Demand properties of concavifiable preferences

The purpose of the present paper is to clarify the relation between choice theory for individual consumers, i.e., the observed demand behavior, and the preference ordering ?$?$ of that individual. Specifically, we study how concavifiability (i.e., representability of ?$?$ by a concave utility function) is expressed by quantities (cross-coefficients) appearing in revealed preferences theory. We present a sequence of rather explicit necessary conditions for concavifiability. All these conditions are quantitative asymptotic strengthenings of the strong axiom of revealed preference. The results and concepts are illustrated by means of examples in which an expenditure data is defined by providing its generating utility function.     

Strictly monotonic preferences on continuum of goods commodity spaces

We consider a set K of differentiated commodities. A preference relation on the set of consumption plans is strictly monotonic whenever to consume more of at least one commodity is more preferred. It is an easy task to find examples of strictly monotonic preference relations when K   is finite or countable. However, it is not easy for spaces like ?^∞([0,1])${?}^{\infty }([0\text{,}1])$, the space of bounded functions on the unit interval.     

A topological approach to Wilson’s impossibility theorem

We will present a topological approach to Wilson’s impossibility theorem [Wilson, R.B., 1972. Social choice theory without the Pareto principle. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 478–486] that there exists no non-null binary social choice rule which satisfies transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-imposition and has no dictator nor inverse dictator. Our research is in line with the studies of topological approaches to discrete social choice problems initiated by [Baryshnikov, Y., 1993. Unifying impossibility theorems: a topological approach. Advances in Applied Mathematics 14, 404–415]. This paper extends the result about the Arrow impossibility theorem shown in [Tanaka, Y., 2006. A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders. Applied Mathematics and Computation 174, 961–981] to Wilson’s theorem.     

Nonparametric Bayesian modelling of monotone preferences for discrete choice experiments

Discrete choice experiments are widely used to learn about the distribution of individual preferences for product attributes. Such experiments are often designed and conducted deliberately for the purpose of designing new products. There is a long-standing literature on nonparametric and Bayesian modelling of preferences for the study of consumer choice when there is a market for each product, but this work does not apply when such markets fail to exist as is the case with most product attributes. This paper takes up the common case in which attributes can be quantified and preferences over these attributes are monotone. It shows that monotonicity is the only shape constraint appropriate for a utility function in these circumstances. The paper models components of utility using a Dirichlet prior distribution and demonstrates that all monotone nondecreasing utility functions are supported by the prior. It develops a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for posterior simulation that is reliable and practical given the number of attributes, choices and sample sizes characteristic of discrete choice experiments. The paper uses the algorithm to demonstrate the flexibility of the model in capturing heterogeneous preferences and applies it to a discrete choice experiment that elicits preferences for different auto insurance policies.     

Risk aversion for variational and multiple-prior preferences

The objective of this paper is to identify variational preferences and multiple-prior (maxmin) expected utility functions that exhibit aversion to risk under some probability measure from among the priors. Risk aversion has profound implications on agents’ choices and on market prices and allocations. Our approach to risk aversion relies on the theory of mean-independent risk of Werner (2009). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for risk aversion of convex variational preferences and concave multiple-prior expected utilities. The conditions are stability of the cost function and of the set of probability priors, respectively, with respect to a probability measure. The two stability properties are new concepts. We show that cost functions defined by the relative entropy distance or other divergence distances have that property. Set of priors defined as cores of convex distortions of probability measures or neighborhoods in divergence distances have that property, too.     

Revealed preference theory on the choice of lotteries

The choice behavior of a decision-maker is said to be consistent with expected utility maximization if there exists a utility function defined on the set of prizes such that the decision-maker chooses lotteries with the highest expected utility. We present a revealed preference characterization of choice behavior that is consistent with expected utility maximization. A necessary and sufficient condition for expected utility maximization is that there does not exist a way to compound lotteries such that the probability distribution over the final prizes generated by the chosen lotteries of each observation is equal to that generated by the rejected lotteries of each observation. Our result is quite general and can be applied to any compact set of prizes and any choice correspondence.     

Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games

This paper studies rational choice behavior of a player in sequential games of perfect and complete information without an assumption that the other players who join the same games are rational. The model of individually rational choice is defined through a decomposition of the behavioral norm assumed in the subgame perfect equilibria, and we propose a set of axioms on collective choice behavior that characterize the individual rationality obtained as such. As the choice of subgame perfect equilibrium paths is a special case where all players involved in the choice environment are each individually rational, the paper offers testable characterizations of both individual rationality and collective rationality in sequential games.     

Agricultural arbitrage and risk preferences

A structural intertemporal model of agricultural asset arbitrage equilibrium is developed and applied to agriculture in the North Central region of the US. The data are consistent with a unifying level of risk aversion. The levels of risk aversion are more plausible than previous estimates for agriculture. However, the standard arbitrage equilibrium is rejected; perhaps, this is due to the period and the shortness of the period studied.     

Decisionmetrics: A decision-based approach to econometric modelling

An approach to developing a possibly misspecified econometric model that will be used as the beliefs of an expected utility maximiser is proposed. This approach builds on a novel objective function that measures the value of predictive distributions in decision-making and is used in model estimation, selection and evaluation. The methods proposed also provide an econometric approach for developing arbitrary parametric action rules such as technical trading rules. The approach is compared in detail with existing methods and is applied in the context of a CARA investor's decision problem where analytical and empirical results suggest it is very effective.     

Trading constraints penalizing default: A recursive approach

This paper proves existence of an ergodic Markov equilibrium for a class of general equilibrium economies with infinite horizon, incomplete markets, and default. Agents may choose to deny their liabilities and face trading constraints that depend on the adjusted amount of past default on each asset. These constraints replace the usual utility penalties and explore intertemporal tie-ins that appear in dynamic economies. The equilibrium prices and solvency rates present stationary properties that are usually required in econometric models of credit risk.     

Preference through indifference: a topological approach

Two problems of consumer theory are approached topologically. An intrinsic topological characterization of transitivity of indifference is provided. Under very weak assumptions, indifference classes are proved to determine the continuous preference inducing them. Moreover, conditions, under which a given topology is the weakest making a preference continuous, are obtained.     

A topological invariant for competitive markets

This paper summarizes the concepts of global cones and limited arbitrage introduced in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108), and the corresponding results establishing that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and for the compactness of Pareto frontier (announced in Chichilnisky (American Economic Review, 1992, 84, 427–434, and Chichilnisky (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1993, 29, 189–207). Using the same global cones I extend my earlier results to encompass ‘mixed economies’ based on Chichilnisky (CORE Discussion Paper No. 9527, 1995). I introduce a topological invariant for competitive markets which deepens the concept of limited arbitrage. This invariant encodes exact information on the equilibria and on the social diversity of the economy and all its subeconomies, and predicts a failure of effective demand.     

Quantification of preferences in markets

In this paper we quantify agent preferences in a market. In our framework every agent has a utility level associated with each transaction, and we assume that the probability of a feasible market transaction increases with an increase in total utility. It is surprising to observe that this simple behavioral principle induces a usually unique probability measure that can be constructed by a fast numerical algorithm. This unusual combination of a rigorous model and a fast numerical algorithm makes it possible to construct a well-defined set of preferences that implies a set of observed commodity prices.     

A non-parametric approach to smoothing by aggregation over preferences

A distributional dispersion condition on C² monotone preferences, defined by unit normals to indifference surfaces, yields a C⁰ mean demand function when one integrates over such suitably diffuse consumers with convex preferences, regardless of the distribution of their initial endowments. For non-convex preferences, the dispersion condition implies that at any price vector, individual demands are finite sets for almost every agent. A stronger dispersion condition, involving both utility functions and unit normals, yields C⁰ mean demand functions with monotone non-convex preferences.     

Evaluating monetary policy under preferences with zero wealth effect: A Bayesian approach

Both real and monetary macro models have parallely exploited the potential for various preferences in accounting for empirical facts. This paper brings the two literatures together by estimating time non-separable preferences with habit formation in consumption that nests several commonly used preferences. In the absence of wealth effects and external habits, these preferences fail to generate observed inflation inertia and output persistence after a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the data strongly rejects these preferences in favor of preferences with external habits. An alternative solution is to include habit adjusted intermediate wealth effect preferences which are able to simultaneously generate sluggish responses of the variables to a monetary policy shock and fit the data better.     

Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued

Abstract. We consider private good economies with single-plateaued preferences. A solution selects for each preference profile a non-empty set of allocations. An agent strictly prefers a set of allocations to another set of allocations if and only if he strictly prefers any allocation in the first set to any in the second set according to his single-plateaued preference relation. We characterize the class of sequential-allotment solutions by essentially single-valuedness, Pareto-indifference, and coalitional stragety-proofness. These solutions are the Pareto-indifferent extensions of the solutions studied by Barberà et al. 1997. Received: 9 May 2000 / Accepted: 1 May 2001