Making partner relationship management systems work: The role of partnership governance mechanisms

While the adoption of Partner Relationship Management (PRM) systems by suppliers to manage and monitor its network of partners (i.e. resellers) has been on the rise, the performance improvements have not been consistently realized. Governance theory suggests this may be due to how the PRM system builds on the mechanisms employed by the supplier to oversee their partners. This study investigates how the two capabilities of PRM systems (relationship and fulfillment capabilities) and two partnership governance mechanisms – formal (certification control) and informal (service support) – reinforce each other. These are then related to partner performance in terms of trust, commitment and customer satisfaction. Analysis of data collected from 192 partners in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector suggest a complex relationship. In terms of direct effects, a relationship capability increased trust yet, surprisingly, a fulfillment capability reduced commitment. In terms of moderating effects, certification control weakened the positive link between the relationship capability and performance. Service support, on the other hand, negated some of the detrimental impact of the fulfillment capability on performance. The results suggest the need of to tailor PRM systems in response to the specific performance expectations around them as well as a need to clearly understand how existing partnership governance mechanisms employed by the supplier will affect the performance of these systems.     

Governing interfirm knowledge transfer in the Chinese market: The interplay of formal and informal mechanisms

Building on knowledge management literature and relational exchange theory, this study addresses how formal (i.e., ex ante contracts and ex post control) and informal mechanisms (i.e., trust) affect interfirm knowledge transfer in the Chinese emerging market. The results of a survey of 343 manufacturer–supplier relationships show that whereas formal control fosters knowledge transfer, contracts are not significantly related to knowledge transfer, and trust greatly facilitates knowledge flows between exchange relationships. Moreover, trust and contracts have a positive joint effect, whereas trust and control have a negative joint effect, on interfirm knowledge transfer. The findings provide important theoretical and managerial implications for interfirm knowledge governance in China.     

Knowledge Sharing in Interorganizational Product Development Teams: The Effect of Formal and Informal Socialization Mechanisms*

Working collaboratively with suppliers is increasingly cited as a “best practice” in product development. The importance of sharing knowledge between buyer and supplier in this context has been well recognized, although comparatively little research exists on the interorganizational socialization mechanisms that facilitate it. The present research proposes and tests a theoretical model of the impact of formal and informal socialization mechanisms on the level of knowledge sharing within interorganizational product development projects and the subsequent effect on buyer firm performance. Results from this study of 111 manufacturing organizations in the United Kingdom largely support its hypotheses. It is revealed that informal socialization mechanisms (e.g., communication guidelines, social events) play an important role in facilitating interorganizational knowledge sharing, whereas formal socialization mechanisms (e.g., cross‐functional teams, matrix reporting structures) act indirectly through informal socialization to influence knowledge sharing. The results also show that interorganizational knowledge sharing is positively associated with supplier contribution to development outcomes, which, in turn, improves buyer product development performance and, ultimately, financial performance. Product development managers are encouraged to build social ties between interorganizational development teams to increase the flow of knowledge and to improve both product development outcomes and financial performance.     

Mitigating the Challenges of Partner Knowledge Diversity While Enhancing Research & Development (R&D) Alliance Performance: The Role of Alliance Governance Mechanisms

This article explores the answers to the following unresolved research question: How do firms mitigate the collaboration challenges associated with partner knowledge diversity and enhance alliance performance? The study provides an alliance performance enhancing framework by identifying two types of partner knowledge diversity: (1) technology base diversity and (2) R&D process experience diversity, and links them with R&D alliance performance. Additionally, the moderating effects of the two types of alliance governance mechanisms (i.e., interactive and contractual mechanisms) were examined to investigate which alliance governance mechanism is conducive to mitigate the collaboration challenges and enhance alliance performance. Using a data set of 316 alliances in the biopharmaceuticals industry, the study found that a moderate degree (not too low or high) of technology base diversity between alliance partners contributes more to R&D alliance performance. Similarly, there was also an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D process experience diversity and alliance performance; too much diversity in R&D process experience may increase the likelihood of partner opportunism, and therefore negatively affect alliance performance. Additionally, the results showed that alliance governance mechanisms played different roles in alliance collaboration; while the contractual alliance mechanisms help reduce relational uncertainty (e.g., opportunism), the interactive mechanisms promoting a more intensive interaction between partners mitigates task difficulty and facilitates complex technology activities. These findings extend the knowledge-based view (KBV) of strategic alliance and advance research on alliance governance design.     

Relational mechanisms,formal contracts,and local knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries

This research focuses on relational and contractual mechanisms and examines their impact on foreign subsidiaries' acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge from local suppliers. Using survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries operating in China, this study finds broad support for the proposed analytical framework. When the foreign subsidiary and supplier share common goals, the foreign subsidiary acquires greater levels of both explicit and tacit knowledge; trust between the two parties promotes the acquisition of greater levels of tacit than explicit knowledge. However, access to the local supplier network through the focal supplier enables the foreign subsidiary to acquire greater levels of explicit but not tacit knowledge. Formal contracts play a complementary role in knowledge acquisition: contracts enhance the acquisition of explicit knowledge and further strengthen the effects of relational mechanisms on tacit and explicit knowledge acquisition. Overall, these findings provide important implications for foreign subsidiaries regarding how to acquire local knowledge in host countries through both formal and informal mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Sources of alliance partner trustworthiness: Integrating calculative and relational perspectives

Research on the sources of organizational trustworthiness remains bifurcated. Some scholars have adopted a calculative perspective, stressing the primacy of actors' rational calculations, while others have approached trustworthiness from a relational perspective, focusing on its social underpinnings. We help to reconcile these seemingly disparate views by adopting an integrative approach that allows us to clarify the boundaries of both perspectives. Based on dyadic survey data from 171 strategic alliances, we find that the calculative perspective (represented by contractual safeguards) has higher predictive power when the partner lacks a favorable reputation. In contrast, the relational perspective (represented by organizational culture) predicts trustworthiness more strongly when familiarity with the partner organization is high. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The environment and its impact on satisfaction with supplier performance: An investigation of the mediating effects of control mechanisms from the perspective of the manufacturer in the U.S.A.

An important question for manufacturers relates to how to conduct exchanges with suppliers when the interaction is done in an uncertain environment. Existing literature suggests the use of unilateral control (i.e., vertical control over the supplier) to reduce the negative effects of environmental uncertainty, whereas recent research on relational norms suggests bilateral control mechanisms (i.e., the norm of information sharing) as an alternative. We propose that in order to secure satisfactory performance from suppliers, manufacturers rely on different control mechanisms depending upon the level of environmental uncertainty on one hand, and the nature of interdependence in the manufacturer-supplier relationship on the other. Our empirical results based on 162 manufacturers indicate the following: 1) manufacturers' reliance on vertical control increases as environmental uncertainty and power asymmetry increase; 2) by contrast, reliance on the bilateral information sharing increases as interdependence magnitude increases and as environmental uncertainty decreases; 3) suppliers' performance, as perceived by manufacturers, increases with the use of bilateral information sharing.     

Reexamining the direct and interactive effects of governance mechanisms upon buyer–supplier cooperative performance

This study aims to explore the effect of governance mechanisms (including both formal and social controls) upon the buyer–supplier cooperative performance in supply chains. Empirical evidence obtained via a mail survey from 106 firms participating in the Taiwanese “Center Satellite Production System” indicates that (1) there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between formal control and cooperative performance; (2) social control has a consistent positive effect on cooperative performance; and (3) the joint use of formal control and social control could enhance cooperative performance in supply chains but only in cases with moderate usage of formal control. Otherwise, social control becomes a supportive factor that repairs cooperative performance damage from overwhelmingly applied formal control.     

Comparing the resource‐based and relational views: knowledge transfer and spillover in vertical alliances

We compare resource‐based and relational perspectives to examine competitive advantages within the context of vertical learning alliances. Previous research has shown that through such alliances suppliers acquire knowledge to forge new capabilities and attain performance improvements. We ask whether such improvements are exclusive to the learning partnership, or are available in other average partnerships of this supplier. We posit that the extent to which such performance improvements are partnership exclusive depends on whether the newly forged capabilities lie entirely within the supplier firm's boundaries, or at the learning dyad level. As such, we untie two forms of performance improvements arising from learning dyads. While the resource‐based view helps explain the performance gains learning suppliers deploy across average partners, the relational view reveals the additional performance edge that remains exclusive to the learning partnership. Based on empirical evidence from a survey of 253 suppliers to the equipment industry, we find that partnership exclusive performance (i.e., ‘relational performance’), the true source of learning dyads' competitive advantage, is a function of suppliers acquiring know‐how within the dyad, developing dyad‐specific assets and capabilities, and structuring buyer‐supplier relational governance mechanisms. We discuss implications for research and practice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing contracts for fairness in buyer–supplier exchanges

Despite the centrality of fairness in the moral and social fabric of governance, few studies relate fairness to contracting research. This paper assesses whether fairness accounts for the effects of contractual complexity and contractual recurrence on exchange performance. Based on a sample of 283 buyer–supplier dyads, we find that procedural fairness partially mediates the effect of contractual complexity, whereas distributive fairness partially mediates the effect of contractual recurrence in fostering exchange performance. Moreover, monitoring better supports the use of contractual complexity, whereas socializing better supports the use of contractual recurrence in enhancing fairness perceptions. These results suggest that contractual design must go beyond its safeguarding function to establish a fair frame of reference, and managers should complement contracts with appropriate practices (e.g., monitoring or socializing). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Governance by targets and the performance of cross-sector partnerships: Do partner diversity and partnership capabilities matter?

Research Summary: This study examines the effectiveness of targets as a tool for the contractual governance of cross-sector partnerships. Applying a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that the use of explicit targets within performance contracts is an effective means for improving partnership outcomes, especially where partner diversity and partnership capabilities are high. Furthermore, we find evidence that target intensity is associated with stronger partnership performance. These findings suggest that contractual forms with explicit targets may be a particularly successful approach for enhancing the public value created by cross-sector partnerships. A downward turn in performance following the removal of targets lends further support to this conclusion. Managerial Summary: Cross-sector partnerships have become a vital means for creating value in pursuit of the public interest. In particular, the effective management of these partnerships is thought to hold the key to addressing the strategic and organizational challenges posed by major social and environmental issues, such as big data and climate change. In this article, we combine data on waste recycling from 2003 to 2014 with information on performance contracts between local cross-sector partnerships and higher levels of government in England to quantify the impact of governance by targets on the performance of those partnerships. The benefits of target-setting for partnership performance that we identify are even stronger when partner diversity is high and partnership capabilities are strong. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of our findings.     

Don't Trust Trust: A Dynamic Approach to Controlling Supplier Involvement in New Product Development

Prior literature stresses the importance for manufacturers to use formal and informal controls to coordinate collaborative new product development activities with suppliers. In doing so, the existence of trust between manufacturers and suppliers is believed to play a key role because it enables manufacturers to reduce investments in formal controls and rely more on less costly informal controls. Manufacturers and suppliers don't suddenly trust each other though: trust typically grows over time as the partners get to know each other. Trust may also decrease if manufacturers overuse formal controls or if suppliers underperform. These fluctuations in trust over the course of supplier–manufacturer relationships complicate the so‐called trust–control nexus and raise important questions about the impact of trust on the efficiency and effectiveness of formal and informal controls as coordination mechanisms. Therefore, this study examines how manufacturers should balance formal and informal controls over time to reap the full benefits of collaborative product development with suppliers. For that purpose, a conceptual and system dynamics model are developed, which incorporate the links among formal and informal controls, trust, and the supplier's development performance. In an empirical validation in the context of the shipbuilding industry, the results reject the notion that manufacturers must lessen formal controls and increase informal controls with trust. Instead, it is most efficient and effective to invest always in formal controls, particularly process control, to coordinate supplier involvement in new product development. These results have important theoretical and managerial implications: Informal controls are not as profitable as expected.     

Boundary spanner relational behavior and inter-organizational control in supply chain relationships

Boundary spanner relational behavior is considered critical in the successful management of buyer–supplier relationships and may help avoiding high costs of more formal inter-organizational controls. Yet, the influence of partners' boundary spanners on effective supply chain collaboration has had much less inquiry than the influence of broader inter-organizational controls. We use survey data of 200 buyer–supplier relationships to examine how these individual and organizational control mechanisms influence the performance effects of interfirm collaborations that vary in scope of activities undertaken. Findings show that collaboration scope as well as boundary spanner relational behavior and inter-organizational controls are positively associated with performance. The effect of collaboration scope on firm performance, however, also depends on both mechanisms but in opposite directions: while its influence on performance is enhanced by inter-organizational controls, relational behavior of partners' boundary spanners has a negative moderating effect, indicating that such behavior contributes more to the effective management of collaborations of narrow scope than those of broader scope.     

Risk management system in business relationships—Polish case studies

The article discusses the problem of risk management in business relationships. The authors' research (including a case study analysis of 5 different relations) enabled them to identify and characterize the risk management systems based on a combination of formal control and relational mechanisms. In the authors' research it has been assumed that relational risk has a negative influence on the cooperation results and therefore it should be a subject of management. The main objective is not to avoid taking risk in relationships, but to reduce it to the minimum possible level. Companies' cooperation, including partnerships with different entities and participation in business networks, is an immanent characteristic of contemporary business. Therefore managers should look for the most efficient methods of dealing with additional relational risk and opportunistic behavior of potential partners.In the paper the case study analysis of five relationships of companies operating on Polish market was presented. The main objective was to demonstrate the relation between the level of trust and the intensity of formal control (including contract and formal monitoring). The range of social control applied in analyzed relationships was also an important issue of consideration.The research presented in the paper indicated that companies located in Poland in order to reduce relational risk aimed at diversification of its partners or full integration. Managers often underlined their fear of being dependent on one particular partner. This phenomenon could comprehensively decrease the advantages of intensive and deepened inter-organizational cooperation in Poland. Furthermore, the research demonstrated the decisive role of relational mechanisms and limited significance of contract in business relationship risk management. However, relatively higher importance of contract was observed in unbalanced relations between partners representing diverse bargaining power. A positive relationship between application of relational tools and cooperation results was identified as well.The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the nature of the relationship risk management system and the role of particular mechanisms that enable to reduce risk and its negative influence on cooperation results.     

Network governance: A cross-level study of social mechanisms,knowledge benefits,and strategic outcomes in joint-design alliances

Drawing on multiple-level embedded case study research of eight dyadic joint-design alliances and 14 collaborative ventures within them, this study sheds light on how value, in the form of common and private benefits, is created in interorganizational relationships. To do so, I focus on network governance (i.e., interorganizational coordination based on social networks) and its outcomes. As a result, I advance a cross-level model of how a system of reciprocally influencing network-level (i.e., structural) and dyad-level (i.e., relational) social mechanisms affects the propensity of allied organizations to engage in knowledge-intensive activities that yield considerable knowledge-based benefits and strategic outcomes at the alliance and firm levels. I conclude that simultaneous consideration of structural and relational embeddedness can enrich our understanding of network-based forms of organization and their impact on the outcomes of interorganizational cooperation. Although the system of social mechanisms needs to be understood as an interconnected whole, practicing alliance managers are advised to leverage different social mechanisms depending on the specific knowledge benefits they intend to achieve.     

Social power as an antecedence of governance in buyer-supplier alliances

Buyer-supplier alliances require certain governance mechanisms to be successfully controlled and coordinated. However, relatively little is known about how power differentials between the actors affect the applicability of those governance mechanisms. This paper follows the assumption that different sources of social power among firms directly influence the governance mechanisms and indirectly their performance. Our study utilizes a sample of 250 European firms to test the influence of four social power sources on three different governance mechanisms. We find different influences of social power on certain governance mechanisms. Suppliers' perception of buyers' coercive power leads to stronger contractual governance and stronger buyer directives but reduces the use of relational norms. Reward power only relates to contractual governance. Expert power steers towards buyer directives and relational norms. Referent power stimulates the development of relational norms. A cluster analysis of power types provides additional insights and enriches our managerial implications.     

Joining Forces or Going It Alone? On the Interplay among External Collaboration Partner Types,Interfirm Governance Modes,and Internal R&D

This paper adds to the emerging literature stream advocating a contingency view on open innovation. Drawing on the relational view of the firm, this study sheds light on the complex interplay among collaboration partner types (market‐ and science‐focused innovation partners), governance modes (informal, self‐enforcing and formal, contractual collaboration governance), and internal research and development(R&D). More specifically, it is proposed that the use of governance modes tailored to both the characteristics of each innovation partner type and the specific innovation objectives pursued by the focal firm (incremental and radical new product development) can increase the payoff from innovation collaboration. Moreover, appropriate collaboration governance is expected to reduce the focal firm's vulnerability to possible negative side effects often assumed to be associated with the simultaneous pursuit of external collaboration and internal R&D, among which most notably the not‐invented‐here (NIH) syndrome. Cross‐industry evidence from 2502 German firms underlines the critical role of collaboration governance—a contingency factor that is at the heart of the relational view, yet has remained surprisingly absent from the open innovation debate so far.     

When does a partner’s reputation impact cooperation effects in partnerships?

We examine how formal contracts moderate the relationship between a partner??s reputation and cooperation effects in public-private (P-P) partnerships. We base our analysis on differences between formal contracts, which require a series of legal agreements, and informal contracts, which may be implicit and/or unwritten. We argue that a partner??s reputation is more likely to impact cooperation effects in the context of strong formal or informal contracts. Using a sample of 244 partners from various P-P partnerships in the medical and healthcare fields in China, we find that the positive relationship between a partner??s reputation and cooperation effects is stronger given the existence of strong formal and/or informal contracts. We conclude that in China, where there is a weak legal system that rarely offers or enforces sufficient protections to contract signatories, it is safer to cooperate with a partner who has a good reputation. Such a reputation correspondingly enhances cooperation effects. Moreover, this relationship may be amplified when there are strong formal and/or informal contracts, all of which may be associated with cooperation between the public and private sectors.     

When do formal control and trust matter? A context-based analysis of the effects on marketing channel relationships in China

Formal control and trust are two typical governance mechanisms employed to safeguard business transactions. Yet the effectiveness of each mechanism for firm relationship outcomes remains unclear. Some relevant literature suggests that formal control and trust simultaneously can help secure transactions, whereas other research argues the two control mechanisms can substitute for each other. This study applies social embeddedness theory and differentiates strong tie from weak tie relationships. In so doing, it reveals the role of strong versus weak social ties in leading to parallel conclusions about the relationship between formal control and trust and their effects on relationship outcomes. On the basis of empirical tests in a Chinese marketing channels context, this study finds that the joint effects of formal control and trust on governing transactions depends on the relational tie that the focal partners share. Specifically, formal control and trust complement each other only in weak tie relations. On the basis of this new perspective, the authors offer theoretical and managerial implications for managing interfirm governance mechanisms in transitional economies such as China.