Text matching to measure patent similarity

Research Summary : We propose using text matching to measure the technological similarity between patents. Technology experts from different fields validate the new similarity measure and its improvement on measures based on the United States Patent Classification System, and identify its limitations. As an application, we replicate prior findings on the localization of knowledge spillovers by constructing a case–control group of text‐matched patents. We also provide open access to the code and data to calculate the similarity between any two utility patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office between 1976 and 2013, or between any two patent portfolios. Managerial Summary : We propose using text matching to measure the technological similarity between patents. The method can be used by various practitioners such as inventors, attorneys, patent examiners, and managers to search for closely related prior art, to assess the novelty of a patent, to identify R&D opportunities in less crowded areas, to detect in‐ or out‐licensing opportunities, to map companies in technology space, and to find acquisition targets. We use an expert panel to validate the improvement of the new similarity measure on measures based on the United States Patent Classification System, and provide open access to the code and data to calculate the similarity between any two utility patents granted by the USPTO between 1976 and 2013, or between any two patent portfolios.     

Inventor bricolage and firm technology research and development

We examine the conditions around firm use of 'inventor bricolage,' or the reconstruction of technological capabilities through reallocation of extant individual inventors to address new opportunities embodied in patents. Empirically, we examine the dynamics of both firm and individual patenting activity in publicly traded Life Science Diagnostic firms to explore how inventor bricolage is related to firms' existing research and development (R&D) capabilities and firms' acquisition of external capabilities through merger and acquisition (M&A) activities. Evidence at the firm level suggests that breadth of inventors' human capital and collaboration with co-researchers with relevant experience is positively related to inventor bricolage. At the inventor level, the fewer patents an inventor has, the broader the individual's prior patent portfolio, and the more co-researchers with relevant experience, the more likely inventors will patent in a new area. M&A does not appear to have an impact on the utilization of existing human capital. Our findings suggest that R&D managers should assign inventors with less assimilative capacity and more creative capacity in teams where there is relevant experience in order to promote inventor bricolage.     

How to analyze technology lifecycle from the perspective of patent characteristics? the cases of DVDs and hard drives

This study aims to analyze the technology lifecycle from the perspective of the dynamics of patent characteristics; the dynamics of patent characteristics are proposed as an approach for characterizing technology lifecycle in this study. DVD and hard drive technologies, which have already experienced their complete technology lifecycles, were selected for analyzing their patent characteristics as a function of the different stages of their technology lifecycles to thus obtain the objective of this research. The results obtained in this study provide a channel to assess the nature of firms’ innovation strategies along technology lifecycles. It can be observed that (1) patents attempt to cite more prior patent or non-patent references at the latter stages to find more technological or scientific sources that can contribute to technological innovation, (2) most litigated patents are granted in the Growth stage, so it is expected that patents in the Growth stage should be more important and, thus, more relevant to dominant design than the patents granted in other stages.     

Scope versus speed: Team diversity,leader experience,and patenting outcomes for firms

Research Summary: How does the organization of patenting activity affect a firm's patenting outcomes? We investigate how the composition of patenting teams relates to both the scope of their patent applications and the speed with which their patents are approved, by examining the main effects of team members’ intra‐organizational diversity (based on affiliations with formal organizational units and informal organizational communities) and the moderating effects of team leader experience. We test our moderated mediation model in a sample of 121 teams that filed patents in a Fortune 50 company's India R&D center between 2005 and 2015, using proprietary employee data combined with newly released micro‐data from the U.S Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our findings illuminate the micro‐foundations of innovation in firms by highlighting a trade‐off between organizing patenting activity to maximize scope versus speed. Managerial Summary: Patenting is an important strategic tool that firms can use to protect and create value from their innovations. A firm can benefit from filing a patent application that gives it a wider possible set of claims related to an innovation. It can also benefit from faster approval of a patent application by the Patent Office. However, our study shows that there is a trade‐off between patent application scope and patent approval speed, which creates tensions for the organization of patenting activities inside firms. In particular, we find that the diversity of a patenting team is positively related to patent scope but negatively related to patenting speed, and that these relationships vary with the experience of the team leader.     

Patenting in the shadow of independent discoveries by rivals

This paper studies the decision of whether to apply for a patent in a dynamic model in which firms innovate stochastically and independently. In the model, a firm can choose between patenting and maintaining secrecy to protect a successful innovation. I consider a legal environment characterized by imperfect patent protection and no prior user rights. Thus, patenting grants probabilistic protection, and secrecy is effectively maintained until rivals innovate. I show that (1) firms that innovate early are more inclined to choose secrecy, whereas firms that innovate late have a stronger tendency to patent; (2) the incentives to patent increase with the innovation arrival rate; and (3) an increase in the number of firms may cause patenting to occur earlier or later, depending on the strength of patent protection. The socially optimal level of patent protection, which balances the trade-off between the provision of patenting incentives and the avoidance of deadweight loss caused by a monopoly, is lower with a higher innovation arrival rate or a larger number of firms.     

Patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs: a literature review and an empirical study of innovation appropriation,patent propensity,and motives

Managers make a number of strategic choices when trying to capture returns from innovation investments, including what appropriation strategy to use and whether or not to patent, strategic choices that depend among other things on firm size. Previous literature, being reviewed in this paper, shows that the patent propensity is lower in small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) than in large firms and that patenting as means for appropriation is of less importance among SMEs. Chief executive officers (CEOs) and/or research and development (R&D) managers of 26 entrepreneurial SMEs have been interviewed to explain these differences and to provide insight on how patenting is used in SMEs. The patent competence was low among the studied SMEs, and internal patent resources were found to be important for effective and efficient use of the patent system, for application as well as monitoring and enforcement. While of limited perceived importance for protecting inventions in entrepreneurial SMEs, patents were used to attract customers and venture capital, which is of utmost importance for the survival and growth of these firms. Thus, patenting has an important role to play even in firms where the protective function of patents is secondary.     

资本市场压力与企业策略性专利行为:卖空机制的视角

创新是一种不确定性高且周期长的投资活动,需要风险偏好更大、对失败容忍更高的市场环境,而资本市场具有筛选和发现创新型企业、有效分散创新风险的功能,因而对创新活动起着关键作用。然而,中国资本市场短期投资者比例高,融券交易成本高且交易不活跃,加上专利评价体系对不同质量的专利区分度较低,导致资本市场压力对创新活动没有发挥出信息机制和治理机制两种效应。相反,资本市场压力带来的负面信息表达渠道和管理层短期业绩压力,造成了中国专利申请中存在“重数量、轻质量”“重申请、轻维护”的企业策略性专利行为所衍生的“专利泡沫”问题。本文采用中国融资融券制度作为准自然实验,考察卖空机制对企业创新的影响效应和作用机理。研究发现,企业面临卖空压力时会更加积极地申请专利,但专利的申请质量有所下降,表现为专利授权率降低;专利结构有所恶化,最终授权数增加的主要是容易研发、授权快的实用新型专利和外观设计专利;专利得到授权后,企业放弃缴纳维持费用以终止专利权。这些策略性专利行为在短期内可以减少企业的卖空交易量,推高企业市值,但长期看对企业的业绩没有积极影响,是一种“创新假象”。卖空机制主要通过施压机制来影响企业创新,管理层业绩压力、外部监督压力、股价信息传递压力越大的企业,在面临卖空威慑时更有动力进行策略性专利行为。为促进企业创新向高质量发展,需要进一步完善融资融券制度和专利评价体系。     

When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industry

Research and development (R&D) consortia are specialized strategic alliances that shape the direction and scope of firm innovation activities. Little research exists on the performance consequences of participating in R&D consortia. We study the effect of patent pools, a unique form of R&D consortia, on firm performance in innovation. While prior research on alliances generally implies that patent pools enhance firm innovation, our study finds the opposite. Analyzing data on systemic innovation in the global optical disc industry, we find that patent pool formation substantially and significantly decreases both the quantity and quality of patents subsequently generated by licensors and licensees relative to the patenting activity of nonparticipants. Our empirical findings suggest that patent pools actually inhibit, rather than enhance, systemic innovation by participating firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Innovating standards through informal consortia: The case of wireless telecommunications

We empirically examine the effects of industry consortia on the coordination of innovation strategies of the members. Our analyses utilize membership data from 32 consortia in wireless telecommunication technology subfields from 2000 to 2005 and prior art citations in standard-essential patents. We find that connections among firms in informal and technically-oriented consortia significantly increase the likelihood that firms cite each other's patents in subsequent patents essential for the UMTS wireless telecommunication standard. Inventions that are likely to become part of the UMTS system tend to build on inventions by firm peers who were members of the same consortia, controlling for patent or firm fixed effects, technology class, and other characteristics. Consortia may enhance productivity of invention and increase the incentives to invest in R&D by internalizing potential externalities. They may also enhance efficiency of standardization by facilitating the interaction of committee and market processes. Consortia thus structure and constrain the process of innovating standardized technologies. This is problematic if consortia are not truly accessible for all the relevant parties. Policymakers thus need to balance these effects. For managers, the results show that participation in a variety of technical consortia enables influencing peers' innovation strategies related to compatibility standards.     

Patent Quality and a Two‐Tiered Patent System

In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two‐tiered patent system. In the two‐tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, ‘gold‐plate’ patent. Introducing a second patent‐tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold‐plate tier attracts inventors with high ex‐ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.     

Market Power and Patent Strategies: Evidence from Renaissance Venice

This paper exploits the introduction of the first regularized patent system, which appeared in the Venetian Republic in 1474, to examine the factors shaping inventors’ propensity to use a new form of intellectual property. We combine detailed information on craft guilds and patents in Renaissance Venice and show a negative association between patenting activity and guild statutory norms that strongly restricted entry and price competition. Our analysis shows that the heterogeneity in patenting activity documented by the industrial organization literature is not a special feature of modern technologies, but is rather a persistent phenomenon affected by market power.     

The influence of corporate acquisitions on the behaviour of key inventors

The behaviour of key inventors after the acquisition of their company is examined. Key inventors are identified on the basis of their patenting output. They account for a large number of their company's high-quality patents. The analysis of 43 acquisitions shows that key inventors leave to a substantial extent their company or they significantly reduce their patenting performance after the acquisition. Factors influencing the behaviour of key inventors after acquisitions are identified. Implications for the effective management of acquisitions as well as suggestions for further research are outlined.     

Firm Patenting,Innovations, and Government Institutional Support as a Double‐Edged Sword

In 2012, China was ranked fourth in patent filing by region of origin. However, firm innovation quality is not comparable to such quantity. Evidence of this is that no Chinese organization was named as a Thomson Reuters 2011 or 2012 Top 100 Global Innovators. This paradox of firm patenting and innovations in China challenges the traditional understanding of the role of government in industrial innovation. This paper provides a theoretical lens through which to examine traditional protective and strategic patenting motives. Based on institutional theory and the ultimate goals of patenting motives, the paper posits that protective patenting motives are directly law‐based while strategic patenting motives are largely law‐derived. The paper also aims to empirically examine three questions: (1) What is the relative importance of various patenting motives to firm patenting behaviors? (2) What effects do patenting behaviors have on firm product and process innovations? (3) How, if at all, does governmental institutional support affect firm patenting and innovations? This paper uses dominant analysis, structural equation modeling, and regression analysis to analyze the survey data collected from a sample of 270 firms in China. The empirical results provide new evidence about firm patenting, innovations, and government institutional support. First, the order of relative importance of patenting motives to patenting behaviors was found to be (in the descending order of importance) reputation, exchange, blocking, and protection. Second, patenting behaviors were more relevant to product innovations than to process innovations. Third, more importantly, while government institutional support can enhance the effects of protective patenting motives on patenting behaviors, it can mitigate the effects of strategic patenting motives on patenting behaviors. Moreover, government institutional support reduces the positive effect of patenting behaviors on product innovations. These findings suggest that firm patenting and innovations are distinct activities, and that government institutional support acts as a double‐edged sword in firm patenting and innovations: On the one hand government institutional support—an extralegal formal institution—may work alongside the patent system—a law‐based formal institution—to advance science and technology, but on the other hand government institutional support may distract firms from commercializing patented knowledge into new products. This paper primarily contributes to institutional theory, new product development literature, and innovation management practice by revealing the dynamics between two different types of formal institutions—patent system and government institutional support—by establishing an institution‐based view of patenting motives, by empirically distinguishing firm patenting and innovations, and more interestingly by uncovering a double‐edged role of government institutional support in firm patenting and innovations.     

Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two firms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative effects of litigation threats on innovation. We define an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially efficient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.     

‘Essential’ Patents,FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards

Standard Setting Organizations have developed FRAND agreements in order to prevent firms from holding up other participants once a standard is created. We analyze here the consequences of such agreements—in particular the requirements of fairness and non-discrimination—for the creation of technological standards that require the participation of existing patent holders. We abandon the usual assumption that patents bring known benefits to the industry or that their benefits are known to all parties. When royalty payments are increasing in one's patent portfolio, as is implicitly the case in FRAND agreements, private information about the quality of patents leads to a variety of distortions, in particular the incentives of firms to ‘pad’ by contributing patents that are ‘inessential’ for the given standard, a phenomenon that seems to be widespread. Several results emerge from the analysis: (i) the number of inessential patents co-varies positively with the number of essential patents; (ii) there is over-investment relative to the second-best, that is when padding cannot be avoided and (iii) the threat of disputes reduces incentives to pad but at the cost of lower production of strong patents; (iv) mitigating this undesirable side-effect calls for a simultaneous increase in the cost of padding, through a better filtering of patent applications.     

The impacts of academic patenting and licensing on knowledge production and diffusion: a test of the anti-commons effect in Taiwan

This paper empirically examines the emerging anti-commons effect of academic patenting and licensing on knowledge production and diffusion in Taiwan. Through a dataset of 229 Taiwanese academic patent inventors, the results reveal that the anti-commons effect is not significant as expected. However, this effect has becomes more vivid in application-oriented research and disclosure delay while academic patent inventors have involved more in licensing activities. Programs to encourage academic licensing should be aware of the side effects on academic knowledge production and diffusion.     

How many patents does it take to signal innovation quality?

In this paper, we offer a novel explanation to the surge in patenting observed during the last few years. When PTOs (Patent and Trademark Offices) award bad patents, not only do “false innovators” have the incentive to file applications but also, and more interestingly, “true innovators” are forced to patent more intensively in an attempt to signal their type. However, if they are liquidity constrained, true innovators may fail to separate and this fact reduces the incentives to exert effort in R&D. In addition, drawing on the signaling role of patents highlighted by the model, we investigate some of the proposals that have been put forward in order to mitigate the bad patent problem. We provide an intuitive condition under which a tightening of the patentability standards (“raising the bar”) reduces the distortions caused by bad patents. Moreover, we show that introducing a two-tiered patent system is unlikely to improve market outcomes.     

Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms

The patent system underpins the business model of some of the fastest-growing companies. Used appropriately, it should support frontier technologies and nurture new firms. Used perniciously, it can stifle innovation and protect established technological behemoths. We analyze patent examination decisions at the American, European, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese patent offices and find evidence that patent attorneys have a surprisingly significant role in the patent system. Our results suggest that some forces within the examination system maintain the uneven playing field by allocating monopoly rights to inventors with better access to influential attorneys, rather than leveling it by favoring inventors with better, nonobvious ideas. Attorney quality is most important, vis-à-vis invention quality, in less codified and more rapidly changing technology areas such as software and ICT.     

Standards,innovation, and latecomer economic development: Conceptual issues and policy challenges

Little is known about the impact of standards on the economic development of countries which are latecomers to industrial manufacturing and innovation. Standardization is regarded primarily as a technical issue, and hence receives only limited high-level policy support.However, technical standards contribute at least as much as patents to economic growth. As a key mechanism for the diffusion of technological knowledge and due to the dominant leadership by advanced countries in patenting, technical standards have emerged in latecomer countries as an alternative to patenting. However, latecomer countries and their firms have a set of capabilities and constraints that are fundamentally different from that of advanced countries and firms. This paper argues that latecomer countries should adopt assessment criteria that are more fitted with latecomer contexts which emphasize learning effects and building dynamic capabilities. The paper discusses current issues that are essential in understanding the rise of Asian countries in standardization. We also examine the critical role that patents play for standardization and argue that “strategic patenting” to generate rents from de facto industry standards can stifle latecomer economic development.