公共支出视阈的中国城市减贫效应分析

在理论上,经济增长与公共支出是解决城市贫困的两大路径。经济增长是消除贫困的根本方式,公共支出追求直接的减贫目标。我国1997～2009年相关数据的实证检验表明,公共支出增长率与城市贫困发生率存在正相关关系,即减贫效应为负,其中,教育、医疗卫生与社会保障支出的减贫贡献各不相同;而经济增长具有显著的正的减贫效应。因此,必须...     

地方政府教育支出效率及影响因素分析

文章利用DEA-Tobit两阶段分析框架以安徽省16市数据为例,研究省以下地方政府公共教育支出的效率及其影响因素,结果表明安徽省2007年以来教育支出效率存在规模递减的情况,各市效率得分具有明显的差别;省以下财政分权程度和人均教育支出与教育支出效率负相关,人口密度与教育支出效率正相关,而各市城市化率、财政负担及省以下财政自给率与教育支出效率的关系不明显。     

公共产品视角下的财政分权研究

财政分权是经济体制转轨的关键环节之一,公共产品理论是财政分权的理论基础。从公共产品视角来看,财政分权要求地方政府有一定的自主权,以便更好地提供社会服务。本文从公共产品供给的效率角度,分析了政府间财政分权的必要性以及地方政府提供地方性公共产品的合理性和高效性,进而初步构建了公共产品的分权式供给机制。     

财政分权对地方政府非生产性公共支出的影响——以教育和行政管理支出为例

本文基于非生产性公共支出直接利益归属的不同,同时由于地方政府官员并非都存在追求职位晋升唯一目标,经济绩效也并非决定地方政府官员晋升的唯一因素、社会网络资源对其晋升的也存在重要影响,对中国式财政分权与教育和行政管理支出的关系进行了理论分析;同时利用中国30个省份1998-2006年的面板数据,运用可行广义最小二乘法和似不相关回归方法进行实证研究。得出以下主要结论:中国式财政分权的总体效应是抑制了地方政府教育投入的力度,而刺激了行政管理支出的增长;而且,行政人员规模的增长在刺激行政管理支出膨胀的同时,对教育支出产生显著的"挤出"效应。     

财政分权程度的经验规律——基于跨国数据的分析

针对财政分权的跨国数据,本文分析发现：各国分权程度差异较大;支出分权高于收入分权,地方政府承担了比真实收入更多的真实财政支出;不含社保的分权程度要高于含社保的分权程度,意味着社保部分更多归属于中央政府。基于多种影响因素的回归分析得到中央地方财政分权程度的经验标准。在相对宽松的条件下,一些国家落在了分权标准的基准线外。无论以哪种指标来衡量,中国的分权程度均高于上基准线。下一步改革应坚持中央政府主导地位,同步减小收入和支出的分权程度,将社保责任更多上收至中央政府。     

我国财政转移支付对城镇减贫效应分析

贫困和减贫是一个世界性课题,是世界上大多数国家不愿面对而又不得不去面对的问题,而财政转移支付是贫困治理的一种主要方式。主要阐述了公共财政转移支付对城镇减贫的影响,研究结果显示经济增长、财政转移支付、经济开放度、产业结构、人力资本、城镇化这六种影响因素对于中国城镇贫困问题的解决影响巨大,其中经济增长对于城镇贫困影响最大,是解决贫困问题的关键,产业结构调整影响程度最小。     

浅谈公共支出体系下的效益审计

公共支出体系是公共财政框架的重要组成部分，调整和优化公共支出结构是当前和今后一个时期财政改革和发展面临的一项重要任务。在公共财政框架下就其效益审计的重点内容和主要目标而言，就是检查评价公共支出的经济性、效率性、效果性的实现程度，并揭露存在的问题，提出改进的建议。     

财政分权及支出结构促进了城乡收入均衡化水平吗?

财政分权和财政支出结构影响城乡收入均衡化水平,本文对中国省际面板数据进行了实证检验与分析。研究发现:东部地区财政分权和财政支出结构是有利于城乡收入均衡的,而中西部地区这种政策则不利于城乡收入均衡。一定限度的财政分权是有益的,但如果绩效考核体系偏重增长激励、城乡二元体制固化程度与城市倾向性较高,那么必然会进一步引致支出政策及相关配套政策扭曲,从而加深收入不均衡程度。财政支出政策应更综合、全面地承担起优化公共服务、改善民生的责任。     

财政分权与地方高等教育投入失衡分析

正一、财政分权概述(一)财政分权的理论财政分权是指中央政府给予地方政府一定的税收权和支出责任范围,允许地方政府自主决定其预算支出的规模和结构。财政分权的核心是地方政府在执行经济计划和预算、管理本地区经济文化建设等方面拥有一定的自主权。财政分     

地方政府财政风险研究：基于省级面板数据

以中央政府与地方政府的关系和地方政府之间关系为切入点,运用1995-2008年我国分省面板数据,以地方政府财政赤字率为风险指标,对财政分权和由财政分权引发的地方政府竞争与地方政府的赤字水平的关系进行研究,结果显示：财政分权和地方政府竞争都显著的影响地方财政赤字水平,财政分权程度越高,地方财政赤字水平越高;地方政府竞争越激烈,财政赤字水平也越高;并且由财政分权带来的地方政府的竞争效应能够更好解释地方政府的赤字膨胀,而非财政分权本身。     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL VERSUS STATE EDUCATION FINANCE IN MEXICO

While decentralization is on the forefront of the reform agenda of many developing countries, few studies have performed empirical analysis to provide a holistic picture of the important fiscal, efficiency, and equity issues. Specifically, decentralization nearly always involves fiscal and administrative decisions by both national and sub-national governments, as well as intricate intergovernmental relations. Here, two empirical models are presented for the Mexican primary and secondary education sector. The first analyzes the efficiency-equity trade-off implicit the Mexican Federal Government's educational fiscal transfers to states. Unlike most similar analyses, this model analyzes the distribution of outcomes not simply expenditures. The second model analyzes the relative productivity of separate expenditures by the Federal and state governments before Mexico's recent educational decentralization legislation. The findings show that before the decentralization, the Federal Government exhibited some concern for equity, but that in doing so also treated states unequally according to criteria that have little to do with either efficiency or equity. In addition, the results show that the Federal Government may indeed have been the more efficient provider of primary and secondary education, raising concern for the fiscal and administrative relationship set up by the decentralization legislation: the Federal Government will continue to pay, while the states have gained relative autonomy over expenditures.     

中国式财政分权下的公共服务供给探析

中国式财政分权体现了突出的政府间收支矛盾。中国的公共服务供给主要依靠地方尤其是县级政府来完成,而它们却只有较小的财力授权。其结果是,公共服务的融资依赖于转移支付和预算外资金。同时,中国财政分权体制背景中公民参与机制的不完善,使得公共服务的满足需求和有效供给的效率较低。     

中国城市扩张的财政激励——基于1998～2009年我国省级面板数据的实证分析

基于我国1998～2009年的省级面板数据,运用广义矩估计法(GMM),实证分析了财政分权、转移支付与当前地方政府城市扩张之间的关系。研究表明:"中国式"的财政分权体制是造成城市快速扩张的重要原因,而现有的财政转移支付并不能有效逆转这种趋势,改革现有的财政体制与政府治理体制才是解决问题的根本之道。研究还表明,我国的财政分权与转移支付效应存在明显的地区差异和跨时差异。同时,财政分权与转移支付对城市扩张存在着相互影响,转移支付的增加会降低财政分权的效应,财政分权度的提高也会减缓转移支付的作用。     

中国收入分配差距的新政治经济学分析——基于分权框架下政治激励与财政激励假说

本文从代表性个人的效用最优化问题出发,通过构建动态最优化模型,深入分析财政分权影响收入分配的作用机制与传导途径,并通过模型扩展,从理论与实证两个角度论证财政分权框架内不同政治激励与财政激励对收入分配的影响效果,最后提出相关的政策建议.     

Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries

This paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency (PSE). We first use a theoretical framework that illustrates the two opposing forces that shape a non-monotonic effect of fiscal decentralization on PSE. Subsequently, we carry out an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2000. A country-level dataset is used to measure PSE in delivering education and health services and the new indices are regressed on well-established decentralization measures. Irrespective of whether PSE concerns education or health services, an inverted U-shaped relationship has been identified between government efficiency in providing these services and fiscal decentralization. This relationship is robust across several different specifications and estimation methods.     

The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Household Income Inequality: Some Empirical Evidence

Abstract

We investigate the effects of fiscal decentralization on income inequality using a sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 1971–2000. We utilize novel and robust measures of fiscal decentralization based on different degrees of fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments. Our results highlight the importance of both the nature of fiscal decentralization—expenditure versus revenue—and the extent to which independent spending responsibility and taxing powers are actually assigned to local governments. A higher degree of tax decentralization is associated with higher household income inequality within a country. Thus, even if fiscal decentralization could be attractive according to efficiency reasons, it may actually have undesirable consequences on the income distribution.     

DESIGNING ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED FISCAL SYSTEM

Abstract When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to take the region, and the government, as a given; that is, this work has neglected important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the various levels of government. It typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?     

海南省财政支出结构对经济增长影响的实证分析

本文通过对海南省1987-2006年财政支出结构与经济增长关系的实证分析表明:海南省科教文卫支出和其他支出对经济发展存在明显的正的相关性,而行政管理费用与经济发展存在负的相关性,海南省的财政支出结构存在一定的不合理性,因此有必要适当调整支出结构,加大科教文卫支出和其他支出的倾斜程度并适当缩减行政管理费用。     

THE ECONOMICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

Abstract There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: ‘first generation approach’ and ‘an emerging second generation approach’. The discussion generally covers the two notions of fiscal decentralization: ‘fiscal autonomy’ and ‘fiscal importance’ of subnational governments as the background of the most recently developed index of fiscal decentralization in Vo. The relevance of this discussion to any further development of a fiscal decentralization index is briefly noted.     

审计监督的财政治理效应研究——基于省以下地方审计机关人财物管理改革的准自然实验

审计监督是党和国家监督体系的重要组成,财政审计能对政府财政收支的真实性、合法性和效益性进行有效监督。以省以下地方审计机关人财物管理改革这一试点政策为准自然实验,从地方政府财政治理视角出发,运用双重差分法分析提升地市级审计机关独立性对地方政府财政支出效率的影响。研究发现,审计机关人财物管理改革能够有效提高地方政府财政支出效率,试点地区财政支出效率提高1.87个百分点。异质性分析结果发现,审计独立性的治理效应在财政透明度低、距离省会城市远和财政自主程度高的城市更大。通过进一步的机制分析,发现试点政策通过提高审计监督质量和优化财政支出结构两条路径提高地方政府财政支出效率。研究表明提高地方审计机关独立性可以对地方政府财政支出产生积极的治理效应。