Measuring Search Frictions Using Japanese Microdata

This paper estimates individual‐level matching functions to measure search frictions in the Japanese labour market and presents the determinants of search duration. We employ administrative microdata that track the job search process of job seekers who left or lost their job in August 2005 and subsequently registered at their local public employment service. Our finding is that the matching function exhibits decreasing rather than constant returns‐to‐scale for job seekers and vacancies. We also find that after controlling for the benefits period, job seekers who lost their job involuntarily were more likely than those quitting voluntarily to exit from unemployment.     

Learning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job

We combine post-displacement survey data with information from personnel files of a displacing firm in order to reveal sources of worker heterogeneity in search time and wage losses. The Fokker Personnel Files and Survey are described in detail. We develop a dynamic reservation wage with updating. The method of updating is based on the simple idea that job seekers are informed about successful matches of their former colleagues similar to them. The data offer empirical support for the updating model.     

The impact of employers' recruitment behaviour on the allocation of vacant jobs to unemployed job seekers

This paper is focused on the allocation of vacant jobs to job seekers from a demand side perspective by studying the recruitment behaviour of employers. A model is developed to analyze the role of search and selection methods of employers as determinants of the probability that an unemployed person will be hired for a certain type of job. In an empirical application for the Dutch labour market, we have examined the effect of employer's recruitment behaviour on the allocation of vacant jobs to employed, unemployed and school-leaving job seekers.We find that job requirements for the applicants with respect to work experience are the most important determinant of the probability that an unemployed person will be selected to fill a vacant job. In addition, the use of advertisements by employers for jobs requiring high skill levels does also have a significant effect.     

Monitoring Job Offer Decisions,Punishments, Exit to Work,and Job Quality

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.     

Does population density matter in the process of matching heterogeneous job seekers and vacancies?

This paper studies the matching of job seekers and vacant jobs using data on local labour markets. We estimate differences in the ability of the local markets to form new matches and trace whether these differences can be explained by the differing population densities across markets or by the heterogeneity of job seekers measured by the distribution of their education level. We find that high-density areas are more efficient in forming matches than other areas despite frictions caused by the wider heterogeneity of job seekers in those areas than elsewhere.

Some Empirical Evidence of the Efficacy of Job Matching in Urban Labor Markets

Theory predicts that workers in cities are more likely to engage in job search, ceteris paribus, due to market efficiencies associated with greater job density. However, if job search is more efficient in urban markets, then the quality of a given job match should also tend to be higher in cities, ceteris paribus. Employed workers living in cities might then be expected to search less than their nonurban counterparts. In this latter instance, it is not city residency itself that makes search less likely, but rather the positive correlation between city residency and job match quality. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, this prediction is confirmed: The estimated coefficient on an indicator of urban residency is found to be near zero and statistically insignificant in models of employed search that omit proxies for job match quality. When job match proxies are included in the models, the estimated coefficient on urban residency becomes positive and highly significant. This result suggests that workers are not only more likely to engage in employed search in urban labor markets, but also tend to find more productive job matches in cities over time.

Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Occupational Change and Mobility Among Employed and Unemployed Job Seekers

We use data from the Labour Force Survey to show that employed and unemployed job seekers in Great Britain originate from different occupations and find jobs in different occupations. We find substantial differences in occupational mobility between job seekers: employed job seekers are most likely to move to occupations paying higher average wages relative to their previous occupation, while unemployed job seekers are most likely to move to lower paying occupations. Employed and unemployed job seekers exhibit different patterns of occupational mobility and, therefore, do not accept the same types of jobs.     

A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT,OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES,AND JOB SEARCH*

This article examines career choices using a dynamic structural model that nests a job search model within a human capital model of occupational and educational choices. Wage growth occurs in the model because workers move between firms and occupations as they search for suitable job matches and because workers endogenously accumulate firm and occupation specific human capital. Simulations performed using the estimated model reveal that both self‐selection in occupational choices and mobility between firms account for a much larger share of total earnings and utility than the combined effects of firm and occupation specific human capital.     

An empirical approach on labour segmentation. Applications with individual duration data

This article proposes empirical tools to account for the role of heterogeneities in the labour matching process, and shows an application to the Andalusian labour market which relies on individual data. The central idea of the paper is that the labour market is segmented, and this segmentation can be treated empirically by grouping workers, jobs and matches into labour groups according to their characteristics. In a segmented labour market the probability that a match occurs in a particular job group affects the probability that a match occurs in a particular worker group or vice versa. We propose two empirical measures related to this idea: propensity to match, and segmentation in worker and job groups. The usefulness of this empirical framework is shown by its application to different labour market analyses. Firstly, we use a clustering methodology, based on a similarity measure, to obtain a better overview of the structure of the labour market. Secondly, we propose a measure of mobility based on our similarity measure, and estimate a regression model that relates mobility to worker and job characteristics and to the economic cycle. Finally, these tools are included in an unemployment duration model. The proposed methodology may be useful in labour intermediation by helping seekers to follow a ‘roadmap’ of successful paths.     

CHOOSY SEARCH AND THE MISMATCH OF TALENTS*

This article proposes a multi‐sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector‐specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: Workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector‐specific mean productivity among the pools of job‐seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so‐called Hosios condition holds.     

DIRECTED SEARCH WITH PHANTOM VACANCIES

When vacancies are filled, the job ads often remain, creating phantom vacancies. Older listings more likely represent phantoms. We assume job seekers direct their search based on listing age. Forming a match with an age-a vacancy creates an age-a phantom with probability β and generates an externality affecting vacancies aged a and older. Thus, the externality decreases with the match's listing age. Relative to efficient behavior, job seekers overapply to younger listings. We calibrate using U.S. data. The contribution of phantoms to inefficiency is large, but, given their existence, the planner cannot improve much on the directed search allocation.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

Asset accumulation and short-term employment

If access to credit is limited (especially when young or unemployed) but “bad” jobs are easy to come by, then job seekers might use short term employment in undesirable jobs as a way to finance consumption during subsequent unemployed search for a “good” job. In this paper we explore this idea by building a theoretical model of job search by risk averse, debt constrained agents. In this model we characterise analytically conditions under which voluntary planned separations occur as agents cycle between accumulating assets in short term employment and unemployed search for more desirable employment.     

NETWORK SEARCH: CLIMBING THE JOB LADDER FASTER

We introduce an irregular network structure into a model of frictional, on‐the‐job search in which workers find jobs through their network connections or directly from firms. We show network‐found jobs have higher wages, and thus better‐connected workers climb the job ladder faster. The mean field approach allows us to formulate heterogeneous workers' recursive problem tractably. Our calibration is consistent with several empirical findings because of a composition—not information—effect. We also introduce new model‐consistent evidence: Job‐to‐job switches at higher ladder rungs are more likely to use networks.     

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.     

Finding the right employee online: determinants of internet recruitment in Spanish firms

This paper analyses the variation of recruitment strategies in Spanish firms, with special emphasis on the Internet. Using data from the Spanish Labour Trends Survey for the period 2001–2011, we study the factors influencing the decision to use online recruitment and explore the differences between Internet and eight traditional recruitment channels. Our results show that the adoption of the Internet monotonically increases over the sample period, when Internet becomes more universal and even in periods with excess of applicants. Large firms operating in information-intensive activities, and located in regions more developed and with better infrastructures are more likely to search for new employees online. We also find that Internet and traditional recruitment methods follow different patterns, especially when using personal referrals and public employment services. Our results suggest the presence of network externalities derived from the increase number of compatible online job seekers.     

Duration of disability,job mismatch and employment outcomes

Workers with disabilities have functional limitations that affect their productivity in some, but not necessarily all, jobs. Workers who find a job that is a good match for their functional limitations (i.e. a job where their limitations have little or no impact on important job functions) should expect better employment outcomes (e.g. higher wages, longer job tenure) than workers with similar disabilities who are mismatched in their jobs. Merging data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation with O*Net data on job demands, we construct two continuous measures of job mismatch for workers with physical disabilities. We then extend the literature on disability and employment by exploring relationships between duration of disability, job mismatch, wages and hours worked. The results indicate that workers with long durations of disability are employed in jobs that are a better match to their physical limitations than are similar workers with shorter durations of disability. And, workers who are mismatched earn lower wages and work fewer hours than their counterparts whose jobs are a better match. Overall, the findings suggest that disability employment policies should include systematic efforts to help workers with disabilities find good job matches.     

Do Lower Caseloads Improve the Performance of Public Employment Services? New Evidence from German Employment Offices

The caseworker‐to‐clients ratio is an important, but understudied, policy parameter that affects both the quality and cost of public employment services that help job seekers find employment. We exploit a large‐scale pilot by Germany's employment agency, which hired 490 additional caseworkers in 14 of its 779 offices. We find that lowering caseloads caused a decrease in the rate and duration of local unemployment as well as a higher re‐employment rate. Disentangling the mechanisms that contributed to this improvement, we find that offices with lowered caseloads increased monitoring and imposed more sanctions but also intensified search efforts and registered additional vacancies.     

Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records

We show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using Danish tax records. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities. Third, the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers' aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium. Our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods.