The tax-rate induced bond substitution hypothesis and the traditional textbook treatment of the relationship between tax-free and taxable bond yields

ABSTRACT

This empirical study posits and tests the ‘tax-rate induced bond substitution hypothesis,’ wherein the propensity for bond buyers to substitute tax-exempt municipal bonds for taxable bonds in their portfolios is hypothesized to be an increasing function of the maximum federal personal income tax rate. This substitution acts to elevate the real interest rate yield on taxable bonds while diminishing it on tax-exempt bonds, ceteris paribus. Two measures of real interest rates are included in the present analysis, ex post real interest rate and ex ante real interest rate. Empirical estimations for the 1981–2018 period provide strong support for the hypothesis. They reveal that the real interest rate yield on high-grade tax-exempt municipal bonds is a decreasing function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax, whereas the real interest rate yield on taxable ten-year Treasury notes is an increasing function of that same tax rate. We examine the implications of this study and the information underlying it for the traditional formulaic textbook treatment of the relationship between yields on bonds whose interest rate payments are taxable versus those whose interest rate payments are tax exempt and find it is not as dependable as the textbooks would have us believe.     

Monopoly Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty

When a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known, then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices. This article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing. When there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist's optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price.     

Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing

We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who decides the amount of public funding to this quasi‐public good, knowing that the size and the probability of attaining a surplus ex post depend on the private agent's effort. We consider four public‐funding scenarios: benefit‐sharing versus cost‐sharing crossed with ex‐ante versus ex‐interim government intervention. We test our theoretical predictions by means of an experiment that confirms the main result of the model: Cost‐sharing public intervention is more effective than benefit‐sharing in boosting private financial contribution to the project. Furthermore, when public intervention comes after private contribution ( ex‐interim government intervention), both public‐funding scenarios have a negative impact on the private management effort. In our model, the latter result is explained by the private agent's high degree of risk aversion. These results have policy implications for strategic investments with long‐term social consequences. In deciding the optimal timing and method of the contribution, governments should also consider the indirect effects on agents’ long‐term management efforts.     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

An empirical investigation into the impact of US federal government budget deficits on the real interest rate yield on intermediate-term treasury issues, 1972–2012

This study provides new empirical evidence on the impact of the federal budget deficit on the real interest rate yields on intermediate-term debt issues of the US Treasury, represented herein by the ex post real interest rate yields on 3-year Treasury notes and 7-year Treasury notes, two interest rate measures that have received essentially no attention in the economics and finance literature in recent years. This study is couched within a loanable funds model that includes two ex post real interest rate yields, the monetary base as a per cent of GDP, the change in per capita real GDP, net financial capital inflows as a per cent of GDP and the budget deficit as a per cent of GDP. This study uses annual data for the study period 1972 to 2012, a time period that includes ‘quantitative easing’ monetary policies by the Federal Reserve. Two-stage least squares estimations reveal that the federal budget deficit, expressed as a per cent of GDP, exercised a positive and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yields on both 3-year and 7-year Treasury notes, even after allowing for quantitative easing and other factors. The study also considers the time period 1980 to 2012 and offers simple robustness testing.     

Growth with many agents and wages paid ex ante

In this paper, we consider a one-sector model of economic growth with several infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents, who are endowed with diverse discount factors as well as preferences over consumption. In line with the classical Ramsey model, agents are not allowed to borrow against future income. Unlike the traditional assumption of ex post wage payment, wages are paid ex ante in our model. We first explain the difference between the assumptions of wages being paid ex ante and wages being paid ex post in the framework of a simple illustrative two-class model. Our main result shows that in contrast to the many-agent Ramsey model with ex post wage payment, the capital stock sequence converges to the steady state stock irrespective of production technology employed by the firms. Further, all impatient agents own zero capital stock, whereas the most patient agent owns the entire capital stock from some time onward. Thus, we have shown that a slight modification in the timing of wage payment in growth models can lead to significant changes in the stability properties of equilibrium dynamics.     

UNCERTAIN INCOME,UNCERTAIN TAXES AND RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE*

L. K. C. Chan (1983) and R. B. Barsky et al. (1986) have demonstrated that a tax cut financed by bonds to be repaid from proportional income taxes on uncertain future income, by reducing the latter's riskiness, stimulates current consumption - Ricardian equivalence does not hold. However, their two-period models exclude the possibility that future taxes are uncertain. In this paper a three-period model is developed that, by allowing the government two periods in which to collect taxes, introduces ex ante tax rate uncertainty. This renders the result concerning Ricardian equivalence ambiguous. By comparison, taxes levied as lump sums and via a ‘lottery’ respectively produce the ‘usual’ effects (zero and negative) on consumption.     

The Political Economy of Clientelism*

In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.     

Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefit Provision with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement

We determine the optimal combination of a universal benefit and categorical benefit when individuals differ in their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. The categorical benefit is conditioned ex ante on applicants being unable to work and ex post on recipients not working. The awards test makes Type I/II errors. If the ex post condition is (i) not enforced, the optimal categorical benefit is positive only if the awards test has discriminatory power, while maximum welfare falls with both error propensities; but if (ii) fully enforced, the optimal categorical benefit is positive always and maximum welfare can increase with the Type II error propensity.     

Contractual exchange and the timing of payment

In this paper we stress the informal institutions that have evolved alongside formal contracts to mitigate agency costs. The timing of payment is a pervasive example of such an informal institution. The basic result of our analysis is that ex post payment is a rational institutional choice of buyers and sellers designed to control the significant transactions costs inherent in certain types of exchanges characterized by interpersonal differences in information. Moreover, the selection of a payment scheme allocates the roles of principal and agent, with the party having the greater likelihood of cheating becoming the agent.     

Discrepancies between ex ante and ex post efficiency under identical subjective probabilities

Summary. Starr (1973) showed that, if people have different subjective probabilities, ex ante and ex post efficiency conflict. Conversely, under the simple preferences that he considered, the discrepancy between ex ante and ex post efficiency disappears when subjective probabilities are identical. Here I consider identical subjective probabilities, but more general preferences. First, risk attraction is admitted. Second, I dispense with the double requirement (dubbed IZU) of additive separability and state-independence of the utility of zero-date consumption, an unrealistic requirement when modeling the investment in durable goods. I find that, under IZU, and as long as ex post preferences satisfy the natural assumption of quasiconcavity (and satisfy some technical qualifications), an ex ante efficient allocation is indeed ex post efficient, but the converse is not necessarily true under risk attraction. If, on the other hand, IZU is violated, then one can have ex ante efficient allocations that are not ex post efficient, and vice-versa, even under risk aversion. Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: March 2001     

A cointegrated structural VAR model of the Canadian economy

This paper implements a cointegrated structural VAR model of the Canadian economy using quarterly data over the period 1964–1994. The dynamic properties of the estimated model are compared to the predictions of a simple textbook macro model. Four long-run equilibrium relationships are tested: (i) consumption–income; (ii) consumption–wealth; (iii) money demand; and (iv) the Fisher equation. The empirical results obtained are generally consistent with the predictions of the textbook model's long-run implications, although level shifts are observed in the consumption/income and the wealth/income ratios. Similarly it is found that there was an increase in the ex post real interest rate, implying a level shift in the Fisher relation, following the Bank of Canada's policy change towards a stable price level target.     

Ex Post Welfare under Alternative Health Care Systems

The implications of a societal aversion to inequality for the optimal structure of the health care system are studied. The agents are assumed to be ex ante identical, but to differ ex post in the state of their health. Inequality aversion is introduced by postulating a strictly concave ex post social welfare function. It is shown that the optimal public health care system allocates health care differently than would private health insurance; specifically, people who are relatively unhealthy with and without treatment receive more health care, and people who are relatively healthy with and without treatment receive less health care. The aggregate quantity of health care under the optimal public health care system can be either greater or smaller than under private health care insurance. If the public health care system is optimally designed, allowing agents to purchase supplementary private health care insurance cannot raise social welfare and is likely to decrease it.     

Uncertainty,Learning and Heterogeneity in International Environmental Agreements

This paper concerns the formation of International Environmental Agreements under uncertainty about environmental damage with different models of learning (complete learning, partial learning or no learning). The results of the existing literature are generally pessimistic: the possibility of either complete or partial learning generally reduces the level of global welfare that can be achieved from forming an IEA relative to no learning. That literature regards uncertainty as a parameter common to all countries, so that countries are identical ex ante as well as ex post. In this paper we extend the literature to the case where there is no correlation between damage costs across countries; each country is uncertain about a particular parameter (in our case the benefit-cost ratio) drawn from a common distribution but, ex post, each country’s realized parameter value is independently drawn. Consequently, while countries remain identical ex ante, they may be heterogeneous ex post. We show that this change reinforces the negative conclusions about the effects of partial learning on international environmental agreements, but, under certain conditions, moderates the negative conclusions about the effects of complete learning.     

Pensions,Ageing and Retirement in Australia: Long‐Term Projections and Policies

Australia's retirement income provision system, comprising the ‘three pillars’ of a means‐tested aged pension, mandatory occupational superannuation and other, voluntary long‐term savings, is at the heart of understanding the fiscal implications of ageing. While the Intergenerational Report, an account of long‐term fiscal sustainability, is celebrating its tenth birthday since the first edition was published, the Superannuation Guarantee, first implemented in 1992, turns a sprightly 20 years old. This article considers the Intergenerational Report as a prism for studying fiscal, demographic and policy developments in the Australian retirement income system over the last decade and into the future.     

Input versus output incentive schemes

Previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a ‘portfolio problem’, deriving the optimal consumption of the ‘risky asset’ (unreported income) assuming a fixed probability of detection. We compare an alternative audit policy to the standard random audit policy. We focus on an ‘audit cutoff’ policy, in which an agent triggers an audit if reported income is ‘too low’, and is not audited if reported income is ‘sufficiently high’. We find that random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules. Given lump-sum taxes and fines, audit cutoff rules are the least-cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income.     

The effect of gender and race on student performance in principles of economics: the importance of personality type

This article analyses motion picture box-office gross revenue using a cross-section of films from 1997 to 2001. The dependent variable is total domestic box-office revenue. The independent variables investigated include: production budget; peak number of screens that the film was shown on in theaters; Consumer price index for movie tickets; personal income; season and year of the release in theaters; a measure of pre-existing audience; aggregate critic rating; MPAA rating; genre; word-of-mouth recommendation; the presence of popular stars and the award nominations. A distinction is made in the analysis between information available to the public prior to the release of the film in theaters (ex ante) and information available to the public after the film opens in theaters (ex post). Results for the ex ante ordinary least squares (OLS) regression reveal positive impacts of budget, summer and holiday release dates, critical reviews, sequels and several genres on gross revenue. Significant, positive determinants in the ex post OLS regressions include budget, the peak number of screens, sequels, critical reviews, summer and holiday releases, word-of-mouth, award nominations and star power.     

Hybrid Contests

This paper examines hybrid contests where participants commit two types of resources to improve their probability of winning the prize. The first type is forfeited ex ante, before the prize is allocated, by winners and losers alike, while the second is committed ex ante by all contenders but expended ex post, after the prize is allocated, and only by the contestant that wins the prize. The model yields a number of interesting results. Among them is the finding that, as the number of contestants increases, the ex ante expenditures of individual contestants decrease while the ex post expenditure increases. Even more interesting, the total of the ex ante and ex post expenditures by the contenders in a hybrid contest may decrease with the number of competitors. The study also finds that there is no rent overdissipation, and compares the total expenditures in the contest and “all‐pay” allocation mechanisms.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Economies of Scale and Product Variety*

It is well known that laissez faire may not be the ‘first-best’ policy in a closed economy where economies of scale are present. Corden has shown that this conclusion can carry over into an open economy, though under his assumption that imported goods are perfect substitutes for home-produced goods, interference with international trade could not raise real income. We have shown that where there are economies of scale, and imported goods are not identical to the home produced goods, interference with trade could raise real national income, though such a form of intervention would not normally be optimal. Further, it could even be desirable to support home production of more than one ‘variety’. Measurements of ‘costs of protection’ that aggregate several varieties into one may mislead not only regarding the size of the cost but even regarding its sign.