Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures

Previous studies in organizational economics and international business research have not tested a property rights view on the allocation of decision rights (DR) in joint ventures (JVs). The paper offers a test of the property rights explanation by using data from Hungarian JVs. Our analysis derives the following hypothesis: The more important the JV partner's intangible knowledge assets for the generation of residual surplus, the more residual DR are assigned to him. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model-based decision support system for solving vehicle routing and driver scheduling problems under hours of service regulations

In principle, hours-of-service (HOS) regulations are intended to help ensure truck drivers get adequate rest and perform safe operations. The new HOS regulations, however, may lead to substantial cost increases for regional common carriers which have already been hit hard by rising fuel prices and declining shipping demands. In addition, the new HOS regulations complicate driver schedules by not only restricting the driver's consecutive driving hours, but also expanding off-duty hours. To deal with this complex challenge, we propose a model-based decision support system (DSS) that helps determine the truck driver's working hours, rest periods, and his/her assigned truck's schedules and routes under HOS regulations. As a core of this model-based DSS, we developed a mixed-integer programming model and a simulated annealing metaheuristic for solving it. This model was also integrated with a geographical information system and relational database management system to enhance interfaces between the model and its parametric data using spatial, graphical displays.     

信息不对称条件下无形资产减值测度研究(Ⅰ)——信息不对称条件下无形资产减值测度研究与评论

无形资产减值测度是无形资产后续计量的重要理论和实务问题,它直接关系到企业无形资产减值准备的计提和利润质量。我国关于无形资产减值测度问题的研究尚处于起步阶段,还未形成完整的理论体系和定型的操作模型。作为研究信息不对称条件下的无形资产减值测度问题的起点,本文在梳理国内外对无形资产减值相关问题研究现状的基础上,简要评价已有的研究成果及其特点,为进一步研究奠定基础和提供参考。     

On the determinants of foreign ownership shares: Evidence from US firms' joint ventures in Japan

It is often argued that firms' foreign expansion is motivated by economies of scale in information-based intangible assets. Since these assets are combined with local factors in real production, their owner often has to deal with local factor owners' opportunistic behavior such as siphoning of skills which reduces the return on intangibles to the original owner. Local factor owners' agency behavior can also reduce a subsidiary's profit. Maintaining ownership mitigates the former type of opportunistic behavior, while ceding ownership reduces the latter type. Hence there is a non-linear relationship between ownership and the cost of control. In this paper we present a model that incorporates these aspects of a joint venture ownership. In our model the share in a joint venture of a foreign parent firm with a superior technology is determined such that its marginal cost of control is set equal to the marginal benefit it derives from a joint venture. We assume that, because of the uniqueness and mobility of its intangible factor, the foreign partner has more bargaining power than its local counterpart regarding the ownership of their joint venture and that the local partner is less concerned than its foreign counterpart about the problems of agency and property rights protection because of its geographic and cultural proximity to the joint venture. As a consequence, the foreign partner is able to exert its preference for its ownership share in the joint venture. Our theoretical results allow a decomposition of ownership share into components explained by the cost of control and by the profitability of a joint venture. Our empirical results using data on technology-based US firms' subsidiaries in Japan are consistent with our model predictions. In particular, the fraction of ownership share explained by the cost of control relative to the fraction explained by intrinsic profitability is higher for industries that rely more heavily on intangible assets, as expected from the model.     

关于构建现代无形资产管理体系的探讨

无形资产管理是现代化管理的重要内容,在知识经济条件下已成为企业生存与发展至关重要的环节。本文认为,构建我国无形资产管理体系,重点应在增强依法保护意识、设立无形资产管理机构和完善相关管理制度,注重知识资源和人力资源管理,以及无形资产权益、评估与营运管理,建立评估机制与信息系统等方面进行持续努力创新,从而根本上提升我国企业的形象和国际竞争力。     

The Entrepreneurial Organization of Heterogeneous Capital*

abstract Transaction cost, property rights, and resource‐based approaches to the firm assume that assets, both tangible and intangible, are heterogeneous. Arranging these assets to minimize contractual hazards, to provide efficient investment incentives, or to exploit competitive advantage is conceived as the prime task of economic organization. None of these approaches, however, is based on a systematic theory of capital heterogeneity. In this paper we outline the approach to capital developed by the Austrian school of economics and show how Austrian capital theory provides a natural bridge between theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm. We refine Austrian capital theory by defining capital heterogeneity in terms of subjectively perceived attributes, the functions, characteristics, and uses of capital assets. Such attributes are not given, but have to be created or discovered by means of entrepreneurial action. Conceiving entrepreneurship as the organization of heterogeneous capital provides new insights into the emergence, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm, and suggests testable implications about how entrepreneurship is manifested.     

完善我国民办高校法人治理结构的构想及措施研究

民办高校需要构建现代大学制度,法人治理结构是现代大学制度的核心。民办高校法人治理结构是民办院校从自然人治理转向法人治理的保证,有利于形成集体决策和权利制衡机制,有助于促进民办学校运营管理的民主参与。通过中外大学治理结构的比较,我国民办高校法人治理结构主要存在产权不明晰、董事会成员构成不合理、机构不健全等问题。完善我国民办高校法人治理结构可以从落实民办高校法人财产权、全面提升董事会决策能力、健全内部监督机制等方面入手。     

东莞市知识产权质押融资研究

本文介绍了东莞市知识产权质押融资做法及经验。研究了东莞市开展知识产权质押融资的制约因素:知识产权质押融资的质押物只包括专利权;参与商业银行数量不多,商业银行在操作环节创新性不强;企业对于知识产权等无形资产经营能力低;政府的经验不足等。提出了相关破解建议,如扩大商标权、版权等成为知识产权质押融资的质押物;挑选和增加相关的商业银行,商业银行在贷款审批环节中需要创新;企业需要长远规划,准确把握市场,提高对知识产权等无形资产的经营能力;政府可在市内设立试点区与试点企业以吸取经验等。希望本文对东莞市和国内其他地区知识产权质押融资的推行具有参考价值和借鉴意义。     

Does organization capital matter? An analysis of the performance implications of CEO power

Chief executive officer (CEO) power reflects the ability of the CEO to influence the firm's decision-making. Whether the CEO of the firm could manage the firm’s investment assets to support maximizing the efficiency of resource allocation is an important issue. As previous studies found, organization capital is a key intangible asset that improves the firm’s production efficiency and affects long-term performance. This study explores how CEO power affects organization capital investments and how it further affects the efficiency of firm resource allocation. We use the following three variables to measure CEO power: CEO founder, CEO-only insider and CEO duality. Our results indicate that the level of CEO power can influence a firm’s value by controlling the organization capital. When the firm’s CEO is also the founder, the CEO will attempt to increase investments in organization capital to create growth opportunities for the firm, which will therefore increase the firm's value. Specifically, when the company is in financial distress, the powerful CEO's increasing in organizational capital investment will expose the company to greater risk of loss of intangible assets. This result may further increase the company's price volatility.     

国有上市公司控制权转让问题研究

国有上市公司的剩余索取权和剩余控制权是分离的,在监督机制弱化、内部人控制严重的公司治理缺陷下,作为国有股东的代理人有动机和条件通过转让控制权谋取私利,处于劣势地位的受让方必然“贿赂”出让方,以期以较低的价格获得控制权这种稀缺资源,结果导致国有资产流失。因此,有必要完善国有上市公司的监管机制和用人机制,在公开竞价下进行控制权转让,并且强化信息披露制度。     

基于共同治理模式下的公司业绩评价指标体系探索

现代企业理论认为,企业是一系列合约的组合,其中最重要的是企业所有权合约,提高企业所有权安排效率的出路是资本所有者拥有剩余索取权与剩余控制权。在这种理论的基础上产生了“股东至上”理论,公司治理采用“股东至上模式”,与此相适应产生了相关的业绩评价体系。但是这种治理模式和业绩评价体系都存在着缺陷,为适应现代公司经营环境的变化,笔者认为,应该采用“共同治理模式”代替“股东至上模式”,并建立与之相适应的业绩评价体系。     

基于公司治理的会计信息失真分析及治理研究

企业是一个利益相关者权利的集合体,公司治理的核心是剩余索取权和控制权的安排。会计信息在企业剩余索取权和控制权的安排中发挥着至关重要的作用,会计信息失真的深层原因在于企业的产权关系混乱、公司治理不完善、内部人控制问题严重。本文分析了公司治理失范对会计信息失真的影响,并在此基础提出治理会计信息失真应当从实质着手,理顺企业产权关系,完善公司治理,合理构建权力制衡机制,改革董事会的成员结构,在公司董事会之下设立财务委员会、审计委员会、调配监事会人员构成以强化监事会的监督职能。     

The bright side and dark side of trust: The mediating effect of franchisor trust on performance

Previous literature has not examined the dual role of trust in franchise relationships. We extend the franchise and relational governance literature by showing that trust has both a “bright side” and a “dark side” in franchisor–franchisee relationships. Based on transaction cost and knowledge-based reasoning, we argue that intangible knowledge assets and environmental uncertainty have an indirect effect on performance via trust, due to its relational risk and knowledge exchange effect. Using data from the franchise sector in Germany, we show that trust positively mediates the impact of intangible knowledge assets and negatively mediates the impact of environmental uncertainty on franchisor performance. The first effect refers to the “bright side” of trust showing that intangible brand name assets increase trust which, in turn, has a positive effect on performance. Conversely, the second effect refers to the “dark side” of trust highlighting that environmental uncertainty diminishes trust resulting in a negative effect on performance.     

Do investments in intangible customer assets affect firm value?

This paper develops a simple model of investment by service firms in intangible customer assets, and tests whether the model identifies some critical drivers of firms’ stock returns. Similar to firms with significant research and development (R&D) expenditures, we argue that firms in fast-growing service industries with few tangible assets can increase firm value by investing in customer acquisition and service (A&S) expenditure. Using a unique hand-collected data set, we show that per-customer changes in firms’ revenues, customer acquisition costs, and customer service costs help to explain their abnormal stock returns.     

国有企业产权多元化的公司治理结构模式

本文对现行的国有企业的产权多元化的公司治理结构进行了分析,对普遍存在的几种典型的公司治理结构进行了讨论,分析了它们的优缺点,并在此基础上,根据中国的实际情况,提出了合理的国有企业产权多元化的公司治理结构模式:内部治理(股东大会、董事会、常务委员会、监事会、经理层);外部治理(政府、银行、外部企业)。并对完善国有企业产权多元化的公司治理结构模式的措施进行了探讨。     

知识产权管理的经济学探析

知识产权是经济社会发展的产物,各类微观经济体对知识产权的科学运用和管理有利于维护和提升自身的核心竞争力。作为宏观经济的调控者,现代国家对知识产权的保护、干预及管理一方面可以推动全社会技术创新、促进无形资产的总量增长,另一方面可以促进和维护社会公共利益及公平正义。论文从微观经济和宏观经济两个维度对知识产权管理进行了有益的探析,以期为相关经济管理活动提供可借鉴的视角。     

企业核心竞争力会计控制与相关概念的关系研究

本文认为,企业核心竞争力是企业各种资源和能力整合的结果。并将无形资产分为经典无形资产、边缘无形资产、组合无形资产和合力无形资产等四类。核心竞争力作为合力无形资产,不仅与经典无形资产、边缘无形资产具有密切的关系外,而且与商誉、品牌、价值链等概念具有密切的关系,研究企业核心竞争力与这些概念的关系,目的在于从理论上更进一步明确企业核心竞争力会计控制的对象。     

剩余控制权配置与家族企业继任冲突——香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例研究

华人社会盛行的诸子析产制是代际传承中分裂家族和家族企业的根本原因吗?本文通过剖析香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例发现,在代际传承过程中分离剩余索取权和控制权,集中配置剩余控制权并未根本解决上述问题,原因在于这种产权安排造成了控制权与剩余索取权的不对称,甚至控制权反向控制剩余控制权的情况,在代际传承导致家族原有内部治理...     

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE? AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE COROLLARY OF THE COASE THEOREM

Applying the corollary of the Coase Theorem to the development market developed in Lai et al. (2007a) , we evaluate the proposition that procedural steps to use resources are not contingent on property rights assignment, unless the associated transaction costs are positive or property rights are ambiguous. Using aggregate statistics regarding planning applications for residential use, property prices, construction costs, share prices, interest rates, and application success rates in Hong Kong from 1985 to 2005, we evaluated, using regression techniques, the null hypothesis that there was no change in the relationship between readiness for submission of planning applications and property prices in response to changes in the time limits imposed on planning permissions . The relationship was more pronounced or strengthened (less obvious or weakened) when time limits were first imposed and shorter (longer). This can be explained in terms of the transaction costs of switching resource allocation according to the time limit.     

Debt,equity, and information

Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock) to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their characteristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this important gap in the literature, this paper views debt and equity as financial contracts, and asks why they are optimal instead of other financial contracts. By endogenizing the bankruptcy process, this paper shows how debt and equity arise as a consequence of an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights and monitoring rights, and how equity leads to dividend signaling.