The Differential Impact of Accurate Product Cost Information in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation*

Many researchers claim that costing systems that provide materially more accurate or precise cost reports have a strict value-enhancing effect on decisions (i.e., Cooper 1988, 1995; Cooper and Kaplan 1991; Christensen and Sharp 1994; Rogers. Comstock. and Pritz 1994; Swenson 1995; Gupta and King 1997). However, this study provides theoretical and empirical evidence that the value of more accurate cost information may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure, as well as the firm's product market strategy. We extend the theoretical work of Gal-Or 1986 to incorporate an endogenous imprecise cost signal in two imperfect market structures: Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with imperfectly substitutable products. In addition, we theoretically link market structure to product market strategy. To examine product market strategy, we employ a laboratory markets design that allows for strategic reaction by a rival firm in each of these markets, because the competitive position of a firm is determined by its capacity to produce at low cost, or to differentiate its product from other products (Porter 1985). Consistent with our theoretical work, we argue that firms that compete on the basis of cost leadership (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Cournot competition), benefit through increased profits from increased product cost accuracy, whereas firms that compete on the basis of product differentiation (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Benrand competition) do not benefit from such increased product cost accuracy. Our results are consistent with this contention. That is, profit is higher in the experimental cost leadership markets (operationalized as Cournot markets) when subjects know their true cost, while profit is higher in the experimental product differentiation markets (operationalized as Bertrand markets) when subjects receive uninformative cost reports and make their decisions based on expected costs. These results suggest that the value of more accurate cost reports may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure strategy and product market strategy.     

Fixed Cost Magnitude,Fixed Cost Reporting Format,and Competitive Pricing Decisions: Some Experimental Evidence*

Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short‐term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this study) across experimental conditions caused participants to first lower, then raise, competitive prices. Consistent with the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion, this change in pricing behavior reduced the frequency of reported losses. This study further reveals that the accounting format for reporting fixed costs influenced pricing behavior. Specifically, participants receiving capacity costing feedback reports established increasingly lower selling prices relative to the prices established by participants receiving contribution margin feedback reports. Given that a very simple cosmetic reporting manipulation produced increasingly significant competitive pricing differences in a market setting, this study provides evidence that functional fixation is not necessarily eliminated by market forces.     

基于时间与作业成本的物流成本核算模型与方法

在物流作业成本法的基础上,加进了基于物流时间的物流成本核算方法,构建了物流成本核算的T-A模型。试图通过基于时间与作业相结合的物流成本核算模型与方法,对企业物流成本进行管理,以进一步挖掘物流隐性成本,为企业降低成本提高利润提供新的途径和思路。     

电改环境下油气管道企业用电成本管控研究

电力体制改革为油气管道企业用电成本管控提供了政策支持。在梳理电力改革政策的基础上,简要介绍了适用于油气管道企业的新电力政策,详细分析了我国油气管道企业存在的基本电费偏高、力调电费偏高、用电类型不合理、用电管理有待完善等用电现状及其根本原因。在上述分析的基础上,提出了选取合适的用电类别、选择合理的电费计费方式降低基本电费、提高功率因数降低力调电费、积极利用直购电政策、健全用电成本管控激励和考核机制等对策建议,以期为油气管道企业用电成本管控提供参考借鉴。     

某白酒企业成本控制系统的问题与对策

从某白酒企业的成本、成本构成与成本控制情况出发,研究其白酒企业的成本控制系统。分析该白酒企业现有的成本控制系统中存在的突出问题,提出通过成本控制系统的完善,促使该白酒企业的各种耗费得到有效的控制,最终实现该白酒企业运作成本的全面降低。最大限度地拓展该白酒企业的利润空间,从而推动该白酒企业整体经济实力的不断增长,在日趋激烈的市场竞争中更好地生存和发展。     

Does Tax Planning Affect Analysts' Forecast Accuracy?

We investigate whether firms' tax planning affects the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Tax planning can exacerbate the complexity of firms' operations through strategic choices to exploit tax laws. Because of its effect on firms' operations, tax planning can influence analysts' efforts to understand and forecast earnings. Specifically, if the additional complexity arising from tax planning makes firm attributes less representative of expected earnings, analysts may issue less accurate forecasts. Using auditor‐provided tax services (APTS) as a measure of tax planning, we find that, as firms spend more on tax planning, the accuracy of analysts' forecasts of both earnings per share and tax expense declines. We also document that firms with higher levels of APTS have greater year‐to‐year volatility in, and lower persistence of, effective tax rates and earnings. Our results suggest that increased firm complexity, due to greater tax planning, makes earnings and tax expense more difficult to forecast and that analysts do not properly adjust for these effects. Thus, when deciding to engage in tax planning, firms appear to make trade‐offs between potential tax savings and negative effects on earnings properties and analysts' forecasts.     

考虑供电枢纽传输成本的充电站选址定容模型

电动汽车及其配套设施的发展受制于早期形成的有限布局,不断增长的电动汽车市场规模和充电需求产生矛盾。充电站的建设运营方能够在巨大潜力的充电设施发展中获得巨大利好。通过以最大化充电站建设运营方的利润为优化目标,构建需求覆盖选址模型,权衡供电枢纽、充电站和充电桩的成本和满足充电需求的收入,利用遗传算法求解获得选址定容的决策。研究发现：一方面,充电站的覆盖半径对利润和决策结果影响较大且复杂,充电站投资建设前期需要对影响覆盖范围的诸多因素进行市场调研;另一方面,铺电单位成本对决策结果影响明显,相对高的铺电成本会抑制充电站选址数量和容量大小,从而降低利润。因此充电站投资建设方需要分别对两类成本做好数据调研,避免决策结果出现较大偏差。     

A choice‐theoretic analysis of a corporate tax holiday versus a subsidy

This paper attempts to compare the effect of a corporate tax holiday with that of a subsidy on the behaviour of the individual firm. Assuming the subsidy equals the amount of tax paid by a firm operating under the subsidy system, we find that the firm's net profit will be greater under the tax holiday than under the subsidy regime. Similarly, if the subsidy exceeds the tax by an amount that would equalize the profits made by the (“marginal”) firm under the two regimes, then it is found that firms with higher than “average” unit costs would opt for the subsidy system; conversely, firms with a low cost structure would maximize profits by selecting the tax holiday. Finally, a multiperiod analysis of the particular choice facing prospective manufacturers in Ciskei, shows that the firm would normally choose the subsidy system except if the current tax exceeded the subsidy at the output level representing maximum profit under the tax holiday.     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

Improving Financial Reports by Revealing the Accuracy of Prior Estimates*

Several researchers (e.g., Lundholm 1999; Ryan 1997; Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen 2000) have proposed a reporting mechanism to enhance the reliability of estimates and other forward‐looking information in financial reports. Their proposals require companies to report reconciliations of prior‐year estimates to actual realizations as supplemental information in their financial reports. Such disclosures would enable investors to distinguish between accurate and opportunistic reporting behavior, and, arguably, should create incentives for companies to estimate accurately in the first place. Our study provides evidence on these proposals. Specifically, we conduct two experiments within the context of an important intangible asset requiring estimation ‐ software development costs. Our results show that the proposed reporting mechanism is effective in communicating information about the accuracy of financial estimates. We find, however, that not all disclosures are equally useful. The most effective disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation (if any) on both the balance sheet and on earnings, thereby reducing the computational complexity associated with less explicit disclosures. Furthermore, our results show that when the disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation, investors reward accurate estimators but do not explicitly punish those who are inaccurate. We conclude that information about previous estimate accuracy is useful to investors and that regulators should consider the type of disclosure, because not all disclosures may be equally effective in creating management incentives for accurate estimation. Moreover, the competitive advantage conferred on firms that provide accurate estimates arguably should create incentives for all companies to estimate accurately in the future.     

The Industrial Organization of Financial Markets in Thailand

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the industrial organizational features of the financial markets in Thailand which may play an important role in promoting the recent high economic growth. Specifically, we examine whether or not the market-structure-performance hypothesis is valid by estimating profit and cost functions. The main results are as follows:
1) market concentration in Thailand is higher than in Japan;
2) expense rate of Thai commercial banks is considerably higher than Japanese banks;
3) economies of scale are not found;
4) the more concentrated the market is, the larger are the profits and costs of the commercial banks.     

An analysis of RSQE forecasts: 1971–1992

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the accuracy of ex ante econometric model forecasts of four key macroeconomic variables: real GNP growth, the rate of price inflation measured by the GNP deflator, the civilian unemployment rate, and the Treasury Bill rate. Annual forecasts produced by the Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics (RSQE) based on the Michigan Quarterly Econometric Model of the U.S. Economy are compared with quasi ex ante forecasts from a four-variable vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Statistical tests of the equality of forecast error variances as well as univariate and multivariate forecast encompassing-type tests are conducted. The forecast error variance comparisons indicate that for three of the four variables the RSQE forecasts are more accurate than the VAR forecasts and for one of the variables (real GNP growth) only slightly less accurate. The forecast encompassing-type tests indicate that the RSQE forecasts contain information not contained in the VAR forecasts and, conversely, that VAR forecasts contain information not included in the RSQE forecasts. The scope for improving RSQE forecasts by combining them with VAR forecasts is rather limited, however.     

A New Cost Efficiency Measure for Not-for-Profit Firms: Evidence of a Link Between Inefficiency and Large Endowments

Cost functions and cost efficiency are commonly estimated for industries with detailed data on production and cost, both for firms that are for profit as well as not for profit. The data on not-for-profits obtained from the IRS Form 990 lack these details and, consequently, encourage substitution of the ratio of program expenses to total expenses to gauge performance. While a larger program expense ratio captures better administrative cost efficiency, it does not gauge best-practice cost and the extent to which an organization’s administrative costs exceed best practice. Using the Form 990 data, this study constructs an administrative cost function for not-for-profits and uses the distribution-free technique of estimating a best-practice cost frontier to gauge the relative efficiency of not-for-profit organizations. Focusing on not-for-profit hospitals and their holdings of liquid assets, the empirical evidence is consistent with Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis: hospitals holding liquid assets in excess of a benchmark have lower program expense ratios and lower cost efficiency. In addition, the CEOs of more cost efficient hospitals earn higher compensation. The agreement of the evidence on agency problems related to excess holdings of liquid assets from the program expense ratio and administrative cost efficiency reinforce the credibility of the latter as a measure of the performance of not-for-profit organizations.     

Measuring the Accuracy of Federal Reserve Forecasts

Markets across the world pay enormous attention to every economic forecast made by Federal Reserve governors, particularly those from the chair. This article develops a new way that the academic literature can assess the accuracy of these Federal Reserve forecasts. In particular, our proposed method allows for both general and specific predictions to be assessed, while also accounting for the macroeconomic volatility that prevails at the time of the forecast. To develop this measure, we expand upon a methodology proposed by the Wall Street Journal to score the accuracy of forecasts made by the Fed. Our results show that Alan Greenspan was consistently the most accurate forecaster among Fed governors, while the most recent chair in our sample, Janet Yellen, has performed relatively poorly. More generally, we find that the chairs have become less accurate over time with their forecasts and have also tended to make fewer specific predictions.     

Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion

Firms have increasingly adopted open work environments. Although openness is thought to have benefits, it could also expose firms to an unanticipated cost. An open (closed) internal reporting environment makes it more (less) likely that managers will observe a colleague's communications with senior executives. This increase in what one manager knows about another manager's communication to senior executives could facilitate employee collusion to extract resources from the firm. To test whether internal reporting openness results in more collusion, we conduct an experiment in which two managers each make separate reports to the firm about cost information they know in common but that remains unknown by the firm. Because both managers face the same truth‐inducing contract, conventional economic theory predicts that they will not collude to misreport costs regardless of reporting openness. However, using behavioral theory involving trust and reciprocity, we predict and find that managers honor their nonbinding collusive agreements and successfully collude more often in an open versus closed internal reporting environment, leading to lower firm welfare in the open environment. These results suggest that firms should consider how the cost of collusion compares to the benefits of openness.     

An Experimental Analysis of Regulatory Interventions for Complex Pricing

Considerable evidence demonstrates that consumers make poor choices when facing complex multidimensional pricing schemes. The problem is clear but appropriate regulatory interventions less so. We study the efficacy of five different interventions to improve consumer decision making in an experimental context where subjects choose among a set of predefined phone plans involving nonlinear tariffs. We compare two types of intervention: information provision and consumer literacy training. We find that training about plan costs significantly improves decision quality, while providing information about plan value assists inexperienced decision makers, and visual feedback helps experienced decision makers. Implications for policy are discussed, mindful of heterogeneous consumer literacy and the infrequency with which consumers are actually “in the market” for a better phone service plan.     

Commitment and Cost of Equity Capital: An Examination of Timely Balance Sheet Disclosure in Earnings Announcements

In this paper, I examine the relation between disclosure commitment and cost of equity capital using accelerated earnings announcement disclosures as a measure of commitment. In settings characterized by imperfect market competition, I find that firms which consistently disclose balance sheet detail in relatively timely earnings announcements have lower costs of capital compared to other firms. This result is statistically significant and economically meaningful, and is robust to various alternative measurements for cost of capital, and alternative designs addressing endogeneity and underlying information quality. Overall, this result is important because it highlights additional dimensions of disclosure commitment (consistency and timeliness), while incorporating important features from theoretical models (information quality and market competition). In particular, my results suggest that consistency and timeliness are salient features of firms' disclosure behavior that have predictable and robust relations with capital market outcomes. This result is robust to controlling for underlying information quality; however, consistent with theory, it is conditional on low levels of market competition.     

The Association between the Legal and Financial Reporting Environments and Forecast Performance of Individual Analysts*

We test the ability of analyst characteristics to explain relative forecast accuracy across legal origins (common law versus civil law). Common‐law countries generally have more effective corporate governance mechanisms, including stronger investor protection laws and inputs provided through higher‐quality financial reporting systems. In this type of environment, we predict that analysts with superior ability and resources in common‐law countries will more consistently outperform their peers because appropriate market‐based incentives exist. In civil‐law countries, where the demand for earnings information is reduced because of weaker corporate governance mechanisms and lower‐quality financial reporting, we predict that analysts with superior ability will less consistently provide superior forecasts. Results are consistent with our expectations and suggest an association between legal and financial reporting environments and analysts' forecast behavior.     

Ownership or Management Problems? A Case Study of Three Indonesian State Enterprises

Public enterprise managers will tend to behave as entrepreneurs, strive for efficiency and achieve profitability if they and the government ministry responsible for their supervision have compatible profit objectives. The adoption of such objectives by both parties will help to shift state enterprises away from political influence and towards a strictly market orientation. In contrast, managers will behave as government representatives and adopt a bureaucratic style of management if the government imposes sociopolitical goals on state enterprises. Agency costs (costs incurred in the relationship between principal and agent) increase as the parties become less cost conscious, and inefficiency tends to be the result. Too great an emphasis on socio-political rather than commercial goals may leave a country facing the problem of a ‘high-cost’ economy. These tendencies are indicated in this study of three Indonesian state enterprises.