THE ACTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION

In recent years, boards of directors have become more active and independent of management in pursuing shareholder interests. But, up to this point, there has been little empirical evidence that active boards help companies produce higher rates of return for their shareholders. In this article, after describing the new board activism, the authors argue that past failures to document an association between independent boards and superior corporate performance can be explained by two features of the research: its concentration on periods prior to the 1990s (when most boards were largely irrelevant) and its use of unreliable proxies (such as a minimum percentage of outside directors) for a well-functioning board.
The authors hypothesize that an independent and resourceful board takes steps that require management to increase earnings available to investors. To test this hypothesis, the performance of a sample of large U.S. corporations was examined over the period 1991-1995 using two proxies for the "professionalism" of each company's board: (1) the letter grades (A+ to F) assigned by CalPERS for corporate governance; and (2) a "presence" or "absence" grade based on three key indicators of professional board behavior. Both of these governance metrics were associated in statistically significant ways with superior corporate performance, as measured by earnings in excess of cost of capital and net of the industry average. While acknowledging that such results do not prove causation, the authors conclude that, in the first half of the 1990s, corporations with active and independent boards added significantly more value for shareholders than those with passive, "rubber-stamp" boards.     

Global Drivers of and Local Resistance to French Shareholder Activism

Shareholder activism in France has made significant advances during the past 25 years even as it continues to face formidable sources of local resistance. But if the list of corporate governance improvements since 1989 described by the authors might lead one to conclude that France now has minority shareholder protection and shareholder activism comparable to those of the U.S. or U.K., powerful local interests, including much of French management, labor, and government, continue to mount effective resistance to such forces for change. The French government still works closely with French business elites and unions to manage both individual companies and the general economy. And government officials continue to speak publicly of “protecting” French firms from “illegitimate” foreign shareholders. Accordingly, the authors characterize French corporate governance as a “hybrid” model of shareholder activism, one that incorporates the perspectives and interests of the classic French stakeholder model as well as an emerging shareholder value movement. Although foreign institutional investors have increased their shareholdings in French companies and promoted “best practice” governance rules, particularly with respect to voting rights, local forces will continue to resist aggressive shareholder activism. Such a hybrid model makes the outcomes of shareholder activism less predictable, a risk that foreign investors and companies often respond to by seeking alliances with local proxy advisers and investor associations to gain “legitimacy.”     

Boosting Foreign Investment: The Role of Certification of Corporate Governance

This paper studies the economic consequences of certification of corporate governance practices. For identification, we exploit a recent cross-country initiative by a coalition of key institutions in Southeast Asia; the periodic publication of a “Top List” of companies in the region selected based on an independent assessment of corporate governance practices. Our results suggest that being included in the list induces an increase in foreign investment and changes in corporate governance practices. The announcement of the Top List elicits a positive stock market response among constituents and is followed by higher accounting performance. Overall, the evidence suggests that the certification of governance practices is a meaningful tool to boost foreign investment.     

金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究

本文以我国证券市场2002～2004年329家民营上市公司为样本，考察了金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值之间的关系。发现民营上市公司的金字塔控制不利干公司价值：民营上市公司的最终控制人主要通过关联方担保、关联方资金占用和上市公司与关联方的商品购销活动来侵占小股东的利益，其政策含义是应该鼓励自然人直接持股上市公司，加强对关联交易的监管。更为重要的是必须改营公司外部治理环境、尤其是法律对投资者权益的保护，从而从根本上杜绝民营上市公司及其最终控制人对小股东的侵害行为，改善公司治理，提高公司价值。     

Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis

In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family‐controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through “tunneling” activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market‐based solutions and government intervention. The government‐engineered, large‐scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol—the so‐called “big deals” that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business—turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies—notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards—have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange—as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett—are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol‐affiliated or family‐run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti‐takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control.     

The Case for Maximizing Long‐Run Shareholder Value

Criticism of the shareholder model of corporate governance stems in part from misunderstanding about what shareholder wealth maximization means for the other stakeholders of public companies. The corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization does not imply that such stakeholders “do not matter.” Managers maximize shareholder value by maximizing the total expected cash flows available to distribute to all of their stakeholders. To maximize such cash flows, managers must provide their customers with desirable goods and services at attractive prices—which in turn requires that managers attract the employees, suppliers, and financial capital needed to conduct their businesses by providing each of these groups with market‐determined returns on their contributions to firm value. In this way, successful corporations benefit all of their stakeholders, and what is good for the corporation is generally good for society. External forces such as the media and government exert considerable influence on corporate actions and, in so doing, they play a role in helping to limit negative corporate “externalities” such as pollution and climate change. But direct regulation of productive activities should be used sparingly, and subjected to ongoing cost‐benefit analysis. Government regulation replaces the collective decisions of a broad marketplace of stakeholders using their own resources to act in their own interests with decisions made by government officials with complicated incentives and using resources generated by others. More generally, government should seek to regulate corporate actions only in the limited situations in which there are no market solutions for reducing the effects of externalities. For example, government plays a critically important role in identifying and deterring corporate fraud, and in ensuring competition and a level playing field for companies and all their stakeholders.     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

Complicating the current corporate governance controversy is a major disagreement about the fundamental purpose of the corporation. There are two main views on what should constitute the principal goal of the firm. Most economists tend to endorse value maximization—that is, maximization of the value of the firm's debt plus equity—or a version of value maximization known as “value‐based management” (VBM) that aims to maximize shareholder value. The main challenger is “stakeholder theory,” which argues that the corporation exists to benefit not just investors but all its major constituencies—employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and the federal government, as well as shareholders. Thus, whereas the success of a corporation under VBM could be assessed simply by its long‐run return to shareholders, under stakeholder theory a company's success would be judged by taking account of its contributions to all its stakeholders. Using statistical analysis of various measures of corporate success in satisfying non‐investor stakeholders, the author investigates whether a broader focus on multiple stakeholders is necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of long‐term shareholder value. His main findings in fact suggest just the opposite—namely, that long‐term value creation appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. More specifically, the author's study shows that companies with higher levels of value creation tend to have stronger reputations for treating stakeholders well while companies that create little value end up shortchanging not just their shareholders but all their constituencies. For profitable companies that have previously failed to devote the optimal level of resources to their non‐investor stakeholders, the message of this article is that investing in stakeholders can add value—and, in fact, it pays for companies to spend an additional dollar on stakeholder relationships as long as the present value of the expected (long‐run) return is at least a dollar.     

基于会计和治理信息的财务困境预测模型研究

本文以2005年上半年沪深两市中首次被ST的52家公司和52家非ST公司为研究对象，同时利用这些上市公司的会计信息和公司治理信息来构建财务困境预测模型。研究结果表明：（1）公司治理特征对公司陷入财务困境具有显著影响；（2）公司治理信息不能为财务信息所覆盖。一方面，说明公司治理结构对公司的财务安全具有重要影响，另一方面也说明今后在研究和构建财务困境预测模型时，不仅要考虑会计信息，还应考虑公司治理信息等，以构建出更为有效的预测模型。     

Brazil's Experiment with Corporate Governance

The adoption of special listing segments by the São Paulo Stock Exchange in the year 2000 was an important step forward for the Brazilian equity market. Bovespa's introduction of the Novo Mercado and its Special Corporate Governance Levels 1 and 2 provided concrete, standardized certification of corporate commitments to higher governance standards that could be readily observed and verified by all market participants. What evidence do we have that this experiment in corporate governance has been a success? One indication is the performance of the Brazilian stock market itself, along with its ability to attract foreign investors. From 2002 to mid‐2008, the market capitalization of Bovespa companies increased by over 700%, while average daily volume grew almost tenfold. And as of June 2008, international investors represented 37% of total value, up from 26% in 2002. What's more, the growth in the three differentiated governance segments has been even more remarkable. Starting with 15 companies in 2001, the special governance segments had a total of 161 listings by early 2009. And by the end of 2008, the companies listed in the three differentiated segments accounted for more than 60% of Bovespa's total market capitalization and 73% of all trades. Perhaps even more telling, over 70% of the Brazilian IPOs issued between 2001 and 2008 were placed in the special governance segments. In this article, the authors summarize the findings of their study of the reaction of stock prices to the announcement by 31 Brazilian companies of their intent to list on one of the special governance exchanges. Their analysis showed that the companies choosing to list in these segments experienced an increase in both the value and the liquidity of their shares. In light of this evidence, such corporate decisions can be seen as functioning as publicly verifiable signals of commitment to greater transparency and investor protection. And the fact that the listing requirements of the special segments are stricter than those of Brazilian securities legislation means that stock exchanges—and the companies that choose to list on them— effectively have the option to initiate or lead investor protection reforms, as opposed to just complying with them. Thus, in countries where governance legislation is weak and the progress of reform is slow, stock markets can play a key role in helping companies differentiate themselves through exchange‐defined governance codes.     

论我国推行独立董事制度的必要性

在证券市场国际化的发展趋势中,推行独立董事制度成为不同法系国家改善公司治理结构的重要措施,作为一种“国际化标准”的点缀,独立董事制度有合理的存在空间,它对于通过境外资本市场融资的上市公司有着重要的意义。但应该看到,独立董事制度不是医治“公司治理结构”的“灵丹妙药”,因此,在完善我国公司治理结构的过程中,应当理性地对待这一“舶来品”,完善我国公司治理结构、维护中小股东权益,有赖于独立董事制度与其他法律制度的结合。     

It's Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?

Annual shareholder meetings provide an opportunity for shareholders to express their concerns with corporate performance, pressuring managers to demonstrate good performance. We show that managers respond to the shareholder pressure by reporting positive corporate news before the annual shareholder meetings. Specifically, we find significantly positive average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the 40 days before the annual meeting date. The premeeting returns are significantly higher when shareholder discontent with managerial performance is likely to be stronger. The decile of companies with the worst past stock price performance exhibits average CARs of 3.4% and buy‐and‐hold returns of 7.0% during the 40‐day premeeting period. Companies with poor past performance exhibit even higher premeeting returns when shareholder pressure on management is greater, such as when institutional ownership is high, when CEO compensation is high, and when shareholders submit proxy proposals on corporate governance. We complement the evidence based on CARs by showing how managers of poorly performing firms manage the timing and content of earnings announcements and management forecast announcements before the annual shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that managers attempt to influence shareholders before annual shareholder meetings through positive news.     

Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS

This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the 51 firms targeted by CalPERS over the 1987–93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN EMERGING MARKET: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Despite significant capital-market reforms in the mid-1980s, the Israeli government and banks continue to play an unusually dominant role in Israeli financial markets. Israeli banks operate as merchant banks and, through pyramid structures of ownership, control large segments of manufacturing, construction, insurance, and services. In addition, the banks dominate all facets of the capital market, including underwriting, brokerage, investment advice, and the management of mutual and provident funds.
Because of this dominance by the banks, several important mechanisms of corporate governance are missing. There is no effective market for corporate control; institutional investors have little incentive to monitor corporate managers; and those managers in turn have little incentive to improve firm performance and increase shareholder value.
To be sure, there has been an impressive wave of IPOs on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) in the 1990s. But those firms' stocks have substantially underperformed the market since going public, and many "higher-quality" Israeli firms have chosen in recent years to list their securities on the NASDAQ and not at home. The main reason the most promising Israeli firms go public in the U.S. is because that is where U.S. and other foreign investors want to buy them; such investors want the assurances that come with the U.S. corporate governance system.     

Corporate Governance and Value: Evidence from “Close Calls” On Shareholder Governance Proposals

The authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the effects of specific corporate governance provisions on firm value. Using a sample of governance provisions that were subjected to shareholder votes during the period 1997–2011, this study analyzes cases in which shareholder‐sponsored corporate governance proposals were either rejected or passed by a small margin (no more than 5% of the vote). By so doing, this study helps correct two limitations of the existing governance literature: (1) that the effects of expected governance changes are already incorporated in share prices (the “expectations” problem); and (2) that governance policies are often a consequence rather than a cause of other variables such as corporate performance and are thus correlated with many other firm characteristics (the “endogeneity” problem). The authors' findings show that expected improvements in corporate governance through the adoption of particular corporate governance provisions—particularly the removal of anti‐takeover provisions—is associated with both positive abnormal stock returns and improvements in long‐term firm operating performance. The authors estimate that the adoption of such governance proposals increases shareholder value by 2.6%, on average. Moreover, these returns are consistent with, and thus accurate predictors of, future changes in corporate investment (reductions of capital spending, in most cases) and improvements in operating performance.     

The Icahn Manifesto

The title of this opening chapter in the author's new book on activist investors refers to Carl Icahn's solution to the “agency” problem faced by the shareholders of public companies in motivating corporate managers and boards to maximize firm value. During the 1960s and '70s, U.S. public companies tended to be run in ways designed to increase their size while minimizing their financial risk, with heavy emphasis on corporate diversification. Icahn successfully challenged corporate managers throughout the 1970s and 1980s by buying blocks of shares in companies he believed were undervalued and then demanding board seats and other changes in corporate governance and management. This article describes the evolution of Icahn as an investor. Starting by investing in undervalued, closed‐end mutual funds and then shorting shares of the stocks in the underlying portfolio, Icahn was able to get fund managers either to liquidate their funds (giving Icahn an arbitrage profit on his long mutual fund/short underlying stocks position) or take other steps to eliminate the “value gap.” After closing the value gaps within the limited universe of closed‐end mutual funds, Icahn turned his attention to the shares of companies trading for less than his perception of the value of their assets. As the author goes on to point out, the strategy that Icahn used with such powerful effect can be traced to the influence of the great value investor Benjamin Graham. Graham was a forceful advocate for the use of shareholder activism to bring about change in underperforming—and in that sense undervalued—companies. The first edition of Graham's investing classic, Security Analysis, published in 1934, devoted an entire chapter to the relationship between shareholders and management, which Graham described as “one of the strangest phenomena of American finance.”     

“Swimming Ducks Forecast the Coming of Spring”—The predictability of aggregate insider trading on future market returns in the Chinese market

This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive(large shareholder)trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66%(72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater information advantage(e.g., executives and controlling shareholders).Corporate governance also affects the predictability of insider trading. The predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies,probably because the "quasi-official" status of the executives in those companies effectively curbs their incentives to benefit from insider trading.The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger profit motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating how the institutional context and corporate governance affect insider trading.     

Diversification,corporate governance and firm value in small markets: evidence from New Zealand

We find that diversified firms in New Zealand are associated with a value discount of 19–42 per cent relative to single‐segment (undiversified) firms. Although several competing explanations have been offered in the literature, we find that the strength of corporate governance explains between 15–21 per cent of this discount. Specifically, board size, busyness of directors, CEO ownership and whether or not compensation of directors includes equity‐based components collectively explain a large part of the reported discount. Our results from companies trading in New Zealand complement recent findings in the US by not only confirming the existence of a diversification discount but also emphasizing the role of poor governance in destroying shareholder wealth by pursuing a value‐destroying corporate strategy. All our results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in the decision to diversify and the choice of corporate governance structure by employing two‐way fixed‐effects and dynamic‐panel generalized method of moments regression techniques.     

Investor Protection and Governance in the Valuation of Emerging Markets Investments

The combination of ineffective corporate governance at the company level and an uncertain legal and regulatory environment can significantly reduce the prices investors are willing to pay when investing in companies in emerging markets. The authors report the findings of their recent survey that asks investment professionals to compare the value of a hypothetical Australian company with that of its identical counterparts located in five emerging markets: Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Iran. The responding investors said they would value the emerging markets investments at discounts from the value of the Australian company that ranged from a low of 13.5% for its Malaysian counterpart to 51.2% for the Iranian company. Moreover, they indicated they would require costs of equity for these investments that were consistent with even larger valuation discounts. The investors' responses to the survey also suggest that corporate governance is especially important in countries with weaker investor protection. Well‐governed companies located in these countries enjoy significant value premiums that can partly offset the negative effect of the poor institutional environments, which suggests there may be a significant payoff for investors that succeed in improving the governance of the companies they invest in.     

Exploring the transitional behavior among value and growth stocks

Unlike the corporate funds in the US, mutual funds in many countries such as China and Germany operate under a different governance arrangement and are thus called “contractual funds.” The governance structure of contractual funds allows shareholders of fund management companies, rather than the fund investors, to be responsible for asset management decisions. Therefore, a fund’s governance attributes may be especially important in driving its performance. Using a comprehensive governance data covering Chinese mutual funds, this paper finds that the governance and organizational structures of Chinese fund management companies significantly influence the performance of their affiliated funds. In particular, while a larger stake from the top1 shareholder significantly improves the performance of affiliated funds, the presence of multiple largest shareholders reduces their performance. Moreover, fund management companies that offer fewer fund products and charge higher management fees tend to perform better. Finally, more institutional holding in a fund appears to function as an external supervisory surrogate for internal board governance to help improve fund performance.     

Legal protection of investors,corporate governance,and the cost of equity capital

This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance on the cost of equity capital in emerging markets and how the effect is influenced by country-level legal protection of investors. We find that firm-level corporate governance has a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital in these markets. In addition, this corporate governance effect is more pronounced in countries that provide relatively poor legal protection. Thus, in emerging markets, firm-level corporate governance and country-level shareholder protection seem to be substitutes for each other in reducing the cost of equity. Our results are consistent with the finding from McKinsey's surveys that institutional investors are willing to pay a higher premium for shares in firms with good corporate governance, especially when the firms are in countries where the legal protection of investors is weak.