Sudden stops in a currency union – some lessons from the euro area

During the Great Financial Crisis several euro area Member States with current account deficits were subject to sharp reversals of private capital flows. We examine how the specific policy rules of the euro area's payments system TARGET2 affects the macroeconomic adjustments to sudden stops. We find that – in the short run – public capital flows in form of TARGET2 help euro area‐deficit countries to stabilize output, consumption, and investment after a sudden stop of private capital inflows. In the long run, however, euro area countries suffer under a prolonged economic recovery and accumulated large public debt as well as higher welfare losses relative to euro peggers.     

Sudden Stops,Time Inconsistency,and the Duration of Sovereign Debt

We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.     

Sudden stops, banking crises and investment collapses in emerging markets

We evaluate whether financial openness leaves emerging market economies vulnerable to the adverse effects of capital reversals (“sudden stops”) on domestic investment. We investigate this claim in a broad sample of emerging markets during the period 1976–2002. If the banking sector does not experience a systemic crisis, sudden stop events fail to have a significant impact on investment. Bank crises, on the other hand, have a significant negative effect on investment even in the absence of a contemporaneous sudden stop crisis. We also find that openness to capital flows worsens the adverse impact of banking crises on investment. Our results provide statistical support for the policy view that a strong banking sector which can withstand the negative fallout of capital flight is essential for countries that open their economies to international financial flows.     

Sudden stops,sectoral reallocations,and the real exchange rate

A sudden stop of capital flows into a developing country tends to be followed by a rapid switch from trade deficits to surpluses, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and decreases in output and total factor productivity. Substantial reallocation takes place from the nontraded sector to the traded sector. We construct a multisector growth model, calibrate it to the Mexican economy, and use it to analyze Mexico's 1994–95 crisis. When subjected to a sudden stop, the model accounts for the trade balance reversal and the real exchange rate depreciation, but it cannot account for the decreases in GDP and TFP. Extending the model to include labor frictions and variable capital utilization, we still find that it cannot quantitatively account for the dynamics of output and productivity without losing the ability to account for the movements of other variables.     

International Environmental Agreements under Endogenous Uncertainty

This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two‐period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first‐period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puzzle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to international environmental agreements. We also find that in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed membership case.     

Sudden stops, financial frictions, and labor market flows: Evidence from Latin America

While the aggregate effects of sudden stops and international financial crises are well known, the disaggregated channels through which they work are not well explored yet. In this paper, using job flows from a sectoral panel dataset for four Latin American countries, we find that sudden stops are characterized as periods of lower job creation and increased job destruction. Moreover, these effects are heterogeneous across sectors: we find that when a sudden stop occurs, sectors with higher dependence on external financing experience lower job creation. In turn, sectors with higher liquidity needs experience significantly larger job destruction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that dependence on external financing affects mainly the creation margin and that exposure to liquidity conditions affects mainly the destruction margin. Overall, our results provide evidence of financial frictions being an important transmission channel of sudden stops and in the restructuring process in general.     

Sudden stops and output: an empirical Markov switching analysis

Sudden stops and their negative effects on GDP have recently received increased attention because quantitative easing has led to substantial capital inflows into emerging economies. We extend the empirical literature on the impact of sudden stops on GDP by proposing an alternative econometric approach which is multivariate, nonlinear and uses a novel way to identify sudden stops. We estimate a Markov switching vector autoregression with a latent variable indicating whether the economy is in a sudden stop regime. We use the maximum fraction of forecast error variance approach for partial structural identification of the vector autoregression model. Beyond confirming findings from the existing empirical literature on sudden stops, our results additionally show that (i) sudden stops are associated with regime switches (i.e., breaks in the behavior of economic variables), which have significantly negative and permanent effects on GDP; (ii) impulse responses to net capital inflow shocks are regime dependent with economies being more vulnerable to shocks during the sudden stop regime; and (iii) there were different main drivers of the output decline in historical sudden stop episodes.     

Compensation Convexity without Utility Restriction

We develop an optimal contract model on the use of stock options for chief executive officer compensation under the Mirrlees–Rogerson moral hazard framework. We find that convexity, as know as, the use of stock options, can arise with a broader range of agent utility functions than allowed by Hemmer et al. ( 2000 ). We characterise the necessary conditions regarding the behaviour of the agent's marginal risk tolerance for both the concavity and convexity cases of the likelihood‐ratio function. We find stock options need to be used more intensively, when the agent displays a higher marginal risk tolerance and when the realised task output is higher.     

Sudden Stops and Currency Crashes

This paper investigates which factors determine whether sudden stops in international capital flows are followed by a currency crash using data for 85 economies in the period 1980–2012. An event study approach is used for an 11‐year window around the crises for nine potential explanatory variables. In addition, the paper estimates discrete‐choice panel models. The results suggest that low trade openness, shallow financial markets, and current account imbalances increase the likelihood that a sudden stop will be followed by a currency crash. Moreover, it is established that the impact of these factors differs across different exchange rate regimes.     

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SOURCES OF CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE JOB FINDING RATE USING RESERVATION WAGES AND REJECTED WAGE OFFERS*

We consider a structural dynamic job search model where nonstationarity originates from the change over time in the benefit level, the job offer arrival rate, and the wage offer distribution. The model is estimated on the French sample of the ECHP taking advantage of direct observation of reservation wages, rejected job offers, and associated rejected wages. We find that the offered wages deteriorate rapidly (13.8% over six months, 19.2% over one year, and 30% over two years) and that changes in the wage offer distribution are the unique source of negative duration dependence in the hazard.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Outflows–induced sudden stops

The term ‘sudden stop’ refers to a scenario in which an emerging market is suddenly cut off from international capital markets. Losing access to capital markets can be devastating, often resulting in a currency crisis and recession. However, some sudden stop episodes are driven not by global investors heading for the exits, but rather by locals increasing their international claims. The source of the problem determines the policy response. To better focus on sources rather than outcomes, sudden stops should be identified as a cessation of inflows (inflows‐induced) or a sudden surge in outflows (outflows‐induced).     

REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth‐constrained agent are risk‐neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first‐period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be “too good” to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be “overqualified.”     

Unemployment benefits and recall jobs: a split population model

We study the transitions out of unemployment of the recipients of insurance benefits, focusing on whether or not they are recalled to their previous employment. Specifically, a split population duration model (SPDM) for the recall decision by employers is compared with a standard duration model (SDM). We find significant differences between the SPDM and the SDM estimates, both with regard to their magnitude and expected sign. Some of the variables record undervalued estimated hazard rates in the SDM with respect to the SPDM.     

An experimental test of a committee search model

The objective of this paper is to design a laboratory experiment for an infinite-horizon sequential committee search model in order to test some of the implications obtained by the model in Albrecht et al. (2010) (AAV). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the search duration is longer for committee search under the unanimity rule, but is shorter for committee search in which at least one vote is required to stop searching. In addition, according to estimates from round-based search decisions, subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in committee search than in single-agent search. This confirms that agents are less picky in committee search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implications suggested by the AAV model. However, despite the prediction from the AAV model, we could not obtain a significant outcome in relation to the size order of the probabilities of voting to stop searching in committee search for the various plurality voting rules.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

A Mixed Duopoly With Switching Costs

We examine the effects of switching costs in a two‐period Hotelling‐type model where a profit‐maximising private firm competes with a welfare‐maximising public firm. We show that, in contrast with the case in which both firms are private, where switching costs raise prices in both periods, in the mixed duopoly they raise prices in the second period but reduce them in the first period. Moreover, the first‐period price reduction is of such magnitude that switching costs reduce firms’ profits and raise consumer welfare. We also find that switching costs affect the consequences of privatisation in favour of firms and against consumers.     

Whose Job Goes Abroad? International Outsourcing and Individual Job Separations

This paper focuses on the adjustment costs of globalisation by studying the effects of international outsourcing on individual transitions out of jobs in the Danish manufacturing sector for the period 1990–2003. A competing risks duration model that distinguishes between job‐to‐job and job‐to‐unemployment transitions is estimated. Outsourcing is found to increase the unemployment risk of low‐skilled workers, but the quantitative impact is modest. Outsourcing is also found to reduce the job change hazard rate for all education groups. Thus, the paper provides evidence for small adjustment costs of globalisation.     

Determinants of firm survival: a duration analysis using the generalized gamma distribution

We use parametric duration analysis to study the survival of Austrian firms. We find that hazard rates in both manufacturing and services initially increase, reach a peak after the first year of operation and then decrease with age. The maximum hazard rate is higher in services. We also find differences in hazard rates among different types of manufacturing industries distinguished by the nature of their sunk costs, their reliance on human resources and inputs from external services. Finally, we find that larger initial size and higher market growth, and at the same time lower net entry and declining market concentration prolong the life of an entrant.

Do Lower Caseloads Improve the Performance of Public Employment Services? New Evidence from German Employment Offices

The caseworker‐to‐clients ratio is an important, but understudied, policy parameter that affects both the quality and cost of public employment services that help job seekers find employment. We exploit a large‐scale pilot by Germany's employment agency, which hired 490 additional caseworkers in 14 of its 779 offices. We find that lowering caseloads caused a decrease in the rate and duration of local unemployment as well as a higher re‐employment rate. Disentangling the mechanisms that contributed to this improvement, we find that offices with lowered caseloads increased monitoring and imposed more sanctions but also intensified search efforts and registered additional vacancies.