Demographics, dividend clienteles and the dividend premium

The catering theory of dividends proposed that corporate dividend policy is driven by prevailing investor demand for dividend payers, and that managers cater to investors by paying dividends when the dividend premium is high. While earlier research found that the dividend premium is not driven by traditional clienteles derived from market imperfections such as taxes, transaction costs, or institutional investment constraints, we find empirical evidence that demographic clienteles are an important source of the time-varying demand for dividend payers. In particular, we find that, as consistent with the behavioural life-cycle theory and the marginal opinion theory of stock price, the dividend premium is positively driven by demographic clientele variation represented by changes in the proportion of the older population. Our results are robust when controlled for the factors of investor sentiment, signalling, agency costs, tax clienteles, time trend, business cycle fluctuations and varying sample periods.     

Hard Times or Great Expectations? Dividend Omissions and Dividend Cuts by UK Firms*

This paper uncovers an increasing proportion of quoted UK companies omitting cash dividends. Using a large panel of quoted UK firms, we estimate panel data probit models for the incidence of dividend omissions and cuts as functions of financial characteristics including cash flow, leverage, investment opportunities, investment and company size. These variables account for most of the increase in omission since 1995. There is relatively little evidence to link this to the major tax reform of 1997 that abolished tax refunds on dividend income payable to tax‐exempt institutions. Significant persistence effects indicate companies are slow to adjust their balance sheets through their dividend.     

Mandatory dividend rules and the investment decision: The case of Chile

Chilean companies are forced by law to distribute at least 30% of their liquid profits. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether this mandatory dividend rule has an impact on investment decisions. Based on accounting data and by using the discontinuous regression approach, our results show that there are no significant differences between the investment plans of Chilean companies that pay dividends and those that do not. Moreover, consistent with the signaling hypothesis, our results also show that firms with a greater probability of paying an excess dividend (above the minimum required by the law) are those with more investment opportunities and more financial constraints.     

Is corporate payout taxation a long run phenomenon? Evidence from international data

This paper examines whether dividend and capital gains taxation influences corporate payout policy using the country level data of 21 countries in panel versions of time series models. We find that dividend relative to capital gains tax penalty is cointegrated with corporate payouts (dividends and share repurchases) i.e. corporate payout taxation may be a long run phenomenon. Further, the cointegrating vector estimates are largely consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation whereby the tax penalty discourages dividends, while the estimates give limited support to the premise that firms substitute dividends for share repurchases in response to an increase in dividend tax penalty. Long run causality also operates between the tax penalty and payouts in the error correction models. Additionally, dividend tax appears to be more influential than capital gains tax on dividend payout decisions. Lastly, taxation affects dividends more significantly in countries with high investor protection.     

Learning about individual managers’ performance in UK pension funds: The importance of specialization

This study examines the performance of managers over time, as well as its persistence, taking into account both manager characteristics and market conditions. Applying parametric and non-parametric methodologies, we examine a sample of UK equity pension fund managers. Our results help to understand the importance of manager assignments in the industry and reveal the importance and benefits of management specialization. We find certain manager performance persistence, revealing that some managers are better than others and possess superior investment skills. Additionally, we find that managers achieve better results when they run a single fund or one investment-objective funds, which allows managers to focus on specific tasks. Nonetheless, manager performance varies with market conditions and highlights managers’ different skills. Specialist managers perform better in bullish markets, and generalists perform better in bearish periods.     

Institutional investors,corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector

Proportions of equity held by institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds—are rising across all OECD countries. Meanwhile institutions are becoming more influential in corporate governance, even in bank-dominated countries, inter alia due to international investment, pension reform and EMU. We provide two forms of evidence on the effects of institutional corporate governance on corporate performance. First we offer a literature survey on micro evidence, the outcome of which is mixed, but on balance suggesting a positive effect on equity returns. We contend that these micro studies face a difficulty that they cannot capture effects of governance initiatives whose effects go wider than “target firms”. Accordingly, we present results for the reduced form empirical relationship between institutional share holding and corporate sector performance at an economy-wide level. These are consistent with significant effects which differ between “Anglo-Saxon” and “relationship banking” countries. For example, institutions appear to accompany lower investment and higher dividends in the former.     

Realized jumps on financial markets and predicting credit spreads

This paper extends the jump detection method based on bipower variation to identify realized jumps on financial markets and to estimate parametrically the jump intensity, mean, and variance. Finite sample evidence suggests that the jump parameters can be accurately estimated and that the statistical inferences are reliable under the assumption that jumps are rare and large. Applications to equity market, treasury bond, and exchange rate data reveal important differences in jump frequencies and volatilities across asset classes over time. For investment grade bond spread indices, the estimated jump volatility has more forecasting power than interest rate factors and volatility factors including option-implied volatility, with control for systematic risk factors. The jump volatility risk factor seems to capture the low frequency movements in credit spreads and comoves countercyclically with the price–dividend ratio and corporate default rate.     

Democracy and dividend policy around the world

This paper investigates how democracy influences corporate dividend policy. With a sample of 228,628 observations from 37 countries, we find that democracy is negatively associated with both the likelihood to pay dividends and the payout ratio. Moreover, we document that this effect is stronger when shareholders (creditors) are weakly (strongly) protected. These findings imply that the effect of democracy on corporate dividend policy is transmitted mainly through democratic procedures. Besides, we find that democracy also negatively affects dividend initiations.     

Growth Opportunities,Stockholders' Claim/Liability on Pension Plans,and Corporate Pension Policies

In this study, I derive the value of stockholders' claim on a pension surplus and stockholders' liability for a pension deficit in the post‐Employee Retirement Income Security Act regulatory environment. Based on that valuation, I develop a model of corporate pension policies in which sponsoring firms weigh contributions to their pension plan against the exercise of growth options in the allocation of limited financial resources. The model shows how corporate pension funding and asset allocation policies are shaped by the sponsoring firms' characteristics, such as growth options, the marginal corporate tax rate, and regulatory variables such as the deficit reduction contribution rate, the variable‐rate insurance premium, and the maximum possible fraction of operating assets that can be seized by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. I discuss policy and empirical implications of the theoretical results. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investment decisions and debt financing under information uncertainty

This study examines how information uncertainty influences investment decisions. In contrast to prior studies, which assume no information uncertainty, our model includes a discrepancy in valuing debt between shareholders and debtholders at the time of debt issuance. We derive the values of corporate securities and the optimal investment threshold and coupon under information uncertainty. We show that compared with the absence of information uncertainty, debtholders value debt less than shareholders do, and hence, shareholders should contribute more investment funds. Debt financing restraints due to information uncertainty lead to delayed investment. We find that information uncertainty plays a mitigating role in shareholder-debtholder conflicts over investment policy. Moreover, the information uncertainty costs that shareholders incur increase sharply with the level of information uncertainty.     

Investment committees and corporate cash holdings

We investigate the association between the voluntary formation of a board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) firms over the 2005–2013 period. We provide evidence that the existence of a specialized IC increases corporate cash holdings. We also find that several IC characteristics, i.e., member experience, independence, number of meetings, and committee size, are associated with an increase in firms’ cash holdings. Furthermore, the local and foreign institutional ownership of GCC firms moderates the IC-cash holdings relationship. These results remain robust to alternative specifications of cash holdings and endogeneity tests. We contribute to the literature on firms’ incentives to hold cash and to the literature on governance in emerging market contexts.     

Largest shareholder and dividend policy around the world

This paper examines the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy in a sample of 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries. We find that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. Further, the magnitude of dividend payout tends to be smaller when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions.     

Creditor rights and the outcome model of dividends

Using a sample of 22,374 firms from 35 countries, we examine the role of creditor rights, shareholder rights, and corporate governance in determining corporate dividend policy. We find that, while all three variables play a significant role in determining both the likelihood and the dividend amount, the effect of country-level creditor rights dominate. In subsequent analysis, we show that the outcome model is most effective in countries with strong creditor rights. When creditor rights are weak, creditors demand, and firms consent to lower dividends. These findings show that creditors, and not shareholders, exert the greatest influence over corporate dividend policy.     

Does government funding promote or inhibit the financialization of manufacturing enterprises? Evidence from listed Chinese enterprises

This study examines how government funding type affects the financialization of manufacturing enterprises in China and discusses the different impacts of environmental factors. Funding for production can induce managers to increase expenses and reduce main business income by assigning social objectives, promoting corporate financialization. However, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may suffer from soft budget constraints and ignore short-term revenue; enterprises in competitive industries tend to hold cash for precautionary motivation. Therefore, their financialization is insensitive to government funding. In addition, funding for interest can inhibit corporate financialization by increasing debts for non-SOEs and those with financial background employees or facing strong financing constraints, because they are lacking in capital or sensitive to financial risks.     

Peer effect on dividends and return comovement

This study investigates the stock return comovement of dividend-paying and nonpaying firms induced by peer effects of dividend payout policies. We consider peer effect as a channel that links a firm’s dividend initiation to firms that did not change dividend status. Dividend initiation attracts investors to the industry and puts pressure on peer firms to change their dividend policy, which leads to return comovement between nonpaying peers and paying firms. Using matched peer firms that resemble dividend initiators, we find that return comovement can be induced through an indirect channel without changes in style or category. Excess return comovement for firms without dividends is observed with dividend payers of the market and their industries through peer influence.     

Are Corporate Tax Reductions Real Benefits under Imputation Systems?

Imputation systems integrate corporate and shareholder personal income taxes to alleviate double taxation of dividend income. In this study, we empirically examine whether a corporate tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system benefits shareholders. Using Taiwan as a setting, our analyses indicate that decreasing the corporate tax rate is associated with an increase in dividend payout ratio and foreign investment. Moreover, the increase in dividend payout ratio is even greater for firms that have a higher increase in foreign ownership. Additionally, the market reacts positively to an announcement of a tax rate reduction; specifically, positive stock price reactions are stronger for firms that experienced a greater increase in foreign ownership in response to the tax rate reduction, for firms with greater liquidity constraints and more growth opportunities before the tax rate reduction, and for firms with a bigger decrease in effective tax rates after the tax rate reduction. Overall, we provide evidence that a tax rate reduction is associated with economic impacts and that foreign shareholders appear to be the main beneficiaries of a tax rate reduction under an imputation tax system.     

Corporate investment,dividend decisions,differential taxation and the no-arbitrage condition

Masulis and Trueman (1988) investigated corporate investment and dividend decisions under differential personal taxation. They assumed investors in different tax brackets, a state-preference complete market (which includes pure securities for each state) with a ban on short-selling. They concluded that shareholders prefer non-zero dividend payment. In their model, the restrictions on short-sales were needed to bound tax arbitrage profits, among investors in different tax brackets, so that equilibrium could be reached. However, the joint assumptions of complete markets, and restrictions on short-selling, are inconsistent. By utilizing more recent results, from the tax arbitrage literature, we allow short-selling, and examine the role and implications of the no-arbitrage condition. We show that, with investors in different tax brackets, equilibrium is feasible. We conclude that a revised Masulis and Trueman type model does not explain a non-zero optimal dividend policy.     

Corporate sustainability and institutional shareholders: The pressure of social responsible pension funds on environmental firm practices

This paper analyses the role of social responsible (SR) pension funds as influential institutional shareholders in the corporate sustainability of investee firms. We study the influence of 197 UK SR pension funds on 1,253 firms with 31 environmental, social, and governance (ESG) indicators from 2002 to 2018. According to the indicator nature, we perform logit and ordinary least square (OLS) estimations with panel error correction models to control causality. Our results show that SR pension funds significantly impact on 41.93% of the ESG indicators studied. We find that larger pension‐fund shareholding positively influences on ESG firm performance and encourages proactive behaviour towards environmental practices. Firms with larger pension‐fund shareholding are more likely to use renewable energies and disclose environmental information, increasing the firm transparency towards stakeholders. This study contributes to understand that, besides stakeholders, institutional shareholders (SR pension funds) demand sustainable development and are able to transfer important values for the society and the environment to corporate governance.     

Catering to investors through capital expenditures: Testing assets substitution problem around financing

We test the catering theory, which describes how investor preferences might influence individual firms' investment financing decisions. To the best of our knowledge, our study may well be the first that directly connects catering with asset substitution to contrast the magnitude of catering by bondholders and shareholders. And indeed, it is interesting to find that although catering behavior is found to exist among both corporate bond and seasoned equity offering (SEO) managers, the coexistence of both appears to offset the abnormal investment phenomena of either underinvestment or overinvestment. The study results further reveal that firms engage in overinvestment when catering to conversion holders of existing convertible bonds. Taken together, we find that support for the asset substitution and abnormal investment argument is strong from a stockholder–bondholder conflict.     

Stock-market reaction to growth-induced dividend cuts: Are investors myopic?

This paper focuses on shareholder reaction to growth-motivated dividend cuts and omissions. The results reveal that although growth announcements mitigate the capital loss induced by dividend decreases, the stockmarket response to growth-oriented dividend cuts is still strongly negative. However, the capital loss suffered by investors is significantly reduced when dividend cuts are accompanied with stock dividends. Two potential explanations of the results are explored: (1) shareholders find the immediate benefits of stock dividends more attractive than the potentially higher future rewards of investment opportunities; and (2) shareholders overreact to dividend announcements. Analysis of the performance of the firms for two years following the dividend cut indicates weak support for the overreaction hypothesis.