Firm type variation in the cost of risk management

This paper explores how the cost of risk management varies with firm characteristics, offering the first comparison between private, public, and family-owned firms. It exploits a natural experiment in highway procurement, which features diverse firms with common exposure to commodity risk. The Kansas government began to insure highway paving firms against oil price risk in 2006. The analysis compares Kansas to Iowa, which has an otherwise similar highway procurement system but never introduced such a policy. Using data from 1998 to 2012, I show that the policy reduced average bid sensitivity to oil price volatility. Private firms with high credit risk and low industry diversification exhibit the most risk pass-through, while public firms exhibit no pass-through. Family-owned firms do not have a higher than average cost of risk. Financial constraints and distress costs appear to best explain the cost of risk management, rather than risk aversion, information, or agency problems.     

INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND COMMODITY-LINKED FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article provides a framework for appraising new financialinstruments and evaluating the extent to which they can helpalleviate problems of incomplete credit markets and contingentclaims markets in developing countries. Although the issuesinvolved apply to any new financial instrument, we give particularattention to commodity-linked securities because many developingcountries specialize in producing a handful of primary commoditiesand are therefore exposed to substantial commodity price risks.The article looks at the supply of, demand for, and pricingof commodity-linked securities and discusses some issues thataffect their use by developing countries: their special legalstatus as sovereign debt; their feasibility (since to becometruly effective they will require liquid secondary markets);and the construction of an optimal portfolio of external debtobligations. It also discusses the potential for new financialinstruments—particularly commodity-linked securities—asa tool for risk management in developing countries.      

Creating Value at the Intersection of Sourcing,Hedging and Trading

Higher commodity prices, along with higher currency and commodity price volatility, have combined with challenging economic circumstances to make for difficult economics within many industries today. These factors can introduce risk to both top‐line revenue and the cost structure, and wreak havoc on net cash flow and profitability. To the extent that high prices and increasing price volatility continue to be the rule in many global commodity categories, the authors suggest that both sourcing and hedging will soon be (if they are not already) near the top of the strategic agenda for many companies. Many companies now design their hedging programs—and in some cases their sourcing—to achieve the goals of reducing cash flow volatility and optimizing value (as opposed to the more conventional aim of minimizing sourced or manufactured unit cost). And a growing number of corporate managements have expressed interest in an even more systematic approach to risk management. Rising pressure for growth and profitability has led companies with large commodities exposures—both those that are naturally long and those with a natural short—to explore a more strategic role for commodity hedging and trading, as well as the use of innovative risk‐shifting mechanisms for inbound and outbound material flows. This article shows how companies can design their commodity risk management programs to make the greatest use of the expertise and capabilities of four different corporate groups: Purchasing, Treasury, Selling, and Marketing. To that end, the authors presents a five‐step program for creating a company‐wide strategic risk management program:

• ? The first step involves making active design choices about what risks to “own” and what risks to limit based on the company's strategy, core competencies, and relative competitive advantages in owning that risk.
• ? The second step is to establish relevant risk guidelines based on capacity to own risks and, to a lesser extent, risk appetite, with specific hedging targets and benchmarks. This involves defining objectives, priorities, and constraints (for example, protecting liquidity or increasing debt capacity by reducing cash flow volatility).
• ? The third step is to identify and characterize a complete inventory of all exposures—source, size and drivers—and those exposures to be managed. This involves defining, measuring and analyzing all exposures (e.g., commodities, FX, interest rates), with special attention to aggregating, netting, natural offsets, and correlations.
• ? The fourth step involves comparing the suitability of various hedging tools and determining how to incorporate these tools into a systematic program that will achieve stated goals, views, and risk preferences for each exposure.
• ? The fifth and last step is establishing an appropriate risk management operating model, which involves considerations of organizational architecture, management processes, decision rights, information flows, and governance.

     

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.     

Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets

Poor rural and urban households in developing countries facesubstantial risks, which they handle with risk-management andrisk-coping strategies, including self-insurance through savingsand informal insurance mechanisms. Despite these mechanisms,however, vulnerability to poverty linked to risk remains high.This article reviews the literature on poor households' useof risk-management and risk-coping strategies. It identifiesthe constraints on their effectiveness and discusses policyoptions. It shows that risk and lumpiness limit the opportunitiesto use assets as insurance, that entry constraints limit theusefulness of income diversification, and that informal risk-sharingprovides only limited protection, leaving some of the poor exposedto very severe negative shocks. Public safety nets are likelyto be beneficial, but their impact is sometimes limited, andthey may have negative externalities on households that arenot covered. Collecting more information on households' vulnerabilityto poverty—through both quantitative and qualitative methods—couldhelp inform policy.      

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

Financial reforms initiated in most transitional socialist economiesdo not yet adequately provide many of the financial servicesassociated with market-oriented financial systems. Such services—mobilizingresources, selecting firms and allocating capital, monitoringfirm managers, and facilitating the management of transactionsand risk—are a necessary condition for economic reformto improve living standards. This article envisages four central strategies to guide reformof the financial sector: • Building an infrastructure based on clear and enforceableproperty rights, modern accounting and auditing standards, reliablepayments systems, sound prudential and enforcement regulations,and professionals trained in finance • Ending the shell game of trying to hide the losses ofstate-owned enterprises, and separating government decisionsto finance "priority" firms from the allocation decisions ofindependent financial institutions • Privatizing some financial institutions early—althoughnot necessarily precipitously—in concert with the privatizationof firms and supervisory capabilities, meanwhile cleaning upbank loans to maximize the chances that firms and banks willsucceed as private entities • Improving the tax system and stressing a prudent interestrate policy to reduce uncertainty, distortions, and excessiverepression of the financial sector.      

WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects

This article uses a cross-national data set on the performanceof government investment projects financed by the World Bankto examine the link between government efficacy and governance.It demonstrates a strong empirical link between civil libertiesand the performance of government of projects. Even after controllingfor other determinants of performance, countries with the strongestcivil liberties have projects with an economic rate of return8–22 percentage points higher than countries with theweakest civil liberties. The strong effect of civil libertiesholds true even when controlling for the level of democracy. The interrelationship among civil liberties, civil strife, andproject performance suggests that the possible mechanism ofcausation is from more civil liberties to increased citizenvoice to better projects. This result adds to the evidence forthe view that increasing citizen voice and public accountability—throughboth participation and better governance—can lead to greaterefficacy in government action.     

The influence of funding source and legislative requirements on government cost accounting practices

This paper provides preliminary evidence on the determinants of cost accounting practices in government agencies. Drawing on institutional and contingency theories of management accounting choice, we examine two potential influences on the design and use of government cost systems: legal requirements to be self-funding and mandated requirements for cost accounting data. We test these hypotheses using survey data from the U.S. General Accounting Office. The empirical evidence indicates that organizations using cost system output to satisfy external requirements tend to implement more “elaborate” cost accounting systems than units without external requirements, but are no more likely to use cost system data for internal purposes. In contrast, government organizations that are required to “pay their own way” by fully recovering costs through revenues or fees not only implement more elaborate systems than units funded by appropriated budgets or reimbursement of expenses by other government units, but also tend to make more extensive use of cost system output for a wide variety of internal purposes ranging from pricing to management control.     

Service Sector Protection: Considerations for Developing Countries

The inclusion of services in the Uruguay Round of multilateraltrade negotiations has focused attention on the protection ofdomestic service suppliers against competition from foreignsuppliers. Issues arising from these negotiations, however,may obscure another and more important issue: the case for unilateralliberalization. This article first surveys methods of protectionin the service sector, and then examines the likely cost ofprotection. Particular attention is given to developing countries.What evidence there is suggests that the costs of protectionmay be high. The article also discusses economic principlesthat could guide a review of policy toward international transactionsin the service sector. Quantitative restrictions or bans onforeign service suppliers—whether they wish to supplythrough trade or establishment—cannot easily be defendedin economic terms, and provide an obvious first target.     

市场模式、政府模式与城商行流动性风险化解—一个三期博弈的分析框架

分析城商行流动性风险化解中的政府手段和市场机制,对于下一步规范城商行营商环境、化解流动性风险具有参考意义。本文首先通过银行间的博弈模型,发现政府持股比例越高会增加城商行同业负债比例,进而提高流动性风险发生的可能性;当经济处于下行周期时,全社会资金需求不足,大型银行资金投放的机会成本降低,有利于城商行获得同业负债,但却进一步积累了流动性风险。其次,通过系统GMM对2011—2018年80家城商行的非平衡面板数据进行分析,实证结果验证了理论假说。最后,结合理论与实证分析,进一步提出政府行为边界,破除隐性担保,建立城商行资金内部定价机制以及完善城商行监管体系等方面的政策建议。     

A SURVEY OF THE COSTS OF WORLD SUGAR POLICIES

The world sugar market has long been characterized by volatileprices and widespread intervention. Controls on domestic prices,demand, and supply have created an inefficient pattern of worldproduction, consumption, and trade. Without government controls,production would shift from the countries with higher cost,subsidized production (especially the European Community, Japan,and the United States) to the countries with lower costs (suchas Australia, Brazil, and Thailand). The resources saved couldthen be directed to other activities. Sugar policies in countries with high costs reduce world sugarprices quite substantially in the long run and increase pricevariability significantly; production controls in countrieswith low costs increase world prices somewhat and also increasetheir variability. What would happen if all interventions ceased? Average worldsugar prices would probably— but not definitely—rise. World prices would definitely vary less, and economicconditions would definitely improve, especially in developingcountries that depend heavily on sugar exports. But the prospectsfor substantial reform of the sugar market are not promising,even though the GATT Uruguay Round continues. This article putsforward some modest proposals for changing the existing interventionsto lessen economic distortions and reduce costs.      

Optimal commodity asset allocation with a coherent market risk modeling

This paper fills a fundamental gap in commodity price risk management and optimal portfolio selection literatures by contributing a thorough reflection on trading risk modeling with a dynamic asset allocation process and under the supposition of illiquid and adverse market settings. This paper analyzes, from a portfolio managers' perspective, the performance of liquidity adjusted risk modeling in obtaining efficient and coherent investable commodity portfolios under normal and adverse market conditions. As such, the author argues that liquidity risk associated with the uncertainty of liquidating multiple commodity assets over given holding periods is a key factor in formalizing and measuring overall trading risk and is thus an important component to model, particularly in the wake of the repercussions of the recent 2008 financial crisis. To this end, this article proposes a practical technique for the quantification of liquidity trading risk for large portfolios that consist of multiple commodity assets and whereby the holding periods are adjusted according to the specific needs of each trading portfolio. Specifically, the paper proposes a robust technique to commodity optimal portfolio selection, in a liquidity-adjusted value-at-risk (L-VaR) framework, and particularly from the perspective of large portfolios that have both long and short positions or portfolios that consist of merely pure long trading positions. Moreover, in this paper, the author develops a portfolio selection model and an optimization-algorithm which allocates commodity assets by minimizing the L-VaR subject to applying credible operational and financial constraints based on fundamental asset management considerations. The empirical optimization results indicate that this alternate L-VaR technique can be regarded as a robust portfolio management tool and can have many uses and applications in real-world asset management practices and predominantly for fund managers with large commodity portfolios.     

Diversification of Macroeconomic Risk and International Integration of Capital Markets: The Case of Mexico

This article tests the arbitrage pricing theory in the contextof the unstable macroeconomic years in Mexico, 1977–87.Using information on returns on assets available to domesticinvestors—primarily stocks traded at the local stock exchange—anattempt is made to ascertain the extent to which these assetshave offered premia for a set of proposed sources of risk. Thepervasive factors that play an important role in asset pricingin Mexico are unexpected inflation, unexpected money growth,innovations in the Standard & Poor's 500 price series, andinnovations in the dollar oil price. A residual market factoris obtained, using the McElroy and Burmeister model. Given thatthese risks get premia over and above the riskless rate, expectedrates of return in Mexico have been higher during the yearsof erratic macroeconomic conditions. Mexico is not consideredto be well integrated with the international capital marketsbecause local sources of risk—such as inflation—arenot priced in the United States, whereas international sourcesof uncertainty—such as oil price shocks—are pricedlocally but not in the United States.     

Operational expressions for the marginal cost of indirect taxation when merit arguments matter

Marginal indirect tax reform analysis evaluates for each commodity (group) the marginal welfare cost (MC) of increasing government revenue by one euro by raising the indirect tax rate on that commodity. In this paper, an adjustment to the MC expressions is proposed to allow for (de)merit good arguments and it is shown how this adjustment can easily be parameterized on the basis of econometric demand analysis.     

Dynamic volatility spillovers and investment strategies between the Chinese stock market and commodity markets

Building on the increased interest in the volatility spillover effects between Chinese stock market and commodity markets, this paper investigates the dynamic volatility spillovers of Chinese stock market and Chinese commodity markets based on the volatility spillover index under the framework of TVP-VAR. The result shows that there is a highly dependent relationship between the stock market and commodity markets. On average, the Chinese stock market is the net recipient of spillover, non-ferrous metals and chemical industry have a very obvious spillover impact on the stock market. The degree of total volatility spillover is different in different periods. After major crisis events, the volatility correlation between markets increases. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the spillover effect of the stock market on the commodity market has been significantly enhanced. Then optimal portfolio weights and hedge ratios are calculated for portfolio diversification and risk management. The result shows that the ability of most commodities to hedge against risks is significantly reduced when the crisis occurs; NMFI (precious metals) and CRFI (grain) still have good hedging ability after the crisis, but the effectiveness of hedging risk is relatively low. Besides, the combination of CRFI and SHCI (the Shanghai composite index) is the most effective for risk reduction.     

Trend following,risk parity and momentum in commodity futures

We show that combining momentum and trend following strategies for individual commodity futures can lead to portfolios which offer attractive risk adjusted returns which are superior to simple momentum strategies; when we expose these returns to a wide array of sources of systematic risk we find that robust alpha survives. Experimenting with risk parity portfolio weightings has limited impact on our results though in particular is beneficial to long–short strategies; the marginal impact of applying trend following methods far outweighs momentum and risk parity adjustments in terms of risk-adjusted returns and limiting downside risk. Overall this leads to an attractive strategy for investing in commodity futures and emphasises the importance of trend following as an investment strategy in the commodity futures context.     

Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence

Political influence on the central bank is measured here bylooking at the probability that a central bank governor willbe replaced shortly after a political change of government.The governor changes about half the time within six months ofa nonconstitutional or other radical change of government—amilitary coup or a restoration of democracy. The governor ismuch less likely to change within six months following a routinechange in the head of government—about one-fourth of thetime in developing countries and one-tenth in industrial countries.These indicators vary across countries and correlate statisticallywith inflation and its variability and with real growth andreal interest rates. Differences in the vulnerability of thecentral bank to political instability, in political instabilityitself, and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periodsseem to be a major part of the explanation for why developingcountries have, on average, higher and more variable inflationthan industrial countries do.