Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

TURNPIKE PROPERTIES OF A MONEY‐IN‐THE‐UTILITY‐FUNCTION MODEL*

This study establishes the global stability of a long‐run stationary state in a money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model. The major finding is that the constant money supply rule results in a stable allocation and price system if consumers discount their future utilities sufficiently weakly. Nominal and real interest rates will be in the neighbourhood of the inverse of the consumers’ discount factor β^‐1.     

Motivation crowding‐out and green‐paradox‐like outcomes

We analyze the effectiveness of environmental policy in a framework in which households’ utility is determined by both private and social components, representing their extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to undertake green actions, respectively. Environmental policy, in the form of a subsidy aiming to incentivize the adoption of a green technology, on the one hand, directly increases households’ extrinsic motivation, while, on the other hand, indirectly decreases their intrinsic motivation. We show that, provided that the indirect effect dominates, the policy leads to crowding‐out of intrinsic motivation which ultimately undermines the effectiveness of the policy itself. Specifically, despite its positive effect on environmental outcomes in the short run, the policy will lead to a deterioration in long‐run environmental outcomes, giving rise to a reverse green‐paradox‐like outcome. Moreover, even in the case in which the direct effect dominates, provided that the indirect effect is large enough, the policy will generate a deterioration in short‐run environmental outcomes. These results clearly suggest that the optimal design of environmental policy is particularly complicated since it requires to take into account also its effects on intrinsic motivation.     

Long‐term care and pay‐for‐performance programs

Pay‐for‐performance programs are gradually spreading across Asia. This paper builds on the longer experience in the United States to offer lessons for Asia. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services has introduced several pay‐for‐performance programs since 2012 to encourage hospitals to improve quality of care and reduce costs. Some state Medicaid programs have also introduced pay‐for‐performance for nursing homes. Long‐term care providers play an important role in hospital pay‐for‐performance programs because they can affect the readmission rate and also total episode payments. A good pay‐for‐performance program will focus on improving quality of care that affects health outcomes. In addition, that quality must vary across providers and be measurable. Furthermore, it is important that the measures be reported in a timely way, that both demand and supply respond to the measures, and that the measures be risk adjusted. Empirical data from Medicare beneficiaries in the state of Michigan show that mean episode payments and readmission rates in skilled nursing facilities vary widely and are sensitive to the number of observations. These practical matters create challenges for implementing pay‐for‐performance in practice. There is an extensive literature review of pay‐for‐performance in long‐term care in the United States and in Asia.     

STOCK‐BOND CO‐MOVEMENTS AND FLIGHT‐TO‐QUALITY IN G7 COUNTRIES: A TIME‐FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

This paper examines co‐movement between stock returns and changes in 10‐year government bond yields as well as flight‐to‐quality behaviour in G7 countries. We conduct the wavelet squared coherence analysis to explore the dynamics in both time and frequency domain. Our results provide evidence of positive co‐movements, which vary over time and across investment horizon. The higher co‐movement is found to be more concentrated in the lower frequency bands. We further analyse the dynamic nature of the scale‐dependent wavelet correlations and find that the correlations are highly volatile and significantly increase across different time scales during the episodes of equity market turbulence. The increase in correlations reflects flights from stocks to safer bond investments as a result of dramatic changes in investor sentiment and risk aversion at times of market stress.     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.
     

FISCAL STIMULUS WITH LEARNING‐BY‐DOING

Using a Bayesian structural vector autoregression analysis, we document that an increase in government purchases raises private consumption, the real wage, and total factor productivity (TFP) while reducing inflation. These three facts are hard to reconcile with both neoclassical and New Keynesian models. We extend a standard New Keynesian model to allow for skill accumulation through past work experience. An increase in government spending increases hours and induces skill accumulation and higher measured TFP and real wages in subsequent periods. Future marginal costs fall lowering expected inflation and, through the monetary policy rule, the real interest rate. Consumption increases as a result.     

Multiunit Pay‐Your‐Bid Auction with One‐Dimensional Multiunit Demands*

An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two‐step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single‐unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the “relative” supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.     

Self‐Fulfilling Early‐Contracting Rush*

In markets for entry‐level professionals, the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts. The rush to early contracting can be self‐fulfilling, as both its effect on expectations about demand–supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand–supply balance can be nonmonotone. Matching markets with more risk‐averse participants, a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions, or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities are more vulnerable to self‐fulfilling early‐contracting rushes. Employers can have a collective interest in preventing early offers to a few promising applicants from starting the rushes.     

THE BROTHER‐IN‐LAW EFFECT*

When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother‐in‐law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother‐in‐law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.     

COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A MONOPOLISTIC FIRM FACING RATE‐OF‐RETURN AND COMMAND‐AND‐CONTROL POLLUTION CONSTRAINTS

The intrinsic comparative statics properties of a general rate‐of‐return regulated, profit‐maximizing model of a monopolist facing a command‐and‐control pollution constraint are derived. Recent advances in the theory of comparative statics are used to derive the basic comparative statics of the model, which are contained in an observable negative semi‐definite matrix and possess the form of Slutsky‐like expressions. We consider several command‐and‐control pollution constraints that are commonly implemented in practice, and conclude that the intrinsic comparative statics properties of the model are qualitatively invariant to the type of command‐and‐control pollution constraint imposed. We compare our results with those extant, and find that several basic results from the standard A–J model no longer hold in our model.     

MEASURING NON‐ECONOMIC WELL‐BEING ACHIEVEMENT

Income per capita and most widely reported, non‐ or non‐exclusively income based human well‐being indicators are highly correlated among countries. Yet many countries exhibit higher achievement in the latter than predicted by the former. The reverse is true for many other countries. This paper commences by extracting the inter‐country variation in a composite of various widely‐reported, non‐income‐based well‐being indices not accounted for by variations in income pre capita. This extraction is interpreted inter alia as a measure of non‐economic well‐being. The paper then looks at correlations between this extraction and a number of new or less widely‐used well‐being measures, in an attempt to find the measure that best captures these achievements. A number of indicators are examined, including measures of poverty, inequality, health status, education status, gender bias, empowerment, governance and subjective well‐being.     

RE‐EXAMINATION OF THE GROWTH‐ENHANCING BUBBLE

We investigate the growth and welfare effects of the bubble that arise on equities on newly created firms by R&D activities. Considering an economy where the input to the R&D sector is the final goods financed by the savings of the household sector, we show that such a bubble has a growth‐enhancing effect under the condition opposite to the previous literature. We also explore the characteristics of the steady state equilibrium with the bubble and demonstrate that there can be dual bubbly equilibria, one of which is unstable and the other stable, and that the growth and welfare effects of an unexpected permanent change in the initial bubble are very different depending on which equilibrium the economy stays in.     

Consumer arbitrage in cross‐border e‐commerce

In today’s internet markets consumers can search for, find and compare prices worldwide. Online, information circulates faster than offline and arbitrage opportunities such as the ones arising from currency shocks are easily unveiled. In this paper, we estimate for the first‐time exchange rate elasticities for cross‐border e‐commerce transactions. Exploiting a new high‐frequency database on international transactions of parcels, we find that a 1% appreciation of the domestic currency increases e‐commerce imports by 0.7%. Comparing the result with traditional estimates in offline markets, this implies a 50% exchange rate pass‐through online.     

Interlinkage and Generous Tit‐for‐Tat Strategy

We investigate an infinitely‐repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect monitoring and consider the possibility that the interlinkage of the players' distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a generous tit‐for‐tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed.     

Mix‐and‐match divestitures and merger harm

We consider the effects of a merger combined with a divestiture that mixes and matches the assets of the two pre‐merger suppliers into one higher‐cost and one lower‐cost post‐merger supplier. Such mix‐and‐match transactions leave the number of suppliers in a market unchanged but, as we show, can be procompetitive or anticompetitive depending on whether buyers are powerful and on the extent of outside competition. A powerful buyer can benefit from a divestiture that creates a lower‐cost supplier, even if it causes the second‐lowest cost to increase. In contrast, a buyer without power is always harmed by a weakening of the competitive constraint on the lowest‐cost supplier.     

Post‐Malthusian Dynamics in Pre‐Industrial Scandinavia

Theories of economic growth hypothesize that the transition from pre‐industrial stagnation to sustained growth is associated with a post‐Malthusian phase in which technological progress raises income and spurs population growth while offsetting diminishing returns to labor. Evidence suggests that England was characterized by post‐Malthusian dynamics preceding the Industrial Revolution. However, given England's special position as the forerunner of the Industrial Revolution, it is unclear if a transitory post‐Malthusian period is a general phenomenon. Using data from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, this research provides evidence for the existence of a post‐Malthusian phase in the transition from stagnation to growth in Scandinavia.     

Multilateralism and Hub‐and‐Spoke Bilateralism*

This paper studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free‐trade agreements in an oligopoly model. The expansion of trading blocs through overlapping trade agreements allows the option of hub‐and‐spoke systems and achieves multilateral free trade as the equilibrium path, even if the expansion of trading blocs through the acceptance of new members is not feasible. The results suggest that free‐trade areas (FTAs) tend to expand more than customs unions (CUs). Lobbying by a producer can either promote or undermine the achievement of multilateral free trade through overlapping FTAs.     

Tullock's Puzzle in Pay‐and‐Play Lobbying

We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policy‐makers by the hold‐up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy‐maker is a price‐setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is “the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist”; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value. In the absence of contribution caps, the ex ante favored lobbyist strategically devalues her project, and the resulting competitive devaluations destroy private values, revenues, as well as correlated public values. Ex ante, the policy‐maker benefits from a binding contribution cap protects the ex ante favored lobbyist, eliminates competitive devaluations, and thus remedies the hold‐up problem.