Efficiency in large markets with firm heterogeneity

Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differences within industries, and its role in resource allocation. In a benchmark monopolistically competitive economy, productivity differences introduce two new margins for allocational inefficiency. When markups vary across firms, laissez faire markets do not select the right distribution of firms and the market-determined quantities are inefficient. We show that these considerations determine when increased competition from market expansion takes the economy closer to the socially efficient allocation of resources. As market size grow large, differences in market power across firms converge and the market allocation approaches the efficient allocation of an economy with constant markups.     

Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.     

Impact of international trade under dual labor markets

A country's unemployment rate can be affected by technology choice and the opening of international trade. This general equilibrium model examines the impact of international trade with the presence of dual labor markets in which manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies with different marginal and fixed costs to maximize profits. In a closed economy, it is shown that an increase in labor market efficiency or a population increase induces manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies and the wage rate in the manufacturing sector increases. With the existence of a continuum of technologies, technology choice is not a source of firm heterogeneity. The opening of international trade leads to an increase in the wage rate in the manufacturing sector and the price of the agricultural good. When countries are identical, international trade always increases national welfare.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

The Impact of Unionization Structures with Heterogeneous Firms and Rent‐Sharing Motives

How are unemployment and output affected if wages are set on the sector level rather than firm level? We take a new look at this question, allowing for heterogeneous firms and rent‐sharing motives. Without these motives, employment and output are lower under sector‐level wage‐setting due to higher wage markups. With rent‐sharing motives, however, firm selection is higher under sector‐level wage‐setting, which tends to increase employment and output, thus counteracting the markup effect. Simulations show that the firm‐selection effect decreases the difference between the two unionization structures substantially but it does not change the signs of the effects on output and employment.     

International Borrowing, Specialization, and Unemployment in a Small Open Economy

The authors show that an increase in international borrowing increases specialization and unemployment in a small open economy that is subject to terms‐of‐trade risks. The economy has a production advantage in the export sector. However, the size of the export sector is limited by the available funds. To insure workers against income fluctuations arising from terms‐of‐trade risks, firms in the export sector offer workers a stable wage rate with the possibility of unemployment. An increase in international borrowing increases specialization in the export sector, which leads to higher unemployment when the terms‐of‐trade shock is bad. A state‐contingent price subsidy can reduce unemployment without inefficiently reducing specialization. The results are robust to the introduction of risk‐averse firms.     

The empirical effects of competition on third‐degree price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage

Since Borenstein ( 1985 ) and Holmes ( 1989 ), a theoretical and empirical literature has emerged that examines the effects of competition on third‐degree price discrimination. Since transaction costs involved in conducting arbitrage are typically unobserved, empirical investigations in this area have largely been restricted to markets such as for air travel where arbitrage is difficult, if not impossible. Using an entirely novel dataset, this paper documents the effect of competition on price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage in the Canadian online sports betting market where prices for Canadian teams are higher than in the world market. I observe how the prices of Canadian teams change in real time in response to the presence of arbitrageurs that establish Canadian sportsbooks’ observable marginal opportunity costs. I exploit the existence of government betting outlets not subject to arbitrage to obtain reduced form counterfactual estimates of the extent to which competition affects price discrimination in the presence of arbitrage. In this new empirical environment, I find results consistent with the airline literature: competition reduces overall price dispersion and markups, but dispersion and markups shrink more for those in the “strong” market than the “weak” market.     

Measuring the gains from trade under monopolistic competition

Abstract .  Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups.     

Markups and exporting behavior of foreign affiliates

This study investigates the effect of exporting on markups for firms in China with a focus on foreign affiliates. Firm markups are first recovered after correcting for both output and input price biases. The analysis reveals that exporters which are affiliates of foreign firms charge, on average, lower markups in their export pricing. The markups are decomposed into price and marginal cost components to show that although exporting increases both price and marginal cost, the price increases are small relative to the increases in marginal cost. Heterogeneous effects of exporting on markups across firms and location are also examined.     

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.     

Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy

We consider a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition. Firms are price takers in the input market and compete à la Cournot in some or all of the product markets and their technologies display constant returns to scale. We show that an increase in the number of firms in a given sector does not always improve welfare. We also provide a characterization in terms of mark-up rates of the sectors for which entry is welfare enhancing. Our results challenge the common idea that mergers with no cost synergy are not desirable for consumers.     

Estimating entrants' productivity when prices are unobserved

Entrant firms are constrained to set lower price–cost markups than incumbents due to idiosyncratic demand shocks faced in the startup phase. Productivity indices suffer from micro-level markup variation and underestimate entrants' productivity, when productivity is measured by nominal sales and expenditures but not quantities. This study makes the first attempt to estimate entrants' productivity by controlling for their markup difference, when prices or quantities are unobserved at the firm-level. The econometric methodology introduces demand side into a structural model of production to account for the price variation. The estimation routine deals with the endogeneity due to unobserved productivity using a control function approach, and retrieves average markups for entrants and incumbents together with a markup-adjusted productivity index. My findings show that entrants set on average lower markups than incumbents in Japanese manufacturing. When productivity is adjusted to markups, entrants are as productive as incumbents, while the standard measures of labor and total factor productivity indicate low productivity for entrant firms.     

A Union-bashing Model of Inflation Targeting

This paper shows that in an open two‐sector economy, centralization of wage setting may be important in determining the employment (and welfare) effects of different monetary targets. By disciplining unions in the sectors open to international trade, exchange rate targeting yields higher employment than inflation targeting when wage‐setting is more centralized in the open sector than in the shielded sector. When wage‐setting centralization is higher in the shielded sector, we show that general price‐level inflation targeting, while better than exchange rate targeting, is inferior to an inflation target that focuses more heavily on shielded sector prices.     

Monetary Policy with Sectoral Trade‐Offs

We formulate a two‐sector New Keynesian economy featuring sectoral heterogeneity along three dimensions: price stickiness, consumption goods durability, and the usage of input materials in production. These factors affect both inter‐sectoral and intra‐sectoral stabilization. We examine the welfare properties of simple rules that react to alternative measures of final goods price inflation. Due to factor demand linkages, the cost of production in one sector is influenced by price‐setting in the other sector. Therefore, measures of aggregate inflation weighting sectoral prices based on their relative stickiness do not allow one to keep track of the effective speeds of sectoral price adjustment.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

Product Market Imperfection and the Two‐sector Harris–Todaro Economy

This paper examines the ramifications of market imperfection for a dual economy in the context of the two‐sector Harris–Todaro model with the agricultural (manufacturing) sector under perfect competition (monopoly). Based on a utility function of constant elasticity of substitution variety, it demonstrates (i) existence of a unique equilibrium at which the consumer price ratio and the producer price ratio are synchronized; (ii) several fundamental properties of the model (crucial to extended research on this subject area); (iii) contrary to an earlier result obtained under an oligopolistic manufacturing sector, trade liberalization for a small economy may be immiserizing.     

非完全竞争市场假设在CGE模型中的引入及应用

通过对部门生产函数及相关参数、系数的改造,将非完全竞争市场条件引入CGE模型,并模拟在完全竞争与不完全竞争两个不同市场结构下国际油价上升对我国经济的影响.结果表明,当油品市场设定为不完全竞争时,面对国际油价上升的冲击,GDP下降的程度大于完全竞争的情况.因此随着油品市场逐渐开放,油品市场的产出增加,可以增强我国石油产业和总体经济应对国际油价上升冲击的能力,应继续推动我国石油产业市场自由化的进程.     

Multi‐product exporters,variable markups and exchange rate fluctuations

In this paper we investigate how firms adjust markups across products in response to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. We estimate markups at the market–product–plant level using detailed panel production and cost data from Mexican manufacturing between 1994 and 2007. Exploiting variation in the real exchange rate in the aftermath of the peso crisis in December 1994, we provide robust empirical evidence that plants increase their markups and producer prices in response to a real depreciation and that this increase is greater for products with higher productivity. Thus, we provide direct evidence for the theoretical mechanism of variable markup response behind incomplete and heterogeneous exchange rate pass‐through on producer prices. Our empirical methodology allows us to decompose the producer price response to exchange rate shocks into a markup and a marginal cost component using our markup estimates. Using these estimates, we establish that marginal cost at the product–plant level increases more in response to real exchange rate depreciation if the plant has higher share of imported inputs.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

RE‐EXAMINATION OF THE GROWTH‐ENHANCING BUBBLE

We investigate the growth and welfare effects of the bubble that arise on equities on newly created firms by R&D activities. Considering an economy where the input to the R&D sector is the final goods financed by the savings of the household sector, we show that such a bubble has a growth‐enhancing effect under the condition opposite to the previous literature. We also explore the characteristics of the steady state equilibrium with the bubble and demonstrate that there can be dual bubbly equilibria, one of which is unstable and the other stable, and that the growth and welfare effects of an unexpected permanent change in the initial bubble are very different depending on which equilibrium the economy stays in.