Macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Pakistan: a disaggregate analysis

This study analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables in Pakistan. The study utilizes VAR framework and uses quarterly data of Pakistan from 1976Q1 to 2017Q4. The results showed that after an increase in government expenditures, private consumption and prices take three quarters to increase, while private investment follows the declining trend. Private consumption and interest rate are negatively related with taxes, while private investment and prices are positively related with taxes. Real GDP, private consumption and interest rate respond positively with an increase in developmental expenditure, public consumption and public investment. Private investment is negatively related with development expenditure, public consumption and public investment. An increase in direct tax as well as indirect tax leads to an increase in real GDP, private investment and interest rate, while private consumption takes three to five quarters to responds. Private investment and prices are positively related with non-tax revenue, while real GDP, private consumption and interest rate are negatively related. These results support the Keynesian view that government expenditure and taxes are useful tools to stimulate the economic activity, while crowding-out hypothesis holds in Pakistan as well. An active and efficient role of government is required for macroeconomic stability.     

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION UNDER PARENTAL TEACHING*

This paper examines a simple overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation under both the public and private education regimes. Both young individuals and their parents allocate time to human capital accumulation. Under the public education regime, the government collects tax to finance expenditure for education resources. We show that there exists a level of tax which maximizes the speed of human capital accumulation because of parental teaching; and, if the government chooses tax rates adequately, human capital grows faster and welfare levels become higher under the public education regime than under the private.     

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public–good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation.     

The tax advantage of public firms over private firms in the German household solid waste disposal industry

We measure the tax advantage of public firms over private firms, which operate at municipality level in the German household solid waste disposal industry. Public firms with sovereign duties pay no taxes, but equivalent private firms have to. In a simple risk-free setting, we develop a measure of the percentage difference of the charges of both types of firms demanded under their respective tax treatments. We model a cost-covering public firm and a net present value maximizing private firm. For sensible model parameters from the German waste disposal industry the private firm has to demand an about 16% to 18% higher charge. The by far biggest impact on the measure has the value added tax, with revenues as a much larger tax base than profits. Tax savings, which directly affect pre-tax profits, only alleviate the disadvantage bit. There is some evidence that at least one type of private firms—that is, private law firms that are also majority privately owned, are productive enough to overcome the tax advantage of public firms and be able to charge a lower price than public firms.     

Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.     

Infrastructure Investment and Maintenance Expenditure: Optimal Allocation Rules in a Growing Economy

This paper studies the allocation of public expenditure between infrastructure investment and maintenance in an endogenous growth framework. In the basic model, maintenance spending affects both the durability and efficiency of public capital. The balanced growth path is derived and transitional dynamics associated with a revenue-neutral increase in expenditure on maintenance are analyzed. The model is then extended to account for the possibility that public spending on maintenance affects also the durability of private capital. The growth-maximizing tax rate and share of infrastructure investment are calculated in both cases. First- and second-best welfare-maximizing solutions are also discussed.     

提升河北省财政竞争力策略研究

与其他省(市、区)相比,河北省在财政收入竞争上占有一定优势,但由于公共服务提供水平较低,从而其财政综合竞争力处于劣势。提升河北省财政竞争力的战略选择应“以厚税基—低税费负担—高公共服务”为基本政策取向,以非财税手段吸引流动性税基为战略切入点,以此为基础,加强财政支出管理、吸引民间资金对地方混合性公共物品的投入和争取中央财政转移支付资金的支持。     

Public Expenditure,Environment, and Economic Growth

This paper attempts to develop a model of endogenous growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure in the presence of congestion effect of private capital and environmental pollution. We analyze the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in the steady‐state equilibrium when the level of production of the final good is the source of emission. Government allocates its income tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. In the steady‐state equilibrium, optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is less than the competitive output share of the public input; and this ratio varies inversely with the magnitude of the emission‐output coefficient. The steady‐state equilibrium appears to be a saddle point; and the market economy growth rate is not necessarily less than the socially efficient growth rate in the steady‐state equilibrium.     

A note on optimal income taxation,public goods provision and robust mechanism design

This paper extends the model of optimal income taxation due to Mirrlees (Mirrlees, J., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38, 175–208) and includes private information on public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to be robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (Bergemann, D., Morris, S., 2005. Robust mechanism design. Econometrica 73, 1771–1813), then the optimality conditions in the extended model with uncertainty about tax and expenditure policies are the same as in the standard model of optimal income taxation. The paper provides a foundation for a widely-used assumption in public finance, namely that individuals optimize their behavior subject to a predetermined and commonly known tax system.     

中国财政竞争与地方公共支出结构分析

This article examines the impact of intergovernmental fiscal competition on local public expenditure in China under current performance assessment system in which GDP is a critical factor. First, we present the assignment of public goods and tax burden and the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) of 30 provinces, and we find that current fiscal competition in China has taken the form of public expenditure improvement accompanied by preferential tax policies. Second, we regress the share of FDI on different components of provincial public expenditure, and find that the share of FDI is correlated negatively with the public service, tax burden and health care service while positively with infrastructure development. Therefore, FDI-based infrastructural investment crowds out public services investment, which fails to support the view that fiscal competition improves social welfares.     

R&D subsidies and private R&D expenditures: evidence from Italian manufacturing data

This paper uses a comprehensive firm level data set for the manufacturing sector in Italy to investigate the effect of government support on privately financed R&D expenditure. Estimates from a non‐parametric matching procedure suggest that public assistance has a positive effect on private R&D investment in the sense that the recipient firms achieve more private R&D than they would have without public support. This indicates that the possibility of perfect crowding out between private and public funds can be rejected. Furthermore, in this sample of Italian firms, tax incentives appear to be more effective than direct grants. The paper also examines whether public funding affects the financial sources available for R&D and finds that grants encourage the use of internal sources. The results also show some evidence of positive effects on credit financing for R&D.     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

Can a Mixed Health Care System be Desirable on Equity Grounds?*

Should health care provision be public, private, or both? We consider this question in a setting where people differ in their earnings capacity and face some illness risk. We assume that illness reduces an individual's time endowment when waiting for treatment. Treatment can be obtained in a competitive private sector (through private insurance) or in the National Health Service (NHS) where it is provided free of charge but after some (endogenous) waiting time. The equilibrium in the health care sector consists of a waiting time in the NHS such that no patient wants to switch health care provider. This equilibrium is governed by two public policies: the income tax system and the size of the NHS. We find that: (i) a mixed system with a small NHS is never desirable; (ii) actuarially fair sickness insurance is never desirable either; (iii) a mixed system with a sufficiently large NHS may improve on a pure public system if the dispersion of earnings capacities is large enough; and (iv) the welfare gains from such a mixed system are not likely to be significant.     

Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences

Tax-favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy. There are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations. First, for a given level of public good provision, higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare. This follows since considering a lower-paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision. Second, private donation reduces consumption, easing the resource constraint. This paper explores optimal policy, using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving. In addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods, the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels. Analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation. After considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility, the paper considers the choice of normative criterion. Like the earlier literature, this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden. Since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless, the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms, not a direct guide to policy.     

论我国费税制度的改革

费与税是不同的两个概念,而且是政府财政收入形式的两个不同的组成部分,虽然征收对象有所不同,但都是政府的调节工具,这决定了两的征收目的是非盈利性的,一般不能像私人物品那样进行企业化经营,但是税与费各有不同的作用和范围,在供应方式也也不尽相同,所以两又不能互相替代,而我们现在的许多章和件中,却大量的使用“费改税”的不科学提法,因此,有必要明确划分税与费的边界,做到税费共存,税费归位。     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

Fiscal policies, environmental pollution and economic growth

This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure and environmental pollution; and analyses the properties of optimal fiscal policy in the steady state growth equilibrium. We consider the level of consumption as the source of pollution. Government allocates its tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. Optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is equal to the competitive output share of the public input, when productive public expenditure is depicted as tax revenue minus abatement expenditure. However, the proportional income tax rate exceeds the competitive output share of the public input. There is no conflict between the social welfare maximizing solution and the growth rate maximizing solution in the steady state growth equilibrium. The unique steady state growth equilibrium appears to be a saddle-point when the growth rate is above a critical level and the steady state equilibrium growth rate in the market economy is not necessarily lower than the socially efficient growth rate.     

Public–private mix of health expenditure: A political economy and quantitative analysis

This paper constructs a simple model to examine decisions on public and private health spending under majority voting. In the model, agents with heterogeneous incomes choose how much to consume and spend on health care and vote for public health expenditure. The health status of an agent is determined by a CES composite of public and private health expenditure. The existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium are established. A quantitative exercise reveals the importance of the relative effectiveness of public and private health expenditure and their substitutability in determining the public‐private mix of health expenditure and in accounting for the observed differences across a sample of 22 advanced democratic countries.     

THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS

This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects.     

Budget share and optimal commodity taxes without computation

This paper shows for the linear expenditure system that the optimal tax rates increase across commodities in the ratio of the respective budget shares of the rich to those of the poor—i.e., the more luxurious good has a higher tax. These budget shares can be calculated either at pre-tax or post-tax price levels, thus can be expressed directly in terms of the basic parameters of the linear expenditure system.