Bayesian Model Selection with an Uninformative Prior*

Bayesian model selection with posterior probabilities and no subjective prior information is generally not possible because of the Bayes factors being ill‐defined. Using careful consideration of the parameter of interest in cointegration analysis and a re‐specification of the triangular model of Phillips (Econometrica, Vol. 59, pp. 283–306, 1991), this paper presents an approach that allows for Bayesian comparison of models of cointegration with ‘ignorance’ priors. Using the concept of Stiefel and Grassman manifolds, diffuse priors are specified on the dimension and direction of the cointegrating space. The approach is illustrated using a simple term structure of the interest rates model.     

The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies

In this paper we investigate the number of coalitions that block a given non-competitive allocation. In an atomless economy with a finite number of types we identify coalition with its profile. Considering profiles π that represent coalitions with the same proportions of types as in the whole society, we prove that there is a ball B_π with π as its center so that ‘almost half’ of the profiles in B_π are blocking. This result is an analogous result to that of Mas-Colell (1978) who dealt with large finite markets.     

Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules

We examine the linear-quadratic approximation of nonlinear dynamic stochastic optimization problems. A discrete-time version of Magill [1977a. A local analysis of N-sector capital accumulation under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 15(2), 211–219] is generalized to models with forward-looking variables paying special attention to second-order conditions. This is the ‘large distortions’ case in the literature. We apply the approach to monetary policy in a DSGE model with external habit in consumption. We then develop a condition for ‘target-implementability’, a concept related to ‘targeting rules’. Finally, we extend the approach to a comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in a two-country model and show that the ‘small distortions’ approximation is inappropriate for this exercise.     

A characterization of the exponential distribution by higher order gap

Summary SupposeX is a non-negative random variable with an absolutely continuous (with respect to Lebesgue measure) distribution functionF (x) and the corresponding probability density functionf(x). LetX ₁,X ₂,...,X _n be a random sample of sizen fromF andX _i,n is thei-th smallest order statistics. We define thej-th order gapg _i,j(n) asg _i,j(n)=X _i+j,n–X_i,n 1i<n, 1nn–i. In this paper a characterization of the exponential distribution is given by considering a distribution property ofg _i,j(n).     

Control of economic systems under the process of data improvement

The paper deals with optimal control of the systems with a certain part of economic parameters not defined completely, namely, in terms of an interval of uncertainty b ± δ. The important idea of our approach is that optimal control should take into account data improvement. The approach implies the process of introducing new data which make cost estimates more precise. The process is described as a random and exogenous one and by its nature may be named a process with ‘independent decrements’ (of entropy). The stationary model of a dynamic system is developed; the system has the interval of uncertainty as its phase point.     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

Stochastic processes of temporary equilibria

It is the aim of the paper to study within the framework of an ‘overlapping generation model’ the evolution of temporary equilibria. At date t, there are ‘newborn’ agents and ‘old’ agents who were born in previous periods; the old agents hold cash balances (fiat money) that they carried over from the previous period. At the beginning of period t, all agents receive a random endowment of consumption goods. Then the agents exchange these endowments and money on spot markets at date t (trading in future markets is not considered). Once a temporary equilibrium is reached, the economy move to the next date. Agents who were born at date t then become old and meet agents born at period t+1.It is shown that the evolution of temporary equilibria in this model leads to analyse the ergodic properties of a certain class of Markov processes with stationary transition probability.     

Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction

This paper studies a stylized model of local interaction where agents choose from an ever increasing set of vertically ranked actions, e.g. technologies. The driving forces of the model are infrequent upward shifts (‘updates’), followed by a rapid process of local imitation (‘diffusion’). Our main focus is on the regularities displayed by the long-run distribution of diffusion waves and their implication on the performance of the system. By integrating analytical techniques and numerical simulations, we come to the following two main conclusions. (1) If non-coordination costs are sufficiently high, the system behaves critically, in the sense customarily used in physics. (2) The performance of the system is optimal at the frontier of the critical region. Heuristically, this may be interpreted as an indication that (performance-sensitive) evolutionary forces induce the system to be placed ‘at the edge of order and chaos’.     

Myopic utility functions on sequential economies

In Brown and Lewis (1981) continuity in the Mackey topology of (l^∞, l¹) is related to myopic (or impatient) economic behavior. They also show that finer (locally convex) topologies admit continuous non-myopic utility functions. In that work the space of bounded sequences, l^∞, is interpreted as all time sequences of bounded consumption plans. In Brown (1981) the analysis is extended to study the theory of interest on related sequence spaces.This note applies our simple technique for ‘computing’ Mackey continuity of real-valued functions defined on l^∞. Our first result is motivated by Bewley's (1972, app. II) theorem, but extends it in several important ways (on sequential economies). First, Beweley's examples (specialized to the sequential setting) are all ‘temporally separable’,that is, consumption in one time period does not affect indifference sets in another. We give new explicit examples of Cobb-Douglass-like utility functions and show that the ‘obvious’ infinite-dimensional Cobb-Douglass functions are non-myopic. Known equilibrium theory [from Bewley (1972), but pre-dating him in the sequential case] applies to these new examples. Second, we remove the assumptions of concavity and monotony from the proof of continuity.Our second result shows that some of the ‘stationary’ utility functions studied by Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson (1964) are also myopic in the sense of Brown and Lewis. In general their work is based on the finer uniform topology.Finally, we show how to transform our technique so that it applies to Brown's more general sequential economies. A change of variables transfers our examples to these spaces.     

Two planar facility location problems with high-speed corridors and continuous demand

The planar minisam (‘median’) and minimax (‘center’) facility location problems are examined under the assumptions that: demand is continuously and uniformly distributed: the L₁ (right-angle) metric is in use; and the planar region is traversed by a high-speed corridor (highway) running parallel to one of the directions of travel. For the minisum problem in a rectangular region, it is shown that, for any combination of problem parameters, there are only two candidate points in the region for the optimum location of the facility. This is also shown to be true for any convex and symmetric planar region. For the minimax problem in a rectangular region, there are only three candidate points for the optimal location. Some extensions and conjectures for the minisum problem involving more than one highway are also discussed.     

Moment consistency of estimators in partially linear models under NA samples

Consider the heteroscedastic regression model Y ^(j)(x _in , t _in ) = t _in β + g(x _in ) + σ _in e ^(j)(x _in ), 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where s_in²=f(u_in){\sigma_{in}^{2}=f(u_{in})}, (x _in , t _in , u _in ) are fixed design points, β is an unknown parameter, g(·) and f(·) are unknown functions, and the errors {e ^(j)(x _in )} are mean zero NA random variables. The moment consistency for least-squares estimators and weighted least-squares estimators of β is studied. In addition, the moment consistency for estimators of g(·) and f(·) is investigated.     

Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models

This paper examines different theoretical stability tests of infinite-horizon rational expectations equilibria. These ‘tests’ have different status: two of them express that the considered equilibrium is ‘isolated’ [neither (non-sunspot) equilibria (test 1) nor (well-behaved) sunspot equilibria exist in a neighbourhood (test 2)] and two of them are learning criteria [either standard ‘evolutive learning’ (test 3) or game-theoretical ‘eductive’ learning (test 4)]. Surprisingly, these four tests select the same steady state equilibria in the class of one-dimensional one-step-forward looking economic models. The extension of this equivalence theorem to n-dimensional and then more complex systems is discussed.     

The Delphi technique as a forecasting tool: issues and analysis

This paper systematically reviews empirical studies looking at the effectiveness of the Delphi technique, and provides a critique of this research. Findings suggest that Delphi groups outperform statistical groups (by 12 studies to two with two ‘ties’) and standard interacting groups (by five studies to one with two ‘ties’), although there is no consistent evidence that the technique outperforms other structured group procedures. However, important differences exist between the typical laboratory version of the technique and the original concept of Delphi, which make generalisations about ‘Delphi’ per se difficult. These differences derive from a lack of control of important group, task, and technique characteristics (such as the relative level of panellist expertise and the nature of feedback used). Indeed, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that a Delphi conducted according to ‘ideal’ specifications might perform better than the standard laboratory interpretations. It is concluded that a different focus of research is required to answer questions on Delphi effectiveness, focusing on an analysis of the process of judgment change within nominal groups.     

Estimation of the parameters in the gravity model for trip distribution : A new method and solution algorithm

For the unique determination of the parameters in the doubly constrained gravity model with exponential friction function two approaches are common: (1) entropy maximization and (2) application of a travel cost budget. This paper shows by making use of geometric programming that both of these approaches are equivalent with another natural criterion: the minimization of the deviation between the observed [t_1j] and the estimated [x_1j] table for a base year. By means of calculating the derivative of total cost as a function of σ the construction of an efficient algorithm for estimation of σ is made possible.     

Natural conjugate priors for the instrumental variables regression model applied to the Angrist–Krueger data

We propose a natural conjugate prior for the instrumental variables regression model. The prior is a natural conjugate one since the marginal prior and posterior of the structural parameter have the same functional expressions which directly reveal the update from prior to posterior. The Jeffreys prior results from a specific setting of the prior parameters and results in a marginal posterior of the structural parameter that has an identical functional form as the sampling density of the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. We construct informative priors for the Angrist–Krueger [1991. Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings? Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 979–1014] data and show that the marginal posterior of the return on education in the US coincides with the marginal posterior from the Southern region when we use the Jeffreys prior. This result occurs since the instruments are the strongest in the Southern region and the posterior using the Jeffreys prior, identical to maximum likelihood, focusses on the strongest available instruments. We construct informative priors for the other regions that make their posteriors of the return on education similar to that of the US and the Southern region. These priors show the amount of prior information needed to obtain comparable results for all regions.     

Age-specific dynamic labor demand and human capital investment

To study the optimal age-specific labor demand and human capital investment at the firm level we extend the standard dynamic labor demand model by introducing ‘age’ as a second dynamic variable and distinguish between two types of workers: ‘low skilled’ and ‘high skilled’. Applying an age-structured optimal control model we derive qualitative features of the optimal age-specific hiring and training effort. For the case of a linear revenue and production function we prove that firms do not anticipate changes in adjustment costs in their optimal decisions. This result no longer holds if a nonlinear revenue or production function is considered.     

A theory of formal conceptual definitions: developing theory-building measurement instruments

This study develops the need for formal conceptual definitions (sometimes called nominal definitions) and how to develop better measurement instruments for theory-building. It develops the underlying theory for ‘good’ formal conceptual definitions by defining terms, demonstrating that formal conceptual definitions are needed for all theory-building empirical research, explains how and why ‘good’ formal conceptual definitions are used to develop properties and their measures, and last, it logically explains that good formal conceptual definitions are necessary conditions for construct validity (content validity, criterion validity, convergent validity, and discriminant validity) while statistical tests are sufficient conditions for validity. This theory development explains why formal conceptual definitions are necessary before any traditional statistical empirical validity tests are performed. This study suggests that any statistical validity tests are not meaningful if the concept is not formally defined.In short, the theory of formal conceptual definitions provides a structure to develop ‘good’ measures of the formal theory that leads to ‘good’ empirical theory-building.     

Anonymous sequential games with aggregate uncertainty

In this paper we extend a result of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (Anonymous sequential games, Journal of Mathematical Economics 17, 1988) on the existence of equilibrium in Anonymous Sequential Games. Jovanovic and Rosenthal prove existence in the case where the aggregate distribution of agents' characteristics evolves nonstochastically - the case of ‘no aggregate uncertainty’. Here we show how aggregate uncertainty can be introduced into the model (so the aggregate distribution evolves stochastically) and extend the Jovanovic-Rosenthal existence theorem to this case.     

Accessibility of optima in pure exchange economies

Assuming differentiable monotonicity and differentiable convexity of utility functions, we show that if y and z are allocations of a pure exchange economy with z optimal and preferred to y by every agent, then there is a trade curve of finite length from y to z. We make no assumption on utility functions designed to ‘keep away from the boundary’. The conclusion need not hold if z is not optimal, unless a special boundary condition is assumed and (l, m) ≠ (2, 2).