产权重组与金融发展

本从对金融业重组的理解入手，阐述了金融业重组的必要性，进而对在重组中起主导作用的国有商业银行产权重组的目标模武及其运作进行了设计。     

抓住股改试点良机建设现代金融企业

股份制是当今世界影响最为深远的企业组织方式之一，股份制企业的最大便利是通过股权分散化和资本社会化，放大企业经营的资本基础。企业股份化是推动社会化大生产和国际资本市场深入发展的重要力量。我国改革开放以来，随着企业股份制改革的推进，股票交易的规范化，股份化已经成为我国企业改革特别是国有企业改革的重要方式，它也将成为国有银行克服目前存在的制度障碍，推动自身发展的一次契机。     

高悬的达摩克列斯之剑——国有银行的不良资产问题

近期，商业银行不良贷款余额上升的消费在诸多财经媒体披露后．再一次引起了公众的普遍关注。四大国有商业银行不良贷款达到2万亿元．这直接关系到它们能否顺利完成改制，能否尽快上市；财政部金融司有关负责人明确表示．四大国有银行的不良资产不     

国有商业银行绩效考评体系比较分析

目前，我国四家国有商业银行已建立起符合自身实际的绩效考核评价体系和方法，但比较分析，其考评体系和方法既各具特色，也有欠科学、不全面之处。因此，国有商业银行要根据银监会绩效考评的指导思想、原则，按照现代商业银行的发展方向和要求，充分借鉴、积极吸收国内外先进商业银行的经营理念和管理方法，对现行绩效考评体系和机制进行调整和改进。     

关注国有银行与股份制银行的绩效差异

Seen from kinds of statistical data, state-run bank and shareholding bank differ in greatly in capital efficiency and harmful assets rate, management effect of shareholding bank are higher than four state-run banks, This article analyses originally main factors affecting dfficiency of commercial bank, such as enterprise administration stucture, put foward lots of valuable opinions.     

发展中国家国有银行的产权改革:国际经验借鉴

本文着重对世界范围内发展中国家国有银行的产权改革进行了研究。从国有银行改革的理论动因分析开始,到政府选择什么方式对国有银行进行改革。实证研究表明。国有银行较私有银行效率低下,尤其是政府控制的银行体系暴露出来的问题可能对整个国家带来潜在的金融和财政风险。对于部分剥离国有资产的银行,由于政府对银行仍具有控制力,产权改革并不能显著改变其经营绩效。国外战略投资者的进入,能显著提升银行绩效,但需先解决政治体制上的问题。     

对落后地区国有商业银行股改实施效果的分析与评价

近年来，在推进国有商业银行企业化改革过程中，不良资产和体制问题始终成为阻碍国有独资商业银行改革的两大难题。按照“资本充足、内控严密、运营安全、服务高效”的目标，国家通过注资方式，提高国有商业银行的资本充足率；对不良资产进行集中处置；逐步建立健全金融监管体系；陆续启动中国银行、中国建设银行和中国工商银行的股份制改造工作，使国有独资商业银行的情况发生了很大的变化，尤其是落后地区表现更加突出。由于落后地区存在机构少，观念陈旧，     

国有商业银行治理结构产权改革与经营绩效分析

以产权改革为核心的国有商业银行公司制理结构重构已成为当前我国国有商业银行改革的核心问题。本文在梳理公司治理现状的基础上,剖析了我国国有商业银行治理结构的缺陷,并提出了优化国有商业银行治理结构的着力点。     

微观组织效率的重新审视与国有银行改革导向:资产收入率视角

评价国有银行组织绩效应把资产收入率纳入到评价指标体系中来，以弥补单一利润指标的缺陷，收入结构的绝对与相对优化都表现出国有银行效率增进趋势。以资产收入率指标描述的产出效率不低于股份商业银行的国有银行，却表现出了偏低的盈利能力，其原因在于经营者的费用规模扩张侵蚀了出资人利润收益空间。因此，要国有银行提高盈利能力，关键在于抑制经营者费用偏好，而利润约束硬化，作为抑制费用偏好的制度条件，又决定了国有银行制度变迁的路径依赖。     

中国国有企业的融资结构及其对公司治理结构绩效的影响

中国经济体制改革已经使国有企业的融资结构发生了根本变化。改革前，国有企业几乎完全由国家预算提供融资，很少负债。改革后，债务融资逐渐超过权益融资。1994年，国有资产委员会对12．39万家国有企业调查报告认为，如果把坏帐剔除，1994年债务资产比率为75．07％和83．3％，还有很多“零权益企业”。这种高债务资产比率主要有两方面的原因：一     

Ownership structure and target returns

Contrary to past literature, ownership defined as “all officers and directors” of the target firm has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director) ownership has a negative relation with target returns. Using accounting-based versus market-based performance measures, we find that the relation between inside ownership and target returns is best explained by takeover anticipation. Using bidder and synergy returns we find that the relation between outside ownership and target returns is best explained by outsiders' willingness to share gains with the bidder. While the relations are more pronounced for non-tender deals, they also hold for tender offers when active-outside ownership is corporate rather than institutional.     

Ownership structure and tax-friendly dividends

The paper examines the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles using the novel environment of Australia, which has operated a full dividend imputation system since 1987. The analysis jointly focuses on the tax-based preferences of five categories of shareholders, including both domestic and foreign-domiciled shareholder classes. Incorporating the dividend franking percentage as a direct measure of the degree of tax benefit associated with dividends, strong evidence supporting the existence of tax-based dividend clienteles is present for both domestic and foreign shareholder categories. This includes domestic corporate blockholders and company directors, and local institutional investors following tax reforms in 2000, and foreign institutional shareholders which, alternatively, demand lower dividends and dividend franking. These findings persist after considering the effect of share repurchases, and under various model specifications controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity and potential endogeneity between ownership structure and dividend payout policy.     

Ownership structure and forecast accuracy in Spain

This article examines how analysts respond to specific ownership structure characteristics by studying the accuracy of their forecasts after the release of the first Spanish corporate governance code and before IFRS were adopted. Specifically, we analyse the influence of ownership concentration, bank ownership and insider ownership on analyst forecast errors. Overall the results show a positive and significant influence of bank ownership on analyst forecast accuracy, which suggests that bank ownership leads to closer monitoring of management and a reduction in analyst forecast errors. However, the presence of large shareholders and insiders in the ownership structure of the firm does not significantly affect the accuracy of financial analysts. This research provides investors with a more refined sense of how analyst forecasts might be affected through the composition of the ownership structure in a context of high concentration of ownership, relevant presence of banks in firms as creditors and shareholders, and local GAAP.     

Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment speed

Using two dynamic partial adjustment capital structure models to estimate the impact of several macroeconomic factors on the speed of capital structure adjustment toward target leverage, we find evidence that firms adjust their leverage toward target faster in good macroeconomic states relative to bad states. This evidence holds whether or not firms are subject to financial constraints. Our results are robust to an alternative method of calculating states and to omitting zero-debt boundary firms and are not driven by firm size, deviation from target, or leverage definitions.     

Ownership structure, family control, and acquisition decisions

We investigate how ownership and family control influence the decision to take part in M&As as an acquirer or as an acquired company in a sample of 777 large Continental European companies in the period 1998-2008. We find that ownership is negatively correlated with the probability of launching a takeover bid, and family firms are less likely to make acquisitions, especially when the stake held by the family is not large enough to assure the persistence of family control. On the passive side of M&A deals, the effect of the largest shareholders' ownership on the decision to accept an acquisition proposal depends non-linearly on the voting rights they hold, and family control reduces the probability of being acquired by an unrelated party. We do not find evidence that family-controlled firms destroy wealth when they acquire other companies. Finally, we document that ownership and family control, while being negatively correlated with M&A activity, are not negatively correlated with growth in firm size.     

Family values: Ownership structure,performance and capital structure of Canadian firms

This study examines how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure of 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. In particular, we distinguish the effect of family ownership from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. We find that freestanding family owned firms with a single share class have similar market performance than other firms based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial leverage based on debt-to-total assets. By contrast, family owned firms that use dual-class shares have valuations that are lower by 17% on average relative to widely held firms, despite having similar ROA and financial leverage.     

Ownership structure and debt maturity: new evidence from Spain

Companies can use supplier financing as a source of short-term finance. The main objective of this paper is to extend the literature on the determinants of accounts payable and to test whether the accounts payable follow a model of partial adjustment. To do this, we use a sample of 3,589 small and medium sized firms in the UK. Using a dynamic panel data model and employing GMM method of estimation we control for unobservable heterogeneity and for potential endogeneity problems. The results reveal that firms have a target level of accounts payable. In addition, we find that larger firms, with better access to alternative internal and external financing and with a lower cost, use less credit from suppliers. Moreover, firms with higher growth opportunities use more trade credit for financing sales growth.     

Ownership structure and the pricing of discretionary accruals in Japan

This paper examines the valuation effect of discretionary accruals for Japanese firms, taking into account the book value of equity. Consistent with US evidence, the Japanese market prices discretionary accruals, indicating that discretionary accruals enhance the value relevance of reported earnings. This value relevance is lower for cross-held firms, consistent with the view that cross-business shareholding aggravates tunneling or managerial opportunism through discretionary accounting choices. On the other hand, foreign shareholding and bond financing provide effective monitoring on managerial discretion of profit firms to enhance the valuation of discretionary accruals.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore

Drawing on prior empirical research based on disclosure behavior in developed western markets, this study examines the association of ownership structure with the voluntary disclosures of listed companies in the Asian settings of Hong Kong and Singapore. An analysis of annual reporting practices shows that the extent of outside ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosures. In particular, the results also indicate that the level of information disclosure is likely to be less in “insider” or family-controlled companies, a significant feature of the Hong Kong and Singapore stock markets.