Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.     

Pricing and coordination with consideration of piracy for digital goods in supply chains

Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price.     

Balancing Profitability and Customer Welfare in a Supermarket Chain

We investigate the impact of price discrimination by a large Chicago supermarket chain. First we measure the impact of the chain's current zone-pricing policy on shelf prices, variable profits and consumer welfare across its stores. Using the chain's database to simulate a finer store-specific micro-pricing policy, we study the implications of this policy on profits and welfare. We show how a store-pricing policy that is constrained to offer consumers at least as much surplus as a uniform chain wide pricing policy still enables the retailer to generate substantial incremental profits.To ensure our pricing problem exhibits a well-defined optimum, we use the parsimonious, mixed-logit demand function that allows for flexible substitution patterns across brands and also retains a link to consumer theory. We discuss the issue of price endogeneity when estimating the demand parameters with weekly store-level data. Standard instrumental variables techniques used to account for such endogeneity also seem to increase the magnitudes of own-price elasticities thereby offsetting the problem encountered by previous researchers of predicted prices from a demand model exceeding those in the actual data.     

International mergers: Incentives and welfare

Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge. To demonstrate this point, we develop a model of international oligopolistic competition under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. We show that when domestic firms but not foreign firms are completely informed of local market demands, information sharing enhances the profitability of a merger between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We also examine how such a merger affects the non-merging firms' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Shades of gray��the impact of gray markets on authorized distribution channels

Gray markets refer to the diversion of unauthorized products from a market or channel with low prices to another market or channel with higher prices. In this paper, we study the effects of gray markets on the profitability of distribution channel members under different channel structures with different parallel importer identities. We show that a manufacturer can benefit from parallel importation by a third party or by an authorized dealer. However, channel structure is critical in determining both who benefits and the mechanism by which this benefit occurs. In addition, we show whether the parallel importer is a third party or a retailer has significant effects on channel members’ profits. Although this research is motivated by international marketing practices, the modeling approach and the results apply more generally to cases where a manufacturer sells to different customer segments at different prices.     

The Chinese warrant bubble: A fundamental analysis

We investigate the information content in Chinese warrant prices based on an option pricing framework that incorporates short‐selling and margin‐trading constraints in the underlying stock market. We show that Chinese warrant prices can be explained under this pricing framework. On the basis of this new model, we develop a price deviation measure to quantify stock market investors' unobserved demand for short selling or margin trading due to market constraints. We find that warrant‐price deviations are driven by underlying stock valuation to a great extent. Chinese warrant prices, save for the time around expiration dates, are better characterized as derivatives than as pure bubbles.     

TASTE FOR VARIETY,TASTE FOR NOVELTY AND PRICE BEHAVIOUR

In this paper we propose a formulation of preferences that exhibit both love for variety and love for novelty. This enables us to investigate the effects of ageing on imperfect substitutes, as they became progressively old‐fashioned, due to the obsolescence of their aesthetic features. First, we assume that the industry is divided into several submarkets, each dominated by a monopolist producing a variety of a given vintage. We show that prices decrease, and the evolution of demand determines the equilibrium number of varieties at the point where the oldest vintage firm earns zero profits. Second, under a free entry condition assumption, the lifetime horizon of each variety will be characterized by decreasing prices accompanied by increasing demand levels.     

The impact of net buying pressure on index options prices

This study examines whether the demand for options, as measured by the net buying pressure of index options, explains the implied volatility structure created by options prices. We decompose the buying pressure into the direction‐motivated (i.e., delta‐informed) and the volatility‐motivated (i.e., vega‐informed) demand for options. After controlling for options traders' hedging demand, we find that both delta‐ and vega‐informed trading play significant roles in explaining changes in implied volatility. Foreign institutions are more directionally informed in index options trading than their domestic counterparts are. Domestic investors effectively implement volatility trading using put options.     

Implications of parent brand inertia for multiproduct pricing

This paper explores and quantifies the importance of parent brand state dependence to forward looking pricing outcomes in the area of umbrella branding and multi-product firms. We show through numerical simulations that loyalty (inertia) to the parent brand can decrease prices and reduce profits, as well as mitigate or even reverse the benefits of joint profit maximization relative to sub-brand profit maximization. These effects are mediated by brand asymmetries and the relative magnitude of sub-brand state dependence effects. Empirically, we focus on the Yogurt category, where we consider parent brands with several sub-brands. Using household level scanner data, we estimate the parameters that characterize consumer demand while flexibly accounting for consumer heterogeneity. We also estimate unobserved product costs based on a forward looking price setting game. Through counterfactual analysis, we study the overall effect of parent brand state dependence on prices and profits, as well as the empirical impact of joint profit maximization and changes in firms’ beliefs regarding consumer inertia. Our findings have implications for markets where demand is likely characterized by parent brand dynamics.     

Fee or free? How much to add on for an add-on

Sellers often provide complimentary “no extra charge” add-ons (e.g., free Internet connection) to consumers who buy their primary products (e.g., a hotel stay), but recently add-ons that used to be free are offered for a fee. The conventional wisdom is that unadvertised add-ons for high fees help competitors increase profits that are competed away by advertising low prices for the basic products. This theory cannot explain why complimentary add-ons are still offered by some sellers. We show that providing complimentary add-ons can be profitable for sellers with monopoly power under certain demand conditions. If these demand conditions are not met, it is optimal to charge a supplementary fee for the add-on. We also show how pricing policy can be designed to selectively target or deter different consumer segments from purchasing the add-on to boost sellers’ profits, providing a strategic role for selling add-ons at either below-cost or at exorbitantly high prices. Yet such behavior may have repercussions for economic welfare when it results in socially inefficient giveaways when consumers would be better served with a lower price on the basic product without the add-on or, with the other extreme, when it results in excessively high prices for an add-on that restricts sales and leads to its under-provision from a societal perspective. The paper also provides managerial insights on the design and use of add-ons.     

Competition and demand effects of geographic distance to rivals

Based on previous research in the literature of spatial economics and agglomeration, this study proposes that a firm's geographic distance to its rivals may have two opposite effects on prices which depend on the strength of local demand. In periods of high demand, the competition effect of proximity is relatively smaller than the benefits of being geographically close, which results in a positive net effect of proximity on prices. To the contrary, in periods of low demand, the negative competitive effect of proximity will be greater than the positive effect; therefore, the net effect of proximity on prices is negative. The results for a sample of 1838 hotels support the two contrary consequences. These findings contribute to increase our knowledge of the relation between geographical distance and prices in service industries in which competition is local and demand fluctuates over time.     

Piracy on File-sharing Networks: Strategies for Recording Companies

In this article, we study the impact on piracy of selling music as downloadable files and the strategies that recording companies should adopt to increase profits. We find that total music sales and profits of firm (recording company) are higher, and total piracy (demand on file-sharing networks) is lower when the firm sells a downloadable version of a music track. We also look at the firm's optimal level of digital rights management (DRM) protection. We found that revenue decreases with increased protection. It is therefore optimal for the firm not to employ any DRM protection in the absence of network externality (NE). Listening to music or watching videos protected by DRM is cumbersome to users because they have to download license files and there are restrictions on the number of times the file can be copied and on the type of devices that can play the file. As a result, DRM protection is a disutility to the legal consumer and the firm must charge lower prices with more DRM protection. When NE is high and a nominal search cost is above a certain threshold, then non-zero protection becomes optimal.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

Marketplace,reseller, or web-store channel: The impact of return policy and cross-channel spillover from marketplace to web-store

With the advent of e-commerce, new platform sales have been created in the online retailing industry, and choosing the best platform has become a challenge for manufacturers. For instance, marketplace and web-store are two e-channels for selling goods directly to end customers. In the marketplace, manufacturers sell their products directly to online customers through e-tailers' platforms and share revenue with e-tailers. In the web-store channel, manufacturers sell their products directly to end customers through their platforms and do not need to e-tailers' platforms. However, some manufacturers and e-tailers continue with reseller channel yet. Reseller channel is another conventional channel in which manufacturers distribute their products to e-tailers, then e-tailers choose retail prices and sell them to consumers. Therefore, with these three different channels, the key question is when and under what conditions manufacturers can choose marketplace or reseller channel in addition to their web-store channels to grow their market share. In this paper, we analyze these three different e-channels and the conditions that manufacturers adopt the marketplace or reseller channel. For this purpose, we consider a model with two manufacturers and one e-tailer in which the manufacturers have their web-store channels, and they are willing to adopt another channelـ reseller or marketplace. The manufacturers offer a return policy in their web-store channels as a competitive strategy for attracting more customers. We find that offering return policy in web-store channels has no effect on the choice between the marketplace and reseller channel, but it has an impact on the amount of manufacturers' profits in each channel. Also, we demonstrate that regardless of offering return policy, as the coefficient of cross-channel effect increases, the manufacturers' profits, whether they choose reseller channel or marketplace channel, increase. But, as the coefficient of cross-channel effect increases, the e-tailer's profit increases when both manufacturers choose reseller channel, otherwise decreases. If manufacturers offer a return policy, the e-tailer's profit is highest when both manufacturers choose reseller channel, and if they do not offer a return policy, the e-tailer's profit is highest when both manufacturers choose marketplace channel.     

Improving momentum strategies using residual returns and option-implied information

This paper provides an alternative method for enhancing momentum profits by combining residual returns and option-implied information. The results show that the main benefit of applying residual returns to construct momentum portfolios is generating stable returns. Additionally, the incorporation of implied volatility (IV) spread or IV skew into a residual momentum portfolio is found to significantly raise profits, particularly during bad times and high-sentiment periods. This is because IV spread and IV skew can dissociate winners/losers with a price underreaction from those with a price overreaction, which suggests that informed traders who perceive price underreactions/overreactions trade in option markets.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complementary Goods: Prices and Consumer Welfare Under Duopoly and Monopoly

We examine prices, profits, and consumer surplus for differentiated complementary goods under duopoly and a multi‐product monopoly. We find that little can be said about the relative magnitudes of prices of the components of a system of complementary goods under the alternative market structures. Although demand complementarity can lead to lower prices for either the primary or the secondary good under monopoly, both prices are not necessarily lower. The results unique to this paper are that, when two complementary goods form a system, the system price is unambiguously lower and consumer surplus and profits are higher under a multi‐product monopoly.     

Digital coupon promotion and platform selection in the presence of delivery effort

In recent years, physical retailers have started selling products to consumers through either third-party or self-operated online platforms. Doing so, they face demand which depends on digital coupon promotions, delivery effort by the platform (i.e., deliver products from retailers to consumers), and channel preference. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the interactions between the physical retailer's distribution channel choices and coupon promotions. In normal operation, retailers prefer to pay lower fees to the third-party platform, but we find, counterintuitively, that when carrying on a digital coupon promotion, the retailer can be better off paying a higher participation fee to the third-party platform. We also identify the conditions under which the retailer prefers the third-party platform over the self-operated platform with and without coupon promotions. Furthermore, we show that digital coupon promotions and delivery effort boost the retailer's profits by price discriminating among consumers with differing purchase utilities.     

Analysis of Bitcoin prices using market and sentiment variables

This paper proposes an empirical model for analysing the dynamics of Bitcoin prices. To do this, we consider a vector error correction model over two overlapping periods: 2010–17 and 2010–19. Price discovery is achieved through the Gonzalo–Granger permanent‐transitory decomposition. The pricing factors are endogenous linear combinations of the S&P 500 index, gold price, a Google search variable associated to Bitcoin and a fear index proxied by the FED Financial Stress Index. Our empirical analysis shows that during the first period, a linear combination of four pricing factors describes the efficient Bitcoin price. The S&P 500 index and Google searches have a positive effect whereas gold prices and the fear index have a negative effect. In contrast, during the second period, the efficient price behaves idiosyncratically and can be only rationalised by individuals' search for information on the cryptocurrency. These findings provide empirical evidence on the presence of a correction in Bitcoin prices during the period 2018–19 uncorrelated to market fundamentals. We also show that standard empirical asset pricing models perform poorly for explaining Bitcoin prices.