论作为保险人法定免责事由的故意犯罪认定立场

被保险人故意犯罪作为保险人的法定免责事由,其立法根据在于防止道德风险、维护社会公共秩序和善良风俗、避免保险制度被滥用。对作为保险人免责事由的故意犯罪认定与刑法保持一致之立场,既符合保险法与刑法各自的功能与立法目的,不违背保险法把被保险人故意犯罪作为保险人法定免责事由的立法根据,也是由保险法免责要件规范的不明确性决定的,同时也符合保险合同疑义利益解释规则的基本原理。     

Inequality aversion and risk aversion

This note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse with respect to certainty equivalents, if one is more inequality averse for certainty equivalents than the other, the household preference induced by optimally allocating aggregate bundles according to this social welfare function is more risk averse than the other. We present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if absolute inequality aversion is dropped. We show that the utilitarian rule always induces the least risk averse household preference among all social welfare functions (this corresponds to the sum of certainty equivalents).     

基于D-D模型的退保风险传染效应研究

The prevention and control of financial risk has been placed at a more prominent position at present. Preventing the risk of cross infection and systemic risk is one of the most important tasks of the current insurance industry. The crisis signal of an insurance company may shake the confidence of consumers to a large extent, leading to a “flock effect” that causes the risk spillovers and make the insured surrender or no longer renew, which could eventually lead to systemic risk. In this paper, based on a micro perspective and D-D model, we take the insurance companies different levels of loss claims as a key variable to establish a closed insurance market model, to study the relationship between the surrender behavior and the risk contagion, and carries on the numerical simulation and the sensitivity analysis to the risk infectivity caused by the insured under different crises. The study found that there is a critical jump point when the insured faces a different degree of crisis in the insurance company, and the behavior of the insured has a certain degree of influence on the systemic risk transmission. The regulatory authorities and insurance companies need to pay attention to the contagion effects of systemic risk caused by expectations and behaviors of policyholders.     

Adverse Selection and the Decline in Private Health Insurance Coverage in Australia: 1989–95

The decline in private health insurance coverage over the period 1989–95 is analysed using the ABS National Health Surveys. Individuals' health status and health risk behaviours are found to be significant determinants of their decision to purchase private health insurance. At a point in time, the pool of the insured is very heterogeneous, with a mix of both good and bad health risks. It is found that the decline in insurance coverage over the period 1989–95 coincided with an increase in the degree of 'adverse selection' within the insured population.     

The wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets

Insurance premium subsidies are present in many insurance markets. The Swiss government, for example, paid out CHF 4.26 billion or 0.72% of the Swiss GDP for health insurance premium subsidies in 2011. Analyses of premium subsidies have often highlighted that the increased insurance demand due to premium subsidies increases the effects of moral hazard in the market. Other consequences of premium subsidies, however, have mostly been neglected by the literature. We show in our theoretical model that the wealth effects of premium subsidies decrease the sensitivity of the insured towards the monetary consequences of losses. This leads to less prevention efforts by the insured and thus increases moral hazard in the market. The effect is preserved if the subsidy is financed through proportional taxation. Using two alternative models, we show that providing state-dependent subsidies can either increase or reverse this effect, depending on which state subsidies are paid. We argue that whether demand effects or wealth effects of premium subsidies will dominate the insured׳s behavior depends on the market structure.     

我国汽车保险道德风险博弈研究——基于投保人道德风险角度

从投保人的视角,利用博弈分析,研究我国车险市场存在的道德风险,力图通过为保险公司建立有效的调查机制、惩罚体系,减少车险公司因投保人一方的道德风险所引起的损失,增加车险的盈利能力。     

The economics of crowd out under mixed public/private health insurance

It is well known that public insurance sometimes crowds out private insurance. Yet, the economic theory of crowd out has remained unstudied. Here, I show that crowd out causes two countervailing effects: (a) the intensive margin effect-since high demanders are crowded out, the private market now has a larger proportion of low demanders on the intensive margin (The intensive margin are those who have already bought private insurance), and so will drop quality to lower the price to the low demanders liking; and (b) the extensive margin effect-before the public insurance expansion, the private sector had lowered quality to make insurance more affordable at the extensive margin (The extensive margin is the next group of people who would buy private insurance if the price decreased), but now that public insurance crowds out the extensive margin, quality can then be raised back up to the high demanders liking.If the extensive margin effect dominates, then a new phenomenon of push out occurs, in which crowd out causes the private sector to raise quality and to increase the number of uninsured low demanders not eligible for public insurance. If the intensive margin effect dominates, then crowd out will cause the private sector to lower quality, causing the phenomenon of crowd-in, in which the number of uninsured low demanders that take-up private insurance increases.These two countervailing effects have important implications for any government policy that desires to eradicate all uninsurance. First, if push out is dominant, then the private sector will respond to the public insurance by pushing out and leaving some people newly uninsured. If crowd-in is dominant, then all people can be insured and the government can do it at a lower-than-anticipated level of expansion due to the private sector crowding in.Received: April 2002, Accepted: February 2003, JEL Classification: I11, I38The views herein do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of AHRQ, nor the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. I thank Pedro Pita Barros, Hugh Gravelle, and Lise Rochaix-Ranson, and participants at the 2nd Health Economics Workshop at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa for helpful comments.     

REFORM OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM: AN APPRAISAL OF THE FHLBB AND FDIC STUDIES

This paper presents an appraisal of the studies of the deposit insurance system submitted to Congress by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in compliance with the Garn-St. German legislation of 1982. The purpose of these studies was to assess the current structure of the deposit insurance system in light of the changes in the regulation of depository institutions mandated in recent legislation
Many observers of the financial system believe that, as a result of recent regulatory changes, the deposit insurance agencies do not have sufficient power to control risk-taking of insured institutions. These two reports present an assessment of mechanism which could be used to limit the risk of the deposit insurance agencies
The emphasis in both reports is on ways in which the amount of market discipline applied to insured institutions could be increased. Both reports identify essentially three ways in which this might be accomplished. First, risk-adjusted deposit insurance prices might be employed. Second, the volume of uninsured creditors might be increased, either through changes in limits of insurance coverage or through imposition of requirements for use of subordinated debt. Third, the current public deposit insurance system might be partially supplanted by one that is private. This paper evaluates the merits of each of these proposals and compares the positions taken by the FHLBB and the FDIC on the issues     

On the optimal design of insurance contracts with the restriction of equity risk

This paper focuses on the optimal design of insurance contracts with the restriction of equity risk by Arrow's optimal insurance model [2] and Zhou's optimal insurance model [4]. The insured aims to maximize his/her expected utility of terminal wealth, under the constraint that the insurer wishes to control his/her risk. We establish an optimal insurance model that restrains underwriting risk and investment risk simultaneously. We solve this problem and obtain the results which improve and extend the results given by Arrow [2] and Zhou [4].     

The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection

Kaplow (1992) shows in a complete-information environment that allowing income tax deductions for losses as partial insurance is undesirable in the presence of private insurance markets. This paper elaborates on Kaplow's finding by studying two extreme types of asymmetric information structures in private insurance markets: Either the insured or insurers possess superior information. It is shown that our derived result is consistent with Kaplow's if the insured have superior information; however, Kaplow's negative conclusion with respect to the income tax deduction will be overturned if insurers have superior information instead. A policy implication from our finding is that whether or not to allow an income tax deduction for losses needs to be more refined and, specifically, it should be tailored to the “adverse selection” information structures of private insurance.     

意外险的需求模式、感觉阈限与通货膨胀率——基于三区制门限回归模型的实证分析

文章基于中国2000-2010年季度数据的实证分析表明,通货膨胀率不仅显著影响意外险需求,而且意外险保费收入增长率与通货膨胀率之间不是简单的线性负相关。首先,意外险需求对通货膨胀率的敏感程度是边际递减的;其次,与通货膨胀风险相比,投保人更加厌恶通货紧缩风险;最后,由于需求模式在门限值附近出现较大改变,可能会冲击意外险市场,当通货膨胀率接近门限值时保险公司应及时调整营销策略。     

我国开发环境责任保险的必要性与可行性分析

环境责任保险有利于维护公众的利益,有利于企业经营的稳定,有利于对环境污染的监管,有利于我国保险业的发展,有利于社会的安定,也有利于国家财政负担的减轻。但是,由于环境责任风险具有基本风险的特征,导致保险公司的经营风险增加,影响了保险公司的开发积极性;价格偏高制约了投保人的有效需求;公众维护自身权益的意识有待加强以及相关法律、法规不完善也严重地阻碍了环境责任保险的开发,因此,政府应该通过税收优惠、强制保险和完善法律、法规扶持环境责任保险的开发,保险业应通过限制保险金额、规定绝对免赔额和利用再保险降低和转移经营风险,厂家应积极购买环境责任保险来转移环境责任风险。     

如何选择死亡保险的投保期限

当购买死亡保险时,投保人需要选择投保的期限。以平均收益与风险的和为目标函数,讨论了在给定年龄x和安全载荷p的条件下,如何选择投保期限才能使得目标函数达到最大值。同时,利用数值计算结果讨论了年龄对最优投保期限的影响。     

On the Interaction of Risk and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study

Experimental studies of risk and time preference typically focus on one of the two phenomena. The goal of this paper is to investigate the (possible) correlation between subjects' attitude to risk and their time preference. For this sake we ask 61 subjects to price a simple lottery in three different scenarios. At the first, the lottery premium is paid 'now'. At the second, it is paid 'later'. At the third, it is paid 'even later'. By comparing the certainty equivalents offered by the subjects for the three lotteries, we test how time and risk preferences are interrelated. Since the time interval between 'now' and 'later' is the same as between 'later' and 'even later', we also test the hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting. The main result is a statistically significant negative correlation between subjects' degrees of risk aversion and their (implicit) discount factors. Moreover, we show that the negative correlation is independent of the method used to elicit certainty equivalents (willingness to pay versus willingness to accept).     

Insurance,credit, and technology adoption: Field experimental evidencefrom Malawi

Does production risk suppress the demand for credit? We implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology. The study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in Malawi, where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall. We randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high-yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the November 2006 crop season. The other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package, but were also required to purchase (at actuarially fair rates) a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall. Surprisingly, take-up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan. Take-up was 33.0% for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan. There is suggestive evidence that reduced take-up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract: insured loan take-up was positively correlated with farmer education, income, and wealth, which may proxy for the individual's default costs. By contrast, take-up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics.     

Uninsured idiosyncratic risk, liquidity constraints and aggregate fluctuations

Summary. I study the role played by uninsured idiosyncratic risk and liquidity constraints in the propagation of aggregate fluctuations. To this purpose, I compare the aggregate fluctuations of two model economies that differ in their insurance technologies only. In one of these model economies liquidity constrained households vary their holdings of a nominally denominated asset in order to buffer an uninsured idiosyncratic shock to their individual production opportunities. In the other economy every idiosyncratic component of risk can be costlessly insured. I find that the limited insurance technology implies fluctuations in output that are 20% larger, fluctuations in hours relative to output that are 9% larger, fluctuations in consumption relative to output that are 18% smaller, and a correlation of hours and productivity that is 15% smaller than those that obtain under the full insurance technology. Received: March 6, 1996; revised version August 15, 1996     

Information Asymmetries and Risk Management in Healthcare Markets: The U.S. Affordable Care Act in Retrospect

This article critically examines the pertinent issues in ex ante and ex post moral hazard in healthcare markets, with the U.S. Affordable Care Act (ACA) as its focal point of inquiry. First, it compares the various types of information asymmetries resulting from the production, allocation, and utilization of health insurance. Second, it reviews the literature on adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk mitigation against which salient ACA reforms are analyzed. In contrasting conventional moral hazard from an alternative theory of welfare maximization, it suggests that healthcare (over)utilization cannot necessarily be considered wasteful, even if it ends up costing insurers more on a short-term basis. Costs and savings attributable to healthcare spending under the ACA will vary between the consumer, insurer, and regulator-subsidizer. Despite the ambiguities surrounding definitions of “health,” the challenge of containing inefficient moral hazard, and encouraging its desirable counterpart, lies in the tradeoffs that arise between consumer access to affordable and quality healthcare and the market competitiveness of health insurers. The new Trump administration will have to address these tradeoffs in repealing and replacing the ACA, particularly in light of escalating insurance premiums and deductibles, narrower provider networks, and technical implementation issues.     

Ageing and unused capacity in Europe: is there an early retirement trap?

We address the issue of how early retirement may interact with limited use of financial markets in producing financial hardship later in life, when some risks (such as long-term care) are not insured. We argue that the presence of financially attractive early retirement schemes in a world of imperfect financial and insurance markets can lead to an 'early retirement trap'. Indeed, Europe witnesses many (early) retired individuals in financial distress. In our analysis we use data on 10 European countries, which differ in their pension and welfare systems, in prevailing retirement age and in households' access to financial markets. We find evidence that an early retirement trap exists, particularly in some Southern and Central European countries: people who retired early in life are more likely to be in financial hardship in the long run. Our analysis implies that governments should stop making early retirement attractive, let retirees go back to work, improve access to financial markets and make sure long-term care problems are adequately insured.
— Viola Angelini, Agar Brugiavini and Guglielmo Weber     

Should earthquake mitigation measures be voluntary or required?

This paper examines whether or not one should require homeowners to adopt cost-effective loss reduction measures (LRMs) on residential structures in earthquake prone areas. Congress is considering requiring homeowners in earthquake-prone areas to purchase earthquake insurance as a condition for a federally insured mortgage but is still debating what action should be taken regarding mitigation. We show that the incentive to voluntarily adopt LRMs is reduced if homeowners are covered by full insurance rather than being uninsured. This result holds even if individuals have accurate information on the risk and maximize expected utility. The empirical evidence indicates that few homeowners adopt mitigation measures whether they are insured or uninsured. Most individuals do not behave as if they maximize expected utility and instead seem to employ simplified decision rules which suggest that mitigation measures are unnecessary or too costly in relation to the perceived benefits. These findings suggest that it may be necessary to strengthen building codes and/or require the adoption of mitigation measures on existing structures in return for reduced earthquake insurance premiums.     

Health insurance market reform and employee compensation: The case of pure community rating in New York

Pure community rating, which was enacted to improve access to health insurance in New York's small group market in 1993, prevents carriers from charging different premiums based on the ages of a firm's workers. If small firms were adjusting compensation packages prior to reform to offset higher health care costs of older workers, then community rating could lead to greater relative wages for older workers post reform and not necessarily induce adverse selection that results in changes in who is insured. I present evidence showing that relative wages of older workers in small firms increased in comparison with other states and with large firms within New York following reform.