Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games

This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of Markov Perfect equilibria in alternating move repeated games. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with respect to stage game payoffs. This holds despite the fact that the stochastic game representation of the alternating move repeated game is “non-generic” in the larger space of state dependent payoffs. We further obtain that the set of completely mixed Markov Perfect equilibria is generically empty with respect to stage game payoffs.     

Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces

We present a particular class of measure spaces, hyperfinite Loeb spaces, as a model of situations where individual players are strategically negligible, as in large non-anonymous games, or where information is diffused, as in games with imperfect information. We present results on the existence of Nash equilibria in both kinds of games. Our results cover the case when the action sets are taken to be the unit interval, results now known to be false when they are based on more familiar measure spaces such as the Lebesgue unit interval. We also emphasize three criteria for the modelling of such game-theoretic situations—asymptotic implementability, homogeneity and measurability—and argue for games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces on the basis of these criteria. In particular, we show through explicit examples that a sequence of finite games with an increasing number of players or sample points cannot always be represented by a limit game on a Lebesgue space, and even when it can be so represented, the limit of an existing approximate equilibrium may disappear in the limit game. Thus, games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces constitute the ‘right' model even if one is primarily interested in capturing the asymptotic nature of large but finite game-theoretic phenomena.     

Large but finite games with asymmetric information

Carmona considered an increasing sequence of finite games in each of which players are characterized by payoff functions that are restricted to vary within a uniformly equicontinuous set and choose their strategies from a common compact metric strategy set. Then Carmona proved that each finite game in an upper tail of such a sequence admits an approximate Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.     

Rationalizability in continuous games

Define a continuous game to be one in which every player's strategy set is a Polish space, and the payoff function of each player is bounded and continuous. We prove that in this class of games the process of sequentially eliminating “never-best-reply” strategies terminates before or at the first uncountable ordinal, and this bound is tight. Also, we examine the connection between this process and common belief of rationality in the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985).     

Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel

In this article, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by a tree on the set of agents. Agents in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the tree. We first derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of TU-games on a fixed tree, and two new basis for these spaces of TU-games. We then focus our attention on the Average (rooted)-Tree solution (see Herings et al. (2008)). We provide a basis for its kernel and a new axiomatic characterization by using the classical axiom for inessential games, and two new axioms of invariance called Invariance with respect to irrelevant coalitions and Weighted addition invariance on bi-partitions. We also solve the inverse problem for the Average (rooted)-Tree solution.     

Strategic interaction and dynamics under endogenous time preference

This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential lack of concavity and the differentiability of the value functions associated with each agent’s problem, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices. In particular, we provide the sufficient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. The supermodular game structure of the model lets us provide the existence and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondences almost everywhere and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. Finally, we numerically analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent in agents’ strategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under a single agent optimal growth model. In particular, we show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of the poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself.     

Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules

We prove that essential games with endogenous sharing rules form a dense residual set and that every game with endogenous sharing rules has at least one minimal essential set of solutions. Furthermore, we establish that essential continuous games form a dense residual set and that every continuous game has at least one minimal essential set of Nash equilibria.     

The testable implications of zero-sum games

We study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. We characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. We prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games.     

Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games

Extensive form games modeling continuous-time decisions are plagued with problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of outcomes. As a “second-best”, the literature has imposed extraneous restrictions on the strategy sets, raising questions on the nature and interpretation of the resulting formal object, and on which restrictions are appropriate. We provide a “first-best” framework, formalizing continuous-time repeated games as extensive form games incorporating natural conditions from the onset. Every strategy profile induces a unique outcome, without any restrictions on the strategy sets. Further, the unrestricted strategy sets are equivalent to a specific class of strategies in a more naïvely specified continuous-time game.     

Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: Theory and computational approximation

We make two contributions in this paper. First, we extend the characterization of equilibrium payoff correspondences in history-dependent dynamic policy games to a class with endogenously heterogeneous private agents. In contrast to policy games involving representative agents, this extension has interesting consequences as it implies additional nonlinearity (i.e., bilinearity) between the game states (distributions) and continuation/promised values in the policymaker’s objective and incentive constraints. The second contribution of our paper is in addressing the computational challenges arising from this payoff-relevant nonlinearity. Exploiting the game’s structure, we propose implementable approximate bilinear programming formulations to construct estimates of the equilibrium value correspondence. Our approximation method respects the property of upper hemicontinuity in the target correspondence. We provide small-scale computational examples as proofs of concept.     

Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions

In this paper, we extend the Radner–Rosenthal theorem with finite action spaces on the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a finite game to the case that the action space is countable and complete. We also prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a game with a continuum of players of finite types and with a countable and complete action space. To work with the countably infinite action spaces, we prove some regularity properties on the set of distributions induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range by using the Bollobás–Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma.     

Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes

Following Dagan et al. [Dagan, N., Volij, O., Serrano, R. (1997). A non-cooperative view on consistent bankruptcy rules, Games Econ. Behav. 18, 55–72], we construct an extensive form game for veto-balanced TU games in which a veto player is the proposer and the other players are responders. The set of Nash outcomes of this extensive form game is described, and compared to solutions of TU games such as the nucleolus, kernel and egalitarian core. We find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the nucleolus of the game is a Nash outcome.     

Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games

In a Bayesian game, assume that the type space is a complete, separable metric space, the action space is a compact metric space, and the payoff functions are continuous. We show that the iterative and fixed-point definitions of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) coincide, and ICR is non-empty-valued and upper hemicontinuous. This extends the finite-game results of Dekel et al. (2007), who introduced ICR. Our result applies, for instance, to discounted infinite-horizon dynamic games.     

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Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring

We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player’s conjecture about his opponent’s action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history.     

A Review of Modern Computational Algorithms for Bayesian Optimal Design

Bayesian experimental design is a fast growing area of research with many real‐world applications. As computational power has increased over the years, so has the development of simulation‐based design methods, which involve a number of algorithms, such as Markov chain Monte Carlo, sequential Monte Carlo and approximate Bayes methods, facilitating more complex design problems to be solved. The Bayesian framework provides a unified approach for incorporating prior information and/or uncertainties regarding the statistical model with a utility function which describes the experimental aims. In this paper, we provide a general overview on the concepts involved in Bayesian experimental design, and focus on describing some of the more commonly used Bayesian utility functions and methods for their estimation, as well as a number of algorithms that are used to search over the design space to find the Bayesian optimal design. We also discuss other computational strategies for further research in Bayesian optimal design.     

Nonparametric Bayes inference for concave distribution functions

Bayesian inference for concave distribution functions is investigated. This is made by transforming a mixture of Dirichlet processes on the space of distribution functions to the space of concave distribution functions. We give a method for sampling from the posterior distribution using a Pólya urn scheme in combination with a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The methods are extended to estimation of concave distribution functions for incompletely observed data.     

Time-varying combinations of predictive densities using nonlinear filtering

We propose a Bayesian combination approach for multivariate predictive densities which relies upon a distributional state space representation of the combination weights. Several specifications of multivariate time-varying weights are introduced with a particular focus on weight dynamics driven by the past performance of the predictive densities and the use of learning mechanisms. In the proposed approach the model set can be incomplete, meaning that all models can be individually misspecified. A Sequential Monte Carlo method is proposed to approximate the filtering and predictive densities. The combination approach is assessed using statistical and utility-based performance measures for evaluating density forecasts of simulated data, US macroeconomic time series and surveys of stock market prices. Simulation results indicate that, for a set of linear autoregressive models, the combination strategy is successful in selecting, with probability close to one, the true model when the model set is complete and it is able to detect parameter instability when the model set includes the true model that has generated subsamples of data. Also, substantial uncertainty appears in the weights when predictors are similar; residual uncertainty reduces when the model set is complete; and learning reduces this uncertainty. For the macro series we find that incompleteness of the models is relatively large in the 1970’s, the beginning of the 1980’s and during the recent financial crisis, and lower during the Great Moderation; the predicted probabilities of recession accurately compare with the NBER business cycle dating; model weights have substantial uncertainty attached. With respect to returns of the S&P 500 series, we find that an investment strategy using a combination of predictions from professional forecasters and from a white noise model puts more weight on the white noise model in the beginning of the 1990’s and switches to giving more weight to the professional forecasts over time. Information on the complete predictive distribution and not just on some moments turns out to be very important, above all during turbulent times such as the recent financial crisis. More generally, the proposed distributional state space representation offers great flexibility in combining densities.     

Perseverance and suspense in tug-of-war

We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, show that it is unique, and provide closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies and values. In stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all-pay auction CSF, players exert positive efforts until the very last battle in this equilibrium. We deliver a set of empirically appealing results on effort dynamics.