对中外合营企业董事会制度的几点修改建议

我国《中外合资经营企业法》及《实施条例》规定,董事会是中外合营企业的最高权力机构,其下只设执行机构经理层,不设公司股东(大)会和监事(会)。但在实践中,此种董事会制度存在着诸多缺陷,不仅不利于公司自身的管理和发展,而且会侵害到公司股东的权益。文章剖析了该董事会制度的缺陷和不足,并提出了相应的完善措施和建议。     

完善后股改时代上市公司制衡机制的思考

股改并没有使大股东和中小股东的利益一致化,股改完成后,我国上市公司"一股独大"的股权结构也未发生变化。大股东控制了公司股东大会表决权、董事会经营权、经理层管理权和监事会监督权等权力,公司内部和社会外部又缺乏有效的制约机制,目前更需要建立有效制衡和约束大股东权力的制度,限制大股东权力滥用,保护中小投资者利益,维护公平与正义,规范市场秩序。     

公司治理结构下权力制衡机制的研究——基于股东会与董事会权力格局下的分析

本文通过对公司股东会与董事会权力格局的分析,来研究现代公司治理结构下权力制衡机制的建立,平衡公司利益相关者的权力地位。     

优化董事会结构提高董事会运作效率

随着市场经济的发展，公司规模的日益扩大，在公司组织机构的权力设置上，就典型的公司即股份有限公司来说，经历了一个从股东中心主义向董事会中心主义的转换，这是一种世界性的趋势。因此在现代公司制度中，董事会运作的效率及其履行职权的质量，直接关系股东的利益及公司的生死存亡。     

中国上市公司小股东保护:一个公司治理的视角

上市公司小股东权益遭受侵害的一个重要原因在于上市公司治理存在制度缺陷。存在于我国上市公司治理制度中不利于小股东保护。有四大缺陷使其通过各种途径小股东遭受侵害。为完善我国小股东保护制度提出五项建议:稳步推进上市公司股票全流通;建立小股东对控股股东的权力制衡机制;加快董事会制度建设;完善上市公司信息披露制度;构建独立高效的证券司法体系,完善法律救济与实施机制。     

国内公司内部治理机制的研究分析

公司内部治理机制的主要内容是在公司内部构造一个合理的权力结构,从而在股东、董事会与经理人之间形成一种有效的激励、约束与制衡机制,以保证公司实现各种治理目标。内部治理机制主要包括股权结构与大股东治理、董事会、监事会以及经理人薪酬激励等。     

我国公司治理结构与中小股东权利保护

公司治理结构,是指适应公司的产权结构,以股东与经营者分离、分立和整合为基础,连接并规范股东会、董事会、监事会、经理相互之间权利义务关系的制度安排。公司制度中,股东因向公司出资而享有股权,配置科学、运行有效的公司治理结构,能最大限度地保障股权的行使,充分满足所有股东的利益追求。但现行公司治理结构,犹如一柄“双刃剑”,在维持公司存续的同时,大股东对中小股东权利的侵害始终无法避免。本文试图从完善我国公司治理结构出发,提出加强对中小股东的权利保护措施。     

论董事会权力的内外制约机制

董事会是公司内部治理机构的重要组成部分。董事是指在一个公司中对内代表出资者管理公司事务,对外代表公司同第三方签约或参加诉讼的法定执行人。现在世界各国公司的股东会的权力越来越虚化,而董事会的权力越来越膨胀,而且这种现象越来越严重,股东会几乎成为一个空架子,主要权力掌握在董事会手里,造成权力的滥用和对中小股东的利益的侵害。本文从内外两个方面谈了加强董事会权力制约的机制。     

刍议董事自我交易的规制理念

关联交易是现代企业制度发展的必然结果，其存在具有合理性，也对企业和市场的发展具有积极作用，各国法律对关联交易的规制也经历了从完全禁止到逐步放开的过程。但另一方面，关联交易侵害股东、公司利益的倾向依旧。由于公司治理由股东会中心主义向董事会中心主义转变，董事会权力扩大，对董事自我交易的规制更具有重要意义。本文将对目前对其规制理念作简要探讨。     

中国新公司股东知情权制度

健全公司股东知情权制度是保障公司股东知情权实现的根本途径.公司所有权与经营权分离是股东知情权制度的理论基础,平衡股东与公司之间利益是股东知情权制度追求的价值理念,获得公司运营、决策、管理信息是股东知情权制度实现的内容要求.在从股东会中心主义向董事会中心主义立法理念变迁、股东平等原则对股份平等原则修正前提下,充实股东知情权内容,完善股东知情权制度,不仅符合中国实际,而且顺乎公司法发展潮流.     

Compensating Outside Directors with Stock: The Impact on Non-Primary Stakeholders

Two obvious trends in corporate governance include broadening board accountability beyond shareholders’ interests and paying outside directors with equity compensation (stock and stock options). By integrating common agency and instrumental stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of stock compensation on secondary stakeholders and a firm’s participation in social issues, two areas where interests are less aligned with shareholder value. Consistent with our predictions, we found that while stock compensation may be an effective way to align directors’ goals to those of shareholders, it has adverse effects on important non-shareholder constituencies in the company’s operating environment.     

公司治理与企业业绩关系研究文献综述

在美国金融危机的冲击下,公司治理机制问题已成为目前国内外学术界共同面对的课题。总体上看,国际性的研究表明,当大股东的控制权高于他对现金流所拥有的权利时,公司的价值会减少,即大股东在取得控制权后,更多的是以牺牲公司利益的方式获得私人利益。我国学者研究发现,多元化股东、外部董事比例和高管激励是公司治理最重要的三个因素,是影响公司绩效最为显著的变量。但也有研究认为,我国上市公司的董事会行为是低效率的。从国内国外两个方面的文献综述可以看出,对公司治理与企业业绩的研究主要集中在公司的内部治理结构方面,由于研究的角度与变量选取的不同,其研究结果差异较大。但是,就其研究过程来讲,对于我国这样的新兴市场的建设与发展是具有重大影响意义的。     

Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board?

This paper examines whether independent directors who have social ties to management (inside directors) can effectively perform their fiduciary duty to monitor management on behalf of shareholders. Ex ante, it is not clear whether social ties will enhance or obstruct the quality of board performance. Theory suggests that directors who are socially tied to management are ineffective and would make decisions favoring management. However, social ties can increase trust and information sharing between management and independent directors, improving directors’ ability and effectiveness in governing the company (Westphal, J.D.: 1999, The Academy of Management Journal 42(1), 7–24). To examine these contradicting predictions I use social network analysis and construct proxies for social ties between management and independent board members. Using these proxies, I first demonstrate that social ties are associated with higher managerial compensation. Further analyses reveal that these results are driven by social ties that include members of the compensation committee. Conversely, I demonstrate that financial reporting quality is improved when social ties exist. Specifically, I find that the likelihood of material weaknesses in internal controls and the likelihood of financial restatements are lower in companies with social ties. I further observe that this improved quality of financial reporting holds only when social ties include members of the audit committee. I conclude that ethically, socially tied independent directors should disqualify themselves from serving on compensation committees where social independence is essential. However, in tasks where collaboration with management is essential, directors with social links to each other can be of added value to shareholders.     

我国公司治理结构中存在的问题及其对策研究

公司治理结构是公司制的核心。目前我国公司治理结构存在的问题主要表现在几个方面:股权过于集中,大股东侵害小股东利益;董事会独立性不强;监事会有名无实等。现阶段,应通过加强董事会的独立性,完善董事责任;充分发挥监事会的监督职能;完善小股东诉讼权制度;引导、加强职工参与公司管理等,完善我国公司治理结构。     

我国董事会约束机制现状及其问题——对我国500家上市公司的描述性实证分析

完善的董事会约束机制是确保上市公司董事会有效参与公司决策与监督的关键。由于我国上市公司处于由行政型治理向经济型治理转化的过程中,公司治理的各项外部监督机制如公司控制权市场、产品市场、专业董事市场等对上市公司董事会的约束力较弱。掌握董事会治理的状况,强化对董事会的约束,对提高董事会治理的效率具有一定的指导意义。     

Some consequences of the early twentieth-century British divorce of ownership from control

Because ownership was already more divorced from control in the largest stock market of 1911 (London) than in the largest stock market of 1995 (New York), the consequences for the economy, for good or ill, could have been considerable. Using a large sample of quoted companies with capital of £1 million or more, this article shows that this separation did not generally operate against shareholders' interests, despite the very substantial potential for agency problems. More directors were apparently preferable to fewer over a considerable range, as far as their influence on company share price and return on equity was concerned: company directors were not simply ornamental. A greater number of shareholders was more in shareholders' interest than a smaller, despite the enhanced difficulties of coordinating shareholder ‘voice’. A larger share of votes controlled by the board combined with greater board share ownership was also on average consistent with a greater return on equity. Corporate governance thus appears to have been well adapted to the circumstances of the Edwardian company capital market. Hence the reduction in the cost of capital for such a large proportion of British business conferred a substantial advantage on the economy.     

我国上市公司独立董事制度若干特征分析

From three different perspectives, namely, the basic characteristics of independent directors, the percentage of independent directors on board and its relation to company performance, and the remuneration for independent directors and its relation to company performance, we could summarize implementation characteristics of the independent director institution in China: the age distribution of independent directors is relatively even and the majority of them are academic staff and researchers with business administration backgrounds; a positive relationship between the independent director’s remuneration and company performance, as well as between the number of independent directors on board and the company performance. Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2003, (6): 110–121     

Ethics Programs, Board Involvement, and Potential Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Governance

Board composition, insider participation on compensation committees, and director compensation practices can potentially cause conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders. If these corporate governance structures result in situations where actions beneficial to directors do not also benefit shareholders, then shareholders may suffer.Corporate ethics programs usually address conflicts of interest that may arise in the firm's activities. Some boards of directors take active roles in their firms' ethics programs by actively overseeing the programs. This paper empirically examines the relationship between ethics programs and potential conflicts of interest and the relationship between board involvement in a firm's ethics program and potential conflicts of interest.Evidence in this paper shows that firms with ethics programs have a lower percentage of inside directors on their compensation committees than do firms without ethics programs. Firms in which boards are actively involved in the programs have more independent boards (higher percentage of independent directors and lower percentage of inside directors) and are more likely to compensate outside directors with equity than are firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Supplemental analyses show that the incidence of potential conflicts of interest is not significantly different between firms without ethics programs and firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Taken together, the evidence in this paper indicates that a board actively involved in an ethics program, and not the simple existence of an ethics program, is related to the incidence of potential conflicts of interest.     

浙江省上市公司董事会组成与公司绩效研究

利用浙江省上市公司的数据,应用SPSS统计软件,选择净资产收益率和每股收益作为被解释变量,选择董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理的两职是否分离和控股股东担任董事比例四个指标作为解释变量,建立回归模型,对浙江省上市公司董事会组成与公司绩效关系进行实证分析。结果显示,控股股东成员担任的董事比例与浙江省上市公司业绩正相关,而且,董事长与总经理分设是现代公司治理的发展趋势。     

Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India

Most of the existing evidence on the effectiveness of large shareholders in corporate governance has been restricted to a handful of developed countries, notably the UK, US, Germany and Japan. This paper provides evidence on the role of large shareholders in monitoring company value with respect to a developing and emerging economy, India, whose corporate governance system is a hybrid of the outsider‐dominated market‐based systems of the UK and the US, and the insider‐dominated bank‐based systems of Germany and Japan. The picture of large‐shareholder monitoring that emerges from our case study of Indian corporates is a mixed one. Like many of the existing studies, while we find blockholdings by directors to increase company value after a certain level of holdings, we find no evidence that institutional investors, typically mutual funds, are active in governance. We find support for the efficiency of the German/Japanese bank‐based model of governance; our results suggest that lending institutions start monitoring the company effectively once they have substantial equity holdings in the company and that this monitoring is reinforced by the extent of debt holdings by these institutions. Our analysis also highlights that foreign equity ownership has a beneficial effect on company value. In general, our analysis supports the view emerging from developed country studies that the identity of large shareholders matters in corporate governance.