机构投资者参与公司治理研究

近年来,随着机构投资者的不断发展,无论是在发达国家还是在新兴市场,机构投资者在资本市场及金融体系中的作用越来越突出,在参与公司治理、监督公司行为等方面发挥越来越重要的作用。本文从机构投资者参与公司治理的动机、参与公司治理的途径以及参与公司治理的影响因素三方面考察机构投资者在公司治理中发挥的作用,以期能够对中国资本市场科学引导机构投资者发展提供借鉴。     

我国资本市场机构投资者参与公司治理研究

近年来,我国证券市场不断发展,机构投资者更是超常规发展。随着其规模的扩大和影响的加强,机构投资者的持股行为日益受到学术界的关注。本文回顾了我国机构投资者的发展过程;分析了机构投资者参与公司治理的内在动因;借鉴美国经验提出我国机构投资者参与公司治理的可行方式;阐述了我国资本市场中的机构投资者参与公司治理治理的积极作用;从机构投资者本身、法律角度等提出发挥机构投资者参与公司治理作用的建议。     

机构投资者参与公司会计治理：意愿、影响因素与路径

本文认为,机构投资者具有改善公司会计治理、提高公司会计信息质量的意愿。机构投资者参与公司会计治理受控股股东持股比例等多种因素的影响。机构投资者可以通过机构投资者的联合行动参与会计准则的制定、监督公司会计信息披露、约束及激励公司管理层行为等路径参与公司会计治理、影响公司会计信息质量。     

浅谈我国机构投资者参与公司治理积极性理论研究

与发达国家机构投资者参与公司治理程度相比,国内的机构投资者在参与公司治理方面明显受到了内外部环境的制约与影响。本文正是基于这样一个现状,回顾过往相关研究文献,从机构投资者自身因素及外部环境两个方面探讨分析影响国内机构投资者主动参与公司治理的积极性,最后得出有益于促进机构投资者主动参与公司治理的相关对策与建议。     

机构投资者参与公司治理效果验证

机构投资者在公司治理中的地位越来越重要,对机构投资者参与公司治理提出三个假设,并在此基础上对机构投资者参与公司治理的效果进行实证研究,得出目前我国机构投资者有助于公司治理结构与机制的完善和发展,有助于公司经营业绩的提高     

我国资本市场机构投资者参与公司治理研究

近年来，我国证券市场不断发展，机构投资者更是越常规发展。随着其规模的扩大和影响的加强，机构投资者的持股行为日益受到学术界的关注。本文回顾了我国机构投资者的发展过程，分析了机构投资者参与公司治理的内在动因。借鉴美国经验提出我国机构投资者参与公司治理的可行方式；阐述了我国资本市场中的机构投资者参与公司治理的积极作用；从机构投资者本身，法律角度等提出发挥机构投资者参与公司治理作用的建议。     

基于委托代理视角的机构投资者治理行为研究

文章基于委托代理的视角研究了机构投资者参与公司治理的可能性。研究结论表明：从作用机理分析,基于个人投资者、机构投资者、上市公司之间所形成的双重委托代理关系,机构投资者有动力参与到公司治理之中;进一步的博弈证据证明,双重委托代理所形成的契约关系能够促使机构投资者在公司治理中发挥治理作用以改善公司的治理绩效。     

制约我国机构投资者参与公司治理的因素与改进措施

机构投资者介入公司治理已经成为国际趋势,机构投资者的规模在不断扩大,参与公司治理的行为也愈加频繁与深入.而我国机构投资者的发展起步较晚,但近几年发展迅速,在改善公司治理方面的作用也正在不断加强.本文讨论了制约我国机构投资者参与公司治理的因素以及大力推进机构投资者发展的措施.     

控制权私有收益与机构投资者持股比例的关系研究

本文从投资者保护的角度出发,分析随着机构投资者力量的壮大,机构投资者参与公司治理是否会减少控制权私有收益。实证研究发现,机构投资者参与公司治理并没有对控制权私有收益产生显著影响,验证了机构投资者的无效监督假说。     

机构投资者与独立董事——基于公司治理的视角

允许机构投资者持股是改变目前我国上市公司股权结构不合理的重要举措,机构投资者的特殊身份可以以更积极的方式参与公司治理.机构投资者参与公司治理客观上需要独立董事制度,独立董事制度只有在机构投资者参与的条件下才能真正发挥应有的监督和协调作用.     

机构投资者能抑制盈余管理吗?--基于退出威胁视角的经验证据

退出威胁是股东参与公司治理的重要方式。本文以2010?2017年A股上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者的退出威胁与企业盈余管理之间的关系。结果显示:机构投资者能够抑制企业的真实盈余管理,而对应计盈余管理的影响并不显著;机构投资者退出威胁能够降低真实和应计盈余管理水平。进一步考虑机构投资者异质性发现,相比敏感型机构投资者,抗压型机构投资者退出威胁更可能降低企业真实盈余管理水平;当管理层的薪酬对股价越敏感时,机构投资者退出威胁的作用越大;机构投资者退出威胁的影响效应在民营企业中更显著。本文的研究结论为认识我国机构投资者,尤其是以QFII和社保基金为代表的抗压型机构投资者在公司治理中的作用提供了新的思路。     

基于公司治理视角的机构投资者对控股股东的制衡分析

我国公司治理中一直存在控股股东一股独大的问题,控股股东的自利行为严重地影响了公司的健康成长,而对于规避这一弊端的讨论并没有形成有效的解决办法。本文通过引入机构投资者作为外部持股股东,探讨了机构投资者制衡控股股东对公司经营决策的单方面控制的重要作用,从而为政策制定者制定公司治理政策提供决策参考。     

To Thine Shareholders Be True? Linking Large Corporate Ownership to Firms’ Use of Commitment Human Resource Practices

Human resource practitioners and academics have increasingly realized the importance of corporate governance for firm human resource activities. This study investigates how one important form of corporate governance, namely, ownership within large, publicly traded firms, is associated with a firm's use of commitment human resource practices (CHRPs), specifically, the use of incentive compensation, profit sharing, and participative decision making. Our findings indicate that the types of large investor, namely, family and institutional, are differentially associated with the likelihood of the firm using these CHRPs. Specifically, family owners with their long‐term investment horizon, as well as their stakeholder orientation, increase the likelihood of the firm using these practices. In contrast, large institutional owners with their shorter‐term investment horizon, as well as their investor orientation, decrease the likelihood of the firm using these practices. Furthermore, among institutional investors, transient institutional investors are negatively associated with these practices, while dedicated institutional investors are not associated with these practices. Taken together, our results regarding the positive association of family ownership and this subset of CHRPs and the negative association of transient institutional investors and this set of practices, have important implications for human resource professionals who not only need to understand how ownership affects HR practices but also how to articulate the value of these investments in order to attract investors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Institutional investors,corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector

Proportions of equity held by institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds—are rising across all OECD countries. Meanwhile institutions are becoming more influential in corporate governance, even in bank-dominated countries, inter alia due to international investment, pension reform and EMU. We provide two forms of evidence on the effects of institutional corporate governance on corporate performance. First we offer a literature survey on micro evidence, the outcome of which is mixed, but on balance suggesting a positive effect on equity returns. We contend that these micro studies face a difficulty that they cannot capture effects of governance initiatives whose effects go wider than “target firms”. Accordingly, we present results for the reduced form empirical relationship between institutional share holding and corporate sector performance at an economy-wide level. These are consistent with significant effects which differ between “Anglo-Saxon” and “relationship banking” countries. For example, institutions appear to accompany lower investment and higher dividends in the former.     

投资者监督、政府干预与企业价值——基于机构投资者的经验证据

文章通过模型证明大投资者(Blockholders)与个人投资者相比对上市公司实施更多的监督,并且大投资者的监督行为能够增加企业价值;但模型也表明机构投资者是否实施监督及其为企业带来的价值增量取决于监督的成本和收益。文章利用中国资本市场的机构投资者数据,检验了理论模型的四个基本结论。结果表明:机构投资者比个人投资者更积极地监督上市公司,并有助于提高企业价值;政府干预(用上市公司最终控制人为政府代表)减少了机构投资者监督的收益,降低了机构投资者对企业价值所起到的正面作用,削弱了机构投资者监督的积极性。研究结论表明,发展机构投资者有助于改善上市公司的治理水平,提升企业价值;但是政府干预限制了机构投资者的积极公司治理作用。     

Can we expect institutional investors to improve corporate governance?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the way institutional investors use information for equity-investment purposes, and to discuss the implications that this may have for the role of these investors as owners of public companies. On the basis of an empirical study, the paper reports that institutional investors tend to use very little of the available information regarding listed companies, and to simplify their forming of expectations. They managed this by setting a priori limitations on the investment alternatives, by relying on highly trusted external advisors, and by overemphasising the quarterly updating of the spreadsheet model. It is argued in the paper that if institutional investors are assigned a leading role in corporate governance, their heavy dependence on external advisors and their over-emphasis on quarterly financial information, may have negative implications for the management of listed companies.     

Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign Share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

We investigate the association of foreign share ownership with firm‐level disclosure and corporate governance structures in Zimbabwe, a developing country in Southern Africa. Our motivation for the study derives from the literature, which suggests that foreign investors: (1) generally have a preference for companies in which they are well informed and where their investments are more likely to be protected, and (2) avoid companies in developing countries because of weak corporate governance structures and low disclosure. Using data drawn from companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, we examine the effect of disclosure and corporate governance on foreign share ownership. We find that disclosure, proportion of non‐executive directors, institutional share ownership and audit committee independence are all positively and significantly associated with foreign share ownership. Our results also demonstrate that market capitalization, return on equity and liquidity ratios are significantly associated with foreign share ownership. These results are consistent with the notion that foreign investors have a preference for companies with effective corporate governance structures, companies with less information asymmetry, as well as companies with healthy cash positions. The results have implications for policy‐makers in developing countries in their endeavour to improve liquidity on stock markets through the participation of foreign investors. The results are also useful to managers in developing countries who are keen to increase the market value of their company, thereby reducing their cost of capital.     

机构投资者持股、产品市场竞争与上市公司违规治理

以2007—2020年的A股上市公司作为研究样本，实证检验机构投资者持股对上市公司违规的影响。研究发现：机构投资者持股比例越高，上市公司违规可能性越低，且违规频率越少；机构投资者持股与产品市场竞争存在互补效应，产品市场竞争强化了机构投资者持股对上市公司的违规倾向与违规频率的治理效应。研究结论为完善公司治理和解决上市公司违规问题提供了借鉴。     

A Comparison Between One‐Tier and Two‐Tier Board Structures in France

French companies operate in a unique environment characterized by the strong involvement of block shareholders such as families and banks. Furthermore, the French legal system allows firms to choose between a one‐tier or a two‐tier board structure. This study investigates whether this choice can affect the firm's operating and stock performance. Our regression results provide strong evidence that ownership and board structures are used together as corporate governance tools. In particular, the agency cost of debt is strongly affected by their interaction when institutional investors are also bank lenders. Our test results show that while family control has a negative impact on corporate governance, French institutional blockholders play a positive role as monitors of one‐tier structures. In contrast, they are more likely to misuse the two‐tier board system by promoting interlocked directorship, board opacity and their own interests as creditors. Our regression analysis reveals that foreign institutional investors do not have any impact on firm performance, regardless of board structure. Finally, we do not find any inverse relationship between board size and efficiency in France.     

企业控制权视角下的公司治理与内部审计

公司治理是企业内部投资者和管理者之间一系列调解利害关系的契约,内部审计即产生于此。内部审计满足了投资者对公司治理和管理者对经营控制的需求。本文从企业产权理论的角度对公司治理和内部审计的关系及内部审计在公司治理中的作用进行了研究。