Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game withn lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.We thank J. Crémer, H. Haller, S. Mendes, and the referees of this Journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Using inflation to erode the US public debt

Projections indicate the US Federal debt held by the public may exceed 70–100% of GDP within 10 years. In many respects, the temptation to inflate away some of this debt burden is similar to that at the end of World War II. In 1946, the debt ratio was 108.6%. Inflation reduced this ratio by more than a third within a decade. Yet there are some important differences – shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate, while the larger share of debt held by foreigners increases it. This paper lays out an analytical framework for determining the impact of a large nominal debt overhang on the temptation to inflate. It suggests that when economic growth is stalled, the US debt overhang may induce an increase in inflation of about 5% for several years that could significantly reduce the debt ratio.     

Sovereign debt spread and default in a model with self-fulfilling prophecies and asymmetric information

The euro area sovereign debt crisis has renewed interest in government credibility and the risk of default. Recent empirical evidence has shown that the sharp increase in government bond yields cannot be attributed entirely to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion effects can occur, and self-fulfilling speculation may arise. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model in the spirit of the second-generation currency crisis models developed by Obstfled (1996). The model describes a strategic game between governments and private investors. Euro area countries face a trade-off as governments may either commit to and implement restrictive fiscal policies or default on debt. The commitment strategy may not be optimal if the fundamentals deteriorate. The policy maker lose part of their credibility, and governments are forced to default. In addition, we introduce uncertainty about the cost of default in the model, which is then able to account for a greater variety of equilibrium. Thus, when the evaluation of the cost of default is asymmetric, prophecies are not always realized and default does not occur. Simulations of the model then show that it offers insights, and can help to account for the situations of Greece and Italy during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Sudden Stops,Time Inconsistency,and the Duration of Sovereign Debt

We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Sovereign risk,interbank freezes,and aggregate fluctuations

This paper shows how spillovers from sovereign risk to banks׳ access to wholesale funding establish a bank-sovereign nexus. In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up, heterogeneous banks give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral. Government borrowing under limited commitment is costly ex ante as bank funding conditions tighten when the quality of collateral drops. These spillovers, by impeding interbank intermediation, lower the penalty from defaulting due to an interbank freeze during a recession and propagate aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy. The model is calibrated using Greek data and is capable of reproducing stylized facts from the European sovereign debt crisis. In an application, we show that the ECB׳s non-standard financing operations mitigate the adverse feedback mechanism.     

Sovereign default risk premia,fiscal limits,and fiscal policy

We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.     

Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. However, the causes and potential consequences of this increase were only given scarce attention in the literature on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to fill this gap, we first determine the shocks that impact the variation in the share of sovereign debt held at home in an SVAR model on a sample of Eurozone countries between 2002 and 2014, distinguishing between external and domestic shocks. Thanks to several alternative tests, we show that home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to country-specific fundamentals and expectation shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se in the short-run. Second, a stylized theoretical model backed by the empirical results predicts that the consequences for sovereign debt crisis depend on the relative impact of domestic initial destabilizing shocks and increased home bias. The analysis suggests that an increase in home bias in times of sovereign debt stress, despite reflecting deteriorating fiscal conditions, may make default less likely.     

Sovereign risk and deposit dynamics: evidence from Europe

The unprecedented expansion of sovereign balance sheets since the beginning of the global crisis has given a new meaning to the term sovereign risk. Developments in Europe since early 2010 revealed new challenges for the functioning of private banks in an environment of heightened sovereign risk and may have contributed to deleveraging. The article uses an innovative way of measuring the perception of sovereign risk and its impact. Using an extension of a common market discipline framework, it shows that exposure to sovereign risk may have limited the ability of banks in Europe to collect deposits. Potential identification issues between deposits and bank efficiency are controlled by using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results are robust to inclusion of conventional measures of bank performance and the sector-wide holdings of foreign sovereign debt.     

TIME‐VARYING VOLATILITY,DEFAULT, AND THE SOVEREIGN RISK PREMIUM

This article studies how volatility changes affect sovereign spreads in strategic default models. Volatility changes affect savings and sovereign spreads. However, the impact of volatility shocks is state dependent; when the economy has a low debt, an increase in volatility is prone to generate precautionary savings. Instead, with high debt, an increase in volatility is likely to induce an even further increase in debt and spreads, both in endowment and production economies. I document a positive correlation between sovereign spreads and aggregate income volatility for a set of European economies during the debt crisis, consistent with the model's implications.     

Austerity,inequality, and private debt overhang

Using panel data of 17 OECD countries for 1980–2011, we find that the distributional consequences of fiscal consolidations depend significantly on the level of private indebtedness. Austerity leads to a strong and persistent increase in income inequality during periods of private debt overhang. In contrast, there are no discernible distributional effects when private debt is low. This result is robust to alternative identifications of fiscal consolidations, to different ways of defining periods of private debt overhang, and to controlling for the state of the business cycle and the level of government debt. We explore different channels through which our findings can be rationalized.     

Financial crises,debt overhang,and firm growth in transition economies

ABSTRACT

We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and performance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition, forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance. Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at maintaining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a debt overhang situation.     

迪拜债务危机:原因、影响及启示

2009年11月25日,迪拜政府宣布将重组旗下最大的主权投资公司迪拜世界,延迟6个月偿还其即将到期的约600亿美元债务。此事引起全球金融市场对迪拜未来偿还能力的担忧,多国股市出现下跌。迪拜债务危机的爆发主要是迪拜的发展模式出现问题,导致在金融危机冲击下房地产价格大幅度下跌。欧洲银行业在此次危机中风险敞口最大。此次事件会使新兴市场资金流向和美元汇率短期受到影响,但对世界经济的长期影响有限。迪拜危机对中国影响较小,但其所暴露的问题值得我们关注。     

Withstanding financial crises: would trade partners help or hurt?

This article provides new empirical evidence on the losses of real activity caused by various financial shocks. Spillover effects due to foreign trade linkages deserve special attention. To this end, we estimate a modify auto-regressive process and a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations estimator is used to account for the dependency of one’s country growth on its trade-weighted partners growth. We run estimations on a set of currency collapses, banking crises and sovereign defaults in 49 advanced and developing countries from 1978 to 2011. The trade-weighted foreign demand effect mitigated the economic downturn following a banking or a sovereign debt crisis in all countries, while only the advanced ones benefited from it after a currency collapse. Trade-based spillover effects make banking crises more costly in the developing countries, in those that liberalize their financial account. It contrasts with what is observed during currency or sovereign debt crises.     

The Euroland crisis and Germany’s euro trilemma

This paper investigates the causes behind the Euroland crisis, particularly Germany’s role in it. It is argued that the crisis is not primarily a ‘sovereign debt crisis’, but rather a (twin) banking and balance of payments crisis. Intra-area competitiveness and current account imbalances, and the corresponding debt flows that such imbalances give rise to, are at the heart of the matter, and they ultimately go back to competitive wage restraint on Germany’s part since the late 1990s. Germany broke the golden rule of a monetary union: commitment to a common inflation rate. As a result, the country faces a trilemma of its own making and must make a critical choice, since it cannot have it all – perpetual export surpluses, a no transfer/no bailout monetary union, and a ‘clean,’ independent central bank. Misdiagnosis and the wrongly prescribed medication of austerity have made the situation worse by adding a growth crisis to the potpourri of internal stresses that threaten the euro’s survival. The crisis in Euroland poses a global ‘too big to fail’ threat, and presents a moral hazard of perhaps unprecedented scale to the global community.     

Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.     

中国主权资产负债表及其风险评估(上)

本文基于国民资产负债表的理论框架,运用现有数据并通过必要的估算,初步编制了2000—2010年的中国主权资产负债表。结果显示,中国各年主权资产净额均为正值且呈上升趋势。这表明,中国政府拥有足够的主权资产来覆盖其主权负债。因此,在不短的时期内,中国发生主权债务危机的可能性极低。对总债务水平与全社会杠杆率(即总债务/GDP)的分析显示:中国的全社会杠杆率虽高于金砖国家,但远低于所有的发达经济体,总体上处在温和、可控的阶段。但是,近年来该杠杆率的提高速度很快,须引起关注。分部门的分析显示:企业负债率(占GDP比重)很高,构成中国资产负债表的显著特色。2010年,该负债率已逾100%,超过OECD国家90%的阈值,值得高度警惕。     

Indebted state versus intermediary state: who owes what to whom?

Ratios of public debt to GDP are much discussed these days and questions concerning debt relative to taxation have long been explored by fiscal scholars. With respect to monarchical regimes, it seems reasonable to treat public debt as similar to personal debt, recognizing that a monarch is not an ordinary person. When public debt arises through parliamentary assemblies, however, the similarity of form between public and personal debt vanishes because a parliamentary assembly does not trade on its own account; to the contrary, it is a type of intermediary that brings together people who buy bonds and people who later pay the bondholders. In a republic there is no sovereign who is indebted to ruled subjects. The institutional framework of republican governance transforms public borrowing into a process of intermediation among citizens, which leads in turn to the alternative orientation toward public debt that this paper explores.     

The sovereign spread in Asian emerging economies: The significance of external versus internal factors

This paper investigates the dynamic relations between external factors, domestic macroeconomic factors with sovereign spreads, debt to GDP ratio, etc. in Asian emerging countries. First, we develop a theoretical model that determines the equilibrium debt level, probability of default and sovereign spread and draw empirical implications. We then employ a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to investigate empirically how the spread of sovereign debt is influenced over time by both external and domestic factors. The empirical results show that variations in sovereign spreads are mainly driven by external shocks, with the term structure of US interest rate and the global risk aversion having the most important role. The findings also indicate that shocks from the US have a direct effect on sovereign spread and an indirect effect via domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, the evidence produced validates the presence of some response patterns of sovereign spread to the external shocks.