Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk, and Capital Formation

We use a comprehensive data set of funds-of-funds to investigate performance, risk, and capital formation in the hedge fund industry from 1995 to 2004. While the average fund-of-funds delivers alpha only in the period between October 1998 and March 2000, a subset of funds-of-funds consistently delivers alpha. The alpha-producing funds are not as likely to liquidate as those that do not deliver alpha, and experience far greater and steadier capital inflows than their less fortunate counterparts. These capital inflows attenuate the ability of the alpha producers to continue to deliver alpha in the future.     

Factor-based,Non-parametric Risk Measurement Framework for Hedge Funds and Fund-of-Funds

Abstract

A factor-decomposition based framework is presented that facilitates non-parametric risk analysis for complex hedge fund portfolios in the absence of portfolio level transparency. This approach has been designed specifically for use within the hedge fund-of-funds environment, but is equally relevant to those who seek to construct risk-managed portfolios of hedge funds under less than perfect underlying portfolio transparency. Using dynamic multivariate regression analysis coupled with a qualitative understanding of hedge fund return drivers, one is able to perform a robust factor decomposition to attribute risk within any hedge fund portfolio with an identifiable strategy. Furthermore, through use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques, these factors can be employed to generate implied risk profiles at either the constituent fund or aggregate fund-of-funds level. As well as being pertinent to risk forecasting and monitoring, such methods also have application to style analysis, profit attribution, portfolio stress testing and diversification studies. This paper outlines such a framework and presents sample results in each of these areas.     

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas

Hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives: performance fee options (call); equity investors' redemption options (put); and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage (put). The interaction of these option‐like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante, depending on the distance of fund‐value from the high‐water mark. We study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature. We show that reduced‐form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases. The result is stronger for low‐quality funds. We propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds.     

REIT Operational Efficiency: Performance,Risk, and Return

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Relations between Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) efficiency and operational performance, risk, and stock return are examined. REIT-level...     

对冲基金激进主义策略的研究综述

近些年,对冲基金激进主义策略受到越来越多基金管理者的关注,其研究重心也开始从资本市场价格变动转向标的企业管理层。对冲基金激进主义策略呈现出"改善公司治理、注重目标企业长期发展、减少委托代理冲突"等特点。本文针对该策略研究的转变,从对冲基金激进主义策略特征、市场有效性、策略研究方法以及对公司治理的改善等几个方面,对对冲基金激进主义策略进行综述。     

The Secondary Market for Hedge Funds and the Closed Hedge Fund Premium

Rational theories of the closed‐end fund premium puzzle highlight fund share and asset illiquidity, managerial ability, and fees as important determinants of the premium. Several of these attributes are difficult to measure for mutual funds, and easier to measure for hedge funds. This paper employs new data from a secondary market for hedge funds, discovers a closed‐hedge fund premium that is highly correlated with the closed‐end mutual fund premium, and shows that the closed‐hedge fund premium is well explained by variables suggested by rational theories. Sentiment‐based explanations do not find support in the data.     

Hedge Funds and Chapter 11

This paper studies the presence of hedge funds in the Chapter 11 process and their effects on bankruptcy outcomes. Hedge funds strategically choose positions in the capital structure where their actions could have a bigger impact on value. Their presence, especially as unsecured creditors, helps balance power between the debtor and secured creditors. Their effect on the debtor manifests in higher probabilities of the latter's loss of exclusive rights to file reorganization plans, CEO turnover, and adoptions of key employee retention plan, while their effect on secured creditors manifests in higher probabilities of emergence and payoffs to junior claims.     

Hedge Fund Risk Dynamics: Implications for Performance Appraisal

Accurate appraisal of hedge fund performance must recognize the freedom with which managers shift asset classes, strategies, and leverage in response to changing market conditions and arbitrage opportunities. The standard measure of performance is the abnormal return defined by a hedge fund's exposure to risk factors. If exposures are assumed constant when, in fact, they vary through time, estimated abnormal returns may be incorrect. We employ an optimal changepoint regression that allows risk exposures to shift, and illustrate the impact on performance appraisal using a sample of live and dead funds during the period January 1994 through December 2005.     

The Effect of Shortfall as a Risk Measure for Portfolios with Hedge Funds

Abstract:  Current research suggests that the large downside risk in hedge fund returns disqualifies the variance as an appropriate risk measure. For example, one can easily construct portfolios with nonlinear pay-offs that have both a high Sharpe ratio and a high downside risk. This paper examines the consequences of shortfall-based risk measures in the context of portfolio optimization. In contrast to popular belief, we show that negative skewness for optimal mean-shortfall portfolios can be much greater than for mean-variance portfolios. Using empirical hedge fund return data we show that the optimal mean-shortfall portfolio substantially reduces the probability of small shortfalls at the expense of an increased extreme crash probability. We explain this by proving analytically under what conditions short-put payoffs are optimal for a mean-shortfall investor. Finally, we show that quadratic shortfall or semivariance is less prone to these problems. This suggests that the precise choice of the downside risk measure is highly relevant for optimal portfolio construction under loss averse preferences.     

国际金融系统风险的放大与传导:对冲基金在金融风暴中的作用

作为国际热钱的代表,对冲基金在2007～2008年金融风暴中究竟起了怎样的作用?本文首先分析了对冲基金在危机中去杠杆化操作的原因及后果;通过构造1171家美国上市银行加权平均投资组合,以其月度收益率作为美国银行业代理变量,采用1994～2008年对冲基金月度数据进行经验论证。研究发现:第一,对冲基金去杠杆化放大了系统风险;第二,对冲基金全行业具有杠杆效应的一致性;第三,对冲基金的收益水平与美国银行业紧密相关,因此,对冲基金的行动是资本市场剧烈波动的影响因素,向美国银行业传导了系统风险,推动了金融风暴的形成。最后,本文提出加强对冲基金监管的思路。     

Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble

This paper documents that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the technology bubble. Instead, they were heavily invested in technology stocks. This does not seem to be the result of unawareness of the bubble: Hedge funds captured the upturn, but, by reducing their positions in stocks that were about to decline, avoided much of the downturn. Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives

This article studies one of the potential causes of the financialmarket bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutualfunds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds'advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendencyto herd. We argue that investing in bubble stocks amounts toherding and contracts with high incentives induce managers todiverge from the herd, thus reducing their holding of bubblestocks. The differential exposure to bubble stocks significantlyimpacted the funds' performance both in the period prior toMarch 2000, as well as afterwards.     

The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers

This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers’ incentives with investors’ interests. I show empirically that managers’ compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers’ compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style‐average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance.     

Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors

We examine recent confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors. The main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, significantly positive returns over the subsequent year, and the activist's high success rate in achieving its original objective. Further, both activists frequently gain board representation through real or threatened proxy solicitations. Two major differences are that hedge funds target more profitable firms than other activists, and hedge funds address cash flow agency costs whereas other private investors change the target's investment strategies.     

Risks and Portfolio Decisions Involving Hedge Funds

This article characterizes the systematic risk exposures ofhedge funds using buy-and-hold and option-based strategies.Our results show that a large number of equity-oriented hedgefund strategies exhibit payoffs resembling a short positionin a put option on the market index and therefore bear significantleft-tail risk, risk that is ignored by the commonly used mean-varianceframework. Using a mean-conditional value-at-risk framework,we demonstrate the extent to which the mean-variance frameworkunderestimates the tail risk. Finally, working with the systematicrisk exposures of hedge funds, we show that their recent performanceappears significantly better than their long-run performance.     

A Law and Finance Analysis of Hedge Funds

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of hedge fund regulation on fund structure and performance. The data indicate restrictions on the location of key service providers and permissible distributions via wrappers are associated with lower fund alphas, lower average monthly returns, and higher fixed fees. Furthermore, restrictions on the location of key service providers are associated with lower manipulation-proof performance measures, while wrapper distributions are associated with lower performance fees. As well, the data show standard deviations of monthly returns are lower among jurisdictions with restrictions on the location of key service providers and higher minimum capitalization requirements.     

对冲基金及其监管问题研究

近年来,随着金融市场的加速创新和结构性调整,对冲基金的规模也迅速扩张,成为国际金融市场的重要参与者。与传统的资产管理、共同基金相比,对冲基金在投资策略、组织形式等方面具有自己的特点。对冲基金日益扩大的资产规模和自由灵活的投资策略增加了金融市场的流动性、提高了市场效率,但同时也给金融体系带来了新的不稳定因素。2006年以来,对冲基金对金融稳定的影响日益成为全球金融监管者关注的问题。有些国家主张通过间接监管的方式,有些则一直推动加强对对冲基金的直接监管。如何加强对对冲基金的监管,减少对冲基金对金融体系稳定性的负面影响,仍然是全球金融业面临的一项挑战。