Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets

All modern labour market theories capable of explaining involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon imply that increased income tax progressivity reduces unemployment, but they also imply that higher progressivity tends to reduce work effort and labour productivity. This suggests that there may be an optimal degree of tax progressivity where the marginal welfare gain from reduced involuntary unemployment is just offset by the marginal welfare loss from lower productivity. This paper sets up four different models of an imperfect labour market in order to identify the degree of tax progressivity which would maximise the welfare of the representative wage earner. Simulations with these models suggest that the optimal degree of tax progressivity could be quite large, although the results are sensitive to the generosity of unemployment benefits and to the after-tax wage elasticity of work effort.     

Distortionary Taxation and Labour Market Performance

Quarterly estimates of consumption, capital and labour tax rates are provided for six major OECD countries. We then use the 'stylized facts' methodology to evaluate the strength, sign and phase of cyclical comovements between tax rates and labour market variables. Labour taxes distort labour market de-cisions and help explain why the unemployment rate is so high in continental Europe. However, labour taxes cannot be the only determinant of diverging unemployment rates since the labour force is also reduced by higher taxes. Finally, we offer some preliminary structural evidence showing employment growth in particular to be negatively related to the taxation of labour.     

Double Bertrand tax competition: a fiscal game with governments acting as middlemen

In a common market with costless mobility of all factors regional governments can attract mobile firms by granting subsidies which they must finance out of wage taxes on mobile labour. Firms locate where subsidies are highest and workers settle where taxes are lowest, forcing government ‘in the splits’ (double Bertrand-type tax competition). Initially, there is unemployment in the economy. Regional governments then behave like middlemen in the labour market, and the fiscal game takes the form of competition among strategic intermediaries. Results from the theory of intermediation are applied to this framework. It is shown that government size may increase rather than decline in a fiscal competition, that industrial clustering may emerge from tax competition, and that tax competition may alleviate the unemployment problem.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

The Mystery of Regional Unemployment Differentials: Theoretical and Empirical Explanations

Abstract.  This paper provides an integrated overview of theoretical and empirical explanations used in the applied literature on regional unemployment differentials. On the basis of 41 empirical studies, four different model types covering nine theoretical constructs of regional unemployment determination and 13 sets of explanatory variables are identified. The overall conclusion is that theoretical and empirical explanations help to reduce the weaknesses in each other. While theory is found to predict that the regional unemployment rate depends on labour supply factors (a collection of factors which affect natural changes in the labour force, labour force participation, migration and commuting), labour demand factors and wage‐setting factors, it is the empirical studies that provide a more profound understanding of the explanatory variables involved. Conversely, whereas most empirical studies provide clear‐cut explanations for the signs of the explanatory variables, it is theory that shows that some of these explanations might be out of proportion. By grouping many studies together, this paper shows that there are indeed clear‐cut trends.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing under labour market imperfections

We study the effects of international outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment in a high-wage economy with labour market imperfections. We demonstrate, consistent with empirical results, that the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of outsourcing. Furthermore, we show that a production mode with more outsourcing reduces the negotiated wage in a high-wage country with labour market imperfections if the relative bargaining power of the labour union is sufficiently high. Under such circumstances outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we characterize the optimal production mode showing that stronger labour market imperfections induce a production mode with more outsourcing.     

Corporate income taxation of multinationals and unemployment

Within a two-country model with involuntary unemployment, this paper investigates corporate income taxation under separate accounting versus formula apportionment. In contrast to separate accounting, under formula apportionment the corporate tax policy causes a fiscal externality that results from unemployment. This externality is the highest when the apportionment formula contains the payroll factor only. It is minimized for the pure sales (property) formula, if the substitution elasticity is low (high). The unemployment externality tends to compensate other externalities such that tax rates become inefficiently low. The deviation from the efficient tax policy is minimized when the apportionment formula contains the sales factor only.     

Minimum Wages and Youth Unemployment: Will Britain Learn from Canada?

Norman Tebbit is spending vast sums on palliatives for youth employment. Minimum wage legislation may be responsible for nearly 40 per cent of youth unemployment in Britain. Canada suggests that unemployment must result if the labour market is prevented from accommodating population change through state-imposed rigidities which prevent changes in the price of labour.     

Replacement rates and labour market behaviour

This paper studies how the replacement rate, defined as the ratio of disposable income when unemployed to expected disposable income if beginning to work, affects individuals’ transition rate from unemployment. Linked register data, representing a local Finnish labour market in 1996, are analysed with piece-wise constant exponential hazard models. Results suggest that the effect of the replacement rate and, thus, of “unemployment traps”, is fairly modest. It does not seem to change with time spent unemployed. The impact on the transition rate into employment is lower than on the transition rate out of the labour force. Unemployment insurance recipients are found to be less sensitive to changes in the replacement rate than are unemployment assistance recipients.     

Equilibrium Unemployment Dynamics in a Panel of OECD Countries

We focus on the equilibrium unemployment rate as a parameter implied by a dynamic aggregate model of wage and price setting. The equilibrium unemployment rate depends on institutional labour market institutions through mark‐up coefficients. Compared with existing studies, the resulting final equation for unemployment has a richer dynamic structure. The empirical investigation is conducted in a panel data framework and uses OECD data up to 2012. We propose to extend the standard estimation method with time dummies to control and capture the effects of common and national shocks by using impulse indicator saturation (WG‐IIS), which has not been previously used on panel data. WG‐IIS robustifies the estimators of the regression coefficients in the dynamic model, and it affects the estimated equilibrium unemployment rates. We find that wage co‐ordination stands out as the most important institutional variable in our data set, but there is also evidence pointing to the tax wedge and the degree of compensation in the unemployment insurance system as drivers of equilibrium unemployment.     

Household survey data, econometrics and economic transition

This paper explores some of the possible uses of household survey data for the analysis of the process of economic transition. It is argued that such data are particularly valuable for work on the distributional effects of transition, using simulation techniques of various kinds. Some examples are given, focusing on: labour supply; indirect taxation; and the cost and effectiveness of the Hungarian personal income tax and social security systems under alternative assumptions about changes in the distribution of gross earnings and the level and incidence of unemployment.     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work

This paper discusses the effect of tax progression on wage setting and employment in a unionised labour market. Recent contributions to this field argue that tax progression paradoxically enhances employment if wage setting is subject to collective bargaining. In this literature, individual hours of work are usually assumed to be exogenously given. We show that the positive employment effect of tax progression can be generalized to a model with a positive labour supply elasticity of individual workers. However, the wage-moderating effect of tax progression does not unambiguously carry over to a world where the union may fix both wages and individual hours of work. In this framework, the union reacts to tax progression by cutting individual working time. The wage rate, however, may decrease or increase. If the wage rate increases, the number of employed workers may decline despite the reduction in hours of work.     

DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN: RELATIVE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS

ABSTRACT We estimate the effects of unemployment benefit and family situation on the unemployment duration in Spain. Empirical results indicate that the distinctions between the exits into employment and the exits from the labour force and between men and women are important. Although unemployment benefit reduces significantly the job-finding probabilities, its effects are much larger on exits from the labour force. Many people who decide to go out of the labour force delay their exits until they exhaust their unemployment benefits. Family situation also has strong effects on the duration of unemployment in Spain. Household heads have about twice larger job-finding probability than non-heads, and having a working household head or other working household members improves employment probability. This suggests that family connections in the labour market are important determinants of unemployment duration in Spain.     

The effect of international firm mobility on wages and unemployment

Although the increase in international firm mobility is well documented, its effects on macroeconomic aggregates and the labour market remain controversial. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) benefit from an international outside option during wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in average wages. However, a strategic incentive to hire extra workers in a foreign (home) plant in order to reduce wages in the home (foreign) plant has an indirect positive effect on wages due to spillovers resulting from an increased demand for labour. In a framework of frictional unemployment, permitting MNEs leads to a decrease in unemployment. Abstracting from transport and plant fixed costs, MNEs lead to higher wages. Including transport and plant costs generally leads to lower wages, though the effects are small. The strategic hiring effect is important in mitigating the fall in wages.     

Attrition in longitudinal panel data and the empirical analysis of dynamic labour market behaviour

In the empirical analysis of unemployment durations and job durations, it is generally assumed that the stochastic processes underlying labour market behaviour and the behaviour concerning participation in a panel survey are independent. However, there are reasons to believe that the probability of dropping out of the panel is related to the rate at which a (different) job is found. If there is such a relation, and if it is ignored, then the estimator of the rate at which individuals become employed or change jobs will generally be inconsistent. In this paper we analyse the relation between the duration spent in a particular labour market state and the duration of panel survey participation, by explicitly modelling and estimating the joint distribution of both durations. The emphasis will be on models allowing for stochastically related unobserved determinants of both types of duration. We estimate models both for unemployment durations and for job durations.     

Durations in Panel Data Subject to Attrition: A Note on Estimation in the Case of a Stock Sample1

In the empirical analysis of unemployment durations or job durations, it is generally assumed that the stochastic processes underlying labour market behaviour and the behaviour concerning participation in a panel survey are independent. As a consequence, spells that are incomplete due to attrition can be treated as spells that are subjected to independent right censoring. However, if the assumption of independence is violated, i.e. if for example the probability of dropping out of the panel is related to the rate at which a job is found, then attrition may have to be modelled and estimated jointly with the unemployment duration distribution to avoid biased estimates of the rate at which individuals become employed. A way to model the joint dependence is by means of stochastically related unobserved determinants. We discuss some properties of these kinds of models and state conditions needed to estimate such models in the case of stock sampled duration data.     

Wage Formation,Regional Migration and Local Labour Market Tightness*

Empirical studies of regional wage formation and interregional migration routinely include the regional unemployment rate as indicator of local labour market tightness. However, these studies are usually motivated by economic theories that emphasize transition probabilities between unemployment and employment, and the unemployment rate is an imperfect proxy for these probabilities. We use a large micro data set to compute estimates of the rate of outflow from unemployment for 90 Norwegian travel‐to‐work areas. The outflow rates perform better than traditional measures of regional labour market tightness in panel data analyses of regional wages and interregional migration.     

Tax policy and returns to education

This paper considers how asymmetric tax treatment, where labour market earnings are taxed but household production is untaxed, affects educational choice and labour supply. We show that taxes on labour market earnings can generate a large (non-marginal) switch to home production and the ensuing deadweight losses are large. Using a cross-country panel, we find that gender differences in labour supply responses to tax policy can explain differences in aggregate labour supply and years of education across countries.     

Sources of Public Revenue that Make Nations Richer

Among sources of public revenue that make nations richer, the most beneficial are charges for harms, such as pollution and congestion, and charges for the private benefits from public services. Increases in the money supply sufficient to keep price changes in line with expectations are also beneficial. Taxes on concentrations of wealth are beneficial if wealth inequality is considered harmful. Properly administered taxes on land do no harm and are beneficial when markets are imperfect. Among taxes that cause harm, the combination of a tax on labour income and a tax on inheritances is probably the least damaging.