Measuring the Impact of Corporate Investment Announcements on Share Prices: The Spanish Experience

We bring together three disparate strands of literature to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency of security analysts' earnings forecasts in Singapore. We focus specifically on how the increased uncertainty and the negative market sentiment during the period of the Asian crisis affected the quality of earnings forecasts. While we find no evidence of inefficiencies in the pre-crisis period, our results suggest that after the onset of the crisis, analysts (1) issued forecasts that were systematically upward biased; (2) did not fully incorporate the (negative) earnings-related news; and (3) predicted earnings changes which proved too extreme.     

The Performance of Equity Analysts During the Global Financial Crisis

This paper investigates the response of equity analysts following Australian and US listed stocks to the onset of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. Both groups of analysts reacted quickly by adjusting their forecasts downwards, and initially tending towards being overly pessimistic. Relative to pre‐crisis data, the authors identify sharp declines in earnings forecasts, an increase (decrease) in downward (upward) revisions, and a downward (upward) trend in sell (buy) recommendations. Forecast errors are larger, and dispersion of earnings forecasts is higher. Finally, the most accurate analysts in the pre‐crisis period continue to be significantly more accurate during the crisis period than their peers.     

The debt market relevance of management earnings forecasts: evidence from before and during the credit crisis

We investigate the credit market’s response via changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads to management earnings forecasts and evaluate the importance of these forecasts relative to earnings news during the periods before and during the recent credit crisis. We document that credit markets react significantly to management forecast news and that the reactions to forecast news are stronger than to actual earnings news. Consistent with the asymmetric payoffs to debt holders, the forecast news is mainly relevant for firms with poor credit rating or announcing bad news. We also show that the relevance of management forecasts to credit markets is particularly strong during periods of high uncertainty, as experienced during the recent credit crisis.     

Analysts' Reactions to Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

Preannouncements of earnings tend to overstate negative or understate positive news, which decreases the chance of a negative surprise when actual earnings is announced. We conduct an experiment to investigate how experienced sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are affected by preannouncements that either understate, accurately state, or overstate the magnitude of positive or negative total earnings news, holding total earnings news constant. We find that firms with negative (positive) total news receive the highest post-earnings announcement forecasts of future earnings when the earlier preannouncement overstates (understates) the magnitude of the news. These forecasts are consistent with the analysts' perceptions about the firms' future prospects, but not their perceptions of management. While analysts expect preannouncements to be lower than actual earnings, they do not adjust their forecasts for these beliefs. These insights into analysts' responses have implications both for managers and analysts.     

Earnings Volatility and Earnings Prediction: Analysis and UK Evidence

This paper confirms that US evidence of a negative relationship between earnings persistence and earnings volatility applies to UK firms over the period 1991–2010. Our analytical framework highlights the possibility that this result may reflect downward estimation bias in earnings persistence (and persistence of cash flow and accruals components of earnings) related to transitory earnings elements. Out‐of‐sample forecasts, based on models estimated for earnings volatility quartiles, suggest significant improvement in earnings forecasts for lower volatility firms. The results also suggest that the negative association between earnings persistence and volatility may be due to both estimation bias and variation in core earnings persistence.     

How efficient is the market for Australian firms’ earnings information?

We construct a measure of the speed with which forecasts issued by sell-side analysts accurately forecast future annual earnings. Following Marshall, we label this measure earnings information flow timeliness (EIFT). This measure avoids the aggregation problem inherent in price-based measures of information efficiency. We document large variation in EIFT across firm-years, and show that EIFT is positively associated with the extent of analyst following, consistent with increased analyst coverage improving the speed with which earnings-related information is recognised. We also find that EIFT is higher for firm-years classified as ‘bad news’ (i.e., where analysts’ forecasts at the start of the financial period exceed the reported outcome). However, when we separately consider instances where analysts appear to forecast non-GAAP (or ‘street’) earnings rather than GAAP earnings, we find that the greater timeliness of bad news is concentrated among observations where analysts forecast non-GAAP earnings, where unusual items are typically excluded. We conclude that the market for accounting information is more efficient for negative operating outcomes than for negative outcomes reflecting unusual items.     

Rationalizing forecast inefficiency

We show analysts’ own earnings forecasts predict error in their own forecasts of earnings at other horizons, which we argue provides a measure of the extent to which analysts inefficiently use information. We construct our measure by exploiting two sources of variation in analysts’ incentives: (i) more recent forecasts have greater salience at the time of the earnings release so accuracy incentives are higher (lower) at shorter (longer) forecast horizons and (ii) analysts have greater incentives for optimism (pessimism) at longer (shorter) horizons. Consistent with these incentives affecting the incorporation of information into forecasts, we document (i) current year forecasts underweight (overweight) information in shorter (longer) horizon forecasts and (ii) the mis-weighting is more pronounced when recent news is negative—when analysts have greater (weaker) incentives to incorporate the news into shorter (longer) horizon forecasts. Finally, returns tests suggest that forecasts adjusted for the inefficiency we document better represent market expectations of earnings.

     

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

Do UK Security Analysts Over-react?

Consensus analysts' earnings per share forecasts have become increasingly accessible in recent years and such measures have been widely adopted by academics as proxies for the market's expectations of earnings. Some US studies have suggested that analysts, in revising earnings forecasts, are prone to over-reaction. This study tests for evidence of over-reaction in revisions of the consensus earnings per share forecasts of UK companies reported by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System. For a series of periods, portfolios of companies attracting high and low revisions of earnings forecasts are constructed. We then compare the subsequent earnings forecast of the companies which attracted high revisions in the portfolio formation period with those of the companies which attracted low revisions in the portfolio formation period. We also compare actual changes in annual earnings with forecast changes in annual earnings. Both analyses suggest that UK analysts are prone to under-reaction, a finding which contrasts with the US studies which have identified over-reaction. There is little evidence that the market, in reacting to earnings forecast revisions, fails to recognise this under-reaction.     

A re-examination of analysts’ superiority over time-series forecasts of annual earnings

We re-examine the widely held belief that analysts?? earnings per share (EPS) forecasts are superior to random walk (RW) time-series forecasts. We investigate whether analysts?? annual EPS forecasts are superior, and if so, under what conditions. Simple RW EPS forecasts are more accurate than analysts?? forecasts over longer horizons, for smaller or younger firms, and when analysts forecast negative or large changes in EPS. We also compare the accuracy of a third forecast of longer-term earnings based on a na?ve extrapolation of analysts?? 1-year-ahead forecasts. Surprisingly, this na?ve extrapolation provides the most accurate estimate of long-term (2- and 3-year-ahead) earnings. These findings recharacterize prior generalizations about the superiority of analysts?? forecasts and suggest that they are incomplete, misleading, or both. Moreover, in certain settings, researchers can rely on forecasts other than these explicit forecasts.     

An Empirical Analysis of Qualitative Management Earnings Forecasts

Despite efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encourage corporate disclosure of quantitative management earnings projections, only a small fraction of firms voluntarily do so. Instead of quantitative estimates, a large number of firms choose to disclose qualitative (verbal) assessments of their earnings prospects. This paper is a study of the information characteristics and the usefulness of this alternative form of forecast disclosure to investors. The study examines a sample of qualitative forecast statements from the 1979–1985 period and finds associations between these forecasts and percentage changes in realized earnings per share, the direction of financial analysts' forecast revisions following the disclosure of these forecasts, and abnormal stock returns on the date of their disclosure. These associations are, however, shown to be more significant for negative (bad news) than for positive (good news) forecasts.     

Information,uncertainty, and behavioral effects: Evidence from abnormal returns around real estate investment trust earnings announcements

In this study, we examine the influence of real estate market sentiment, market-level uncertainty, and REIT-level uncertainty on cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns over the 1995–2009 time period. We first document the relative coverage of analysts' earnings forecasts on U.S. REITs, as well as REITs from several countries (i.e., Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, and UK). We show that coverage outside of the U.S. is limited, and we consequently focus our analysis on U.S. REITs. We find strong evidence that earnings announcements contain pricing relevant information, with positive (negative) earnings surprises relative to analysts' forecasts resulting in significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns around the announcement date. Consistent with the findings from the broader equity market literature, we find limited evidence of a pre-announcement drift in the cumulative abnormal returns. However, in sharp contrast to the existing equity literature, we find no evidence of a post-earnings announcement drift in our aggregate sample or when the sample is restricted to the largest negative surprises. We find evidence of a post-earnings announcement drift for only the largest positive earnings surprises. These results are consistent with REIT returns more quickly impounding information relative to the broader equity market, in part because of the parallel private real estate market and because of the U.S. REIT structure and information environment. Finally, in our conditional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal returns, we find that real estate investor sentiment, market-wide uncertainty, and firm-level uncertainty significantly affect the magnitude of abnormal announcement returns and also influence the effect of unexpected earnings on abnormal returns.     

Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Forecasts?

We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.     

Performance of Malaysian IPOs: Underwriters reputation and management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the financial performance of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period 1980–1995. The major focus of the study is on the role of management earnings forecasts and underwriters in the valuation of IPOs. The results suggest extremely high and statistically significant initial premiums and positive and statistically significant long-term returns up to 3 years after listing. The findings for long-term returns contradict the consensus of the IPO literature that documents a significant negative long-term performance. Our results indicate a negative association of upward bias in management earnings forecasts with IPOs' performance during the first 12 months after the IPOs.     

Investors' Use of Historical Forecast Bias to Adjust Current Expectations

We explore the extent to which investor response to earnings information differs in the presence of historical bias in earnings forecasts. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that investors take historical forecast bias into account when interpreting information in earnings announcements and that the market's reaction to forecast errors is larger (less negative) when forecasts are historically more optimistic and suggests that the functional form commonly used in the earnings response literature does not appropriately capture the effect of real unexpected earnings information (i.e., investors' expectation errors as opposed to analysts' forecast errors) on stock returns.     

Analyst Pessimism and Forecast Timing

In this study, we show that on average relatively pessimistic analysts tend to reveal their earnings forecasts later than other analysts. Further, we find this forecast timing effect explains a substantial proportion of the well‐known decrease in consensus analyst forecast optimism over the forecast period prior to earnings announcements, which helps explain why analysts’ longer term earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased than their shorter term forecasts. We extend the theory of analyst self‐selection regarding their coverage decisions to argue that analysts with a relatively pessimistic view–compared to other analysts–are more reluctant to issue their earnings forecasts, with the result that they tend to defer revealing their earnings forecasts until later in the forecasting period than other analysts.     

Earnings Forecast Revisions and Security Returns: Canadian Evidence

The impact that revisions of financial analysts' forecasts of earnings have on Canadian security returns during the 1979-1988 period is tested using an event study methodology. A post-revision announcement drift in security prices is documented; the Canadian capital market displays a marked delay in reacting to positive revisions in earnings forecasts. Contingent on revision size, positive and significant excess returns are apparent for up to seven months following their release. The returns, before transaction costs, are not marginal; over a 12-month holding period, excess returns are 18.2%. The results for negative and non-revisions in earnings forecasts suggest that the market reacts quite efficiently to the information implicit in these events. An explanation for the asymmetrical results for the positive and negative revision portfolios is offered. These findings are robust to five control procedures used to test the sensitivity of the reported results to changes in the methodology. A number of explanations for this result are proposed including overlapping excess returns and beta shifts; none reconciles the anomalous results.     

More Than Words: Quantifying Language to Measure Firms' Fundamentals

We examine whether a simple quantitative measure of language can be used to predict individual firms' accounting earnings and stock returns. Our three main findings are: (1) the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news stories forecasts low firm earnings; (2) firms' stock prices briefly underreact to the information embedded in negative words; and (3) the earnings and return predictability from negative words is largest for the stories that focus on fundamentals. Together these findings suggest that linguistic media content captures otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of firms' fundamentals, which investors quickly incorporate into stock prices.