Product differentiation, process R&D, and the nature of market competition

We investigate the relationship between process and product R&D and compare the incentives for both types of R&D under different modes of market competition (Bertrand versus Cournot). It is shown that: (i) process R&D investments increase with the degree of product differentiation and firms invest more in product R&D when they can do process R&D than when they cannot; (ii) Bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product R&D whereas Cournot firms invest more in process R&D; and (iii) cooperation in product R&D promotes both types of R&D relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of R&D discourages R&D relative to cooperation in just product R&D.     

Service-sector competition,innovation and R&D

The central prediction of the Aghion, Bloom, Blundell and Howitt model is an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and competition. The model is built on the assumption of a product market and has not yet been tested on the service sector. Using detailed firm-level data on Swedish service-sector firms, we find evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship for exporting service-sector firms. A further breakdown of innovation expenditures shows that the inverse U-shaped pattern holds for intramural R&D and training, but not for extramural R&D. Finally, the results indicate that as competition increases, small firms tend to seek strategic alliances with competitors, whereas large firms tend to reduce collaboration with competitors. The behavior of large firms can partly be due to their superior capacity to handle innovation projects internally, which will become more important if increased competition results in higher pay-offs to innovation.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

Strategic R&D policy under multiproduct duopoly and quality-price competition

This paper analyses strategic R&D policy in a third-country trade model where multiproduct firms with different production technologies compete in a vertically differentiated market. I show that the optimal R&D policies for both countries are subsidies when the product market is under price competition.     

On the incentives for cooperative research

This paper analyzes incentives for cooperative research for firms competing in the product market. Contrary to the literature, we portray situations to show that non-cooperative R&D can occur even if the probability of success in R&D is large. We then model synergy in cooperative R&D and show that when the innovation size is large, cooperative research is likely to occur.     

R&D competition between public and private sectors

We investigate a mixed market where a welfare-maximizing public research institute competes against profit-maximizing private firms. We investigate R&D competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and R&D expenditure. We find that the innovation size (R&D expenditure) chosen by the public institute is too small (too large) from the viewpoint of social welfare, respectively, and so the government should control the public institute appropriately. We also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes.     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.      

Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.     

R&D cooperation with scientific institutions: a difference-in-difference approach

Economists and business managers have long been interested in the impact of research and development (R&D) cooperation with scientific institutions on the innovation performance of firms. Recent research identifies a positive correlation between these two variables. This paper aims to contribute to the identification of the relationship between R&D cooperation with scientific institutions and the product and process innovation performance of firms by using a difference-in-difference approach. In doing so, we distinguish between two different types of scientific institutions: universities and governmental research institutes. For the econometric analyses, we use data from the German Community Innovation Survey. In total, data from up to 560 German service and manufacturing firms are available for the difference-in-difference analyses. The results suggest that R&D cooperation with universities and governmental research institutes has a positive effect on both product innovation and process innovation performance of firms.     

A matching analysis of why some firms in peripheral regions undertake R&D whereas others do not

Many studies have established the importance of investment in R&D to facilitate innovation and consequently improve firm productivity. Firms decide whether or not to undertake R&D depending on a range of factors such as market orientation, business objectives, competitive advantages and absorptive capacity. This paper studies the factors that influence this decision in peripheral locations; and for firms that do not undertake R&D, we analyse the reasons for not doing so. The research is based on data from a survey of some 250 matched firms operating in Northern Ireland, about half undertaking R&D and half not. Northern Ireland is an interesting case study because it exhibits a low level of investment in R&D despite the public subsidies and policy initiatives that have existed over the last 30 years. For firms that undertake R&D, our results mostly confirm the findings of others while for firms that do not undertake R&D the results point to a capabilities-gap rather than a resource-gap as the fundamental problem. Policy conclusions are drawn as to what might be done to boost both the amount of R&D undertaken and the number of firms engaged in R&D in peripheral regions.     

Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.     

Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium

We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R&D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.     

Does partner type matter in R&D collaboration for product innovation?

Most firms tend to utilise various types of R&D collaboration partners simultaneously and partnerships between different types of partners show different properties. Thus, the effect of R&D collaboration may vary depending on partner types. This study considers four partner types: competitors, customers, suppliers and universities. It empirically examines the effect of R&D collaboration with each type of partner on product innovation, employing the Korean Innovation Survey data. Results show that R&D collaborations with customers and universities have a positive effect on product innovation, whereas R&D collaborations with suppliers and competitors have an inverted-U shape relationship with product innovation. This result can provide an explanation to the chaotic results of previous research and assist managers in selecting appropriate R&D partner.     

Mergers and innovation: evidence from a panel of US firms*

Mergers lead to larger firms and a less competitive market structure, but their effects on innovation are not clear. Mergers may improve innovation incentives by promoting economies of scope and scale, R&D activities, and increasing the ability to deal with uncertainties. However, mergers may also discourage innovation by reducing competition, increasing costs, and decreasing production and R&D efficiencies. In this study, we investigate merger impacts on innovation using a panel data consisting of four different data sets on publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1980 to 2003. Our proxy for innovation is based on citation-weighted patent stocks. In our estimation model, we control for endogeneity using instrumental variables and factors such as market share, size, industry, and time. We find that mergers are positively and significantly correlated with firms’ innovation. Our findings also indicate that merger effect on innovation is heterogeneous across industries, increases with market share, and is greater in the long run. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of innovation.     

Product market competition,R&D composition and growth

We revisit the relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth in a model where horizontal and vertical innovations simultaneously occur. We show that competition exerts an important effect on the composition of aggregate R&D (vertical versus horizontal). In fact, when product market competition gets more intense, a larger fraction of R&D is engaged in improving the quality of products; this occurs at the expense of a lower rate of horizontal innovation. This effect, which is absent in the basic endogenous growth model with only vertical innovations, may overturn the inverse relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth found in prior theoretical models.     

Rent Protection as a Barrier to Innovation and Growth

We build a model of R&D-based growth in which the discovery of higher-quality products is governed by sequential stochastic innovation contests. We term the costly attempts of incumbent firms to safeguard the monopoly rents from their past innovations rent-protecting activities. Our analysis (1) offers a novel explanation of the observation that the difficulty of conducting R&D has been increasing over time, (2) establishes the emergence of endogenous scale-invariant long-run innovation and growth, and (3) identifies a new structural barrier to innovation and growth. We also show that long-run growth depends positively on proportional R&D subsidies, the population growth rate, and the size of innovations, but negatively on the market interest rate and the effectiveness of rent-protecting activities. An unpublished version of this paper was circulated earlier under the title “Innovation and Rent Protection in the Theory of Schumpeterian Growth.” We thank an anonymous referee and seminar participants in several venues for useful comments and suggestions.     

Innovation strategy and the patenting behavior of firms

This paper investigates whether firms’ innovation strategies affect their patenting behavior, as measured by both the probability of having a patent portfolio and the number of active patents held. Three main dimensions of an innovation strategy are taken into account: the relative importance of basic research, applied research and development work in total R&D activities, the product or process orientation of innovation efforts, and the extent to which firms enter into collaborative R&D with other institutions. The major findings can be summarized as follows: (1) taking into account the various dimensions of an innovation strategy turns out to approximate the patenting behavior of firms better than the traditional Schumpeterian hypotheses related to firm size and market power; (2) there is a positive relationship between the patent portfolio of firms and an outward-oriented innovation strategy characterized by R&D partnerships with external organizations - scientific institutions and competitors in particular; (3) process-oriented innovators patent less than product-oriented innovators; (4) a stronger focus on basic and applied research is associated with a more active patenting behavior; (5) firms that perceive high barriers to innovation (internal, risk-related or external barriers) have smaller patent portfolios; (6) the perceived limitations of the patent system do not significantly influence the patenting behavior, suggesting that firms patent for other strategic reasons than merely protecting innovation rents.     

Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate

Summary. We present a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. Firms choose levels of a cost-reducing innovation from a continuum before they engage in competition for each other's R&D-employees. Successful bids for the competitor's employee then result in higher levels of cost reduction. Finally, firms enter product market competition. We apply the approach to the long-standing debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives. We show that incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity competition than under price competition. As a result, for a wide range of parameters, price competition gives stronger innovation incentives than quantity competition. Received: February 1, 1999; revised version: November 14, 2001     

DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS IN CHINA'S EMERGING MARKET

This study aims to explore the determinants and relative contributions of different types of research partnerships among Chinese firms. Using a large sample of innovating firms, it is found here that factors that determine the needs of the firms for external research and development (R&D) resources and the ability to utilize the knowledge learned through partnerships (i.e., firm size, industrial sectors, internal R&D intensity, and foreign competition) are major antecedents for research partnerships in China. In addition, these factors are found to have different effects on three different types of research partnerships, which, in turn, have different effects on product innovation and patent innovation. (JEL O32)     

STRATEGIC R&D AND NETWORK COMPATIBILITY

We analyse the effects of network externalities in strategic R&D competition. We present a model of two firms competing with R&D investments and prices in a differentiated consumer market. Buyers form firm-specific networks which can be compatible. A high degree of compatibility and large spillovers moderate price competition due to weak strategic value of firm-specific networks and R&D investments, respectively. Asymmetry in product qualities brings out network effects that cancel out in conventional symmetric settings. The lower quality firm increases R&D and decreases its price as spillovers or network compatibility is increased. This happens when R&D and firm-specific network size have high strategic value.