Overreactions,Momentum, Liquidity,and Price Bubbles in Laboratory and Field Asset Markets

Laboratory asset markets provide an experimental setting in which to observe investor behavior. Over more than a decade, numerous studies have found that participants in laboratory experiments frequently drive asset prices far above fundamental value, after which the prices crash. This bubble-and-crash behavior is robust to variations in a number of variables, including liquidity (the amount of cash available relative to the value of the assets being traded), short-selling, certainty or uncertainty of dividend payments, brokerage fees, capital gains taxes, buying on margin, and others.

This paper attempts to model the behavior of asset prices in experimental settings by proposing a "momentum model" of asset price changes. The model assumes that investors follow a combination of two factors when setting prices: fundamental value, and the recent price trend. The predictions of the model, while still far from perfect, are superior to those of a rational expectations model, in which traders consider only fundamental value. In particular, the momentum model predicts that higher levels of liquidity lead to larger price bubbles, a result that is confirmed in the experiments. The similarity between laboratory results and data from field (real-world) markets suggests that the momentum model may be applicable there as well.     

Investor sentiment,information and asset pricing model

We present an asset pricing model with investor sentiment and information, which shows that the investor sentiment has a systematic and significant impact on the asset price. The equilibrium price's rational term drives the asset price to the rational, and the sentiment term leads to the asset price deviating from it. In our model, the proportion of sentiment investors and the information quality could amplify the sentiment shock on the asset price. Finally, the information is fully incorporated into prices when sentiment investors learn from prices. The model could offer a partial explanation of some financial anomalies: price bubbles, high volatility, asset prices' momentum effect and reversal effect.     

Two-period trading sentiment asset pricing model with information

We present a dynamic asset pricing model with investor sentiment and information, which shows that the investor sentiment plays a systematic and important role in the asset prices and the information is gradually incorporated into prices. The model has an analytical solution to the sentiment equilibrium price. We find that sentiment trading quantity not only increases the market liquidity, but also causes the asset prices' overreaction if the intensity of sentiment demand is more than a constant value. Therefore, the continuing overreactions result in a short-term momentum and a long-term reversal. The model could offer a partial explanation to some financial anomalies such as price bubbles, high volatility, asset prices' overreaction and so on.     

Double Bubbles in Assets Markets With Multiple Generations

We construct an asset market in a finite horizon overlapping-generations environment. Subjects are tested for comprehension of their fundamental value exchange environment and then reminded during each of 25 periods of the environment's declining new value. We observe price bubbles forming when new generations enter the market with additional liquidity and bursting as old generations exit the market and withdrawing cash. The entry and exit of traders in the market creates an M shaped double bubble price path over the life of the traded asset. This finding is significant in documenting that bubbles can reoccur within one extended trading horizon and, consistent with previous cross-subject comparisons, shows how fluctuations in market liquidity influence price paths. We also find that trading experience leads to price expectations that incorporate fundamental value.     

资产价格泡沫与货币政策应对——事先行动还是事后反应

资产价格泡沫的产生原因是多方面的,早期的研究更多地认为资产泡沫来自于投资者的非理性因素,但是随着金融自由化进程的推进,与经济金融发展水平不相适应的金融自由化也成为资产泡沫产生的一个重要原因。而对于资产价格泡沫的货币政策应对一直存在争议,一些学者主张货币政策应该忽略资产价格,而另一些学者则主张货币政策应该对资产价格作出反应。本文基于后一种观点,来探讨当预期资产价格将出现泡沫时,货币政策是该事先行动还是事后反应,为此,本文引入产出跨期配置的理论,来阐述货币政策应对资产价格泡沫的决策模型。     

过度自信、流动性和资产定价

本文研究了过度自信的投资者在一个多阶段金融市场中是如何影响均衡价格和投资者要求的期望收益的.结论表明,由于投资者过度自信,容易低估风险,从而在一段时期内会使得价格急剧上升.投资者人数实际上是股票市场流动性的一个表征,我们的结论表明,由于过度自信的投资者的存在,他们实际上充当了流动性提供者的角色,从而使得一段时期内即使对理性投资者来说,依然导致了风险的暂时降低,他们也会接受比较高的资产价格,要求相对比较低的期望收益.     

The Effects of Subject Pool and Design Experience on Rationality in Experimental Asset Markets

Empirical evidence suggests that prices do not always reflect fundamental values and individual behavior is often inconsistent with rational expectations theory. We report the results of fourteen experimental asset markets designed to examine whether the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience (i.e., previous experience in a market under identical conditions) tempers price bubbles and improves forecasting ability. Our main findings are: 1) price run-ups are modest and dissipate quickly when traders are knowledgeable about financial markets and have participated in a previous market under identical conditions; 2) price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced; 3) the heterogeneity of expectations about price changes is smaller in markets with knowledgeable and experienced traders, even if such traders only represent a subset of the market; and 4) individual forecasts of prices are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model in any market, although absolute forecast errors are smaller for subjects who are knowledgeable of financial markets and for those subjects who have participated in a previous market. In sum, our findings suggest that markets populated by at least a subset of knowledgeable and experienced traders behave rationally, even though average individual behavior can be characterized as irrational.     

Quantitative easing tilts the balance between monetary and macroprudential policy

Quantitative easing by central banks has stimulated risk-taking in financial markets and contributed to a liquidity-driven boom in asset prices. It puts the relation between monetary policy and financial stability into a new perspective. We show by a regression analysis for a panel of 11 advanced economies that an asset price bust has adverse effects on inflation. The effect of stock prices and corporate bond rates on inflation is significant, also if we control for developments in credit. This insight implies that in conducting and implementing quantitative easing, central banks should closely monitor and take into account asset bubbles.     

Financial crises and liquidity shocks a bank-run perspective

In contrast with the financial multiplier literature, this note explores a case in which the shock triggering a financial crisis stems from the financial sector itself; it is not a shock stemming from the real sector which gets amplified by, say, agency problems. The basic intuition is provided by the bank-run literature of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) variety. Financial development is modeled as a mechanism that endows real assets (e.g., land and capital) with liquidity. However, liquidity can be impaired by shocks that are equivalent to a bank run. Liquidity creation enhances real asset prices, while a liquidity crunch generates asset price collapse. This bubble-looking episode is not driven by standard fundamentals, although it is fully in line with rationality. In this context, devoid of other frictions like price stickiness, the note examines the effect of monetary policy in the absence of nominal rigidities. It shows that preventing price deflation is not enough to offset relative (to output) asset price meltdown, but lower policy interest rates increase relative asset prices and steady-state output. Moreover, in the neighborhood of a first-best capital allocation, an increase in the liquidity of capital may lower the welfare of the representative individual, even if the higher liquidity of capital is sustainable and, hence, not destroyed by future crash – illustrating the possibility of “excessive” financial innovation. An extension of the basic model supports the conjecture that low policy interest rates may have given further incentives to the development of “shadow banking.”     

Real estate prices and systemic banking crises

The collapse of real estate prices has historically jeopardized banking stability and triggered systemic banking crises. This paper studies risk contagion in a banking system in real estate price shock by adopting complex network theory. Modelling the real estate-related asset as a common exposure of banks to the real estate market, we propose a model that incorporates two main risk contagion channels, i.e., the financial network and asset fire sales, and reveal how the real estate price shock is transmitted and propagated across banks. We demonstrate that banking stability is highly sensitive to the real estate price shock. Moreover, due to the particularly low liquidity of the real estate market, the asset fire-sales of real estate assets overwhelms the financial network, playing the dominant role in risk contagion. Our model can be adopted by regulators to conduct stress testing and to forge effective risk management strategies.     

流动性约束与货币政策的资产价格效应

本文在新凯恩斯主义分析框架下,基于一个动态随机模型探讨了代理人消费流动性约束下的货币政策的资产价格效应,得到下列结论：资产价格波动通过财富效应影响代理人的消费。以利率为操作目标的最优货币政策应对股价、房价等资产价格波动做出反应,而其反应强度依赖于受流动性约束的代理人所占的比重。由于资产价格波动导致了流动性约束的时变性,最优利率规则对股价、房价等资产价格波动的最优权重也具有时变性。本文的实证分析表明,我国央行对房价和股价波动的利率调整具有时变性,以及此次金融危机爆发期间显现的这种时变性特征,与本文理论分析结果相吻合。     

No-arbitrage, state prices and trade in thin financial markets

We examine how non-competitiveness in financial markets affects the choice of asset portfolios and the determination of equilibrium prices. In our model, potential arbitrage is conducted by a few highly specialized institutional investors who recognize and estimate the impact of their trades on financial prices. We apply a model of economic equilibrium, based on Weretka (, 2007a), in which price effects are determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium concept. For the case in which markets allow for perfect insurance, we argue that the principle of no-arbitrage asset pricing is consistent with non-competitive behavior of the arbitragers and extend the fundamental theorem of asset pricing to the non-competitive setting.     

Systemic Characteristics of Financial Instability

I describe how in the new paradigm of a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE), introduced in Falahati (2019), macroeconomic imbalances with fluctuating levels of liquidity emerge endogenously. This provides a solid foundation for studying Minsky’s views on financial instability in an economy with a banking and risk-underwriting system. I identify an inverse relationship between liquidity premia and risk premia, which leads to endogenous risk-premium rating cycles, including credit-risk-premium rating cycles, and macroeconomic swings. Ceteris paribus, lower liquidity increases the prices of contracts covering risks (e.g., credit default swaps), whist it decreases prices of all other assets. The opposite occurs with higher liquidity. I analyze operations of banks, risk-underwriters, and the State/Central Bank, and present a new theory of banking which improves current understandings. This theory explains how a banking system uses the floating capital of the economy more efficiently, while it also generates greater systemic risks, compared to an economy without banks. I show how the banking system can induce macroeconomic booms and busts and generate endogenous asset price bubbles and bursts. I highlight other systemic problems of the economy and derive their implications for improving the financial management of the economy and its institutions.     

Stochastic investor sentiment,crowdedness and deviation of asset prices from fundamentals

This study constructs a theoretical model to address how stochastic investor sentiment affects investor's crowdedness, and how stochastic investor sentiment and crowdedness affect asset prices. An asset pricing model incorporating stochastic investor sentiment and crowdedness is developed, which can provide efficient explanations for the deviations of asset prices from fundamentals and the maverick risk of investors. This model indicates that the optimistic (pessimistic) investor sentiment and the long (short) crowdedness caused by optimistic (pessimistic) sentimental investors can push asset price above (below) fundamental value. Also, the sentimental investors who are wrong and alone would take the maverick risk. Our results are consistent with the idea that investor sentiment and investor behavior matter for the asset prices and the deviations of asset prices from fundamentals.     

A novel measure of liquidity premium: application to the Korean stock market

This study proposes a novel measure for an asset’s liquidity premium. Applying Brownian first-passage time distribution properties, we derive an explicit form of liquidity premium embedded in the asset price. Our liquidity premium measure is intuitive because it assesses the extent to which the value of the asset should be increased from the current market price if investors were allowed to retain the asset until they achieve an investment goal. This measure is readily available for assessing an asset’s liquidity because it does not require information on the asset’s transactional characteristics. Our empirical experiment using Korean stock market data suggests that the liquidity premium in this study is inversely related to Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, which is commonly used to measure stocks’ illiquidity.     

过度自信、有限参与和资产价格泡沫

当存在模型不确定性且有限市场参与内生时,过度自信的投资者和理性投资者参与股票市场的程度有着不同的行为模式。本文给出的模型分析了两种投资者在不同情况下对股票市场的参与情况,借此解释有限市场参与、超额进入和资产定价之间的关系。模型在流动性溢价、投资者结构和风险溢价的关系等方面具有明显的实证含义。模型表明,理性投资者有更大的投资区域,但是非理性投资者在其投资区域内更为激进。进而,在不同情形下,模型给出了资产均衡价格与投资者结构之间对应关系。     

中国股市的理性泡沫

传统理论通常把证券市场的泡沫与投资者的非理性行为混为一谈。近期的研究却表明在一个完全理性的市场中 ,泡沫依然可以出现。本文首先对我国证券市场存在理性泡沫的可能性提出多种理论解释 ,认为下列原因导致了我国证券市场泡沫的存在 :( 1 )上市审批制 ;( 2 )可供投资的证券种类少 ;( 3 )政府的托市行为 ;( 4)卖空机制的缺乏 ;( 5)套利机制缺乏有效性 ;( 6)上市公司很少分红 ,投资者买卖股票只是为了获得买卖差价。其次 ,我们通过分析所得的结果 ,提出应对理性泡沫的政策措施。     

Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices

Traditional asset pricing models predict that covariance between prices of different assets should be lower than what we observe in the data. This paper introduces markets for information that generate high price covariance within a rational expectations framework. When information is costly, rational investors only buy information about a subset of the assets. Because information production has high fixed costs, competitive producers charge more for low-demand information than for high-demand information. The low price of high-demand information makes investors want to purchase the same information that others are purchasing. When investors price assets using a common subset of information, news about one asset affects the other assets' prices; asset prices comove. The cross-sectional and time-series properties of comovement are consistent with this explanation.     

Beauty contest,bounded rationality,and sentiment pricing dynamics

We present a dynamic asset pricing model that incorporates investor sentiment, bounded rationality and higher-order expectations to study how these factors affect asset pricing equilibrium. In the model, we utilize a two-period trading market and investors make decisions based on the heterogeneous expectations principle and the “sparsity-based bounded rational” sentiment. We find that bounded rationality results in mispricing and reduces it in next period. Investor sentiment produces more significant effects than private signals, optimistic investor sentiment increases hedging demand, thus causing prices to soar. Higher-order investors are more rational and attentive to the strategies of other participants rather than private signals. This model also derives the dampening effect of higher-order expectations to price volatility and the heterogeneity expectation depicts inconsistent investor behavior in financial markets. In the model, investors' expectations about future price is distorted by their sentiment and bounded rationality, so they obtain a biased mean from the signal extraction.     

Price Limits, Information Acquisition, and Bid–ask Spreads: Theory and Evidence

A number of futures markets use price limits which, in effect, preclude trade from occurring at prices outside certain exogenous bounds. Noting that such markets are characterized by heterogeneously informed traders, whereas previous work on price limits assumes symmetrically informed traders, we examine the effects of price limits in a setting where market participants are asymmetrically informed. We find that imposing price limits generally lowers the quality of information acquired in equilibrium, but lowers bid–ask spreads as well. Thus, depending on the relative weights placed by society on liquidity versus price efficiency, there may exist a set of price limits that are most efficient in achieving a trade-off between liquidity and informational efficiency. We perform empirical tests of some implications of the model using cross-sectional data on price limits. We find that price limits are strongly negatively related to both price volatility and trading volume. Though other explanations for our empirical findings cannot be ruled out, these results are not inconsistent with the model's implication that price limits should be tighter for contracts which offer greater profit potential for informed traders.