Fairness versus efficiency: An experimental study of (mutual) gift giving

Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games, such as the prisoners’ dilemma. In our experiment, the participants can increase efficiency by giving gifts. In the one-sided treatment, this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases, decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. Our results indicate that efficiency concerns are dominated by fairness concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in one-sided gift relationships.     

Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment

Many people may suffer from moral biases when making allocation decisions having consequences to others. This means that some factors hinder people from finding, or constructing, their true social preferences in those situations. As a counterforce to this, numerous devices of moral priming have evolved—such as parenting, formal education as well as various formal and informal contracting procedures. This paper focuses on the influences of social identity and the perceived fairness of contracting procedures on subjects’ behaviour in situations of allocation decisions. The analysis of experimental data suggest, first, that males are less likely than females to engage in other-regarding behaviour in a pre-agreement situation where two active players divide an endowment among themselves and a third, passive, player. However, this difference disappeared after the joint contract of the rule of dividing the endowment was made. Second, it was found that students of economics are less likely than other students to behave in an other-regarding way before the contract; this difference remained also in decisions after the contract was made. Finally, both a random selection mechanism and a majority voting mechanism were rated fair by the majority of the subjects. However, the data suggests that fairness ratings are positively associated with compliant behavior only in the case of the majority voting mechanism.     

International tax coordination: regionalism versus globalism

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature. The model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination. With high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world, the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination, even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy.     

Optimal monetary policy: distribution efficiency versus production efficiency

This paper investigates the trade‐off between distribution effect and production effect of monetary policy when there exist unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In the absence of risk‐sharing arrangements such as a credit market, monetary policy serves to provide ex post insurance to smooth consumption. Specifically, issuing interest‐bearing bonds restores credit transactions on money through bond‐money exchanges. Such a policy has a positive distribution effect, but the resulting inflation hampers production efficiency. It is demonstrated that the trade‐off between distribution efficiency gain and production efficiency loss would result in net welfare enhancement if consumers are relative‐risk‐averse enough.     

Fairness and the employment contract: North American regions versus Germany

Substantial evidence shows that North Americans are generallymore accepting of the market than Europeans and attribute marketoutcomes to a larger degree to effort or skill. Thus, NorthAmericans might be more accepting of layoffs and pay cuts thanGermans, and Germans might be more sensitive to the proceduresand conditions under which pay cuts and layoffs occur. The empiricalresults from our quasi-experiment are largely in line with thesehypotheses. The results may help to explain and be explainedby the different labour market institutions in the differentregions.     

Compensation payments for habitat heterogeneity: Existence, efficiency, and fairness considerations

Compensation payments for voluntary conservation measures have become an important tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide. Each year substantial financial resources are spent on such measures, particularly in the context of agri-environmental schemes. In Europe, a debate has started on whether this money is spent effectively. In response to this debate it has been suggested that a portfolio of measures leading to habitat heterogeneity be implemented. Although payments for heterogeneous conservation measures have been analysed in the literature, it has never been questioned that payments can be designed in a way that encourages enough land users to carry out each conservation measure within a portfolio of measures. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that such payments do not always exist. Moreover, in cases where payments for habitat heterogeneity exist the payment scheme may require overcompensation of the land users, posing a limit to both efficiency and fairness considerations.     

Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory

We investigate the relative merits of the Boston and Serial Dictatorship mechanisms when the timing of students’ preference submission over schools varies within the structure of the mechanism. Despite the well-documented disadvantages of the Boston mechanism Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (American Economic Review 93:729–747 2003), we hypothesize that a Boston mechanism where students are required to submit their preferences before the realization of their exam scores, can in fact have fairness and efficiency advantages compared to the often favored Serial Dictatorship mechanism. We test these hypotheses in a series of laboratory experiments which vary by the class of mechanism implemented, and the preference submission timing by students, reflective of actual policy changes which have occurred in China. Our experimental findings confirm the efficiency hypothesis straightforwardly, and lend support to the fairness hypothesis when subjects have the chance to learn with experience. The results have important policy implications for school choice mechanism design when students’ relative rankings by schools are initially uncertain.     

Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.     

Innovation and knowledge sharing in crowdfunding: how social dynamics affect project success

The aim of this study is to contribute to the existing literature on innovation and knowledge sharing in crowdfunding, by exploring the importance of internal social capital, and how the previous failure of a campaign may lead to the success of a second one from the same project creator. Thus, the research question of the study is: how do social dynamics affect project success in a crowdfunding context? The paper reports an illustrative case study which has been promoted on the Kickstarter platform. The authors analysed data, documentation and physical artefacts, especially regarding the network size during the funding period. The results show that the self-learning which project creators gain from previous failure supports them in relaunching their crowdfunding campaign. However, various revisions take place during the second campaign (e.g. social capital size, product redesign and knowledge sharing) to achieve success.     

Market power versus efficiency under uncertainty: conventional versus Islamic banking in the GCC

In this article we estimate the effect of concentration on intermediation margins in Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) Islamic and conventional banking under the assumption that margins are uncertain. The empirical model, which we formally derive from an expected utility maximization problem, allows us to test for risk aversion as well as competitive conduct in loan and the deposit markets. The model also yields an expression showing that the effect of concentration on margins is the sum of its respective effects on market power, marginal cost of intermediation and marginal cost of uncertainty. The expression allows us to test whether concentration is welfare enhancing, reducing or neutral. We find Islamic banks to be risk-averse and conventional banks to be risk-neutral. We also find that concentration is welfare-neutral in Islamic loans and deposits, welfare-enhancing in conventional loans and welfare-neutral in conventional deposits. We used Nonlinear Two-Stage Least Squares (N2SLS) and Nonlinear Three-Stage Least Squares (N3SLS) to check for robustness.     

Recreational versus professional bettors: Performance differences and efficiency implications

Using a novel dataset, which allows comparisons across heterogeneous sub-groups of pari-mutuel bettors, we demonstrate significant behaviour and performance distinctions between recreational and professional investors. Professionals’ ability to earn abnormal returns on short odds horses in high volume markets challenges the existing empirical consensus, which offers very limited evidence of betting market inefficiency. The results offer important lessons for betting operators and regulators and highlight the potential for similar avenues of investigation in other speculative markets.     

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Summary. A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance – the more common route in the literature – we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mechanism that satisfies certain reasonable conditions: we call this the marginal cost pricing mechanism. We compare the size of the marginal cost pricing mechanism's worst budget surplus with the worst welfare loss of the Shapley value mechanism. Received: October 26, 1998; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Status quo effects in fairness games: reciprocal responses to acts of commission versus acts of omission

Both the law and culture distinguish between acts of commission that overturn the status quo and acts of omission that uphold it. This distinction is of central importance when it comes to reciprocal actions. A stylized fact of everyday life is that acts of commission elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. We report experiments that directly test whether this stylized fact characterizes behavior in controlled experiments. We compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts in experiments using binary, extensive form games. Across three experiments, we examine the robustness of our results to different ways in which the status quo can be induced in experiments. The data show a clear difference between effects of acts of commission and omission by first movers on reciprocal responses by second movers.     

Hit by the Silk Road: how wage coordination in Europe mitigates the China shock*

Coordination in collective wage setting can constrain potential monopoly gains to unions in non-tradable industries. Countries with national wage coordination can thus stabilize overall employment against fluctuations and shocks in the world economy. We investigate this argument by exploring within-country variation in exposure to competition from China in 13 European countries. Our estimates demonstrate that in countries with uncoordinated wage setting, regions with higher import exposure experienced a marked fall in employment, while countries with wage coordination experienced no such employment effects. We show that our findings are robust to alternative measures of wage coordination, industry classifications, and trade exposure.     

Under- versus overconfidence: an experiment on how others perceive a biased self-assessment

This paper reports findings of a laboratory experiment, which explores how reported self-assessment regarding the own relative performance is perceived by others. In particular, I investigate whether overconfident or underconfident subjects are considered as more likeable, and who of the two is expected to win in a tournament, thereby controlling for performance. Underconfidence beats overconfidence in both respects. Underconfident subjects are rewarded significantly more often than overconfident subjects, and are significantly more often expected to win. Subjects being less convinced of their performance are taken as more congenial and are expected to be more ambitious to improve, whereas overconfident subjects are rather expected to rest on their high beliefs. While subjects do not anticipate the stronger performance signal of underconfidence, they anticipate its higher sympathy value. The comparison to a non-strategic setting shows that men strategically deflate their self-assessment to be rewarded by others. Women, in contrast, either do not deflate their self-assessment or do so even in non-strategic situations, a behavior that might be driven by non-monetary image concerns of women.     

Advertising bans and product demand: how does marketing affect demand for a differentiated product?

Applied economists have made extensive use of product category time series studies to investigate the effects that an advertising ban might have on markets for potentially harmful products such as tobacco and alcohol. This paper argues that such studies can cast little light on the question, partly because they contain no plausible hypothesis of how advertising influences demand in a market for differentiated products. This paper extracts such an hypothesis from literature on the psychology of consumer behaviour, and uses it in simple economic model of a differentiated product market. The analytical results are sensitive to the precise assumptions made about the competitive structure of the market. This apparently negative conclusion is an important warning against making over-generalized predictions about the effects of an advertising ban. Finally, the paper makes several proposals about how its hypothesis could be tested empirically.     

Private ownership form and productive efficiency: Electric cooperatives versus investor-owned utilities

Property rights theory predicts that private firms whose ownership shares are not tradable will not be managed efficiently. This paper tests that theory by comparing the costs of rural electric cooperatives (RECs) and investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs). Separate translog cost functions are estimated for the RECs and the IOUs. The estimated costs of producing several three-product output bundles are then compared across ownership form under the assumption that all firms face identical input prices. The empirical results suggest that the cooperative sector of the electric power industry produces its output in a much less efficient manner than does the investor-owned sector.I would like to thank David Kaserman, Steven Caudill, T. Randolph Beard, Daniel Gropper, and David Laband for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was partially funded by the Auburn University Utilities Research Center. The views expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the New York State Public Service Commission.     

Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.     

Bank loan versus financial lease: how do traditional and innovative approaches within the banking sector influence economic growth? A comparative analysis between the US and China

ABSTRACT

The argument over the effects of financial structures on economic growth remains unsettled. This study, therefore, compares the dynamic correlation and lead–lag relationship between the different financial approaches within the banking sector (that is, traditional bank loans versus innovative financial leasing) and economic growth. We employ a continuous wavelet analysis using time-series data from 1982–2017 from the US (the world’s largest developed country) and China (the world’s largest developing country). The empirical results show that (1) episodes of significant correlation usually emerge during periods of reform, crisis or policy implementation; and (2) in China, traditional banking promotes economic growth in the long term, while the real economy only imputes the evolution of banks during critical economic reforms in the short term. Meanwhile, financial leasing could only promote the development of the real economy under suitable regulation; and (3) in the US, before the crises, the irrational growth of the real economy could increase bank assets, while during the crises, the traditional banking approach harms economic growth, and after the crises, financial leases play an important role in recovery. Therefore, we suggest that policymakers should establish adequate policies and regulations to solve the situation.