Shareholder rights, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital

This study extends research into whether shareholder rights and disclosures of financial-related attributes are associated with firms' costs of equity capital. Using cost-of-equity-capital estimates derived from expected earnings growth valuation models, we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights regimes and higher levels of financial transparency are associated with significantly lower costs of equity capital. We also find evidence that greater financial disclosure and stronger rights regimes interact in reducing firms' costs of equity capital, such that the effect of a high level of one mechanism is minimal when it is combined with a low level of the other. Finally, we document that neither factor dominates the other in their associations, and that there are tradeoffs between disclosure levels and shareholder rights in their influence on firms' implied costs of equity capital. JEL Classification G30 · M10     

Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?

This paper develops and tests a model of how country characteristics, such as legal protections for minority investors and the level of economic and financial development, influence firms’ costs and benefits in implementing measures to improve their own governance and transparency. We find that country characteristics explain much more of the variance in governance ratings (ranging from 39% to 73%) than observable firm characteristics (ranging from 4% to 22%). Further, we show that firm characteristics explain almost none of the variation in governance ratings in less-developed countries and that access to global capital markets sharpens firms’ incentives for better governance.     

The impacts of parent’s listing status on subsidiary’s financial constraint and cost of equity capital: the case of equity carve‐outs

We find that listed parents’ carve‐outs have investment‐cash‐flow sensitivities 70 per cent lower than unlisted parents’ carve‐outs, on average. Such a finding is stronger when we consider only equity carve‐outs in technological industries. The finding suggests that listed parents are more capable of alleviating the financial constraint of their carved‐out units than private parents. Our further analysis shows that listed parents’ carve‐outs also have a lower cost of equity than their counterparts, but such difference cannot be explained by corporate transparency, as implied by analyst coverage and analysts’ forecast dispersion. Therefore, we argue that the benefits from affiliation with a listed parent to the carve‐out come mainly from the parent’s financial support rather than an increase in corporate transparency.     

Degrees-of-freedom problem and implied cost of equity capital

Bias in implied cost of equity estimates arises from analyst optimism and a degrees-of-freedom problem. The common practice in empirical studies of using a proxy for the earnings forecast horizon beyond two years in the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (OJ) model is potentially biased. We derive a generalized OJ model over a T period forecast horizon and indicate the extent of this bias. The implied cost of equity capital is obtained from a quadratic equation, where our constant term comprises T short-term annual earnings per share growth rates, rather than just the next-period counterpart in the OJ model.     

The implied cost of equity capital,corporate investment and chief executive officer turnover

This study investigates how the cost of equity capital, along with corporate investment, affects chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions. We hypothesize that the cost of equity conveys information about firm performance uncertainty that is informative of CEO talent. Consistently, our empirical results show that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, after controlling for earnings and stock performance measures and risk factors. Additional analysis of reverse causality supports the causal effect of the high cost of equity on CEO dismissals. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems. These results suggest that the cost of equity plays a more important role in assessing CEO performance when the firm needs more external equity capital to pursue investment opportunities.     

Financial integration and emerging markets capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of country-level financial integration on corporate financing choices in emerging economies. Examining 4477 public firms from 24 countries, we find that corporate leverage is positively related to credit market integration and negatively related to equity market integration. As integration proceeds to higher levels, high-growth firms seem to obtain more debt than low-growth firms; large firms seem to obtain more debt - especially long-term debt - and issue more equity than small firms. Also, there is evidence that firms are able to borrow more funds in countries with more efficient legal systems during integration process.     

Divestitures,wealth effects and corporate governance

We analyse the market reaction to divestiture decisions and determine the impact of corporate governance practices. We find the market reaction is significant and can be determined using internal governance mechanisms. We evaluate the determinants of the decision to sell using a control sample of firms displaying characteristics often associated with divestitures indicating that these firms may face the same incentives to divest but elect not to restructure in this manner. Our results suggest that a combination of strong internal and external governance may force managers to act in a manner that is incompatible with their personal desires.     

Improved corporate governance and Chinese seasoned equity offering announcement effects

Corporate governance and thus overall investor protection in China improved after the Split Share Structure Reform and the release of the new company law in 2005. This study examines the impact of improved corporate governance and investor protection on the market's reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements in China. The market reacts to post‐2005 SEOs positively, while it reacts to pre‐2005 SEOs negatively. The different market reactions are attributed to the market's different perceptions of firms' intentions behind SEO decisions – that is, investors are more optimistic and have more trust in SEO issuers when they believe they are better protected.     

Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity

In this paper, we examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders alleviates a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in the cost of equity financing. Using data for 1165 corporations from 8 East Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find evidence that the implied cost of equity decreases with the presence, number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner. We also find that the identity of the second largest shareholder is important in determining the risk of corporate expropriation in family-controlled firms. Our regional analysis reveals that, mainly in East Asian firms, multiple large shareholders structures exert an internal governance role in curbing private benefits and reducing information asymmetry, perhaps to sidestep deficiencies in the external institutional environment.     

Equity value,implied cost of equity and shareholders’ real options

This study investigates the effects of shareholders’ real options on (i) firm financial performance and (ii) estimations of the implied cost of equity. After measuring the equity value of steady‐state operations using the residual income model, and the abandonment and expansion options using the Black‐Scholes option pricing model, I find that firms with a large expansion (abandonment) option value experience better (worse) financial performance than those with a small such value. I also find that ignoring these options results in a downward bias in implied cost of equity estimates by an average of 1.23 percentage points.