论邓小平的执政思想

执政党如何使自己的决策和运行机制适应执政的特点，如何按照执政的要求建立领导体制和执政方式，以及如何提高执政党的执政能力，从而巩固党的执政地位。邓小平同志提出了执政党首先应该搞清楚的问题是“什么是社会主义，如何建设社会主义”和“执政党应该是一个什么样的党，怎样建设执政党”。不仅如此，执政党还要研究世情、国情和党情，还必须加强自身的建设，只有这样中国共产党才能立于不败之地。     

提高党的执政能力巩固党的执政基础

在长期执政、发展市场经济和经济全球化的条件下，如何增强执政基础是党的自身建设中面临的一个重大课题。党的执政基础是指党在执政的过程中赖以掌握政权、巩固政权，保证事业成功所必备的根本条件和基础前提，是一个执政党赖以生存和发展的基本立足点。中国共产党是中国惟一的执政党，党在执政中能否获得支持，以及所获得的支持程度如何，最终取决于我们党的实际作为，取决于我们党的执政能力。     

提高执政能力 巩固执政合法性

任何一个执政党在执政以后,都必然要想方设法地扩大其合法性基础,证明自己权力来源的合法性。人民群众对过去和现在执政能力的认同并不等于对未来执政能力的认同,更不能说明党的执政能力不再需要提高,党的执政地位就一劳永逸了。中国共产党成立已经九十年了,要想继续巩固自己的执政地位,必须增强执政意识,不断地提高执政能力,不断地满足人民群众的愿望和要求,不断地巩固执政合法性基础。因此,巩固执政合法性理所当然成为党的执政能力建设中的首要问题,值得我们深入研究。     

加强组织建设 形成基层合力

党的基层组织是党的全部工作和战斗力的基础，也是提高党的执政能力、巩固执政党地位的基础。党的基层组织状况如何，直接决定着党的执政能力强弱，决定着执政的成效。党的十六届四中全会通过的《中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定》明确指出，要“加强和改进党的基层组织建设，使党的基层组织真正成为贯彻“三个代表”重要思想的组织者、推动者、     

列宁对保持执政党纯洁性的探讨

保持党的纯洁性是无产阶级执政党提高执政能力、巩固执政地位的重要途径。列宁通过加强党的思想建设、组织建设和作风建设,构建了无产阶级执政党建设的内在系统;通过加强立法和执法、建立权力监督机构和机制、开展文化革命等举措,构建了无产阶级执政党建设的社会系统。     

党的执政能力建设研究

党的执政能力建设关系到党的执政地位的巩固和加强,关系到党和国家的长治久安。本文以马克思主义的科学态度和理论勇气,从回顾和考察党的执政能力建设的历史进程入手,了解党的执政能力建设的重要性,明确党的执政能力建设的主要途径,从而深化对中国共产党执政的基本规律、基本经验的认识,进一步丰富党的执政能力建设研究,为新时期提高党的执政能力提供实践经验和历史借鉴。     

执政党建设的关键：加强执政能力建设

十六大报告提出加强党的执政能力建设，抓住了执政党建设的关键，阐明了执政党建设的目的和归宿，推动了执政党建设的理论创新。     

目标绩效管理是提高医院党组织执政能力的有效途径

加强党的执政能力地设,是十六大提出的一项重大战略任务,是社会主义民主政治建设的重要组成部分。党的执政能力建设．不仅关系到党的执政地位的巩固,关系到党自身的形象和影响力,而且,事关国家和社会的发展进步。作为基层医院党组织,其领导水平和领导能力如何,对医院持续健康发展起着至关重要的作用。近年米,无锡市第一人民医院致力于探索提高医院党组织执政能力的有效途径,     

论发展先进生产力与巩固党的执政地位的关系

江泽民同志的“三个代表”重要思想中的首要一条就是：“代表中国先进生产力的发展要求。”这是我们党的理论与时俱进的体现。代表先进生产力发展要求是巩固执政党地位的重要基础；党的执政地位的巩固将有利于先进生产力的高度发展；发展先进生产力与巩固党的执政地位是相辅相成、密不可分的。     

加强党的执政能力建设需要创新干部工作机制

加强党的执政能力建设，关键是建设一支能够担当重任、经得起风浪考验、善于治国理政的高素质干部队伍，形成朝气蓬勃、奋发有为的领导集体。这不仅是加强党的执政能力建设的重要内容，也是巩固党的执政地位的重要保证。因此。必须围绕建设高素质的干部队伍，不断改进选人用人方法，创新干部工作机制，提高选入用人的能力，确保选人用人的准确性和科学性。     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inflation,money, interest rate,exchange rate,and casuality: the case of Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia

This study provides further evidence of the inflationary efects of the rates of growth of money supply, gross domestic product, efective exchange rate, and imported inflation for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia using quarterly data from 1964 to 1990. In addition, it examines the Granger causality between inflation and money supply as well as between inflation and the real exchange rate in the countries under consideration. Most of the results are consistent with extant theory and empirical evidence.     

Country terms of trade: trends,unit roots,over-differencing,endogeneity, time dummies,and heterogeneity

The debate about the Prebisch-Singer thesis has focused on primary commodities with some extensions to manufactures. We analyse trends in country terms-of-trade for goods and services rather than those for commodities according to the World Bank income classification. We find that the natural logarithm of the terms of trade for all groups except for the poorest has common unit roots, but none has individual unit roots. As low-income countries have no unit roots over-differencing is inefficient and biases significance levels in first differences against the fall in the terms of trade. For the low-income countries the terms of trade of goods and services are falling at a rate that is significantly negative without and with endogeneity treatment by system GMM. A comprehensive analysis of the effects of time dummies supports the result of falling terms of trade for low-income countries. When all coefficients are country-specific 50% of all low-income countries have falling terms of trade in a simultaneous equation estimation using the SUR method. Food and financial crisis have no effect on the number of countries with falling terms of trade, but (dis-)improve the terms of trade or the significance of the results for a very small number of countries.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.