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1.
Chen-Ying Huang 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):401-412
Summary. We present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light
on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make
both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001 相似文献
2.
A resolution of N-person prisoners' dilemma 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Ko Nishihara 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):531-540
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible in N-person prisoners' dilemma if players have incomplete information on the order of their moves. We consider a modified version
of N-person prisoners' dilemma in which players sequentially move in the order determined by Nature, and during the play they
get some information about others. We provide an information partition and a condition of payoffs for which cooperation is
attained in an equilibrium. Further, for the case that full cooperation is not attained, we examine the largest partial cooperation
which is achieved in an equilibrium.
Received: March 5, 1995; revised version August 11, 1996 相似文献
3.
Licun Xue 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):603-627
Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of
a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures
the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions
that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted)
players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments.
Received: February 12, 1996; revised version: March 3, 1997 相似文献
4.
Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection,
in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including
some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an
outside option of positive value.
Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997 相似文献
5.
Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that
the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of
the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least
core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably
additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
Received: June 6, 1996; revised version: March 1, 1997 相似文献
6.
John Wooders 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):215-224
Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
7.
Diana Richards 《Economic Theory》1997,10(1):185-193
Summary. This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most
well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas
from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation
of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results.
Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996 相似文献
8.
Summary. This paper derives the set of equilibria for common agency games in which the principals compete in piece rates and lump
sum payments and one principal has incomplete information about the agent's preferences. We show that the uninformed principal's
expected payoff function is discontinuous with respect to the identity of the marginal agent type. This discontinuity is shown
to support an open set of equilibria. For games in which the first-best equilibrium strategies are measurable with respect
to the uninformed principal's information partition, this result implies the existence of an open set of Pareto inefficient
equilibria.
Received: December 5, 1995; revised version August 18, 1996 相似文献
9.
Yaw Nyarko 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):643-655
Summary. Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players
in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute
continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future
of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria.
Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain
convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs,
and not actual play, are subjective equilibria.
Received: March 3, 1995; revised version: February 17, 1997 相似文献
10.
Summary. At an interim stage players possessing only their private information freely communicate with each other to coordinate their strategies.
This results in a core strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players' alternative type-contingent contract
offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action,
thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. Now with new information thus obtained from each other, the
players play a new game to re-write their contract. In all of the optimization and gaming just described, Bayesian incentive
compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information
which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler's multidivisional firm.
Received: May 17, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997 相似文献
11.
Juan-Manuel Renero 《Economic Theory》1998,11(2):275-294
Summary. I provide new results concerning dynamics for a version of the Kiyotaki-Wright model (1989) in which strategies (either mixed
or pure) are restricted so that agents play the same strategy for each opportunity set. My results demonstrate the importance
of examining stability in such models, because they show that many steady states focused on in the literature are not stable. Furthermore, I exhibit examples of two-period-convergent equilibria in which agents are indifferent among media of
exchange. Consequently, their endogenous transaction pattern is analog to the coexistence of assets whose acceptability or “liquidity” varies inversely with their
rates of return.
Received: June 21, 1996; revised version: December 2, 1996 相似文献
12.
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer?s identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan [34] insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected. 相似文献
13.
Hülya Eraslan 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,103(1):11-30
We consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer. For the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer, we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: C72, C78, D70. 相似文献
14.
Gerhard Sorger 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):79-100
Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.Received: November 1, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
15.
James A. Dearden 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):189-198
Summary. A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate
that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing
formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable incentive properties. First, a direct economic mechanism that uses the serial formula is coalition strategy-proof, envy-free and satisfies the stand-alone property.
Second, the serial mechanism involves partial exclusion, which is important for the reduction of the free-rider problem.
Received: June 10, 1996; revised version; February 11, 1997 相似文献
16.
Summary. Bertrand criticized Cournot's analysis of the competitive process, arguing that firms should be seen as playing a strategy
of setting price below competitors' prices (henceforth, the Bertrand strategy) instead of a strategy of accepting the price needed to sell an optimal quantity (the Cournot strategy). We characterize Nash equilibria in a generalized model in which firms choose among Cournot and Bertrand strategies. Best responses always exist in this model. For the duopoly case, we show that iterated best responses
converge under mild assumptions on initial states either to Cournot equilibrium or to an equilibrium in which only one firm
plays the Bertrand strategy with price equal to marginal cost and that firm has zero sales.
Received: December 11, 1995; revised version October 2, 1996 相似文献
17.
Aner Sela 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):635-651
Summary. A compound game is an (n + 1) player game based on n two-person subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so
that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in compound games for which all subgames
are either zero-sum games, potential games, or games.
Received: July 18, 1997; revised version: December 4, 1998 相似文献
18.
Ed Nosal 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):413-435
Summary. When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative
contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set
of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently
renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming
that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to
the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require
nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions.
Received: January 27, 1995; revised version July 1, 1996 相似文献
19.
Contest success functions: an extension 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Summary. This note extends the axiomatic characterization of the power success function in fair contests by Skaperdas (1996) to an unfair contest. We show that the results previously obtained are straightforward to generalize; the success function is uniquely characterized by Luces Choice Axiom (implying independence of irrelevant alternatives) and homogeneity of degree zero.Received: July 1, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
20.
Niels Anthonisen 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):143-169
Summary. The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs,
where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point
rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these
conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what
is predicted by rationalizability.
Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献