as endogenous to the firm. With a sample of 329 Chinese listed firms and a confidence measure based on management shareholding, the 3SLS regression results show significant interactions among the three variables. Firm value has a positive impact on managerial confidence while the latter's impact on the former turns from positive to negative at a certain point. The results suggest a non‐monotonic relationship between managerial self‐confidence and firm value and imply an optimal level of managerial confidence. Therefore, while the leader selection process encourages confident talents to become decision‐makers, proper measures are required to prevent the confidence transformed into overconfidence.     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts

This paper studies the endogenous choices of strategic contracts in a duopoly with bargaining between the owner and manager of each firm over the content of the managerial delegation contract. We show that when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner within each firm is sufficiently high, quantity competition based on the quantity contracts chosen by the owners of both firms can be uniquely observed in the equilibrium, whereas quantity competition and price competition can be observed in the equilibrium when this relative bargaining power is sufficiently low. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incentives to innovate in response to competition: The role of agency costs

This paper investigates the role of managerial ownership and incentive payment as potential drivers of innovation decisions by firms and as shifters of the competition-innovation link in the Russian manufacturing industry, where poorly protected property rights and a path-dependent market structure (typical for many transition economies) lead to a variety of outcomes. We use recent survey-based microdata for nearly 2000 non-listed companies in Russia. Our results suggest that managerial ownership, which initially evolved as a means of protecting against and resisting dysfunctional institutions, may stimulate decisions to undertake R&D and risky product innovations. Further, managerial ownership and competition are complementary motivations for R&D and innovation. Incentive payment to hired managers is a positive commitment instrument but has no impact on the competition-innovation link.     

The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

Going green,going clean: Lean‐green sustainability strategy and firm growth

Despite the widespread recognition of the paybacks of “going green” and “going clean,” limited research has focused on the impact of lean‐green strategy on firm growth. In this study, we contribute to strategy and environmental sustainability literatures by investigating the possibility that the influence on lean‐green strategy and firm growth is driven by different levels of industry competition, managerial power, and family ties. Using panel data from 732 firms in four major industrialized economies (the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), we found that lean‐green strategy positively relates to firm growth and this relationship is amplified at higher levels of competition, managerial power, and family ties. Theoretical and practical implications of the study are also discussed.     

HR in the small business enterprise: Assessing the impact of PEO utilization

Within small businesses, organizational leaders are themselves often responsible for the HR function, an area where they typically have limited training and experience. Not surprisingly, small business leaders have raised concerns about the quality of HR programs in their firms and the fact that HR consumes scarce managerial time. While professional employer organizations (PEOs) emerged in response to such concerns, much controversy exists as to whether and how small businesses benefit from PEO utilization. Using a survey of more than 740 small businesses, we examine the relationship between PEO utilization and two key small business outcomes: managerial time required by HR activities and satisfaction with HR outcomes. Our results indicate that firms not using a PEO reported significantly lower levels of satisfaction with HR outcomes than firms that used a PEO for a limited set of transactional services and firms that used a PEO for both transactional and strategic HR services. Among firms using a PEO, satisfaction with HR outcomes was significantly higher among firms that obtained a broader set of transactional and strategic HR services. Firms that used a PEO also reported that HR consumed significantly less managerial time relative to leaders in firms that made no use of a PEO. However, there was no significant difference in the time demanded by HR between firms that used a limited set of transactional services and those that used a broader range of transactional and strategic services. Implications for the role of PEOs and their use within small businesses are discussed. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Advertising Media Planning,Optimal Pricing,and Welfare

This paper analyzes optimal media planning strategies in a pricing‐advertising competition model where firms can use mass and specialized advertising. We find that although targeted advertising avoids the wasting of ads, firms might find it optimal to mix specialized advertising with the mass media. We also show that the characteristics of the specialized media available crucially affect the outcome of price competition between firms, which can range from a full fragmentation of the market into local monopolies to lower average prices (compared to the case where firms had only mass advertising available). Regarding welfare, we prove that although the use of specialized advertising can lower consumer surplus and drive a fragment of consumers out of the market, this advertising technology is welfare‐improving, and can be Pareto superior.     

Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China

This study provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in socialistic internal capital markets. Listed Chinese companies are required to disclose the amount of resources that are reallocated to other firms of the parent company, which provides us with a direct measure of the socialistic subsidization of weak member firms by strong member firms within a business group. We hypothesize that in strong member firms, managerial compensation is less sensitive to firm performance because cross‐subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for their own firms' performance, and also increases the noise in performance measures. We also hypothesize that socialistic cross‐subsidization results in an increase in managerial agency costs of strong member firms due to the low pay‐performance sensitivity and low incentive to work hard. We document empirical results that are consistent with these two predictions.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.