Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

The political economy of income comparisons and economic growth

The literature on income inequality has provided various explanations as to how income inequality can affect growth, with the emphasis on ideas such as investments in human capital, issues of occupational choice, or the redistributive policies of governments. Inequality not only has a direct effect on the distribution of consumption in an economy, but it also has a powerful effect on people's subjective sense of well being. This paper takes a novel approach by focusing on the way in which a government's choice of economic policy can be influenced by how individuals perceive themselves relative to other individuals, both within the country and in foreign countries. The chosen policy affects economic growth, with the assumption being that policies that promote growth also tend to result in more switching of individuals between income groups. We show that the government's optimal policy depends on the importance of both inside country and outside country income comparisons, the fraction of national income earned by the different income groups, the potential magnitude of economic growth, the probability of switching between income groups in the presence of growth, and the relative importance of the various income groups. The model predicts that a greater degree of inside country income comparison is bad for growth whereas more outside country comparison is good for growth.     

Redistribution and entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian growth

We examine the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse agents. There are skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth rate is determined by the occupational choice of skilled agents between entrepreneurship and employment. We show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and increases the growth rate. The effects on inequality are such that low tax rates increase inequality relative to laissez-faire due to changes in wages, but higher tax rates can simultaneously raise growth and reduce inequality. We contrast the optimal linear income tax with alternative policies for promoting R&D and find that it is preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.      

Growth and inequality in an endogenous fiscal policy model with taxes on labor and capital

I study an economy where individuals have different initial endowments and fiscal policy is decided by majority voting. Public investment is financed by two flat rate taxes, one on labor income and the other one on capital income. The model shows a positive (negative) correlation between growth and the tax rate on labor (capital) income and a negative (positive) correlation between the tax rate on labor (capital) income and inequality. The results reconcile the theory with empirical evidence.     

新古典模型中收入和财富分配持续不平等的动态演化

本文讨论了当个人劳动能力和偏好存在差异的情况下，资本收入和劳动收入分配的差异如何通过遗产机制影响收入和财富分配的持续性不平等程度。论文分析表明：在偏好、个人劳动能力和个人收入的随机冲击的影响下，如果市场是完善的，整个经济系统存在收入和财富分配的稳定不平等状态，而且，这种稳定的不平等状态与初始的财富分配的不平等和一次性的产权配置都是无关的。最后，本文分析了资本收入税和劳动收入税对持续不平等程度的影响，通过分析指出：从长期来看，在劳动能力和初始财富存在差异而偏好没有差异的情况下，征收劳动收入税比征收资本收入税更有利于改善由于能力差异所造成的持续不平等。     

新古典模型中收入和财富分配持续不平等的动态演化

本文讨论了当个人劳动能力和偏好存在差异的情况下,资本收入和劳动收入分配的差异如何通过遗产机制影响收入和财富分配的持续性不平等程度。论文分析表明:在偏好、个人劳动能力和个人收入的随机冲击的影响下,如果市场是完善的,整个经济系统存在收入和财富分配的稳定不平等状态,而且,这种稳定的不平等状态与初始的财富分配的不平等和一次性的产权配置都是无关的。最后,本文分析了资本收入税和劳动收入税对持续不平等程度的影响,通过分析指出:从长期来看,在劳动能力和初始财富存在差异而偏好没有差异的情况下,征收劳动收入税比征收资本收入税更有利于改善由于能力差异所造成的持续不平等。     

Human capital and income distribution dynamics

The paper assumes a continuum of two period-lived agents; agents are identical except for inherited income. Young agents allocate their inheritance between consumption and investment in human capital under uncertainty. In the second period they receive a wage proportional to the accumulated human capital and invest in offspring. Two main results arise: a low earning per unit of human capital leads economy to converge to a stationary income distribution whatever the initial distribution and vice versa, for a sufficiently high wage, endogenous growth operates and the distributive dynamics depends on initial conditions. In this case different redistributive policies are analysed.     

US federal redistributive income policies

The purpose of this paper is to present a statiscial model of inequality that allows us to analyse simultaneously the impact of several major redistributive expenditure policies, as well as analysing the impact of income taxation on inequality. The paper includes multivariate exogeeity tests to determine whether the policies have ‘caused’ the observed income distribution or if there is feedback, i.e. inequality in the distribution has lead to enhanced (or diminished) redistributive policies. The direction of causality for these policies has not, to ourr knowledge, been previously examined. This paper examines the usual redistributive vehicles of transfer payments, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, as well as analysing the impact of the personal income tax system on inequality. Using time series analysis we can allow for lagged effects of these policies as well as current period effects. This lagged effects specification may be sugggestive of behavioural responses to policy changes.     

Negative income taxes,inequality and poverty

We use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the redistributive effects of a negative income tax system, which combines a flat rate tax with a fully refundable credit (“demogrant”). We show that changing the demogrant‐to‐output ratio causes significant changes in the distribution of income. Specifically, we find that increasing the demogrant‐to‐output ratio sharply reduces the level of inequality as well as both relative and absolute poverty (all measured in terms of post‐tax total income). However, these reductions in inequality and poverty come at the expense of a significant reduction in output.     

Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people

We consider optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic model where the labor‐leisure choice is the extensive margin, each household faces idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and a pecuniary cost to work, and there is no insurance market against the shocks. We show that the well‐known property of the optimal participation tax rate in the static model continues to hold in our dynamic economy, that is, the participation tax rates for some income groups with low consumption are likely negative. In dynamic models, the optimal participation tax rate depends on age and on labor income. Our numerical simulations suggest that a negative participation tax should be restricted to young households.     

Redistributive policy,inequality and growth

Does redistribution increase inequality? Is inequality harmful for growth? Both questions have recently been addressed in a number of single-tax models. In this paper, I examine the relationship between policy, growth and inequality when income and inherited wealth can be taxed at different rates. In the model, parents accumulate human capital and a return-bearing, storable good in order to increase the quality of their children. Inequality arises because the learning ability of children is stochastic. Redistributive labor income taxation has a negative impact on short- and long-run growth while taxation of inherited stocks increases growth. Effects of both taxes on income inequality are ambiguous. A switch from income to inheritance taxation may increase average utility of all generations involved. I calculate a structure-induced equilibrium of the political process by means of a stochastic simulation of the model. In the short run initial wealth-inequality can stimulate growth, while initial inequality of the endowment with human capital is harmful for growth.     

Flat income taxation,redistribution and labour market performance

A flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in European countries. This article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. Only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment. This finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity-efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way.     

Income distribution and redistribution through taxation: An international comparison

Income tax progressivity is studied with Generalized Entropy measures of inequality. Luxembourg Income Study data sets for nine countries are used for international comparison and analysis. progressivity indices are generated by using the Generalized Entropy family as well as Atkinson measures. We further our understanding by examining pre-tax and post-tax measures of inequality based respectively on gross and disposable household incomes. The decomposition property is shown to be desirable for enhancing our knowledge of income inequality and the redistributive effect of income taxes. Thus decomposition based on family size and number of earners is conducted. We learn that countries vary in their emphasis regarding redistributive effects of income taxes.     

THE VANISHING BEQUEST TAX: THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BEQUEST TAXATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bequest tax revenues have been declining in OECD countries for at least 70 years. We propose an explanation that is based on a dynamic politico‐economic model where the evolution of bequest taxation is determined by wealth inequality. Since economic development induces a growing role of labor income and thus a reduction of wealth inequality, bequest taxation is reduced over time. The model also embeds a process of structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and a consequent shift of the tax base from easy‐to‐tax land to hard‐to‐tax capital. This process implies a lower tax level and slower equalization‐induced tax reduction, the higher is the tax avoidance rate and the less developed is the economy. The introduction of franchise restrictions which are gradually lifted over time allows the hump‐shaped long‐term evolution of bequest taxation to be reproduced starting from the nineteenth century for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies. The evolution of political institutions also helps to explain the discrepancies currently observed between tax systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.     

Progressive Tax and Inequality in a Unionized Economy*

In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous-agent, endogenous growth model of a unionized economy with distinct progressive tax schedules on labor and capital income. With time preference heterogeneity, the effective labor force, balanced growth, and income inequality are endogenously determined, and these interact with each other. A reduction in the degree of progressive labor tax yields a “double-dividend” in terms of reducing income inequality and boosting economic growth, while capital income progressivity displays the usual growth–inequality trade-off. Particularly, the double-dividend effect becomes more pronounced when unionization is declined or trade unions become more wage-oriented, leading to the so-called “Cheshire cat” phenomenon.     

Optimal income taxation with human capital accumulation and limited record keeping

This paper characterizes optimal income taxes in a dynamic economy where human capital is unobservable and the government is restricted to use taxes that depend only on current income. I show that unobservability of human capital tends to decrease the labor wedge, while the effect on the human capital wedge is uncertain. I also analyze the relationship between optimal taxes in economies with and without endogenous human capital and identify two qualitative reasons why the optimal tax codes will differ. I perform numerical simulations to calculate the quantitative relevance of endogenous human capital formation for optimal tax policy. I find that endogenous human capital lowers marginal tax rates by about 9% on average, as compared with a static model without human capital.     

内生经济增长理论框架下的市场失效与财政政策

内生经济增长理论认为,知识和人力资本的外部效应与创新带来的垄断势力推动经济增长的同时,也会带来非帕雷托最优的经济增长收入分配的不公平,将阻碍经济增长;加快知识和人力资本积累、促进技术进步以及缓解收入分配不公平的财政政策能纠正市场失效,使长期经济增长达到社会最优.     

人工智能的财富分配效应研究*

人工智能对经济不平等的影响引起学术界的广泛重视，但是现有研究以分析其对劳动收入不平等的影响为主，关于人工智能对财富分配从而对财产性收入不平等影响的相关研究尚有欠缺。本文通过构建一个连续时间异质性个体动态一般均衡模型，将人工智能对生产技术的影响看作一揽子偏向性技术进步，研究人工智能技术对财富分配的影响。分析发现，人工智能对财富不平等的影响在短期和长期表现有所不同，短期中人工智能技术的应用会提高经济中财富分配不平等程度，而长期中其财富分配效应则取决于人工智能对不同类型技术进步的促进程度。核心机制在于，人工智能技术进步的多样性在短期和长期中对资本回报率产生不同影响，短期中各类技术进步总是会提高资本回报率，而在长期，不同类型的技术进步对资本回报率的影响出现差异。基于以上结论，本文就我国如何在应用人工智能促进增长的同时预防不平等程度扩大提出了政策建议。     

Labor or consumption taxes? An application with a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents

This study analyzes the effects of tax reform that shifts tax burden from labor to consumption. In this context, I also deal with the issue of progressivity. Even though this kind of tax policy change has recently gained popularity, its positive effects are debatable while the offsetting effect of a consumption tax on labor supply makes the net output change rather ambiguous. I examine these effects using a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. The model is calibrated to fit certain characteristics of the Finnish economy. In addition to output and employment effects, I study the tax reform's effect on income and wealth distribution. First, I find that eliminating progressivity in labor taxation increases output via increase in capital accumulation that comes, however, in expense of slightly more inequality. Then, tax reform that replaces progressive labor taxes with a flat-rate consumption tax leads to a significant rise in capital accumulation, a negligible change in labor supply and gross labor income distribution, but a relatively considerable increase in wealth concentration.     

Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime‐Dynastic Income Concepts*

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth‐tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes. In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by high‐income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.